Ancient Logistics and ancient warfare

[Paralus]

You keep making the same mistake of arguing that Herodot’s numbers ARE wrong as if my position is that they ARE right. No, our HUGE difference is that I claim that they MAY be right whereas you that ?. I have theories of my own which I personally hold as more or less probable but I am very reluctant to disregard Herodot as a fairytale just because some numbers “sound” inflated/ridiculous etc to some. Scholars often work with minimums and maximums, and even these are often self-accepted as personal estimations. In my opinion, Herodot’s numbers of Xerxes’ land army and fleet are my maximum, not my minimum. And since I am baffled as to your position.. please, tell me clearly where you stand as regards Herodot's numbers on the Persian fleet at th start of the campaign and at Salamis.

I do believe Herodoyus'

Sybota (1.49.1):

As soon as the signals were raised on either side, they joined battle. The fighting was of a somewhat old fashioned kind since they were still behindhand in naval matters, both sides having a large number of hoplites aboard their ships, together with archers and javelin throwers.

Clearly the old way was to deck the trireme and fight using infantry. This likey explains the “heavier” or “larger” Phoenician triremes: these were loaded with infantry whereas we hear only of ramming by the Greeks at Salamis. The diekplous, as practised by the Phoenicians at the time of Salamis, was designed to catch up enemy ships (grappling hooks, et al) and bring the on-board infantry to bear. This is clearly what Cimon did when he sailed east: decked his ships and loaded them with hoplites (Plut.Cim.12.2). By 450 the Athenians seem to have changed tactics for Diodorus (12.3.3) tells us that they “sank” many enemy ships. Here is possibly the classic diekplous of driving through, turning and ramming rather than catching?

Yes and no. It was indeed an older mode of sea-fighting to have more hoplites on board based more on boarding tactics, but that doesn't mean that there was no ramming on the Persian side during the 2nd Persian War. Where did you find this information on the “Phoenician diecplous”? I think that you use the word “clear” very freely. At Lade, Herodot reports that many ships of the Chians were damaged. This points to ramming tactics being implemented by the Imperial fleet too. At Salamis, we also see action that resembles ramming among the Imperials in both Herodot and Aeschylus. Having more hoplites on board did not mean that there was only boarding to be employed and do not forget that, as I wrote in a former post, it is the Greek ships that are described to be heavier... What seems to be described in the accounts is a mix of ramming and boarding tactics on both sides, as was deemed most effective by the captain of each trireme. Herodot also describes something that might be a periplous, an even more complex maneuver to be employed by the Greeks. And of course we cannot say how common were tactics like the diekplous or the periplous. To ram you do not have to employ any of the above. Maybe the imperials used less ramming, the Greek more. Fact is that ramming tactics require higher expertise than boarding tactics, and yet one could easily maintain that boarding should have been more effective than ramming in what was supposed to have been very confined space.

Again, I’d love to see the source material that describes the constant warring of the Greeks at sea. It matters little that your “marines” are the most experienced belligerents in the Mediterranean if you cannot sail the ships upon which they fight. Seamanship is paramount: pilots, rowers and captains must all know what they are doing.

You did not understand what I wrote. Seamanship is paramount BUT :
Experience and training in trireme fighting is the seamanship needed here. Take the best captain and crew of any merchant ship and give them charge of a warship… It is a completely different thing. Experience in trireme fighting does not only have to do with the “marines”. It also has to do with the rowmen, the sailors, the captains and the generals. If I have 20,000 rowmen that are experienced in trireme fighting, I will have the upper hand against someone whose rowers have less such experience. If my captains have more experience in trireme fighting, they will have the upper hand. If my generals have better tactical knowledge and experience in trireme fighting…. Well I hope that you get my meaning now. It is one thing to have HUGE experience in merchant sailing and another to have that experience in sea combat. And I am sure you know that triremes were combat vessels, they were not used for trade or casual traveling.

And of course I do not say that the Phoenicians or the Ionians, the Cypriots etc were incompetent or something. I simply stated that in my opinion it is very possible for the sources to be right regarding the mainland Greeks' relative superiority. Being better, of course does not mean that the opponent is not good...

What source material? That the hundreds of Greek independent states warred against each other? That they fought in sea too since maybe half of them were island or maritime states with sea trade interests?

That is a most remarkable assertion regarding the Phoenicians. “Non-Aegean” and whose wars were “mainly land-bound”!? This is one of the most famous of seafaring peoples of the ancient world and always the core of any “royal fleet”. To imply that they were somehow inexperienced compared to the Greeks at this time is incredible to me. Clearly the Greeks thought not. Aeschylus (Persae, 341 ff) describes 207 of the Persian ships as “arrogant in speed”. These are almost certainly Phoenician. At Artemesium the Greeks sought to test the Phoenician’s tactics – including the diekplous which they were clearly aware of and concerned about. Having done so, Themistocles was in no mood for a repeat and so pushed for the confines of Salamis to remove the luxury of space.

There is nothing remarkable about this assertion. Sea fights are fought when land fights cannot be fought or when they are not enough. There are very few islands along the Phoenician coast, certainly very few inhabited places that would be fought over. The city of Tyre was one and even in its case, the lands it ruled over were on the mainland, Sea lanes were straightforward, along a single coast and into the open sea. You just cannot compare the opportunities and necessities for sea fights in that area with that in the Aegean which is a unique peculiarity in the Mediterranean and not only. Sea faring, again I will say, has nothing to do with trireme fighting. And “clearly”, since you clearly like the use of this word, the Greeks believed so too and the sources also tell us so (of course the Greek sources). Your comment about ships which are “arrogant in speed” and for some reason “almost certainly Phoenician” I do not understand. How can something like that indicate that the Phoenicians were or were regarded as equal to the Greeks in trireme fight? At Lade, the Persian fleet was supposedly (Herodot) very alarmed for having to fight against the 350 Ionian triremes with only 600 ships. Yep, might be a boastful lie… the thing is that our (Greek) sources mainly present the mainland Greeks better at sea fight than the Ionians and the Ionians better than any other non-Greek. We may argue about that, but this is what the sources say. We also have to somehow account for the Persian defeat… Even if no source is taken into account, inferiority in trireme fighting would be a very valid guess as to why a smaller fleet beat a larger one. What is this about the diekplous and the Phoenicians in your posts? I do not get it. Have you read in any sources that the Phoenicians performed the diekplous (which is a ramming tactic when used as a tactical term) whereas the Greeks did not? What is that about the Greeks being terrified at the prospects of facing the Phoenicians because of this diekplous and so pushing into space where the Phoenicians would not use this tactic?[/quote]

[Paralus]

Double post.

