When did the Roman Empire fall (your thoughts)?

[starman2012]

Being an infantryman in the Late Empire didn't have the attraction it once did during the principate. The pay was low, the danger greater, and the prospect for loot was rare.

I don't think there was an acute shortage of infantry from mid to late third century, when things were probably as bad or worse.

[starman2012]

I don't see why Aetius hiring Huns 'evidently' means the regular forces no longer amounted to much. For one, Aetius had a special relation with the Huns and seems to have used this to aquire a personal army (which gave him political power).

IMO it says much about the paucity of regular Roman troops that Huns were necessary not only to get Aetius back in power after his defeat in 432 but to deal with burgundians and visigoths later.

But even if not, Germanic forces and other non-Roman troops had been hired even during the time of Roman conquests. Ceasar used Germans in Gaul and in Britain - surely no sign that his legions did no longer 'amount to much'?!

The difference is that, in the good old days, foreign units augmented Roman strength, whereas in the fifth century they seem to have largely replaced it.

Constantine hired tens of thousands of barbarians in his civil war against Licinius - such troops were hired to get numbers, they do not tell us anything about the quality of the Roman forces.

Elton argued that the quality remained OK but "not enough soldiers" was part of the problem.

[ValentinianVictrix]

In the civil war between Constantius II and Magnentius, AD351-353, sources claim that the number of troops raised by both sides amounted to at least two hundred and fifty thousand. At the battle of Mursa Major the casualties numbered over 50,000, a mix of both Roman and 'barbarian' as Magnentius had been hiring 'barbarians' to aid him. Although this cviil war did have a huge impact on Gaul, it lead to the Allemanni over-running it at one stage, Julian, at Constantius' behest, restored Gaul to full Roman control. within just a year of becoming sole emperor Julian was able to raise an army of at least 60,000 for his invasion of Sasanid Persia. Even though that invsion ended in disaster, by 376AD Valens was able to raise another invasion force, possibly even larger than Julian's as Valens had been hiring Goth's in large numbers, the force could have been as large as 90,000 according to one historian.

What this shows is that despite very damaging set-backs the Romans usually bounced back and could raise large forces if needed. However, after Adrianopolis this appears to have changed, something happened to prevent the Romans raising large armies without having to resort to hiring large numbers of 'barbarians'. It's not as if the Battle of Adrianopolis was a complete disaster. Yes, two thirds of Valens army was lost, but that would only have amounted to something like 16,000 men at the most, and the Western army was largely intact. No, there must have been another factor and if we could only identify what that factor was then we could start to see waht actually casused the Western Empire to collapse.

[Marja]

Sorry but which sources?

250,000+ on on each side sounds about right for total army strength including garrison units, maybe high because many units were below strength, but it's extremely high for field army strength. 50,000 casualties would represent the complete destruction of at least two, probably three, field armies, but it might be the cumulative total for the entire war.

[Theodosius the Great]

A law of 409 forbidding pagans to serve in the army must have been intended to address such concerns, hence make service more appealing to christians.

Interesting. Are you sure about the year? I could only find a reference to a law from 435 that bans pagans. Maybe the law was simply reiterated.

Dunno if it worked well...

Actually, the law may indicate that the army was already majority Christian by the early 5th century. Otherwise it wouldn't seem wise to enforce such a law.

~Theo

[ValentinianVictrix]

Sorry but which sources?

250,000+ on on each side sounds about right for total army strength including garrison units, maybe high because many units were below strength, but it's extremely high for field army strength. 50,000 casualties would represent the complete destruction of at least two, probably three, field armies, but it might be the cumulative total for the entire war.

The 250,000 is based on figures given by one source just for the combined troops on both sides at that particular battle. It was probably one of the largest civil war battles ever fought and its repercussions were felt long afterwards, possibly the first identifiable cause for the fall of the western half of the Empire. Sources for the battle are rather scant, Julian discusses it, as does Zosimus, Sozomen, Socrates Scolasticus and Zonarius, Zonarius gives the 50,000+ casualty figure.

