Use of whistles to relay commands in battle

[Bryan]

Macedon and Brent,

It seems there are now three things one does not speak about in public: Religion, Politics and historically uncited assumptions of small unit tactics of the Army of the Roman Republic We all heard the quote about how arguing on the internet is like participating in the Special olympics. So now I am back to strictly asking questions cause this "defending your statements" is hard work.

Brent, hope the books work out, would love to read a draft. I am actually doing research on my own novel.

[Brent Nielsen]

Macedon: We have worn out the whistle thing. Done deal. Ya need to read th earlier threads to see where that went. New thread on Sinistere/dextere would be good. New/old thread on Polybian/Marian formations in the Legions is really necessary, but I would prefer to read and observe, then get back to writing book three. I don't have the references at hand to defend my position, and my job drains me from working on my real passion after I spend a couple hours responding to Bryan's very excellent arguements. Glad to have you back my friend. I was very worried about you, with the crap going on in your country! Your a good man and a very valuable resource on this site! I have to work early so I amsigning off! Ave!

[Brent Nielsen]

Bryan: Only when I have to argue with someone as smart as you, without references on-hand to back me up! Gotta get to bed....long day tomorrow. This is exactly the place to discuss small unit tactics in the army of the SPQR!This is why I joined!
BTW: number six soldier: detached to guard the baggage camp and number five, detached to work catapults! HAHAHA!

[Macedon]

Macedon and Brent,

It seems there are now three things one does not speak about in public: Religion, Politics and historically uncited assumptions of small unit tactics of the Army of the Roman Republic We all heard the quote about how arguing on the internet is like participating in the Special olympics. So now I am back to strictly asking questions cause this "defending your statements" is hard work.

Brent, hope the books work out, would love to read a draft. I am actually doing research on my own novel.

? I do not understand how I have urged you to not discuss theories by simply stating that I would like see this discussion have a thread of its own... :?: :?:

In this forum, suggesting and discussing theories that are not supported by sources is very usual, since most of us are also re-enactors and share ideas, evaluations and other observations that crop up during training and that have nothing to do with the actual sources or archaeological evidence, so know that we do not shun or discourage such theories. They are always a basis for a good, wholesome discussion.

[Robert Vermaat]

At the risk of having to split this thread and create a new one myself... :wink:

Centuries eight men deep as fighting units wouldn't work. Formation lacks depth, maneuverability and hitting power.

Why? there's plenty of documentation (which I am going to try and dig up, honest!) of formations being 4 (half-file), 8 (file) or 16 (double file) deep. Perhaps not 4 when confronted by 100.000 screaming Germans (which is a LOT of Germans, although they weren't exactly all trained for war, as previously suggested by someone), but depending on the opposing force.

Lets look at a typical file of the 1st line:
1st soldier - Veteran killing machine
2nd soldier - Same
3rd soldier - Motivated soldier with decent fighting abilities
4th soldier - Somewhat motivated soldier with OK abilities
5th soldier - Doesn't want to fight any longer, only joined cause he was levied
6th soldier - Terrified of fighting/dying. (even in ancient Rome not everyone was tough)
7th soldier - Slot open, soldier wounded severely in sword sharpening accident
8th soldier - Slot open, soldier dead from fever

The Strategicon describes such a file, and recommends that, in order to ensure that the formation can make a turn in place when attacked by an enemy from behind, or split down the middle, the file closers should also be motivated soldiers. They could also serve in a capacity to 'motivate' the soldiers in the rear of the file.
Anyway, the point i want to make is that the formation is always 4, 8 or 16 deep, so when there's a manpower shortage, the front become smaller - the depth always remains the same.

So now we have an entire front line of this. And they are fighting against a phalanx 16 deep, or Germans in shield wall 50 deep.

A phalanx of 16 I can imagine, but whereever did you find a description of a germanic shield wall with a formation depth of 50 ?!?? hock: Unimaginable. My guess would be that this never exceeded more than 4 to 8, the rest swarmed around - Germanic tribes never had the Roman's training nor discipline.

For sake of argument the length of lines of both forces are equal. And for the record I am pretty sure the enemy wasn't standing still when the enemy hit them, they went forward to. Both sides would charge and both sides threw missiles. Greek phalanx had slingers, archers. The germans/celts are generally given extra lighter spears to throw.