[Paralus]

Might have to reply piecemeal as that other Greek distraction seems to be invading my time - the Olympics.

You keep making the same mistake of arguing that Herodot’s numbers ARE wrong as if my position is that they ARE right. No, our HUGE difference is that I claim that they MAY be right whereas you that ?. I have theories of my own which I personally hold as more or less probable but I am very reluctant to disregard Herodot as a fairytale just because some numbers “sound” inflated/ridiculous etc to some. Scholars often work with minimums and maximums, and even these are often self-accepted as personal estimations. In my opinion, Herodot’s numbers of Xerxes’ land army and fleet are my maximum, not my minimum.

I do believe Herodotus' numbers are wrong and, as such, cannot be considered as a practical "maximum".

Regarding the actual number of ships taking part on the Persian side, Herodot does not provide a number but says that in his opinion they should be no less than 1,200, not because of any reinforcements from Asia but because of the further ships that joined him from Europe.

That is incorrect. Herodutus provides chapter(s) and verse on the trireme fleet. Beginning at 7.89 and concluding at 7.100. At 7.89.1 he makes the clear statement:

The number of the triremes was twelve hundred and seven

Not satisfied with having driven through his army nation by nation (one can only imagine how long that process took on the figures supplied), Xerxes did the same with the fleet (7.100.2-3):

After he had done this, the ships were drawn down and launched into the sea. Xerxes alighted from his chariot into a Sidonian ship and sat under a golden canopy while he was carried past the prows of the ships, questioning the men in the same way as the army and having the answers written down. The captains put out and anchored in line four hundred feet from the shore, with their prows turned landward and the marines armed for war; Xerxes viewed them by passing between the prows and the land.

If one allows a very conservative 15 metres to be occupied by each trireme (3.5 metres odd in beam and allowance for oars and station keeping without fouling due to breezes), Xerxes has sailed some 18 kilometres down the coast to do this.

And since I am baffled as to your position.. please, tell me clearly where you stand as regards Herodot's numbers on the Persian fleet at th start of the campaign and at Salamis.

My view is neatly summed up by Peirre Briant - possibly the Achaeminid scholar - in the attachment below (From Cyrus to Alexander, p 527). A snippett:

For a long time, Herodotus' statistics were adjudged unacceptable, if only for purely logistical reasons [...] Other ancient authors' statements seem no more credible: from 700,000 (Isocrates) to 3,000,000 (Simonides). All share a GReek perspectivewhen they calculate the armies of Darius III; their motive is to exaggerate the glory of the Greek warriors who defeated them

Everyone agrees with this assessment...

[attachment=4737]Briant015_2012-07-29.jpg[/attachment]


Clearly (yes I like the word ) he cannot be correct in that last statement for you do not agree with such an assessment. To do a Diodorus on your position and summarise tightly...

• That it might be possible the Persian Empire could conscript 2,617,610 infantry, cavalry, archers, etc, Herodotus is not fantasising in saying that it did.
  
• The Empire might possibly levy 1,200 triremes (plus 3,000 transports) Herodotus is likely correct in that it did
  
• That the Persians had this number of triremes was not, in the end, telling because the Greeks were much better at "trireme fighting".
  

And, if all that is correct, then I must abandon my argument for there is no way to rationally argue against it. Xerxes failed in an invasion that was, on Herodotus' figures (your "maximum"), far larger than D-Day.

On other matter (diekplous, etc) I'll get back to it when time permits.

[Macedon]

That is incorrect. Herodutus provides chapter(s) and verse on the trireme fleet. Beginning at 7.89 and concluding at 7.100. At 7.89.1 he makes the clear statement:

The number of the triremes was twelve hundred and seven

No Michael, that number was the number of triremes that he started the expedition with. The comment was about the triremes he fought with at Salamis. From the 1207 triremes mentioned by Herodot, some 600-650 were somehow damaged or destroyed. Plus the 120 Graeco-thracian and island ships are beyond that number. So, in all, Herodot mentions 1327 triremes sailing to Thessaly. From there on, no more info is provided in absolute numbers on ships arriving as any kind of reinforcement. About Salamis, he just says that the ships should not be less than those at the beginning.

Not satisfied with having driven through his army nation by nation (one can only imagine how long that process took on the figures supplied), Xerxes did the same with the fleet (7.100.2-3):

After he had done this, the ships were drawn down and launched into the sea. Xerxes alighted from his chariot into a Sidonian ship and sat under a golden canopy while he was carried past the prows of the ships, questioning the men in the same way as the army and having the answers written down. The captains put out and anchored in line four hundred feet from the shore, with their prows turned landward and the marines armed for war; Xerxes viewed them by passing between the prows and the land.

If one allows a very conservative 15 metres to be occupied by each trireme (3.5 metres odd in beam and allowance for oars and station keeping without fouling due to breezes), Xerxes has sailed some 18 kilometres down the coast to do this.

And? Why would this be problematic?

I do believe Herodotus' numbers are wrong and, as such, cannot be considered as a practical "maximum". My view is neatly summed up by Peirre Briant - possibly the Achaeminid scholar - in the attachment below (From Cyrus to Alexander, p 527). A snippett:

[quote]For a long time, Herodotus' statistics were adjudged unacceptable, if only for purely logistical reasons [...] Other ancient authors' statements seem no more credible: from 700,000 (Isocrates) to 3,000,000 (Simonides). All share a GReek perspectivewhen they calculate the armies of Darius III; their motive is to exaggerate the glory of the Greek warriors who defeated them

Everyone agrees with this assessment...

