Ancient army numbers

[Nikanor]

I think nobody doubts that in cases of emergency the attacked states could mobilize huge forces often probably lager than what any invader could send, see the Thucycides quote above.

Personally I do claim the opposite. Even basic military manuals indicate that for comparable armies, the attacker must field considerably greater numbers than the defender.

There is a huge difference between the dream force of any invader that ensures victory in all circumstance and what they could really afford.

Correct observation, though I have already catered for this particularly for the Persian campaign. The army numbers for both Persians and Carthagenians when properly explained (logistics vs. fighting troops) are well into their capacity keeping in mind that these were one-off efforts meant to last a few months campaign, not decades.

The whole purpose of this thread should be to discuss what was possible not why it was desirable to field huge armies.

This is precisely the reason that I have writtern long - boring! - texts above analysing the feasibility of such campaigns. And most points point out to Persians and Carthagenians being able to field for a few months/1-year campaigns such armies.

-> Carthaginians were much aware of their own motley-crew infantry deficit in front of Greek infantries ..

Are there any sources to support this assumption or is this a modern interpretation?

Yes, you are correct, this is more of a modern interpretation but certainly in the contemporary context. We have lots of sources mentioning Greek mercenaries throughout the centuries and all over the Mediterranean, Egypt and Middle East where they were hired most often as the kingdoms' special forces and not as standard or auxiliaries. Greeks themselves (5th century) made use of mercenaries (most often fellow Greeks) mostly as side troops. On the contrary, the Carthagenian army was de-facto a motley crew of mercenaries hired from all over the place, different cultures, languages, often antagonistic etc. Difficult to manage in low or high numbers alike - in fact higher overall numbers could as well enable some more safety (the one watching the other). It takes no great leaps to understand the unfeasibility of Carthagenians employing a motley crew of equal size to the fairly uniform Greek armies - they had to have considerably more.

...Northern Africa was not yet the bread basket... According to Diodorus (13.81 )even 70 years Carthage, just like Athens, had to import food...

Correct reasoning. But they had so many other places to get foodstocks, Persian Egypt alone sufficed, then they had Spain, Corse, Sardinia, Gaul, northwest Italy. With 3000 cargo ships they did not even need to deplete a kilogram from the stocks of their allies in western Sicily. All they had to do was to source double their usual stocks for just 1 summer. Yes, expensive but this was meant to be an expensive 1-off investment that would ensure decades if not centuries of monopoly afterall!

Unlike the Persian...Carthage ruled over... Phoenician colonies and trading posts scattered all over the western med. More comparable to Athens and its league at the height of its power.

Valid question. From what I have read in primary sources as well as in modern analyses, our knowledge of Carthage comes mostly out of their failures to beat the Syracuseans, and their failures to beat the Romans. However, Carthage was unlike these two Greek-Latin powers. At its peak power in 8th century and then again in 4th century, they controlled the quasitotality of the western Mediterranean trade and they had a continuous trade/cultural/political link with the Phoenician east to which they still looked upon surprisingly till very late times contrary to the dispersed and independent Greek powers acting on their own even if allied. So no they were not really in the same league with Athens which even at its peak it remained a minor player in the Mediterranean lake. If Syracuse provenly fielded more than 60,000 own troops, Carthage could amass easily 4 times the number, at least for 1 summer "campaign to end all campaigns". Do not forget, in 480 BC, it was an once in a century chance to hit Greeks in Magna Graecia.

While this cemetery seems supports parts of Diodoros narrative, as the horse graves, the number of excavated mass graves is not sufficient to support this massive armies....

I had also mentioned on the time-span covering both Himera battles. I was mentioning those graves that relate to the first one at 480BC. The articles I read in the Italian press mentioned a far higher number of mass-graves but then since these were general newspapers and not specialist press (as work still continues on the graves...) there could be an error by unknowledgeable editors. In any case, the mere existence of mass-graves (esteemed as not something really nice in Greek culture) for own troops implies (does not prove anything but points) that there was a considerable amount of dead among the victorious side. And the casualties among the losers had been worse. It could be another side-indication of the magnitude of the battle.

Based on what I said at the beginning of this post we should check if their numbers are consistent with what else we know about the combatants and their resources.

I am not "vertically" taking the ancient writers' numbers - I also treat them as "rouch" estimates mingling often logistics with fighting force. I am neither preaching the above as dogma, but I do sincirely believe that after clearing details, the overall mobilisations could most possibly be at the magnitudes writers tell us and not in the arbitrary magnitudes later writers esteemed quite arbitrarily.

Nikos