02-13-2012, 07:31 PM
I tend to agree more with the opinion of Macedon over those matters for a large series of reasons of all sorts.
First I do also share the belief of many people here that calculations of human population in antiquity are very inexact not just in Greece and Persia but all over the world and that they are based largely on a mis-conception that world numbers always increased which is simply not true. Even ignoring plagues and wars, birth rates and children mortality they were very variable throughout history even more so if we talk regionally. Certainly for Greece, all data tells us that in antiquity there were more than in medieval times and for this reason I do accept Macedon's parallel with the Byzantine example as a good way to find out. Indeed Byzantines complained of their lower numbers in relation to a more "populous past" but then what is interesting is that even their own numbers were far more than most writers tend to think today. After Gothic raids and during the catastrophic for the Empire reign of Justinian, Hierocles, author of Synecdemus, listed the number of cities up to more than 900, nearly 1000. Contrary to western European standards where cities even as late as Renaissance were incredibly small since 95% of the population lived in rural settings, in Byzantine Empire we casually read about unheard, totally unimportant and totally boring cities here and there having casually 30 and 40,000 citizens. In Greek mainland only, a number of lesser cities like Thebes, Athens, Corinth, Argos till before the late Bulgarian raids were averaging more than 30,000 souls while much later and after huge wars post-saracen, post-bulgarian raids Thessalonika still amassed more than 100,000 (perhaps more than 150,000) souls. Back in pre-Renaissance Eastern Europe and Minor Asia, the worth-mentioning towns and cities had to at least pass the strict cap of 5,000 people but in reality most often by the standards of those days, anything more than 8,000 people. For Greek mainland only, Heriocles mentions 80 (!!!) cities presenting a bustling highly urbanised region that contrasts all the tears Gibbon had wept for the late Roman Empire and the supposed total destruction by barbarians. Given that, Greek mainland had a strict minimum half a million strictly urbanised population but really more close to 1,2 million. Since despite the urbanisation, in all pre-industrialised societies the relation at best could rise at 1 city dweller for 4 rural ones, that results in a an overall population that would be surpassing the 5 million. Is there anyone to suggest that in classical antiquity Greece would have a population smaller than 5 million? Even if we talk about only 1 in 4 Greeks resisting the Persian assault still 1,5 million Greeks could provide easily a 150,000 overall force dispatched together or in parts - Persians knew Greeks were divided by they also knew that in danger they would try to form some kind of union, thus they had tried to sent envoys to all major cities to play them apart.
So given these quite obvious calculations can we imagine that Persians - whose whole Empire was based on numbers - would be unaware of all the above? Wouldn't they calculate an overall Greek force that in a very probable scenario of 1 in 3 resisting would surpass the 150,000 soldiers among them the best Greece had to show when then they already struggled with the Ionian average? And would Persians - who liked to have at least the double numbers even in case of defending and who knew very well that their armies could defeat hoplite armies only if they employed more than double - take the risk invading the Greek mainland with an army only equal to the potential force they could meet either in one or in a series of battles?
It goes without standing that they would calculate at minimum 3 times more the minimum force Greeks could amass. That is an absolute strict minimum of 300,000 men, and in reality more in the region of 400,000 men. From there on if for every 1 soldier you have to have 4 men supporting it, carriers, stock-responsibles, smiths and technicians, cooks then the 100,000s of mariners on the 1000s of ships and so on, the number easily rises to above 1 million and I would say easily more than 1,5 million. Given that at various stages the army would had mobilised here and there a cummulative of more than 2 million people.
Was that feasible? Absolutely! I am amased how easily some are ready to swallow the numbers of migrating Gauls, Goths, Huns and Mongols who were nothing else than a bunch of wandering barbarians that did little calculations and survived by looting the places they invaded and not being able to accept the numbers that the Persian Empire mobilised, which could employ not just confiscation (i.e. Imperial-style looting) not just provisions by supplies from traderoutes but most importantly an overall careful planning.
Speaking in general and not particularly for Greeks and Persians we see in other cultures that even for lower more regional scale warfare the employment of large armies was really casual. The Chinese Sun Tzu writes that any descent army wishing to have any hope should campaign with more than 100,000 soldiers. Of course true that eastern China was really populous and that 1kg of rice may feed more than 1kg of wheat but back then it was not really that much more populous than central Asia, the richest part of the world then, while Sun Tzu wrote this so casually in the sense that he saw the 100,000 number as the limit between a serious army and a bunch of peasants.
You also tend to forget that only in late-19th century with the advent of industrialised technology armies managed to present improved logistics. Up to then, those of the Persian Empire were a prime example. Persians could easily mobilise vast amounts and feed them. They had both the roads and the ships and they could organise local production and according confiscations from own lands and looting from conquered ones. If they did built a bridge over the Bosporus destroying ships that meant they would certainly not pass an army of 80,000 or even 150,000 which they could had simply passed with boats much faster. They passed an extraordinary amount which had to number several 100,000s of fighting men and many others following behind for logistics. They could do it. They had the money.