I disagree. The main argument still is "the numbers are incredibly high because they are just too high...". Of course there are scholars who support various opinions and vastly different numbers themselves. I especially dislike the "glorifying Greeks" argument. It is very problematic and is only used to mask inability of otherwise check numbers. For some reasons, such numbers were not reported to glorify Greeks fighting against Romans, Thracians, Illyrians, Indians etc. For some reason, even the Carthaginian armies, who are also "deemed" very inflated are not that high. So, if 300,000 Carthaginians in Sicily was a "gross" attempt to glorify the Greek war against them, then why were the millions of Persians necessary? Why not saying 500,000 and be done with, a most glorious victory as well. If there is anyone you should blame for inflating the Persian numbers this someone would be the Persians themselves. Herodot writes of the numbers he learned. And these he learned from Persian sources. He is especially careful and judgmental. He all the time speaks of the problems such an army (land forces) would come before, but these are the numbers he was given. He even gives the numbering method that the Persians supposedly used to further enhance this questioning of the numbers of the land forces, as it was clearly below standards. Notice, here that such number repeatedly crop up when Persian campaigns of importance are reported by any Greek and not only directed against Greeks. This does not happen with any other people. His account of Lade is actually very informative as to how he operated. He questioned people from all Ionian sides (he doers not say who...maybe old men, maybe archives, maybe heard stories), he reports that they differ and everyone blames the other and then speaks of a stele that existed at that time as further evidence. Estimates are just estimates. And most are very wild and very simplistically supported in order to make the Persian defeat sound not only logical but even predestined, totally disregarding the sources. What is even more silly is stating that the sources are totally unreliable, trying to overglorify the Greek victory and then use them as "proof" for other assertions.

Anyways... I do of course know of these positions and arguments of course and I do know that there are many skeptics out there (me one of them) and many who deem all sources as unreliable and come up with their own theories. No problem.

Clearly (yes I like the word ) he cannot be correct in that last statement for you do not agree with such an assessment. To do a Diodorus on your position and summarise tightly...

• That it might be possible the Persian Empire could conscript 2,617,610 infantry, cavalry, archers, etc, Herodotus is not fantasising in saying that it did.
  
• The Empire might possibly levy 1,200 triremes (plus 3,000 transports) Herodotus is likely correct in that it did
  
• That the Persians had this number of triremes was not, in the end, telling because the Greeks were much better at "trireme fighting".
  

And, if all that is correct, then I must abandon my argument for there is no way to rationally argue against it. Xerxes failed in an invasion that was, on Herodotus' figures (your "maximum"), far larger than D-Day.

On other matter (diekplous, etc) I'll get back to it when time permits.

Clearly...

Yes, this summarizes my opinion. I choose to read the word "rationally" as not implying that my position is irrational, I generally deem myself as a (sometimes overly) rational person, which is the exact reason why I do not a priori accept these criticisms against Herodot and other ancient authors.

My personal estimates are that the land-forces account is inflated and Herodot hints at it all the time, although these were the numbers he found and therefore used. Personally, I would argue in favor of a force more around a million troops and about 500,000 non-combatants, maybe even a bit less (some 20%). I do not doubt the numbers given as to the Persian navy and personally think that at Salamis, they would have about 1,000 ships ready for battle (some 20% less than the initial 1,200). Of course less would have taken part in the actual battle.

[Macedon]

Sure, I don't see any reason not to. But to go on discussing it, we must understand the microeconomics situation at the time. Reason why is due to how food would be priced, e.g. in a Capitalist economy prices conform to the laws of supply and demand, in a monopoly the business is free to set prices, and in a socialized economy the government sets the price.

That question was directed at Michael regarding his comment on the inflation of food prices during Alexamder's invasion in the Empire. I think it is of no real interest regarding the campaign of Xerxes, since first and foremost, there is no evidence I know of about that issue.

I don't know, but perhaps you can expand on why. Government was divided based on satraps, ergo it was more decentralized where decisions to take war would lag to its implementation. Sure they had import taxes but the revenue reaped from it depends on the volume of trade/exports. On the additional royal granaries, it simply required labor, which was immobile at the time.

Yes.. this was also a question directed at Michael. Yet, the satrapies system would actually add to the speed the Empire would act or react in a time of war. The satraps' obligations were clear and among these were also the support with a certain number of troops that they would send to the mustering centers when ordered to. Sure, other guidelines and orders would have been issued for the preparation of the campaign, but still, they would have enough time to prepare. As for the taxes, yes, of course this would have been the case of import taxes. This would have been considerable in trade centers along the coast or inland. Produce taxation and tributes were the number one means of collecting supplies. Alexander is attested by Arrian to have yearly reaped a tribute of 100 horses, 500 beasts of burden and 30,000 sheep from the Uxians alone, a mountain tribe near Persis.

Hence an example of a feigned retreat by the Greeks. His incompetence with this decision depends on the intel he had leading to pursue them. Or it was a psychological reason, follow up any perceived success.

Herodot does not describe it as a fake retreat but as a sincere effort to reach more advantageous ground. The thing is that the attack was uncoordinated (always according to the sources) and removed any advantage the Persians might have had. He may have believed that the Greeks were set on escaping, that they would not fight in phalanx and instead march on to wherever they were going. It was night when the reports came, surely Mardonius did not have much intel. He took a risk.

Yes, but how would the garrisons deal with the crews of small fleets?

Deal with them as they were doing what? Anyways, raids of small fleets were only very localized, for the ships would have been very vulnerable if the troops made it far inland. Sometimes, crews fought as psiloi and of course would have been used to carry some loot, but they were no fighting force to reckon with. When the ships were guarded in secure ports or camps, parties of rowmen would often be sent for provision acquisition (and often suffered from enemy attacks).