[starman2012]

Actually, the law may indicate that the army was already majority Christian by the early 5th century. Otherwise it wouldn't seem wise to enforce such a law.

Of course. But while we can assume it was christian, there wasn't much of it...

[starman2012]

What this shows is that despite very damaging set-backs the Romans usually bounced back and could raise large forces if needed.

Right, this had been going on for centuries, at least since the time of Hannibal and continuing into the third century and, as you note, the fourth.

However, after Adrianopolis this appears to have changed, something happened to prevent the Romans raising large armies without having to resort to hiring large numbers of 'barbarians'. It's not as if the Battle of Adrianopolis was a complete disaster. Yes, two thirds of Valens army was lost, but that would only have amounted to something like 16,000 men at the most, and the Western army was largely intact. No, there must have been another factor and if we could only identify what that factor was then we could start to see waht actually casused the Western Empire to collapse.

Exactly, and there's good evidence that citizens just didn't want to serve anymore. Without much backing from its own men, the western Empire (the one under greatest stress) just didn't have the old resilience anymore.

[Marja]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't Theodosius divide military command in the East among five magistri militum, while concentrating it in the west under the magister utriusque militiae Stilicho?

Why would he adopt such different policies in east and west? Why would he concentrate military command under one person, since it gave even more opportunity to would-be-imitators of Merobaudes and Arbogastes?

[Robert Vermaat]

IMO it says much about the paucity of regular Roman troops that Huns were necessary not only to get Aetius back in power after his defeat in 432 but to deal with burgundians and visigoths later.

Not at all. Ceasar and Pompey raised their own legions, Aetius could not do that, but he could hire Huns. Or Goths or whatever. The reason - political power - is the same. It tells us nothing about the strenght of the Roman units.

The difference is that, in the good old days, foreign units augmented Roman strength, whereas in the fifth century they seem to have largely replaced it.

Now you're argumenting in circles. You've already determined for yourself that the fifth century only knew weak Roman forces, so your interpretation of the mercenaries is that they were hired "evidently because the regular forces no longer amounted to much". As I made clear in my example of Ceasar, the hiring of mercenaries tells us nothing in theory of the strength of an army.

Elton argued that the quality remained OK but "not enough soldiers" was part of the problem.

Why do you think Ceasar or Contsantine, or any Roman emperor really, needed mercenaries - to get extra soldiers! But like I said: that, in itself, does not tell us anything about the Roman units.

[Robert Vermaat]

What this shows is that despite very damaging set-backs the Romans usually bounced back and could raise large forces if needed. However, after Adrianopolis this appears to have changed, something happened to prevent the Romans raising large armies without having to resort to hiring large numbers of 'barbarians'.

My guess would be the changed policy of avoiding pitched battles.

[Robert Vermaat]

Why would he adopt such different policies in east and west? Why would he concentrate military command under one person, since it gave even more opportunity to would-be-imitators of Merobaudes and Arbogastes?

I think Stilicho may have had more to do with that than Theodosius. But if not, Theodosius may have had a problem with trusting his commanders: those in the East had to be balanced against each other (no one too strong). In the West he just defeated a usurper, and apparently he could trust just one man, so he chose Stilicho?

[starman2012]

Now you're argumenting

I take it English isn't your first language. Arguing.

[starman2012]

No, there must have been another factor and if we could only identify what that factor was

Care to hazard a guess?

[sonic]

It's not as if the Battle of Adrianopolis was a complete disaster. Yes, two thirds of Valens army was lost, but that would only have amounted to something like 16,000 men at the most, and the Western army was largely intact. No, there must have been another factor and if we could only identify what that factor was then we could start to see waht actually casused the Western Empire to collapse.

For an unknown reason everybody remembers the disaster that was the Battle of Adrianople as the 'last major defeat of the Roman army'.

After Adrianople there were two major defeats for the Western army. In 388 Theodosius defeated the West in a hard-fought civil war at the Battle of the Save, during the course of which large numbers of Western troops were lost. As if that wasn't enough, in 394 there was another civil war during which even more Western troops were killed at the Battle of the Frigidus. These two major defeats for the West was the major cause of the West's manpower shortages.