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Greeks always fought outnumbered?
#31
The old Temenid=Greek thing is little more than another "establishment" myth. There are, in fact, various versions of this; the latter being that of the late fifth / early fourth century. There is no problem with accepting this myth as reality just as there is none with the mythical foundation of Athens or most other Greek states.

What is clear is that the poleis Greeks considered only only the royal family as "Greeks" in the classical period and the Macedonians were so much chaff. This remained the same under Philip II as any "treaty" or symmachia would show. Here it was "*name your Greek polis here* and Philip swear to have..." Macedonians never appear. That because they had no say and their basileus spoke for them.

Such "unfree" men could never be acknowledged by the poleis Greeks as "free" men (or citizens if you prefer).

And, yes, the discussion needs to remain in the ancient world: modern lines on maps did not exist then and should not be retrojected.
Paralus|Michael Park

Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους

Wicked men, you are sinning against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander!

Academia.edu
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#32
On that matter I would suggest to first look up the relative threads here on RAT and then expand on them. This does not seem the place and much valuable input, questions and answers, has already been posted that could be helpful.
Macedon
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#33
Quote:The old Temenid=Greek thing is little more than another "establishment" myth. There are, in fact, various versions of this; the latter being that of the late fifth / early fourth century. There is no problem with accepting this myth as reality just as there is none with the mythical foundation of Athens or most other Greek states...

I agree there are different views. There are plenty of historic references, however, such as from the Oracle at Delphi (alledgedly) to Perdikkas about searching out some new land for the Temenids:

"Illustrious Temenidai have royal rule over a wealth-producing land; for it is the gift of Zeus, bearer of the goatskin shield. But you (i.e. Perdikkas), go to the Bouteid land of many flocks, and where you see shiny-horned, snow-white goats encumbent in their sleep make sacrifice to the blessed gods and found the city of your state upon the level ground of that land"

And of course this 'Goat Town' was Aigiai [Aegeae] (earlier Phrygian Edessa) and seemingly later Vergina. The Makedonian royals believed this to be the case, and I see no reason to challenge that reasoning, with something which is equally incontestable from the opposite point of view. Perdikkas I was seen to be the leader of the Argiadai tribe. The combined tribes became known as the Makedones, under the leadership of the Temenidai kings. Later, Alexander I of Makedon of course successfully proclaimed his right to enter the Olympic games as a Hellene. I recognise that Hesiod tried to neatly give every tribe a mythic related founding eponymous ancestor - but the fact that he included these 'highlanders' into that equation perhaps is revealing?

Thukydides seemed to believe there were three distinct groups. The first and foremost being the conquering Makedones under their Temenid leaders. I have always believed this first group to be homogeneous and inclined to expell 'others' they encountered, rather than mingling with them in Lower Makedonia. The second group were also Makedones but wandering more nomadic (less settled) inhabitants of Upper Makedonia. The third group seemed to have been the others they encountered and often displaced.

I recognise I am pushing my luck now because this is wandering from the original thread subject - but perhaps that subject has been exhausted anyway? And this is an equally fascinating subject which deserves to be somewhere.
[size=75:2kpklzm3]Ghostmojo / Howard Johnston[/size]

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[size=75:2kpklzm3]Xerxes - "What did the guy in the pass say?" ... Scout - "Μολὼν λαβέ my Lord - and he meant it!!!"[/size]
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#34
I think it's fair to say that we oughtn't continue this here too, I just wanted to post and say that I'm not ignoring Ghost Mojo or anyone, just recognizing the validity of Macedon's comment.

To the topic at hand I would like to reiterate the analysis of the hydapses found in Bosworth's book. I seem to remember problems with the numbers at the Granikos too, though I don't have my notes to hand. Unfortunately I only really know about Alexander/Early Hellenistic in this area.
Jass
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#35
Quote:I recognise I am pushing my luck now because this is wandering from the original thread subject - but perhaps that subject has been exhausted anyway? And this is an equally fascinating subject which deserves to be somewhere.

Some of the best discussions result from slight divergences from the subject. George is likely right though: I think this is discussed elsewhere (but am too lazy to go find it!)