Why would it be Athens? Surely it had a huge political and cultural significance in the Greek world, but the same could be said of Sparta due to its superior army or Corinth for its shipping and logistical considerations.

What do you mean here? Because it was! After Boeotia, Xerxes came to Attica, where Athens lies. There he took the city and it was there where the battle of Salamis was fought. He didn't reach Peloponnesus.

Examples are Leuctra, Gaugamela, Issus, and even in Philip's campaigns. This is all explained by Dodge.

Battlefield tactics are very complex. This is a kind of very generalized view - "reinforcing" the part of the battle-line (whatever that might mean in terms of tactics) you plan to rest your hopes of offensive success - one that generally is true in attacks of all eras. Yet, alone, this "doctrine" entails a number of tactics and terminology issues and the real tactical question is in what manner(s) (out of many possible options) will you enact this "reinforcement". Tell me, if you like, which pages of Dodge's work (Alexander?) you would like me to review, what your exact position is as well as how you think that in these battles you mentioned this doctrine was implemented, although I think that it might be out of the scope of the OP.

[Jugibar]

Macedon busy as ever now so no time to reply at the moment. However, could you give a general synopsis of Alexander's Balkan campaigns from your point of view?

[Macedon]

Macedon busy as ever now so no time to reply at the moment. However, could you give a general synopsis of Alexander's Balkan campaigns from your point of view?

From what point of view? Logistics?

[Paralus]

No Michael, that number was the number of triremes that he started the expedition with. The comment was about the triremes he fought with at Salamis. From the 1207 triremes mentioned by Herodot, some 600-650 were somehow damaged or destroyed. Plus the 120 Graeco-thracian and island ships are beyond that number.

The Islanders' ships are in fact included in the 1,207. Herodotus notes them after listing the Ionians (7.95.1):

The islanders provided seventeen ships and were armed like Greeks; they were also of Pelasgian stock, which was later called Ionian for the same reason as were the Ionians of the twelve cities,1 who came from Athens

They are only 17 are of little consequence though. I'm not so sure of 120 ships from Thrace - be they from Greek towns or not. Ditto the possibility of Boeotian ships. The first I can recall of any "Boeotian" ships would be those planned by Epaminondas when the Thebans had decided they'd enough of Athens' vacillating.

Ships at Salamis? I'd suggest a figure near to 600 at the start and nowhere near the losses described by Herodotus. If, as you say, Herodotus betrays consternation at the numbers he received ("Herodot gave the arguments against such numbers himself"), then I do see the fortunate halving of the original number by storms as I described: a method of rendering the concerning believable. If you believe I fail to understand that you are not arguing Herodotus as being correct then you fail to understand me. Herodotus reports those figures relayed to him. An exact date for composition is beyond us but he certainly was still writing in 429. The likelihood is that he wrote 440-42?. In any case, the information is now two generations or so old. Like anglers' tales, the fish probably grew. Still, he can only report the numbers told to him and it is those that I disagree with.

I stress that I believe that Themistocles wanted the fight in the confines of Salamis to deny the Persian fleet (particularly the Sidonians and other Phoenicians) room to maneuver. The Greeks wanted to find out about the Persian fleet's ("test") tactics (esp diekplous) at Artemesium. They did and, in one encounter, were treated as Phormio would later treat the Corinthians in the Corinthian Gulf during the Peloponnesian War. Themistocles was not about to fight in open waters again. The Athenians would later regale the Spartans (and their allies) with his tactical stroke of persuasion later in the debate before war in 432/1.

Anyways... I do of course know of these positions and arguments of course and I do know that there are many skeptics out there (me one of them) and many who deem all sources as unreliable and come up with their own theories. No problem.

I was going to ask the question as to why you felt the need to reduce the numbers but I see you class yourself as one of "the sceptics". Therefore we agree that the numbers given Herodotus need to be rationalised. The only difference is by how far. On that, as we have, for the very great part, only Iranian troops doing the fighting (and serving as marines), I think we can dismiss the polyglot hoards of the army list as having played a part in the invasion. The fact that the Greeks were not ever flanked at Plataea indicates that the Persians did not seriously outnumber them (unless, for some odd reason, they were deployed to great depth and threw away the advantage).

On a related matter, Mycalae. Herodotus reports that, after Salamis, the fleet under Leutychides, wintered at Aegina where it numbered 110 ships. The fleet being such a size is exactly what one would expect given losses at Artemesium and Salamis and, far more so, the fact that Athens (and others) needed her men for Plataea. Thus with Athens removing many crews to contribute to the land effort, the fleet is reduced. This fleet then sails, in the spring, to what becomes the battle of Mycalae. This armament then fights and defeats 60,000 "Persians".

Now, it is said the battle took place the same day as Plataea. This armament cannot have been army and navy (as the hoplite muster was to gather for the decisive showdown in Boeotia). There is no mention anywhere of any addition to the force which, again, is logical for the Greeks were assembling for Plataea. It cannot have carried more than 4,000 marines (if we accord forty per ship). How do you see these numbers?

Yes, this summarizes my opinion. I choose to read the word "rationally" as not implying that my position is irrational, I generally deem myself as a (sometimes overly) rational person, which is the exact reason why I do not a priori accept these criticisms against Herodot and other ancient authors.

It's not always an either / or proposition George. What I mean is that if one proposition is that "all these are possible" (not necessarily probable - just possible) then there can be no rational argument formulated against it. It does not mean you are irrational.

[Macedon]

The Islanders' ships are in fact included in the 1,207. Herodotus notes them after listing the Ionians (7.95.1):

The islanders provided seventeen ships and were armed like Greeks; they were also of Pelasgian stock, which was later called Ionian for the same reason as were the Ionians of the twelve cities,1 who came from Athens

They are only 17 are of little consequence though. I'm not so sure of 120 ships from Thrace - be they from Greek towns or not. Ditto the possibility of Boeotian ships. The first I can recall of any "Boeotian" ships would be those planned by Epaminondas when the Thebans had decided they'd enough of Athens' vacillating.

