Legion reinforcements

[Nathan Ross]

Nathan,
When Sabinus' & Cotta's force of 15 cohorts was destroyed it is my opinion that the 5 cohorts aside from those of Legio XIV were probably detachments from one or two of the other legions. Do you agree?

I remember this thread, but sadly the older one I linked to in it seems to have evaporated! We still don't know the origin of the mysterious extra cohorts with Legion XIV (or whatever they were called) - I think the most interesting suggestion is that they were non-citizen troops raised as cohorts rather than legions, like the 22 cohorts raised in Transalpine Gaul at around the same time. The unfortunate legion themselves had been under arms for over a year and were able to conduct themselves effectively on the battlefield, so there's no particulat reason to assume that they needed stiffening with veterans from elsewhere.

Reinforcing a legion, while perhaps useful during a campaign, would create an administrative nightmare, especially if no system was in place to swiftly replace the outgoing veterans.

Absolutely! And notice that during the 47 mutiny Caesar offers to disband the entire tenth legion - he later went back on it, but disbanding a legion whose members had been recruited at different times would indeed be a nightmare: handing out rewards and land grants to some of them, while trying to allocate others to different legions depending on time served, and so on... I think this demonstrates that all the men of the tenth had served for the same period, and all of them had indeed been recruited at the same time.

[Nathan Ross]

We have discussed a great deal about what a transition that the Late Republic was for the Roman army: no longer a militia, not yet a fully professional force.

It seems to me that the legions of the civil wars were effectively mercenaries, paid directly by their commanders from their own pockets (or togas, or whatever...). This made them very loyal, of course, as these commanders were the only men who would honour the various extravagant promises made to ensure service: if they won, the commander could pay them out of state funds or by raiding temple treasuries, but if they lost they got nothing! This is sometimes forgotten, perhaps, and we assume that the simple-hearted soldiery followed Caesar so loyally due to a natural regard for his charisma and authority, rather than his very big money-box!

Aristocrats like Appian naturally had little sympathy with the rights of soldiers, and he presents their demands as entirely venal, but it's interesting that the man Caesar sent to negotiate with the soldiers, Gaius Sallustius, was a politican and legal orator (Praetor, in fact): the troops chucked rocks at Sallust, but presumably he was intended to reassure them of their rights and remind them of their responsibilities both as soldiers and as Roman citizens. They had made a contract with Caesar and wanted it to be honoured.

[D B Campbell]

... but sadly the older one I linked to in it seems to have evaporated!

No, it's still here.

[JeffF]

Nathan,
I don't agree that the 5 extra cohorts were non legion troops. Caesar several times speaks of forces of 12 cohorts e.g. Publius Crassus' force sent to Aquitania & the guard force on the Rhine bridge yet o one seems to feel the need to explain the extra 2 cohorts with a non legion origin. In book VIII para 38 Caesar even made another detachment of 15 cohorts under Marcus Antonius, in para 24 a force of 25 cohorts again no non legion theories of the 5 extra cohorts of the forces. Obviously Caesar assigned he number of cohorts to a force based on the mision requirements and so logically Sabinus'/Cotta's 15 cohorts must also be legion units.

In book VII after the mention of a draft of recruits fom Italy, in para 60 Labienus divides a legion in 2, one force of 5 cohorts he judged least steady for action, the other five he sends on a diverion. If these troopswere all raised at the same time in one intake here should be no significant difference in readiness.

Caesar also also distinguishes between the forces of the province and the supplemental levy from Italy (book VII para 7). On the whole it's enough evidence in my opinion for a periodic draft of replacements, a system that breaks down only when all recruits are used to raise new legions.

Since I probably can't convince you that the extra 5 cohorts of the destroyed force were legion units, in book VI para 44 Caesar admits to a loss of 2 cohorts. In your view would owning legion(s) reform these cohorts by weakening the remaining cohorts or would they simply campaign on with fewer cohorts?

[Nathan Ross]

I don't agree that the 5 extra cohorts were non legion troops.

You may very well be right. We don't (and probably won't) know for sure though, so best guesses and speculation is all we have..

On the whole it's enough evidence in my opinion for a periodic draft of replacements

OK! It seems to me they weren't, but we'll have to agree to differ on that.

[starman2012]

I know I'm a little late on this but I strongly agree with your statement about them coming from the same region to avoid ethnic tensions.

The potential downside is that this might encourage separatism when the whole point of conquest was political unification.

Romans felt that the Gauls (and many others) were inferior and I would not doubt that there would be conflict within the legion putting it on the brink of mutiny.

Down to the third century, it is thought that barbarians recruited into the army, such as those captured by Timesitheus in the balkans, were used to fill gaps in existing Roman units instead of forming their own.

[JeffF]

Goldsworthy book Punic Wars references several times bodies of recruits used to bring legions up to strength and sometimes to make legions over strength. Twice Caesar made mention of levies of 22 cohorts, the first was a levy raised to defend Transalpine Gaul, the second raised in Cisalpine Gaul. Some historians believe the first group eventually became Legio V Alaude and some add Legio Vi. Caesar's references to supplemental levies thru his book, which in my opinion were used to strengthen existing legions would therefore not be without precedent. Part of the first group is 22 cohorts and in my opinion most or all of the second may also have been used as replacements for legion losses. Goldsworthy's Caesar p.473 states that only men who served their full term were discharged indicating that there was an administrative system to track soldiers who served the traditional 16 year maximum service and therefore legions were not necessarily discharged en masse.

Until the 20th century military losses in the vast majority were due to disease. Without a steady stream of replacements units would not even be maintained at below strength levels. Even If we assume legion discipline was superior in field sanitation to that of all the armies that followed even they suffered significant losses due to medical reasons. The strength report of a milliaria cohort while in garrison in Britain with a high percentage of men in hospital is a good indication of this. For units on campaign as Caesars were in the Gallic Wars losses would have been significantly higher and I'm my opinion the strength of two legions totaling 7000 not only indicates medical and battle losses but also included replacements received. Throughout military history units were almost never at their theoretical full strength levels. Caesar even states Legio XII was never at full strength even when first formed. The percentages of medical losses that we have information on from 18th & 19th century armies from Napoleonic to American Civil War are probably applicable to the legions and even if we assume smaller percentages lost to disease (a big if) legions would dwindle to nothing in a few years of active campaigning without replacements. I think Legio VI dwindling to 1000 men by the time Caesar took it to Alexandria indicates not only battle and medical losses but also a breakdown in the use of replacement cohorts most likely because all the available manpower had been used by both sides to rase new legions.

[Frank]

I also like the idea, that the romans in late republic did not replenish legions with recruits, because they did not like to mess up the retirement process.

On the other hand just the normal mortality rate without battles would lead to losses of about 30-40% in 16 years, if we compare it to later centuries of comparable medical care. I also wonder, how the legion of Augustus could evolve into a huge bureaucracy in a few decades, if there was nothing comparable in the late republican legion. A feasible solution would have been, to pool veterans and recruits in different cohorts of a legion, which was obviously the rule in Vegetius times.

However, the sources show clearly, that some legions were tremendously understrength. Perhaps it was a mix of reasons and exceptions prove the rule? :?