Thucydides does report that part of the "foundation" tale. It is not the only time that this "serious and critical" historian includes such "asides". His most interesting comment is when he clearly discriminates between Perdiccas' Greek hoplites, hetairoi and the rest of the Macedonian forces (for the tilt at Lyncestis in the 420's) which he refers to as a "mass of barbarians".

I'd suggest that reflects the view of the poleis Greeks.

Quote:To the topic at hand I would like to reiterate the analysis of the hydapses found in Bosworth's book. I seem to remember problems with the numbers at the Granikos too, though I don't have my notes to hand. Unfortunately I only really know about Alexander/Early Hellenistic in this area.

I have it but am at the office. As I recall Bosworth argues that the centre force may only have been the "Grecian mercenaries" as the taxeis of Meleagher, Attalus and Gorgias are not specifically mentioned as being with their taxiarchs. He postulates that they were away elsewhere. This is, of course, possible given that taxeis seemed to be detached under different commanders over the Indian campaign.

Arguing against that is the fact that Coenus' hipparchy - which takes the left in the battle - is not named at all in the forces that cross with Alexander but clearly was there. I'd think that the named taxiarchs had their taxeis with them as well as the mercenaries given Alexander left two taxeis with Craterus.
Paralus|Michael Park

Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους

Wicked men, you are sinning against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander!

Academia.edu
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#36
Something like a year ago we had a discussion here

Much was said with the occasional misunderstanding and tension that crops up in such discussions but in a generally good spirit.
Macedon
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#37
Quote:Something like a year ago we had a discussion here

Much was said with the occasional misunderstanding and tension that crops up in such discussions but in a generally good spirit.

Yes indeed we did - and I should remember (but I didn't) because I started it!!! :oops: :lol: and after just wading through all five pages again I realise I finished it too! :wink:
[size=75:2kpklzm3]Ghostmojo / Howard Johnston[/size]

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[size=75:2kpklzm3]Xerxes - "What did the guy in the pass say?" ... Scout - "Μολὼν λαβέ my Lord - and he meant it!!!"[/size]
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#38
Back to the initial question about Greek army numbers, it is generally true that in most cases Greeks fought outnumbered. This is not even any observation of the classical era but actually extends throughout the Greek history, ancient, medieval and modern.

This does not oversees the fact that in number of battles, Greeks were overnumbering the enemy - afterall in their first known campaign that emerges from the myths, the Trojan war, Greeks seem to had flocked around the sieged city in important numbers (difficult of course to state ifTroy and its allies had gathered or not a sizeable army but still Achaians as siege attackers should be more).

Now, there are explanations for Greeks coming in low numbers. First, of all this was due to the geography and political situation. Not only in the ancient world but in later history too, Greeks came for the most in divided regions where the most important would not be to field as many soldiers as possible but actually to save as many as possible men for... (agricultural) production and (generation) reproduction purposes! Communities that did not do it faced the danger of annihilation afterall. Hence, Greeks tended to field smaller compact armies which were drilled to do the task in the most efficient way.

The development of hoplite tactics since the 7th century actually derived from the need to use as less as possible men from the mass of citizens in the most efficient way putting as less as possible lifes in risk. Hoplite tactics caused ferocious battles which however ended in relatively few dead. Archers, slingers (and light troops till the latest developments Iphicrates times) did usually little more than harass causing very few fatalities upon the bronze clad hoplites. Battle was ending when the ranks of the opponent were broken and his men (8 out of 10 times) fleed the field. The dead would come only from the first 2-3 lines of each side thus often numbering a total of no more than a couple of hundred men from each side if talking about armies passing the 5000 cap.

Now since the question is largely more in relation to fighting foreigners this has 2 angles: the defensive and the offensive.