About the money they had, we have to take into account this: When Alexander raided just one of the 3 main capital cities of the Empire he found in the treasury about 120,000 talents of gold. This was not even the total treasury of the Empire! And this at a time the Empire was in a financial downward spiral. And after all those huge expenses of war and the mobilisation of 100,000s of men! We can easily imagine that in the previous century Persians would have 300 and 400,000 talents to spend. For comparison Athenians only after stealing the money of their allies had managed to gather roughly a mere 10,000 talents which they mostly spent on building projects. That means that Athenians would have less than that 100 years earlier. So if Athenians with 5,000 - 7,000 talents and no developed logistics other than their ships and traderoutes could move around armies and navies of more than 10,000 troops that were more expensive to upkeep than the average Persian soldier in the greater Eastern Mediterranean region, then certainly Persians with an Empire already presenting full logistics enjoying the huge Phoenician navy and with more than 300,000 talents could certainly very easily mobilise 400,000 soldiers which anyway were on average more lightly armed than Athenian ones.
From there one calculate. Water would never be a problem. Food would also not be a problem. Minor Asia and Thrace were 2 days of ship and then you had the amasing Black Sea trade route. We do accept that 1 kg of wheat feeds easily 2 men for a whole day while 1 average sized commercial ship could carry easily a minimum of 50 tons deadweight based on specifications we know for medieval ships that were by no means vastly superior to ancient ones. I.e. a single ship could provide a day's diet of 100,000 men! With Phoenician ships coming and going and with total control over the Black Sea traderoute and the access to Ukrainian wheat-paradise let alone the abundance of Minor Asia, the Persian army following a low-land coastal approach could provide constantly the army with no problem worth-mentioning by Greek writers.
Did all these several 100,00s men appear in a single battle? Of course not. Add the garissons, add the vanguards and rears, add the personal imperial guards, and of course take into account the terrain certainly Mardonius (the main instigator of these campaigns and general of the Persian army) never managed to amass all that mass in a single field and probably he had never expected to do so. The biggest amassing was in the battle of Platea where a substantial Greek force (them too of 100,000 men) met with Mardonius force that was at least double that number but still no army could had ever involve the total mass of its forces. We know that following Mardonius death Persian generals packed their contingents and rushed out of Europe as quickly as possible being also kicked out from the revolting vassals. That would be certainly the most difficult part of their campaign in terms of provisions but still they would survive simply on smaller ratios and eating some of the uneeded animals.
Nikos
First I do also share the belief of many people here that calculations of human population in antiquity are very inexact not just in Greece and Persia but all over the world and that they are based largely on a mis-conception that world numbers always increased which is simply not true. Even ignoring plagues and wars, birth rates and children mortality they were very variable throughout history even more so if we talk regionally. Certainly for Greece, all data tells us that in antiquity there were more than in medieval times and for this reason I do accept Macedon's parallel with the Byzantine example as a good way to find out. Indeed Byzantines complained of their lower numbers in relation to a more "populous past" but then what is interesting is that even their own numbers were far more than most writers tend to think today. After Gothic raids and during the catastrophic for the Empire reign of Justinian, Hierocles, author of Synecdemus, listed the number of cities up to more than 900, nearly 1000. Contrary to western European standards where cities even as late as Renaissance were incredibly small since 95% of the population lived in rural settings, in Byzantine Empire we casually read about unheard, totally unimportant and totally boring cities here and there having casually 30 and 40,000 citizens. In Greek mainland only, a number of lesser cities like Thebes, Athens, Corinth, Argos till before the late Bulgarian raids were averaging more than 30,000 souls while much later and after huge wars post-saracen, post-bulgarian raids Thessalonika still amassed more than 100,000 (perhaps more than 150,000) souls. Back in pre-Renaissance Eastern Europe and Minor Asia, the worth-mentioning towns and cities had to at least pass the strict cap of 5,000 people but in reality most often by the standards of those days, anything more than 8,000 people. For Greek mainland only, Heriocles mentions 80 (!!!) cities presenting a bustling highly urbanised region that contrasts all the tears Gibbon had wept for the late Roman Empire and the supposed total destruction by barbarians. Given that, Greek mainland had a strict minimum half a million strictly urbanised population but really more close to 1,2 million. Since despite the urbanisation, in all pre-industrialised societies the relation at best could rise at 1 city dweller for 4 rural ones, that results in a an overall population that would be surpassing the 5 million. Is there anyone to suggest that in classical antiquity Greece would have a population smaller than 5 million? Even if we talk about only 1 in 4 Greeks resisting the Persian assault still 1,5 million Greeks could provide easily a 150,000 overall force dispatched together or in parts - Persians knew Greeks were divided by they also knew that in danger they would try to form some kind of union, thus they had tried to sent envoys to all major cities to play them apart.