Ah, but here we have a big difference. Greek hopltes never threw missiles, only their light support troops did. Germans never had anything but javelins, which soon ran out (next to some archers perhaps. The Romans on the other hand not only had heavy missiles in every front rank (pilum, or later plumbata), but were know to sustain a constant rate of missile fire with javelins, slingers, archers throughout the battle.

Exactly how do the Roman's win?
Easy, they don't. Not if they fight in one line. When the two sides collide the men in the first couple ranks will fight like demons while the men in the rear panic when they see the insurmountable odds they face. Remember, war is psychological. Men see for their 6 man deep file they face 16-50 men. Not going through them so the only way is backwards.

If you present it like that, they will of course fail do to the odds being heavily against them. But Romans often fought in line; before, during and after the development of the manipular system. Roman infantry from the Tetrarchy and after was known for an immense steadfastness, even when outnumbered. So to the contrary, they could (and did) win.

(but I thought Romans were unstoppable...)

A well-groomed Roman myth, but unsupported by historical records. :wink:

So now you take 100,000 Germanic warriors, all who spend their entire lives training for battle, and you put them against your entire line of centuries 8 deep (but they wouldn't be because of casualties/sickness/desertions). So actually 6 deep. Or 8 deep with replacements from those of the second or third line who are now running at 40% manpower instead of 80% and who would probably not send their best men anyway because what commander/centurion sends his best men away right before a battle? I don't need to be a Roman general to figure out how this situation will turn out.

Ah, it was you with that quote about Germanics and training. they didn't. They wer raiders, not training full time for pitched battle. they screamed and ran at the enemy, and when scared they could loose. Big time. As the Cimbri and Teutones eventually did.

Back to your general: he would never have deployed his men like that. If he did, it would be suicide. So he would choose for 16 deep, preferably in three lines.
Like I said above, a formation would not vary in depth due to men being sick or wounded.
I'm afraid your view on how this works is too simplistic, no offense meant.

[Bryan]

Robert Vermaat wrote:
The Strategicon describes such a file, and recommends that, in order to ensure that the formation can make a turn in place when attacked by an enemy from behind, or split down the middle, the file closers should also be motivated soldiers. They could also serve in a capacity to 'motivate' the soldiers in the rear of the file.
Anyway, the point i want to make is that the formation is always 4, 8 or 16 deep, so when there's a manpower shortage, the front become smaller - the depth always remains the same.

So your basing what happened in 100 BC on something that was written in the 6th century. So your saying that no military innovation happened between the Romans in the mid Republic period of a civil militia period with politically chosen military commanders to an actual true professional military. The formation is always 4,8,16 men deep, okay show me please.

Robert Vermaat wrote:

A phalanx of 16 I can imagine, but whereever did you find a description of a germanic shield wall with a formation depth of 50 ?!?? Unimaginable. My guess would be that this never exceeded more than 4 to 8, the rest swarmed around - Germanic tribes never had the Roman's training nor discipline.

Four (five if you could the separate ones at Arausio) Roman consular armies had been beaten by the Cimbri/Teutone confederation. Gnaeus Papririus Carbo (C. 113 BC), Marcus Junius Silanius (C. 109 BC), Lucius Cassius Longinus (C. 107 BC), Quintus Servilius Caepio (C. 106 BC) and Mallius Mallius Maximum (C. 105 BC)
So these barbarians just used their size to beat the trained and disciplined Romans. Okay, fine, but since the battlefields aren't known or mentioned in detail by any sources that the terrain would have limited the deployment of the width of the German battleline. Going from Plutarch they numbered over 500,000 with him stating that the numbers were probably more not less. So if the terrain doesn't allow you to add width to fight the Romans it would mean depth. So lets play conservative and say that the germans only showed up to each battle with 150,000 men. In one line of 8 deep that would mean 18,750 files (150,000/8 ). Since the Germans are known to carry shields they probably fought in a shield wall. So we'll give a frontage of three feet for each file. So the Germans with no gaps have a front line of 56,250 feet (3 * 18,750). So you're saying that the Germans would had a front of 10 1/2 miles? My guess, they packed them in with deeper ranks.

Robert Vermaat wrote:

Ah, but here we have a big difference. Greek hopltes never threw missiles, only their light support troops did. Germans never had anything but javelins, which soon ran out (next to some archers perhaps. The Romans on the other hand not only had heavy missiles in every front rank (pilum, or later plumbata), but were know to sustain a constant rate of missile fire with javelins, slingers, archers throughout the battle.