And Greeks were rarely really on the offensive. If talking about colonies in east and west that had to be seen being in the offensive while being defensive over their coastal towns - largely outnumbered by the surrouding enemies (first example that comes to mind is Massalia, Nikea, Cannes in France that resisted for centuries the Gaulic attacks mostly via a combination of military defenses and local alliances finally resolving to permanent treaty with Romans for protection, that being the first Roman move towards their empire-building). The only main Greek offensive - practically their only historical main offensive was Alexander's campaign where again compared to the opponents, Alexander's forces were ridiculously outnumbered. Of course in particular battles, like the famous "Persian Gates" where Ariobarzan with a small army (possibly less than 5,000) tried to block the one half of Alexander's army (about 15,000 men) or again while subduing Pakistan-Afganistan, Alexander could have faced in battles smaller tribes. But in that kind of warfare of attrition, you have to see the bigger picture too: 35,000 Greeks wandering alone in the depths of Asia among millions of most often than not angered locals of the short of... nasty Afganis, not friendly kind Phrygians with little hope of finding friends and allies (though Alexander used that to the maximum possible with great success). Not easy. From there one, the other famous offensive (though it should be seen really as defensive) is the Epirotan king Pyrros campaign to Italy where he was outnumbered by Romans at 1 to 5 if speaking for an overall army and on average about 2 to 3 or 4 to 5 if speaking for individual battles - Romans managed to win by continuously losing battles in a war of attrition, a tactic that became a main-game for Romans later too.

In terms of the defensive, it cannot be more obvious: 10 out of 10 times Greeks had to defend outnumbered and the primary reason is geographic: to invade such a difficult terrain like mountainous Greece one needs anyway a massive army so as to be able to block all strategic points and press upon the locals who may defend passages (Thermopyles during the massive Persian invasion comes first to mind) fairly proficiently with extremely small armies. The massive Gaulic raid that fielded armies as big as the Persian invasion becomes the next obvious example. Even the Roman invasion implied the use of repeated campaigns of minimum 30,000-40,000 men (i.e. the maximum number that the biggest individual Greek states could assemble) again and again over a long period of time that no Greek state, not even Macedonia that was still the most powerfull of them, could had ever undertaken.

In Greek history, the only exception of the rule was the Eruli-Gothic invasions of the 3rd and 4th centuries AD where small and badly armed armies of Germanic looters raided (among other) parts of Greece but then this was not only due to the lack of Roman Imperial defenses in Greece (for obvious political reasons) but also due to the intricate Roman political in-fighting as well as the dubious position of the rising christian sect which is known in the latter case particularly to have "opened the doors" on every single case since "looting the pagans" offered them the chance to rise on top.

In later Byzantine history - if we are to include Greeks as a main part of the Byzantine armies, still we see that for the most of it the Empire held minimal military force in comparison to the huge earlier Roman armies and fielded usually bits of it at a time apparently with great effectiveness for the most.

Even later, in their war of independence Greeks had to field much much smaller armies against the massive Ottoman force with notable examples the battle of Dervenakia where 7,500 rebels faced 45,000 Ottomans and the battle of Gravia inn where 118 rebels barricaded inside an inn incircled by 8,000 Ottomans - both battles ending victorious for the Greeks surprisingly!!!

Perhaps the battle of the Gravia inn is the most prime worldwide example of "being outnumbered", yet rebels managed to slay/maim the 1/10th of the opponents and escape out of the siege!!!
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#39
Hi Nikos,
Quote:In Greek history, the only exception of the rule was the Eruli-Gothic invasions of the 3rd and 4th centuries AD where small and badly armed armies of Germanic looters raided (among other) parts of Greece but then this was not only due to the lack of Roman Imperial defenses in Greece (for obvious political reasons) but also due to the intricate Roman political in-fighting as well as the dubious position of the rising christian sect which is known in the latter case particularly to have "opened the doors" on every single case since "looting the pagans" offered them the chance to rise on top.
Now those are some VERY bold statements. Please provide more details (and preferably sources) for:
- "only exception of the rule was the Eruli-Gothic invasions of the 3rd and 4th centuries AD". Were those the only exceptions? How about Huns and Goths during the 5th century? Or Bulgarians and Avars during the 6th (and I could name a few more) and afterwards?
- "due to the lack of Roman Imperial defenses in Greece (for obvious political reasons)". Confusedhock: Sorry, but you really have to explain this one. Why would there be 'obvious political reasons' for any lack of defences in Greece. As compared to other parts of the Empire where this was not the case? Please explain that, and why other regions far removed from a border (say, Spain, southern Gaul, southern Italy) were defended better whereas Greece (in your opinion) was not?
- "the dubious position of the rising christian sect which is known in the latter case particularly to have "opened the doors" on every single case since "looting the pagans" offered them the chance to rise on top". Confusedhock: You will have to do better that that. Please provide sources for that - both for the treason against their cities as well as the reasons to do this. And please do better than your modern view on things, or claims of 'logic'.