There are many islanders in the Aegean... too many isles to count.. I was not clear enough I admit.

Herodot writes : "Νέας μέν νυν οἱ ἀπὸ Θρηίκης Ἕλληνες καὶ ἐκ τῶν νήσων τῶν ἐπικειμένων τῇ Θρηίκῃ παρείχοντο εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν·"

"Now, ships provided by the Greeks of Thrace and the isles near Thrace 120" 7.188 The Thracians as a nation had no navy but there were many Greek cities in the region and Herodot directly speaks of them. If Boeotian ships were further added or even the Thessalians, we of course do not know, Herodot makes no mention thereof. Maybe they could be among these or not. I personally believe that Thessaly and Boeotia being in the core of Greece, such information would be stressed by Herodot.

Ships at Salamis? I'd suggest a figure near to 600 at the start and nowhere near the losses described by Herodotus. If, as you say, Herodotus betrays consternation at the numbers he received ("Herodot gave the arguments against such numbers himself"), then I do see the fortunate halving of the original number by storms as I described: a method of rendering the concerning believable. If you believe I fail to understand that you are not arguing Herodotus as being correct then you fail to understand me. Herodotus reports those figures relayed to him. An exact date for composition is beyond us but he certainly was still writing in 429. The likelihood is that he wrote 440-42?. In any case, the information is now two generations or so old. Like anglers' tales, the fish probably grew. Still, he can only report the numbers told to him and it is those that I disagree with.

Herodot does not lower the numbers of the Persian fleet. He directly says that at Salamis they had as many ships as they had at the beginning. This is what his sources claimed, this is what he reports. His numbers regarding the events before the battle are also those that were reported to him. For the ancients the numbers were not "unbelievable" concerning the navy. This is why he does not criticize the use of such a fleet while he does the use of a land force as great as was reported. He clearly portrays the land army as a mistake of Xerxes. He does no such thing regarding the fleet.

Regarding how "late" he wrote, this is a bit misleading. Herodot, who was himself a little child during the campaign of Xerxes,had plenty of eye-witness accounts to go by. Xerxes' invasion was a major event for the broader region, much like WW2 in Europe. No one can state with a considerable degree of certainty when Herodot exactly wrote his Histories, nor when he started amassing his data. He may have started in 445 (or in 450 or in 440) but his trips, interviews and looking into archives and more solid evidence he would have started years before that. If he wanted to, he certainly would talk with men who fought, who commanded, who scouted, who numbered etc from both sides of the Aegean. Ancient Greeks did reach ages of 60+ very often. Where I disagree with you is the "reported to him" part. No, Herodot did not only speak with people. He talks of evidence as "hard" as they can get. His most "improbable" numbers were directly taken from a Persian stele which told the official Persian side. The followers numbers were an assumption of his and he was also clear on it.It was also he, IIRC that also wrote of some Greek monument in Thermopylae talking about how Leonidas fought 3,000,000 "Persians". Of course, all this information may have been wrong, bloated etc. BUT, it was the contemporary Persian side, the contemporary side of the Greeks who fought at Thermopylae, first hand witness accounts, second hand witness accounts and tradition that talked of such numbers.

I stress that I believe that Themistocles wanted the fight in the confines of Salamis to deny the Persian fleet (particularly the Sidonians and other Phoenicians) room to maneuver. The Greeks wanted to find out about the Persian fleet's ("test") tactics (esp diekplous) at Artemesium. They did and, in one encounter, were treated as Phormio would later treat the Corinthians in the Corinthian Gulf during the Peloponnesian War. Themistocles was not about to fight in open waters again. The Athenians would later regale the Spartans (and their allies) with his tactical stroke of persuasion later in the debate before war in 432/1.

Well... this is a theory, I guess you have concluded to it after having researched the matter. I still do not understand where this "Phoenician diekplous" comes from, although I did read some comments in certain books I skimmed through but I found no sources. Some insisted that the Phoenicians would try to board the Greek ships, others that it was Themistocles who tried to protect the Greek fleet from the ramming attacks of the enemy and instead preferred that the Greeks would use boarding tactics, hence the battle of Salamis... I generally found there is a very wide range of opinions on the matter...

I am not as well versed in naval combat as I am in land combat and I can in no way claim any certainty. But, as far as the sources are concerned, I see that

A. At Artemisium, Herodot again speaks of the Persian fleet having trouble coordinating
B. The aristeion on the third day of the battle of Artemisium was given to the Egyptians, not the Phoenicians.
C. At Artemisium, the Greeks are described as using superior and more complex tactics and thus even the odds, which were heavily against them in matters of numbers. If a smaller army gains a victory and a draw, then it must have some kind of advantage.

I see that generally, Herodot does not praise the Phoenicians. He usually describes others on the Persian side fighting better than them. Even the incident wit the Phoenician commanders at Salamis shows that he viewed them with some kind of contempt. Was he biased? Maybe, maybe not. But in his Histories it is not the Phoenicians that the Greeks are afraid of. It is the numbers of the enemy, which is very understandable. When you have inferior number, the most sound tactic is to fight someplace where these numbers cannot be of service. This is what Themistocles proposed. The maneuverability issue, is something that one could claim lies in Themistocles stressing that the Greek ships are heavier than the ones of their enemy. This could mean that they were less maneuverable, although I guess that the word "heavier" is subjective and a better design could make an even heavier ship more maneuverable, it could also mean that the Greeks had an additional advantage when ramming. I wish Herodot was clearer on that.

I was going to ask the question as to why you felt the need to reduce the numbers but I see you class yourself as one of "the sceptics". Therefore we agree that the numbers given Herodotus need to be rationalised. The only difference is by how far. On that, as we have, for the very great part, only Iranian troops doing the fighting (and serving as marines), I think we can dismiss the polyglot hoards of the army list as having played a part in the invasion. The fact that the Greeks were not ever flanked at Plataea indicates that the Persians did not seriously outnumber them (unless, for some odd reason, they were deployed to great depth and threw away the advantage).