I don't get what you are saying. You concede that the enemies of Rome used slingers, archers and carried javelins. Caesar in De bello Gallico mentions archers. I,7-31 is an example. But then you state that they used them up quicker than the Romans?

Robert Vermaat wrote:

If you present it like that, they will of course fail do to the odds being heavily against them. But Romans often fought in line; before, during and after the development of the manipular system. Roman infantry from the Tetrarchy and after was known for an immense steadfastness, even when outnumbered. So to the contrary, they could (and did) win.

My argument is thus: 1st line of Romans, the hastati maniples, used as columns to pierce enemy line. Organized based off of polybius' description. Since gaps are present the second line of Principes maniples is not a reserve (the triari is the reserve) but is actually used as a front line as well when they are committed. See the bad diagrams I made earlier.


Please give sources for your quotes about Romans fighting on line verses in lines (one means in continuous line the other is an order of battle) during the maniple and cohort state of the Republic. If you can I will concede that argument.


Robert Vermaat wrote:

Ah, it was you with that quote about Germanics and training. they didn't. They wer raiders, not training full time for pitched battle. they screamed and ran at the enemy, and when scared they could loose. Big time. As the Cimbri and Teutones eventually did.


So again you're saying that a culture which is based on all males being raised as warriors (they only took warriors when they migrated from Jutland), who walked all around western Europe defeating everyone they encountered for over ten years (Gauls and Germans were the first to ask Rome to intervene in the first place), were ignorant about warfare. They trounced the Romans at five different battles, almost a sixth when Catalus barely kept his men in check when the Cimbri crossed the Po. But they're untrained, undisciplined screaming beserkers?
They would have been broken down in families, clans, lesser tribes, probably with "Big Men", chiefs or thanes commanding them. But they fought in unorganized ranks? Might not of been completely orderly compared to Romans or Greeks but they would have needed some order to not just be successful but to feed them all and later organize them for battle.

How about this. In order for the trained and disciplined legions of Rome to finally conquer these people it took Gaius Marius reorganizing the legions in some way and then using flanking attacks from hidden forces to win one battle (Aquae Sextiae) and some other form of trickery to win the other (Vercellae).

My take on it:It wasn't a specific Roman order of battle that gained them an empire, it was the ability of men, Generals, centurions and the good old foot slogger. And their ability to never accept defeat even if they lost a major battle.

Anyway, can we copy all this and just put it in a new topic called "Roman Tactics during the Transition From Maniple Legions to Cohort"?

[Brent Nielsen]

Bryan Wrote: My argument is thus: 1st line of Romans, the hastati maniples, used as columns to pierce enemy line. Organized based off of polybius' description. Since gaps are present the second line of Principes maniples is not a reserve (the triari is the reserve) but is actually used as a front line as well when they are committed. See the bad diagrams I made earlier.

Okay, I already quoted you the page numbers for the reference I do have, Goldsworthy pg 26+ 27 diagrams the Polybian Legion with separate maniples of 120 men each. The Marian Legion with no gaps between maniples or Centuries can be found on page 46-47. He shows the ranks 4deep but Macedon has alread demonstrated in a different thread, Goldsworthy's formation is correct but the depth is wrong. Be that as it may, the Polybian Legion NO LONGER EXISTS when Caesar is in Gaul. He makes no mention of maniples, he dispatches and task organizes around COHORTS. He makes no mention of Hastati, he makes no use of Princips or Triarii. Velites have been replaced by Baelearic slingers, Cretan archers and Numidian javeliners (J.C BG II-7,10,19,24,/IV,-25/VII-80/VIII-40). The tradition of these old formation is preserved in the ranking system of the Centurionate in the late Republic (IE: Princeps Prior and Posterior Centruios fought in the third and fourth centuries, to the Hastatus Prior and Posterior who fought in the fifth and sixth Centuries of each Cohort) Roman Legion/http:??w.w.w.unrv.com/military/legion.php


The 'bad diagrams' aren't bad they are antiquated... mid Roman Republic. Comparing the Legion of Polybius agains the Marian (WHICH DID EXIST with odd even odd even, right to left alignments of the centuries in a single COHORT formation, fget used to it, accept it, it happened!) is like comparing the US Army of WW II or Viet Nam to the Army and equipment we have today. Denying it's existance just falters in the face of logic. How it was done (Polybian) in the Punic Wars is not completely different but very modified (Marian)Legion of Caesar's time and well in place by Octavian's.
Sixteen man depth is used but that depth is NOT achieved until the second line closes in behind the first VERY soon after the enemy gets a dose of Pila. (Macedon has the reference for this, Mine is at home in Columbus).