Quote:In later Byzantine history - if we are to include Greeks as a main part of the Byzantine armies, still we see that for the most of it the Empire held minimal military force in comparison to the huge earlier Roman armies and fielded usually bits of it at a time apparently with great effectiveness for the most.
I really doubt whether you can compare 'Byzantine' to Classical Greek times. This was a society shaped by centuries of Roman culture, and it's policies, especially on the army, did not change overnight, but consisted for centuries along a similar path. 'Byzantine' is a relatively modern German invention, which you should have known when you are concerned with posts about who called whom 'Greek', surely? They did for sure not call themselves 'Byzantine' or 'Greek', and were adressed as 'Romanoi' by others.

Anyway, Late Roman military policy was quite the same during the 4th century as it was under Justinian or later 'Greek' emperors where it came to army nimbers: Justinian even managed to go on the offensive with those small armies. It was also the achilles heel of Medieval Roman policies - a continuous shortage of manpower meant a continuous policy of defense.
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THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
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#40
Hi Robert, thanks for the precise comments,

My comments were meant to be of more general nature aiming to present some very few examples of invasions into the Aegean territory of smaller armies (i.e. let us say smaller than 30-40,000 troops) - these being the exception rather than the general rule which wants mountainous regions to be successfully invaded only with big enough armies. Avars and Bulgarians did a couple of major raids but certainly the average size of their armies was larger

When I referred to the 1st Eruli campaign, that was the first incursion in mid-3rd century when an alliance of Eruli and Goths passed from the black sea and raided the Aegean onboard 500 ships. If a ship carried on average 50 fighters the overall fighting force should be well below 30,000 men while we have to count also their losses since they had lost the first battle before escaping to loot mostly unprotected islands and cities. By all means, the 2nd Eruli campaign of the next decade was much larger.

The later Gothic raid of the end of 4th century refers to the feat of Alarich that passed with not much more than a mid-sized (and not so well armed) army of 20,000 men with particular ease and raided many Greek cities before "escaping" to the north, being armed by the Roman state itself to finally end up raiding the Italic peninsula and Rome itself.

The events are clear and given the general knowledge of participants in the forum, I do did not think they required much more details to support my basic viewpoint (i.e. reference of mountainous terrain to numbers for attackers/defenders).

On the question of Roman politics in terms of the protection of the Aegean space or any other Roman territory for that matter, my comment was right on the spot:

Rome's 1st priority was never the protection of its citizens but rather the maintenance of the status quo and the continuation of Roman control over traderoutes. Until quite late cities and regions were not meant to have their own developed defenses but a simple police-like guard, the case of even those Greek states allied to Rome that provided some militia-type troops as auxiliaries to the Roman Imperial army. Smart move, otherwise Emperors would have to face frequent rebellions like later Eastern Romans had to face with the thematic regional armies.

By the end of the 2nd century things were even more complicated. Various politico-religious fractions (with christians the most prominent) fought inside the Empire while Goths were enterring inside initially either as refugees or illegal intruders and then turning either as mercenaries or as looters. In both cases, their apparent use by the Roman aristocracy was being a tool to be used against citizens of the Empire. This was more than obvious in the latter case of Alarich's raid in Greece. To add up on the political aspect of the event and the notable indifference of the state to protect its citizens (on the contrary...) you had the inner complications with the division of the two parts of the Empire, the antagonisms, the jealousy between emperors (like Arcadius) and generals (like the germanic Stilicho who dreamt but could not become an Emperor) and even further implications with the dominance of the christian aristocracy with its eunuch "councelors" (of the type of Eutychius). The christian aristocracy were a class of people for whom the greatest enemy were not really the already christianised Goths (even if by an opposing fraction, Arians) but the large mass (vast majority if speaking for the Aegean region) of pagan Greek populations.

One must be totally ignorant to these factors that played a huge role in the unexpected but eventual success of the Gothic raiders. It is not afterall accidental that the pre-gothic-raid christian-related findings in the region are totally insignificant while the first notable christianic presence (in the form of smaller temples turned into churches) rises in the period right after these raids. The christian roman officer responsible for guarding the passage of Thermopyles who welcomed the Goths has to be seen as the general rule - on how many other passages or cities christians gave "the keys" to the hands of their "brothers" Goths is unknown but quite apparent.