We can discuss Plataea, which was no ordinary battle if you like. I do not dismiss any numbers offered by Herodot or reports of many nations having marched with him and I do believe that at Plataea the Greeks were greatly outnumbered.

As to my being a skeptic thing : yes, I am, but I am not a denier. I am fully aware that any "rationalizations" I make are only based on my own logic and perception of things and I fully consider Herodot a much more able interpreter of what happened than I. My theories have more to do with interpreting Herodot himself rather than dismiss him as well as with juxtaposition of sources. I would never dismiss the fact that many nations, some of whom very "exotic" took part in the campaign for Herodot is sure as are all the relative sources. I work on the parts he himself directly or indirectly (as I see it) questions.

On a related matter, Mycalae. Herodotus reports that, after Salamis, the fleet under Leutychides, wintered at Aegina where it numbered 110 ships. The fleet being such a size is exactly what one would expect given losses at Artemesium and Salamis and, far more so, the fact that Athens (and others) needed her men for Plataea. Thus with Athens removing many crews to contribute to the land effort, the fleet is reduced. This fleet then sails, in the spring, to what becomes the battle of Mycalae. This armament then fights and defeats 60,000 "Persians".

Now, it is said the battle took place the same day as Plataea. This armament cannot have been army and navy (as the hoplite muster was to gather for the decisive showdown in Boeotia). There is no mention anywhere of any addition to the force which, again, is logical for the Greeks were assembling for Plataea. It cannot have carried more than 4,000 marines (if we accord forty per ship). How do you see these numbers?

I consider them good numbers. The battle took place in very narrow country, not even the Greeks were able to deploy their relatively small phalanx in full. Herodot does not say that there were 60,000 Persians fighting at the battle but that this was the army left with Tigranes to guard Ionia. Certainly a good part of it would have been present, maybe most. We also do not know how much of it was light infantry (as were the rowmen too) and cavalry. If 20% were cavalry (I guess that a somewhat mobile force would be advantageous for a guard), we are left with 48,000 infantry. If half of that was line infantry, then the Persian phalanx would have been 24,000 strong. A more conservative 10% cavalry would still compute to 27,000 infantry of the line. A 20% of the force absent in various forts or other tasks (a total of 48,000 present) would bring the numbers of heavy infantry even lower (19,200 or 21,600 men respectively) Could there be less light infantry? More? Certainly. Anyways, this only serves as an example of how a 60,000 strong army becomes "rationalized" without having to go against the sources, by simply analyzing them first. And victory was finally secured by the appearance of the Samians and Milesians, who came with considerable forces.

[Paralus]

Herodot does not lower the numbers of the Persian fleet. He directly says that at Salamis they had as many ships as they had at the beginning. This is what his sources claimed, this is what he reports. His numbers regarding the events before the battle are also those that were reported to him. For the ancients the numbers were not "unbelievable" concerning the navy. This is why he does not criticize the use of such a fleet while he does the use of a land force as great as was reported. He clearly portrays the land army as a mistake of Xerxes. He does no such thing regarding the fleet.

He must have had concerns regarding the numbers of ships. This is plain to me from his reduction of those numbers (even after adding the 120 of 7.185) prior to Artemesium. Here 600 are removed by storms thus reducing the size (on his received figures) to 727. The telling sentence is 8.13:

All this was done by the god so that the Persian power might be more equally matched with the Greek, and not much greater than it.

Note Herodotus claims that Persian numbers are now more equal to the Greeks'. "More equally" does not, to me, imply two or three to one. Interesting also is the supposed conversation after Thermopylae before Xerxes impales Leonidas' head. Here Demaratus advises sending 300 ships around the Peloponnese (7.235.1). Achaemenes disagrees noting that Persian naval superiority will be lost (236.2):

...if after the recent calamity which has wrecked four hundred of your ships you send away three hundred more from your fleet to sail round the Peloponnese, your enemies will be enough to do battle with you; while your fleet is united, however, it is invincible, and your enemies will not be so many as to be enough to fight

727 is closer to my preferred figure and far and away more preferable to 1,327. If, then, there were not less than 1,200 at Salamis, whence came the 500-600 extras in so short a time?

I guess we will never agree on the numbers. On the idea that the Greeks were much more experienced in naval warfare and better "trireme fighters" than the Phoenicians and others in the Persian navy, I'll leave that to Thucydides (1.14.1-3):

These were the most powerful navies. And even these, although so many generations had elapsed since the Trojan war, seem to have been principally composed of the old fifty-oars and long-boats, and to have counted few galleys among their ranks. Indeed it was only shortly before the Persian war and the death of Darius the successor of Cambyses, that the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans acquired any large number of galleys. For after these there were no navies of any account in Hellas till the expedition of Xerxes; Aegina, Athens, and others may have possessed a few vessels, but they were principally fifty-oars. It was quite at the end of this period that the war with Aegina and the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles to persuade the Athenians to build the fleet with which they fought at Salamis; and even these vessels had not complete decks

.

Those triremes which Athens built for the invasion clearly far outnumbered anything the city had possessed prior. It logically follows that the crews were, for the great part, inexperienced (indeed Cimon is reported to have urged his fellow "knights" to lay down their bridles and take to the ships - Plut Cim. 5.2-3) and many of the hoplite class will have had to row (thus the reduced fleet so Athens could send her army to Plataea). Indeed, of the eventual 180 ships Athens sent to Artemesium, more than a few were manned by the Plataeans who do not strike one as experienced "trireme fighters".

[Macedon]

He must have had concerns regarding the numbers of ships. This is plain to me from his reduction of those numbers (even after adding the 120 of 7.185) prior to Artemesium. Here 600 are removed by storms thus reducing the size (on his received figures) to 727. The telling sentence is 8.13:

All this was done by the god so that the Persian power might be more equally matched with the Greek, and not much greater than it.