Robert Vermaat wrote:
[i]The Strategicon describes such a file, and recommends that, in order to ensure that the formation can make a turn in place when attacked by an enemy from behind, or split down the middle, the file closers should also be motivated soldiers. They could also serve in a capacity to 'motivate' the soldiers in the rear of the file.
Robert is correct once again I cite Roman Legion/http://w.w.w.unrv.com/military/legion.php

Robert wrote: Anyway, the point i want to make is that the formation is always 4, 8 or 16 deep, so when there's a manpower shortage, the front become smaller - the depth always remains the same.
Look up Ludis Militis Tactica on Wikepeda. It is a facinating thesis on Roman marching techniques...erroneously drawn in ranks of four but NOT sixteen! LMT says even the cohorts are manuevered on the field by individual Century commanders and file leaders with the Senior Centurion providing guidance and 'file closers' motivating the men from the rear along with the Optios.


Oh yeah I forgot one more thing about the file we discussed:

Bryan wrote:

Lets look at a typical file of the 1st line:
1st soldier - Veteran killing machine
2nd soldier - Same
3rd soldier - Motivated soldier with decent fighting abilities
4th soldier - Somewhat motivated soldier with OK abilities
5th soldier - Doesn't want to fight any longer, only joined cause he was levied
6th soldier - Terrified of fighting/dying. (even in ancient Rome not everyone was tough)
7th soldier - Slot open, soldier wounded severely in sword sharpening accident
8th soldier - Slot open, soldier dead from fever

What about soldier number six and maybe even 5 detailed off to assist with the Torments catapuls and scorpios? LOL!

Ya'll can do what ya want with the thread, I am worn out from this...and signing off for good! Ya'll take care! Talk to ya soon...about anything else!

[Macedon]

So your basing what happened in 100 BC on something that was written in the 6th century. So your saying that no military innovation happened between the Romans in the mid Republic period of a civil militia period with politically chosen military commanders to an actual true professional military. The formation is always 4,8,16 men deep, okay show me please.

In order to understand how battle tactics worked we should use every text available that has to do with that issue. Strategicon is invaluable in understanding ancient and medieval battle tactics as are a number of other texts from the Byzantine era. It is actually more important than the description of a battle as we read in in Polybius, Plutarchus or Arrian, since it is about tactics in its pure form. Of course descriptions of historians offer much in that understanding too but they rarely give insight to the actual mechanics. Anyways, it is true that tactics varied, not just because they "evolved" (or even devolved...) but because needs are different. When you have huge populations of barbarians migrating into your dominion, you have to adopt your strategy and tactics to that new reality. When you fight against cavalry, light infantry, horsearchers, in grand plains or in mountainous Anatolia, tactics employed will vary as they did in any specific time. But for thousands of years the mechanics were practically the same, no matter how important the import of the stirrup or the use of the longbow may look to some. Of course there were changes in the Roman army as there were changes in all armies through times, some adopting new weapons, mounting on horses, or reverting back to the use of a weapon they haven't used for centuries.

As far as the depth of the battleline is concerned, there is much evidence and for many armies. Romans are usually attested to deploy 6,8 and 10 deep. Other depths are attested of course too. JC deployed 4 deep against Pompey, Pompey deployed 10 deep. Yet, by reading the manuals and studying these numbers in depth, we see that 4 is considered something like an absolute minimum, oftentimes called "shallow". The same sources tell us that it was deemed to shallow to withstand pressure, that it could not divide in two forming an double phalanx if necessary, since two deep was considered improper to use in battle. Again, lines two or even one deep are attested but only to cover a wide area to practically hunt down fugitives, fleeing enemies or in raids. The fact that most of these details are coming from the Byzantine times does not make them less valuable or less probable that they apply in ancient times too. After all, the ancients actually used more complex tactics than the medieval Europeans, this is also admitted in the Byzantine manuals. If you look for depths in general, then we have references to a unit 100 deep, that is the Egyptians who fought against Cyrus, as Xenophon writes in Cyropedia, some 50 deep units in Greece, 25 deep units in Greece too. But even they usually deployed 8-12 men deep (against the sources give abundant information, so you can ask for more info if you like, I and others will surely reply - I still think that such a discussion deserves a new thread of its own). The Macedonian Greeks fought 8,16 or, rarely, 32 deep.