That era is another hot potato that historians do not touch or when they touch it they tend to get too pro-christian or too anti-christian or too pro-roman or too pro-germanic while this was simple a case of an Empire maintaining its status quo over the international traderoutes by means of managing inner and outer "issues" at one g
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#41
And to link the above back to the initial issue, the main argument I presented previously is that in a geographically complex region that is Greece (1000s of mountains and islands packed in a small space), the geomorphology shapes not only the cultural and political aspects but above all the military aspects for both the locals and the wanabe invaders.

The mountainous regions benefit the defender and the application of smaller armies, that is a general rule. The attacker needs to either attract local co-operation and go in politically (like Romans did - them too took almost a century to subdue the region despite having mostly friends there) or if really enterring with a head on military effort (like Persians, Gauls, Avars, Bulgarians did) then massive numbers in repeated campaigns are required and in all aforementioned paradigms the invaders eventually broke their backbones. 2 successful invaders like the Latins, Turks present particular details but even more agree with the general rule since Latins enterred politically via the Eastern Roman aristocracy inviting them, then breaking their numbers to small looting armies raiding wherever they could, still failing blatantly to obtain full control of more than a 20-30% of lands thus clinging on to the strategic key points only, while Turks that initially were favoured by Empire's civil war took 200 employing mostly military-failures-but-political-victiories and other 200 years after the end of the Empire by the Latins to subdue the region which they only partially did in the late 17th century (fall of south Peloponesus and Crete), and this only after employing massive numbers of tactical army plus the practically endless militia they could raise anywhere.

I guess 3000 of well-monitored historic record (best we have worldwide for the matters) gives us a good statistical approach as for the above argumentation to underline the effect of the geomorphology and how Greeks tended to present smaller numbers, even when they were briefly united under any banner, and still be so successful, having developed strategies and tactics tailored to that kind of approach.

I guess the exact opposite of the above approach is the Persian-Early/mid-Roman-Ottoman approach according to which throwing successive waves of massive armies always bring victory at the end. It is a wholly different approach. The first defends. The latter builds Empires. Ironically the post-Justinian continuation of the Roman Empire inscribed itself mostly to the first rather than to the latter approach thus they never attempted (or never were tempted by) Empire building.
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#42
Quote:I guess the exact opposite of the above approach is the Persian-Early/mid-Roman-Ottoman approach according to which throwing successive waves of massive armies always bring victory at the end.

I'd like to dispute this.
1) The Achaemenids didn't really rely on mass of numbers as much as on consistent cavalry superiority, which allowed them to defeat infantry forces through flanking, and a missile superiority over cavalry oriented armies;
2) The Romans relied not on numbers of expendable troops, but rather had a much thicker reserve in case of defeat;
3) The Ottomans were usually on the offensive strategically, but tactically they usually adopted a defensive formation suited for moving down enemies with superior firepower.

None of these started out with superior numbers either.
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#43
Hi Nikos,

Quote: Avars and Bulgarians did a couple of major raids but certainly the average size of their armies was larger
That would explain your comment. However, I doubt that the Heruli and Gothic forces were so much smaller than the Hun, Avar or Bulgar armies that I mentioned.

Quote: Rome's 1st priority was never the protection of its citizens but rather the maintenance of the status quo and the continuation of Roman control over traderoutes.
Although I agree that these routes were of great importance, your view on Roman strategy does not compare to what we can learn from history. For centuries, Roman military defense was placed at the border, not along the trade routes. I agree that it was not centered on civilian settlements either, but then that’s not my position, you brought that up.
My initial thought was that you had some anti-Greek policy in mind – glad to hear that that was not the case.

Your comments about Christianity continue to mystify me.

Quote: [..] Goths were enterring inside initially either as refugees or illegal intruders and then turning either as mercenaries or as looters. In both cases, their apparent use by the Roman aristocracy was being a tool to be used against citizens of the Empire.
More mysteries. Can you name me a source that claims this?

Quote: generals (like the germanic Stilicho who dreamt but could not become an Emperor)
Stilicho was a Roman. Of Germanic descent, sure, but fully raised as a Roman. Don’t be fooled by his name or later propaganda. Stilicho never wanted to become an emperor, he knew his limits. He instead meant to set up his daughter as spouse of an emperor.