Note Herodotus claims that Persian numbers are now more equal to the Greeks'. "More equally" does not, to me, imply two or three to one. Interesting also is the supposed conversation after Thermopylae before Xerxes impales Leonidas' head. Here Demaratus advises sending 300 ships around the Peloponnese (7.235.1). Achaemenes disagrees noting that Persian naval superiority will be lost (236.2):

...if after the recent calamity which has wrecked four hundred of your ships you send away three hundred more from your fleet to sail round the Peloponnese, your enemies will be enough to do battle with you; while your fleet is united, however, it is invincible, and your enemies will not be so many as to be enough to fight

727 is closer to my preferred figure and far and away more preferable to 1,327. If, then, there were not less than 1,200 at Salamis, whence came the 500-600 extras in so short a time?

First you have to state what your opinion on the number is throughout the campaign. 727 might be your preferred figure but does that mean that you accept the 1,327 ships mentioned in the beginning? I think, though I am not sure, that your position is that there were something like 400-600 Persian ships from the beginning and that Herodot had to invent all disasters in order to finally reduce the "mythical" numbers to this.

8.13 commends the Gods who helped reduce the numbers of the Persian ships and does not say anything about how many ships fought or were present at Salamis. "More equally" could imply anything less than before but it is not this that is the issue. It is more the "not many more/τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ τὸ Περσικὸν μηδὲ πολλῷ πλέον εἴη" 8.13.19 part that brings the balance lower. Yet, this sentence is denoting intention, not outcome. Herodot says that this was the intention of the Gods "ὅκως ἂν ἐξισωθείη".

Achaemenes talks of the Greeks becoming ἀξιόμαχοι. This has nothing to do with equal numbers but with being "in position to fight". This would easily be a 2:1 or 1.5:1 ratio that would give the Greeks in the eyes of the Persians a chance to win. It does not talk about naval superiority in numbers.

I truly would like you to give me your hypothesis of how the numbers of the Persian fleet changed from the time they left Hellespont. My own hypothesis is that the Persians had a sea-worthy fleet of about 1,000 triremes at Salamis, with the discrepancy between initial number 1,327 and losses about 600 being explained by repaired damages rather than an unattested influx of reinforcements. This would also mean that there would be at least proportionate losses in the numbers of the Asian nations. The Phoenicians would not any more have 300 ships but more probably 200 etc. Maybe from these 1,000 another 100 would not have been battle-worthy (although they would have been sea-worthy). This would again conciliate all sources with the lack of reports of further reinforcements. Note here, that my lowering the numbers is not done because I think that a fleet of 1,300 or 1,200 ships is impossible "to muster, control or/and supply" but because Herodot does not report any reinforcements coming from Asia nor does he say anything about the Thessalians and Boeotians joining the fleet and with what numbers. I do this "rationalization" in an effort to explain Herodot in a more "detailed" way.

I guess we will never agree on the numbers. On the idea that the Greeks were much more experienced in naval warfare and better "trireme fighters" than the Phoenicians and others in the Persian navy, I'll leave that to Thucydides (1.14.1-3):

These were the most powerful navies. And even these, although so many generations had elapsed since the Trojan war, seem to have been principally composed of the old fifty-oars and long-boats, and to have counted few galleys among their ranks. Indeed it was only shortly before the Persian war and the death of Darius the successor of Cambyses, that the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans acquired any large number of galleys. For after these there were no navies of any account in Hellas till the expedition of Xerxes; Aegina, Athens, and others may have possessed a few vessels, but they were principally fifty-oars. It was quite at the end of this period that the war with Aegina and the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles to persuade the Athenians to build the fleet with which they fought at Salamis; and even these vessels had not complete decks

.

Those triremes which Athens built for the invasion clearly far outnumbered anything the city had possessed prior. It logically follows that the crews were, for the great part, inexperienced (indeed Cimon is reported to have urged his fellow "knights" to lay down their bridles and take to the ships - Plut Cim. 5.2-3) and many of the hoplite class will have had to row (thus the reduced fleet so Athens could send her army to Plataea). Indeed, of the eventual 180 ships Athens sent to Artemesium, more than a few were manned by the Plataeans who do not strike one as experienced "trireme fighters".

It is interesting that you use Thucydides when you talked of Herodot as a source that was quite far from the events but I will give you that what you offer initially seems to support that the Greeks were not experienced in trireme warfare.

Yet, Thucydides makes a comparison between the older times and that of the Peloponnesian War which he experienced and writes about. He tells of the first triremes dating back 3 centuries before the end of the Pel. War and accepts that the Greeks had vast experience in naval warfare, himself counting a number of "strong navies". He says that the majority of ships before the Persian Wars were smaller vessels and he indeed says that before Xerxes there were few ναυτικὰ ἀξιόλογα in Greece, navies "worth telling of", or better translated as "considerable". Now, this is a comparison between the naval actions taking place during the Pel. War and the past and has little to do with the Persian Wars per se. First, the numbers that he would consider "considerable" or strong would be those used in the Pel. War and it is a fact that no SINGLE Greek state apart from Athens at the time could boast any such fleet. Yet this does say little about how good or how many were the inconsiderable Greek state navies. 100 fleets of 10 ships still comprise a grand fleet of 1,000. The same principal was also the case among ALL nations of the Mediterranean. The Phoenicians were also fragmented and each state had its own fleet. The same applies to the Cilicians, the Cypriots and the Ionians. A single exception here were the Egyptians. The same applies to the "trireme fighting" doctrines/tactics and experience. It does not matter if mass trireme fighting, according to Thucydides, was a relatively recent fad. The Greeks still had more experience in naval warfare and had more crews and commanders trained and experienced in such kind of warfare.