In order to talk about a specific era, we should of course look for sources describing it and then evaluate them. Do you want to discuss Republican Romans, Late Republican? Any specific eras? If we take JC as our starting point for a discussion, we can observe diverse tactics, unfortunately, if I am not mistaken he rarely if ever talks depths. You can look into Frontinus for more information, he sheds some light to this issue.

Anyways, there is no reason for me to assume that the mechanics governing the depth of the Roman line were different in any of these and later eras. The sources seem to agree that 6-10 is normal, 4 is possible but rare (when an army is very experienced AND less in number than the enemy, in training (Vegetius) etc). Barbarian depths are very rarely attested but again, there is no reason to think that they deployed very deep. A unit 50 deep needs 2,500 men to be just 50 men (maybe 50 yards) wide. I know that this is a later source but Sextus Grammaticus in his Gesta Danorum for example, describes the Danish (Viking) wedge as 10 ranks deep.

How did you come to the conclusion that a depth suggested as the norm by most, if not all, ancient writers for any army including Romans would not work? Did you find any references that the opponents of the late Republican Romans were arranged in such deep formations?

Four (five if you could the separate ones at Arausio) Roman consular armies had been beaten by the Cimbri/Teutone confederation. Gnaeus Papririus Carbo (C. 113 BC), Marcus Junius Silanius (C. 109 BC), Lucius Cassius Longinus (C. 107 BC), Quintus Servilius Caepio (C. 106 BC) and Mallius Mallius Maximum (C. 105 BC)
So these barbarians just used their size to beat the trained and disciplined Romans. Okay, fine, but since the battlefields aren't known or mentioned in detail by any sources that the terrain would have limited the deployment of the width of the German battleline. Going from Plutarch they numbered over 500,000 with him stating that the numbers were probably more not less. So if the terrain doesn't allow you to add width to fight the Romans it would mean depth. So lets play conservative and say that the germans only showed up to each battle with 150,000 men. In one line of 8 deep that would mean 18,750 files (150,000/8 ). Since the Germans are known to carry shields they probably fought in a shield wall. So we'll give a frontage of three feet for each file. So the Germans with no gaps have a front line of 56,250 feet (3 * 18,750). So you're saying that the Germans would had a front of 10 1/2 miles? My guess, they packed them in with deeper ranks.

Where did you come up with these numbers again? I do not doubt you but where does Plutarch describe a German army 500,000 men strong on the battlefield? Of course there would have been battles fought on narrower terrain than that necessary to deploy every man. The problem faced by a 100,000 man army in a 3 mile wide valley would also be faced by a 30,000 man army in a 1 mile wide valley. Indeed in such cases, lines could be deeper than normal (normal being the keyword here), multiple lines could be employed (in contrast to general belief barbarians also sometimes deployed in multiple lines), men left in the camp or in other duties should be also taken into account. Again, a well known advice in tactical treatises is to not employ huge armies, it is worse to have 20,000 good men supported by 100,000 levies than 20,000 good men supported by 10,000 levies. Considering that there is no actual shoving of crowded formations as some would suggest (my personal opinion of course, some very knowledgeable members here do disagree with that and we have discussed it in length especially regarding hoplites if you want to look it up), to have a very deep line, whose members are prone to fleeing lacking experience and adequate training is very dangerous and makes the line actually weaker, since it will give way much easier than an average deep line formed by appropriately prepared men.

Yet, of course, in some cases huge armies would deploy in unusual depths because of reasons such as those you mentioned. This of course has very little to do with the depth of the Romans themselves, especially if you take into account that such battles were extremely rare to dictate a new, universal tactical doctrine for the Romans.

I don't get what you are saying. You concede that the enemies of Rome used slingers, archers and carried javelins. Caesar in De bello Gallico mentions archers. I,7-31 is an example. But then you state that they used them up quicker than the Romans?