Quote: ). The christian aristocracy were a class of people for whom the greatest enemy were not really the already christianised Goths (even if by an opposing fraction, Arians) but the large mass (vast majority if speaking for the Aegean region) of pagan Greek populations.
Now you did it again. Once more a wild, generalizing claim, without the slightest bit of support. Where it was in fact clear that Catholic Christians hated Arian Christians more than pagans (for they were bad but savable, whereas Arians were heretics in their eyes), I see no proof for
a) the Christianaized aristoracy turning en mass against pagans or
b) the vast Aegean population being pagan, or prosecuted during the 4th century.

If we’re going into a discussion about Greeks and Christianity, I’d love to open a new thread btw.

I did not ask for an explanation about the internal affairs of the Roman state, only for an example for that claim of yours, in which Christian supposedly opened the gates to barbarians in order to harm their pagan fellow-citizens.

Quote: One must be totally ignorant to these factors that played a huge role in the unexpected but eventual success of the Gothic raiders.
Must One? One thinks not.

Quote: It is not afterall accidental that the pre-gothic-raid christian-related findings in the region are totally insignificant while the first notable christianic presence (in the form of smaller temples turned into churches) rises in the period right after these raids.
It’s one thing to know the precise date of such buildings in relation to these raids, it’s quite another to link the raids to the disappearance of paganism in the region, one quite another thing to suppose that the raids were used to that end!


Quote: The christian roman officer responsible for guarding the passage of Thermopyles who welcomed the Goths has to be seen as the general rule - on how many other passages or cities christians gave "the keys" to the hands of their "brothers" Goths is unknown but quite apparent.
Sorry, but now your argument is rambling.
One, to suppose that the one officer was a Christian who supported the Goths’ raiding of pagans (I suppose they skipped Christians and their possessions?) is pure guesswork.
Two, to state that this case was exemplary and a general rule is worse than guesswork, it’s completely unproven.
Three, I suppose that you think that Ephialtes betraying the Spartans to the Persians at that very spot has to be seen as a general rule of hatred towards Athenians and Spartans and a policy of using the Persians to that end?
Three, as you admit, you have no knowledge of any other incident in which the Goths were admitted by Christians (even this incident is not an example thereof), yet you boldly state that it was “quite apparent”. That, my dear Nikos, is a false claim.

Quote: That era is another hot potato that historians do not touch or when they touch it they tend to get too pro-christian or too anti-christian or too pro-roman or too pro-germanic while this was simple a case of an Empire maintaining its status quo over the international traderoutes by means of managing inner and outer "issues" at one g
I’m not sure what you mean. Historians do not treat this period as a ‘hot potato’, I wish I had the fund to buy all the books written about this very period. Nor are the ones who do write about it as a rule so subjective that they are “get too pro-christian or too anti-christian or too pro-roman or too pro-germanic”. I fear, dear Nikos, that you simply have as yet not read enough publications. :wink:
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
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#44
Yes, indeed none of thee lot Persians, Romans, Ottomans started with big numbers but their Empires were only built when the big numbers came. Just picture Romans or Ottomans without the several 100,000s of troops they possessed even prior to their Empires - how far would they go? Chances are, you would not even know their names today. However you know very well one that did much more with much less, he happens to be the most well known figure in human history. He used the 1/10th of their numbers, took him less than 10 years, not 400 years, to make an Empire and at the end a great % of his initial army men were still alive and kicking, this despite having given innumerable battles on the top of major pitched encounters facing massive armies. Well, this is the thing about "efficiency"

Now, compare Alexander's effort with Roman one - 300 to 400 years to establish an Empire, keeping an enormous standing army ranging from the pre-Imperial 250,000 to the Imperial 550,000 or more despite their Empire was around a sea-lake (i.e. normally they could move much more quickly their troops). They were repeatedly losing more than Alexander's total army in single battles and their own historic record admits 9 out of 10 "first contact" type battles ending in their defeat, often a terrible one.

