Ancient army numbers

[Nikanor]

Actually, Nick, I do not get your argument about the attacker "having to" be more in numbers than the defender.

Speaking of ancient texts, the attacker having more than the defender due to the latter's advantage of holding ground, is mentioned in Sun Tzu if I remember correctly (I have a small reservation on this in case my memory betrays me). Sun considered campaigns below 100,000 as amateurisms (ok maybe Chinese standards but stil...) and he underlined the importance in conquest campaigns to field as many as possible for as short as possible to clear out fast and clean the game avoiding logistics-originated failure. We can see that both Persian and Carthagenian campaigns aimed at that massive fast campaign 1-summer strike rather than a prolonged campaign of attrition, say Roman-Dacian wars like. Also remember that in the above we make reference to campaigns, not to single battle encounters where an enemy can send a task force to strike in surprise etc. Also we must stick to armies of "roughly comparable levels", certainly not the case of the highly trained Alexander's army as compared to the Asian armies of his times - a historic exception of the rule.

I very much doubt that alone, only from its own Libyophoenician population it could effectively muster 240,000 men

I share your doubt. But then mercenary soldiers came from all over western Mediterranean, Iberia, Gaul, Corsica, Sardinia, plus the N. African troops. A far larger human pool than "little" Sicily. Difficult to attract so many? Maybe yes, but still very feasible if one pays some "ad" cash in front and promises a nice big part of the loot of hyper rich Sicily. Phoenicians were not interested in the looting of Sicily. They were interested only in the wiping out of the commercial threat and in the establishment of monopoly.

Although I do not dismiss the possibility...I very much question the ability of the Carthaginians to transport them over to Sicily. This is a major difference to Xerxes' campaign, whose army marched along the coast and was not carried over by ships.
Even if these numbers also contain the crews of the navy, which would bring the total for the army down by maybe a third or more, it still is a huge operation (not impossible) and many thousands of transport ships are necessary to cross over the men, horses and chariots attested... a supply effort that would have been very vulnerable, especially near Sicily, whose harbors would largely be controlled by the enemy Greeks...

First I am happy that somebody can see the logistic approach of Persians. Then let us move to see the rough numbers mentioned by the 2 ancient writers Herodotus-Diodorus = roughly 300,000 men, 3000 cargo ships, 200 war ships - and let us analyse the logistics.

- Carthagenians were not interested in looting Sicily but wiping out the competition. Certainly there was loot there for 300,000 mercenaries so they could eventually attract so many with a small forward payment and a later high loot-cash reward in a campaign meant to last 1 summer. Note that such mercenaries of course were traditionally attracted in such campaigns only when there was some degree of certainty.

- Carthagenians and their outposts could potentially amass 3000 cargo ships of various sizes - and Phoenice/Carthage had the biggest ships around! Let us say 200 big cargo (more than 150 men per ship), 1000 average (more than 100 men per ship), 1800 small (more than 50 men per ship) - in this sailors are not included : remember, cargo ships were sailing with sails, not oars but even in those military oar-ships there was no olympic games to compete, you could put some of the untrained mercenaries to row as part of their job! Result? 220,000 in one go!!! Ok, cut the numbers in 2 to accomodate for horses and food stocks (IF these were carried in parallel) and it sufficed 2,5 goes to bring the 300,000 into Sicily!!! Given that only a fraction of that was needed to carry the Sardinian and North African stationed men since ships could do multiple goes.

- The 200 war ships present in Italy was an extremely low number of ships for Carthagenians (even little Samos gathered more than 100!!!) who had not sent big numbers for the Persian invasion either. It should tell us a lot. It implies that the massive part of the military fleet was occupied by following and guarding strategic points of the supply lines with these 200 only as a tip of the iceberg : remember, Carthage wanted to conquer by land the island, not just play business-port wars, business as usual style - so all attention was given to fielding a massive army.

Personally I find it not difficult to imagine commercial power Carthage amassing 600 war ships (if Samos could have 100) out of which 200 securing west Sicily and along with all western Phoenician ouposts amassing 3000 cargo ships of various sizes. I would also imagine that the largest part of logistics (remaining our of Sicily) would not be even visible to Greeks and that if we consider a 300,000 force only the 1/5th of it would be occupied with land/port-based logistics. Remember: on the other side there was sitting an alledged 6-digit Greek army, what hope could a mere 80,000 or 120,000 Carthagenians have? Remember too the size of army Syracuse alone could raise, remember its casual offer to send 24,000 troops and 4000 cavalry and 200 military ships to aid mainland Greece (would't they be able to amass 3ple that force in Sicily?). Treat the above as rought suggestions but ponder well over them.

Am I excessive? Too much mobilisation? Not at all. I would like someone to explain to me what would be the difference for Phoenician salesmen, captains, sailors to transfer goods not for sale at Carthage or Egypt but for the army to be sent in Sicily. Job as usual. Next day they would be back home with wifes and children. What difference would it make for Iberian farmers if the wheat they sold to Carthagenians went not to Carthage but to the army in Sicily? You get my point? Like for an important part of the Persian logistics, the largest part of Carthagenian logistics saw it as business as usual, no big change in their lifes. The war campaign occupied the minds of the mercenaries while for the military fleets who were into that game of passage guarding peace or war alike afterall.

Nikos