I did not understand the relation that missile using troops have with depth, but I did not actually have the patience to carefully read very far back. To my knowledge, according to the tacticians 16 was the maximum depth of a formation IF light troops were to be posted behind in order to support the melee with missiles.

My argument is thus: 1st line of Romans, the hastati maniples, used as columns to pierce enemy line. Organized based off of polybius' description. Since gaps are present the second line of Principes maniples is not a reserve (the triari is the reserve) but is actually used as a front line as well when they are committed. See the bad diagrams I made earlier.

Please give sources for your quotes about Romans fighting on line verses in lines (one means in continuous line the other is an order of battle) during the maniple and cohort state of the Republic. If you can I will concede that argument.

I have still to see one example of how Polybius suggests that a fragmented phalanx was used by the Romans during combat. Polybius (actually no writer) says such thing. There are examples of such formations all (strangely enough) on the Greek side. We have Antigonus in Sellasia using what you call a "manipular" formation which would be a direct translation of the Greek word "speridon", as well as Antiochus' phalanx in Magnesia. Yet, both tactical choices were not the norm and were employed to fit the situation. Polybius and every other Greek writer never described the first line of the Romans as anything else than a continuous, virtually uninterrupted line. The mechanism behind gaps is very analytically discussed in the Byzantine treatises all the way into the 10th century and gives insight into how and when they were used.

I do not believe that any model based on the assumption that the Romans fought in a fragmented line comprised of multiple, virtually independent units (called wedges, cohorts or any other way) of any columnar form would work in an infantry battle. Were they so effective, then I guess that we would have multiple examples and good evidence that they existed. Total absence thereof speaks louder than any argument we could voice.

On the other hand, the second line of the Polybian Romans was indeed a reserve. Again the sources are too clear on this. No matter what mechanism we assume they used in order to support the front line, there is no text pointing to the possibility that they fought with the front line in such a manner as you suggest. If I accept that the Principes kept close to the Hastati only to attack seconds after the former charge in, then we have to dismiss everything Polybius and every other writer said of the line of the Principes. A battle in which the Romans do not seem to have used their triplex acies was Cannae. But even then, they did not employ any gaps in their line. Zama is also a good example to analyze. It is one of the few battles where Polybius (or any other) gives so much detail as to the actual maneuvers of the different units and lines. Again we have no gaps, I guess that the order of Scipio to create gaps is enough proof that habitually there were none and that during actual melee they were not used.

As for the mentions of "lines" these are many. The question is where did you find any other description? I will post some examples when I get home, although I have mentioned some above (read Polybius accounts of Cannae and Zama for example)

So again you're saying that a culture which is based on all males being raised as warriors (they only took warriors when they migrated from Jutland), who walked all around western Europe defeating everyone they encountered for over ten years (Gauls and Germans were the first to ask Rome to intervene in the first place), were ignorant about warfare. They trounced the Romans at five different battles, almost a sixth when Catalus barely kept his men in check when the Cimbri crossed the Po. But they're untrained, undisciplined screaming beserkers?
They would have been broken down in families, clans, lesser tribes, probably with "Big Men", chiefs or thanes commanding them. But they fought in unorganized ranks? Might not of been completely orderly compared to Romans or Greeks but they would have needed some order to not just be successful but to feed them all and later organize them for battle.

I agree with you here. The same applies to other "barbarian" armies too. We have a very beautiful ancient text discussing exactly that by Polybius (second book if I remember well, in the battle of Telamon)... Barbarians were capable of employing quite advanced tactics indeed. On the other hand, you also make the mistake of not differentiating between the percentage of battle hardened warriors and those not more able than any Roman levy who has undergone basic training. Again according to the Tacticians (with who I happen to agree), a sizable percentage of the latter would actually be a hindrance rather than add to the efficiency of the former.

How about this. In order for the trained and disciplined legions of Rome to finally conquer these people it took Gaius Marius reorganizing the legions in some way and then using flanking attacks from hidden forces to win one battle (Aquae Sextiae) and some other form of trickery to win the other (Vercellae).

My take on it:It wasn't a specific Roman order of battle that gained them an empire, it was the ability of men, Generals, centurions and the good old foot slogger. And their ability to never accept defeat even if they lost a major battle.

Anyway, can we copy all this and just put it in a new topic called "Roman Tactics during the Transition From Maniple Legions to Cohort"?