Now I know there are excuses of the type "Romans never used full force at once". True that they usually sent just a bit more than the opponent, they were good managers in that sense, but the efficiency of these armies was so low that they never managed to solve a situation in less than 50 to 100 years and without employing a total of successive waves of armies surpassing the 100 to 150,000 troops. Which has nothing to do with "tactical efficiency" - if you have it you have it and you just go and hit and take it in a year, 2 years, maximum 4-5 years. When you do not have it you sit and play the waiting game "He has 20,000 I have 200,000, bit by bit he will fall".

It is for this reason, I do believe that TACTICALLY (i.e. not strategically speaking) the most overrated army in history has been the (300B.C.-200 A.D.Roman one.

To comprehend this you have to stick to the definition of "tactical efficiency":

Tactical efficiency means
1) Employing as few as possible men
2) Spend as less as possible time
3) Win as many as possible battles/enemies while wasting as less as possible men

Strategic efficiency means
1) Spend whatever it takes and with a strategic depth that aims at your rise, today or tomorrow (and that can be generations in future) to a position of control over as many as possible

Now Greek armies aimed for tactical efficiency, this surprisingly including the Eastern Roman one which was actually the continuation of the earlier "high-consumption" Roman army. Roman (just like later Ottoman armies) were merely the military parts of a wider strategic. That does not mean that Roman or Ottoman forces had no tactical merits on their own but that in Roman and Ottoman armies, the tactical efficiency was not the point at all in the first place so the armies per-number-of-soldiers could never be even remotedly as efficient as the armies of ancient and medieval Greeks (as main part of Eastern Romans), medieval English (ref. to 100-years war with France) or the Swiss (Swiss pikemen) or the Spanish (tercios etc.) or the Swedish (first modern rifle army).

Romans were constructed on the basis of own troops plus vassals plus allies plus mercenaries (and later Ottomans were like that, Mongols too similarly). And as the ONLY efficient strategy in Empire building dictates, it suffices not to win just like that but to win while also having "consumed" vassals, allies, and mercenaries. Having the fist 2 being slaughtered by the enemy takes them out from being potential threats in future. Consuming the last one saves you from having to pay them salaries in future or even worse them going elsewhere where they give more.

Tactical efficiency/inefficiency, strategic depth/superficiality. We have to really stick to the definitions in this talk to avoid misconceptions. It goes without saying that in real-life, tactical-efficiency is a minor detail and what matters is the all-included strategy. Romans were much more successful in the long run than most of the aforementioned lot of armies (in the exception of Eastern Romans) but speaking only of tactical efficiency (which is measured in numbers) they were, to put it mildly, mediocre.

Nikos (Νικόλαος)
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#45
Quote:Yes, indeed none of thee lot Persians, Romans, Ottomans started with big numbers but their Empires were only built when the big numbers came.
Not really:
1. The Persians rose from obscurity, in literally just a few years. Under Cyrus the Great a tribe of goat-herding nomads conquered three giant empires.
2. The Romans rose mainly through their willingness to adapt and utter stubbornness. They refused to ever give up, and every new conquest gave them new targets to conquer.
3. The Ottmans rose from a group of opportunistic raiders, scrubbing away at the territories of the Roman "empire".
Quote: Just picture Romans or Ottomans without the several 100,000s of troops they possessed even prior to their Empires - how far would they go? Chances are, you would not even know their names today.

And? It's just natural that larger states have larger forces. Why not field masses of troops if you can?
Quote:However you know very well one that did much more with much less, he happens to be the most well known figure in human history. He used the 1/10th of their numbers, took him less than 10 years, not 400 years, to make an Empire and at the end a great % of his initial army men were still alive and kicking, this despite having given innumerable battles on the top of major pitched encounters facing massive armies. Well, this is the thing about "efficiency"
Alexander? Alexander had a very large army by the standards of the day. If we look at logistics realistically, it is quite obvious not a single ancient army in the field could have exceeded 70 thousand men at most. And 47 thousand was a massive army by ancient standards.
Quote:Now, compare Alexander's effort with Roman one - 300 to 400 years to establish an Empire, keeping an enormous standing army ranging from the pre-Imperial 250,000 to the Imperial 550,000 or more despite their Empire was around a sea-lake (i.e. normally they could move much more quickly their troops). They were repeatedly losing more than Alexander's total army in single battles and their own historic record admits 9 out of 10 "first contact" type battles ending in their defeat, often a terrible one.
Rome didn't rise from one fluke, it was a concentrated effort by generation upon generation. Much like the Ottomans. The Achaemenids, however...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyrus_the_Great
Let's just say "been there, done that".
Quote:Now I know there are excuses of the type "Romans never used full force at once". True that they usually sent just a bit more than the opponent, they were good managers in that sense, but the efficiency of these armies was so low that they never managed to solve a situation in less than 50 to 100 years and without employing a total of successive waves of armies surpassing the 100 to 150,000 troops. Which has nothing to do with "tactical efficiency" - if you have it you have it and you just go and hit and take it in a year, 2 years, maximum 4-5 years. When you do not have it you sit and play the waiting game "He has 20,000 I have 200,000, bit by bit he will fall".
I still don't get what's wrong with using numbers when you have them.
Quote:It is for this reason, I do believe that TACTICALLY (i.e. not strategically speaking) the most overrated army in history has been the (300B.C.-200 A.D.Roman one.
I would say they were perfectly capable tactically. As were the Ottos and Achies. They just don't get as much good rep nowadays. Numbers are just another advantage. It's like saying "oh, but they're such cowards, using their strengths!".
Quote:To comprehend this you have to stick to the definition of "tactical efficiency":