As for the Athenian crews, this is not actually the case. the crews were like the army, They all trained and they all served. Having only 50 ships does not mean that only 10,000 men know how to row them or command them. They took turns and were called up for the expeditions. And still, even if some were not as well trained, (of course some would have been...) it does not mean that the average experience and training was not superior.
Of course men in the Athenian triremes would have been sent to Plataea, some would have been hoplites, others would have been sent as light infantry. This has little to do with the ability of the Athenians in trireme combat. As for the Plataeans, the comment of Herodot that they were unskilled is telling. Plataea was always very close to Athens and paid for it a huge prize afterwards. It was a very small city and even if half of all able men took to the oars, they would not be able to man a considerable number of ships (probably 2 or 3 if given full control of some triremes). Their presence was inconsiderable and Herodot's comments show that they were an exception. At Salamis, they did not take part.

It would be a good thing if you found some evidence as to the superiority or at least equality in battle-worth of the Persian allies, if this is what you claim. The probably biased Greek side gives this explanation as to why they eventually conquered. If one starts claiming that the sources are obviously prejudiced, trying to glorify the Greek side, that the Persians sailed/marched to Greece with numbers comparable to those reported for the Greeks, which could also be inflated, that the Greeks are mistakingly portrayed as superior in land and sea combat and that their victories cannot have been as grand, then one may write his own history that will only boil down to "It seems that some Persians came, they seem to have fought with some Greeks, they somehow lost and that was it...". This is not meant to be ironic. I just, in such discussions need to see what the criteria are regarding the evaluation of the specific sources and where we draw the line between useful and useless information, which is certainly a topic very few would agree on completely. If only there were multiple sources from multiple origins we could draw on.

[Paralus]

I think, though I am not sure, that your position is that there were something like 400-600 Persian ships from the beginning and that Herodot had to invent all disasters in order to finally reduce the "mythical" numbers to this.

I would say the size of the largest otherwise attested invasion fleet of 600 (Danube – though why such figures when no naval action was likely is intriguing) at the most. If there were ever 1,200 then Peter Green’s notion (mentioned elsewhere hereabouts) is logical: the older and less battle worthy provided the Hellespont bridges.

8.13 commends the Gods who helped reduce the numbers of the Persian ships and does not say anything about how many ships fought or were present at Salamis. "More equally" could imply anything less than before but it is not this that is the issue. It is more the "not many more/τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ τὸ Περσικὸν μηδὲ πολλῷ πλέον εἴη" 8.13.19 part that brings the balance lower. Yet, this sentence is denoting intention, not outcome. Herodot says that this was the intention of the Gods "ὅκως ἂν ἐξισωθείη".

The intention of the passage is plainly that the “god” was doing this to reduce the Persian numbers to “more equally” reflect the Greeks’.

My own hypothesis is that the Persians had a sea-worthy fleet of about 1,000 triremes at Salamis, with the discrepancy between initial number 1,327 and losses about 600 being explained by repaired damages rather than an unattested influx of reinforcements.

Herodotus is plain that these six hundred ships were “destroyed” (diaphtharēnai); the same word he uses for the “destroyed” Hellespontine bridges (and elsewhere). Perhaps the tradition he relies on exaggerates by the use of the word; perhaps the tradition as a whole exaggerates. Then again, Herodotus, possibly a sceptic like you, took the opportunity to exaggerate the losses in a storm that likely “destroyed” many support ships but not large numbers of triremes on shore? I would also suggest that the force sent around Euboea would surely have consisted of a landing force to get behind Thermoplylae. Tactically this was absolutely necessary. Thus the trireme component may have only been enough to block the thin straits and keep the Greeks in.
In any case, Herodotus does not mention any more ships added after Artemesium either by reinforcement or by recommissioning. If we allow almost a month between Artemesium and Salamis that sees some 500 ships rebuilt.

The Phoenicians were also fragmented and each state had its own fleet. The same applies to the Cilicians, the Cypriots and the Ionians. A single exception here were the Egyptians. The same applies to the "trireme fighting" doctrines/tactics and experience. It does not matter if mass trireme fighting, according to Thucydides, was a relatively recent fad. The Greeks still had more experience in naval warfare and had more crews and commanders trained and experienced in such kind of warfare.

The Phoenicians were a Levantine people with a strong tradition of seafaring and colonising (Carthage eg) very like the Greeks. Their major centre was Sidon and, it seems, they always fought as a group for the Persians. That they supposedly didn’t have the skill of the Greeks didn’t stop them building triremes for the king, nor fighting in them. In fact, as you single out the Egyptians, I gather you see them as a more experienced trireme fighting nation. Interesting then that it is with these Phoenicians , from whom “the whole fleet drew its strength” (Her.3.19.3) that Cambyses takes egypt.

As for the Athenian crews, this is not actually the case. the crews were like the army, They all trained and they all served. Having only 50 ships does not mean that only 10,000 men know how to row them or command them. They took turns and were called up for the expeditions. And still, even if some were not as well trained, (of course some would have been...) it does not mean that the average experience and training was not superior. As for the Plataeans, the comment of Herodot that they were unskilled is telling. Plataea was always very close to Athens and paid for it a huge prize afterwards. It was a very small city and even if half of all able men took to the oars, they would not be able to man a considerable number of ships (probably 2 or 3 if given full control of some triremes). Their presence was inconsiderable and Herodot's comments show that they were an exception. At Salamis, they did not take part.

I disagree. The “naval rabble” (those trained and paid sailors of years after the Persian invasion) were a result of the war; there was no great trained lot of sailors in Athens prior to the invasion. Here the reaction of "the men of marathon" is telling: they were not about to get into ships!! Thirty-four thousand trained sailors (oarsmen and others; leaving aside marines) did not spring up overnight. Herodotus tells us that The Athenians had to give 20 ships to Chalcis to man. Athens clearly mustered every able bodied person for this crisis and it likely included – as it would during the crises after the Sicilian expedition – slaves.

[Domen]

According to Herodotus feeding the army of the size that Herodotus claimed Xerxes was leading, would require 3,310,200 kg of wheat alone per each day, not including food for women, eunuchs and animals.