So given these quite obvious calculations can we imagine that Persians - whose whole Empire was based on numbers - would be unaware of all the above? Wouldn't they calculate an overall Greek force that in a very probable scenario of 1 in 3 resisting would surpass the 150,000 soldiers among them the best Greece had to show when then they already struggled with the Ionian average? And would Persians - who liked to have at least the double numbers even in case of defending and who knew very well that their armies could defeat hoplite armies only if they employed more than double - take the risk invading the Greek mainland with an army only equal to the potential force they could meet either in one or in a series of battles?
It goes without standing that they would calculate at minimum 3 times more the minimum force Greeks could amass. That is an absolute strict minimum of 300,000 men, and in reality more in the region of 400,000 men. From there on if for every 1 soldier you have to have 4 men supporting it, carriers, stock-responsibles, smiths and technicians, cooks then the 100,000s of mariners on the 1000s of ships and so on, the number easily rises to above 1 million and I would say easily more than 1,5 million. Given that at various stages the army would had mobilised here and there a cummulative of more than 2 million people.
Was that feasible? Absolutely! I am amased how easily some are ready to swallow the numbers of migrating Gauls, Goths, Huns and Mongols who were nothing else than a bunch of wandering barbarians that did little calculations and survived by looting the places they invaded and not being able to accept the numbers that the Persian Empire mobilised, which could employ not just confiscation (i.e. Imperial-style looting) not just provisions by supplies from traderoutes but most importantly an overall careful planning.
Speaking in general and not particularly for Greeks and Persians we see in other cultures that even for lower more regional scale warfare the employment of large armies was really casual. The Chinese Sun Tzu writes that any descent army wishing to have any hope should campaign with more than 100,000 soldiers. Of course true that eastern China was really populous and that 1kg of rice may feed more than 1kg of wheat but back then it was not really that much more populous than central Asia, the richest part of the world then, while Sun Tzu wrote this so casually in the sense that he saw the 100,000 number as the limit between a serious army and a bunch of peasants.
You also tend to forget that only in late-19th century with the advent of industrialised technology armies managed to present improved logistics. Up to then, those of the Persian Empire were a prime example. Persians could easily mobilise vast amounts and feed them. They had both the roads and the ships and they could organise local production and according confiscations from own lands and looting from conquered ones. If they did built a bridge over the Bosporus destroying ships that meant they would certainly not pass an army of 80,000 or even 150,000 which they could had simply passed with boats much faster. They passed an extraordinary amount which had to number several 100,000s of fighting men and many others following behind for logistics. They could do it. They had the money.
About the money they had, we have to take into account this: When Alexander raided just one of the 3 main capital cities of the Empire he found in the treasury about 120,000 talents of gold. This was not even the total treasury of the Empire! And this at a time the Empire was in a financial downward spiral. And after all those huge expenses of war and the mobilisation of 100,000s of men! We can easily imagine that in the previous century Persians would have 300 and 400,000 talents to spend. For comparison Athenians only after stealing the money of their allies had managed to gather roughly a mere 10,000 talents which they mostly spent on building projects. That means that Athenians would have less than that 100 years earlier. So if Athenians with 5,000 - 7,000 talents and no developed logistics other than their ships and traderoutes could move around armies and navies of more than 10,000 troops that were more expensive to upkeep than the average Persian soldier in the greater Eastern Mediterranean region, then certainly Persians with an Empire already presenting full logistics enjoying the huge Phoenician navy and with more than 300,000 talents could certainly very easily mobilise 400,000 soldiers which anyway were on average more lightly armed than Athenian ones.
From there one calculate. Water would never be a problem. Food would also not be a problem. Minor Asia and Thrace were 2 days of ship and then you had the amasing Black Sea trade route. We do accept that 1 kg of wheat feeds easily 2 men for a whole day while 1 average sized commercial ship could carry easily a minimum of 50 tons deadweight based on specifications we know for medieval ships that were by no means vastly superior to ancient ones. I.e. a single ship could provide a day's diet of 100,000 men! With Phoenician ships coming and going and with total control over the Black Sea traderoute and the access to Ukrainian wheat-paradise let alone the abundance of Minor Asia, the Persian army following a low-land coastal approach could provide constantly the army with no problem worth-mentioning by Greek writers.
Did all these several 100,00s men appear in a single battle? Of course not. Add the garissons, add the vanguards and rears, add the personal imperial guards, and of course take into account the terrain certainly Mardonius (the main instigator of these campaigns and general of the Persian army) never managed to amass all that mass in a single field and probably he had never expected to do so. The biggest amassing was in the battle of Platea where a substantial Greek force (them too of 100,000 men) met with Mardonius force that was at least double that number but still no army could had ever involve the total mass of its forces. We know that following Mardonius death Persian generals packed their contingents and rushed out of Europe as quickly as possible being also kicked out from the revolting vassals. That would be certainly the most difficult part of their campaign in terms of provisions but still they would survive simply on smaller ratios and eating some of the uneeded animals.
Nikos