Tactical efficiency means
1) Employing as few as possible men
Not really. That's a gamble. The most efficient strategy is to come prepared, with every advantage in your hand. If you can have lots of good troops, you have no reason not to use them to accomplish your tactical and strategic goals.
Quote:2) Spend as less as possible time
Only if there is any strategic circumstance pressing you to achieve tactical victory ASAP. If there isn't, this is moot. Like at Carrhae - the Parthians won a flawless victory, achieved every one of their objectives, using the time as an advantage. They were on home ground. Well supplied and pretty much safe from retaliation. They had no reason to rush things.
Quote:3) Win as many as possible battles/enemies while wasting as less as possible men
Not really. It seems to me that you don't see that tactics are tied to strategy. You base your tactics on what you need to achieve strategically. The ultimate goal is victory, and one which hurts the enemy more than you.
Quote:Strategic efficiency means
1) Spend whatever it takes and with a strategic depth that aims at your rise, today or tomorrow (and that can be generations in future) to a position of control over as many as possible
Oh god. That may be a part of a specific strategy, but it doesn't apply to any strategy. Strategic efficiency is when you utilize your advantages to the fullest. That's it.
Quote:Now Greek armies aimed for tactical efficiency, this surprisingly including the Eastern Roman one which was actually the continuation of the earlier "high-consumption" Roman army. Roman (just like later Ottoman armies) were merely the military parts of a wider strategic. That does not mean that Roman or Ottoman forces had no tactical merits on their own but that in Roman and Ottoman armies, the tactical efficiency was not the point at all in the first place so the armies per-number-of-soldiers could never be even remotedly as efficient as the armies of ancient and medieval Greeks (as main part of Eastern Romans), medieval English (ref. to 100-years war with France) or the Swiss (Swiss pikemen) or the Spanish (tercios etc.) or the Swedish (first modern rifle army).
You seem to be very confined in your tactical and strategic mindset. Again, any good strategist will tell you that if you have an advantage, you better press it. Because it is best not to take any chances.
Quote:Romans were constructed on the basis of own troops plus vassals plus allies plus mercenaries (and later Ottomans were like that, Mongols too similarly). And as the ONLY efficient strategy in Empire building dictates, it suffices not to win just like that but to win while also having "consumed" vassals, allies, and mercenaries. Having the fist 2 being slaughtered by the enemy takes them out from being potential threats in future. Consuming the last one saves you from having to pay them salaries in future or even worse them going elsewhere where they give more.
Yes. The auxiliaries are always the first ones to die.
Quote:Tactical efficiency/inefficiency, strategic depth/superficiality. We have to really stick to the definitions in this talk to avoid misconceptions. It goes without saying that in real-life, tactical-efficiency is a minor detail and what matters is the all-included strategy. Romans were much more successful in the long run than most of the aforementioned lot of armies (in the exception of Eastern Romans) but speaking only of tactical efficiency (which is measured in numbers) they were, to put it mildly, mediocre.

Nikos (Νικόλαος)
Except that they were perfectly capable of beating your so called "tactically efficient" Hellenistic armies, time after time after time. They simply adapted to facing them.
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