Starting by agreeing to your last proposal, I also have to add that stratagems are attested for most battles. Of course a good general would use everything to shift the balance to his favor, even if it was so in the first place! At Cannae, Hannibal is attested to have ordered a contingent of his men to shift over to the Romans. When the Romans brought them to the rear and returned to battle, these men attacked their guards, took weapons and attacked the Romans from behind (not in Plutarch's account)! Philip's withdrawal in Cheronea was also a stratagem that worked and so on. Stratagems can be very valuable but of course the battle is eventually won by the men in the line. Yet, you should not think that they were the reason for Roman supremacy in general.

[Macedon]

Okay, I already quoted you the page numbers for the reference I do have, Goldsworthy pg 26+ 27 diagrams the Polybian Legion with separate maniples of 120 men each. The Marian Legion with no gaps between maniples or Centuries can be found on page 46-47. He shows the ranks 4deep but Macedon has alread demonstrated in a different thread, Goldsworthy's formation is correct but the depth is wrong. Be that as it may, the Polybian Legion NO LONGER EXISTS when Caesar is in Gaul. He makes no mention of maniples, he dispatches and task organizes around COHORTS. He makes no mention of Hastati, he makes no use of Princips or Triarii. Velites have been replaced by Baelearic slingers, Cretan archers and Numidian javeliners (J.C BG II-7,10,19,24,/IV,-25/VII-80/VIII-40). The tradition of these old formation is preserved in the ranking system of the Centurionate in the late Republic (IE: Princeps Prior and Posterior Centruios fought in the third and fourth centuries, to the Hastatus Prior and Posterior who fought in the fifth and sixth Centuries of each Cohort) Roman Legion/http:??w.w.w.unrv.com/military/legion.php

The differences attested in the two systems are not that great in the battle itself. If the question is whether Julius Caesar deployed his men in the traditional Polybian system the answer is definitely no. There are no more Hastati, Princeps and Triarri but that does not mean that the arrangement is not in subsequent lines. It is. The difference is that now the general can choose what parts of his army he will keep in reserve in the assistant lines behind the first. Before that this question did not exist. The general practically had (by tradition) to use the specific units in their predetermined places in the formation. This is why, Brent, I never thought it as strange that the first cohort would by the book be of double strength. The second line would not have to be as wide anyways.

The fact that the army now was subdivided in cohorts instead of maniples played little role in the battle itself. These were subdivisions that were made bigger to be able to be better utilized outside the main battle, where 99% of a legion's work really lay... Greeks had taxeis and syntagmata too, that did not mean that the Greek phalanx would have huge gaps between its own "sperai".

Sixteen man depth is used but that depth is NOT achieved until the second line closes in behind the first VERY soon after the enemy gets a dose of Pila. (Macedon has the reference for this, Mine is at home in Columbus).

What do you mean by that? I do not think that this was a normal tactic (although it could happen), sounds more than an exception to the "rules".

Oh yeah I forgot one more thing about the file we discussed:

Bryan wrote:

Lets look at a typical file of the 1st line:
1st soldier - Veteran killing machine
2nd soldier - Same
3rd soldier - Motivated soldier with decent fighting abilities
4th soldier - Somewhat motivated soldier with OK abilities
5th soldier - Doesn't want to fight any longer, only joined cause he was levied
6th soldier - Terrified of fighting/dying. (even in ancient Rome not everyone was tough)
7th soldier - Slot open, soldier wounded severely in sword sharpening accident
8th soldier - Slot open, soldier dead from fever

What about soldier number six and maybe even 5 detailed off to assist with the Torments catapuls and scorpios? LOL!

That table is completely unsubstantiated. I have made a relative comparison of many sources regarding that issue last spring and, although sources vary in their details, the best troopers in an 8 man file would normally be placed as such :

best man (in stature, experience, training, valor...)
1st rank

second best man
2nd rank or file closer

third best man
file closer or 2nd rank

fourth best man
often in the middle, especially in a deeper file that could be ordered to split in half, so that this man could become a first ranker.

the rest
in between

The file closer was a very important figure in the line. There even were men acting as "extraordinary file-closers" who followed the line and made sure everything was OK.

[Bryan]

Macedon wrote:

JC deployed 4 deep against Pompey, Pompey deployed 10 deep.

"Caesar, observing his former custom, had placed the tenth legion on the right, the ninth on the left, although it was very much weakened by the battles at Dyrrachium. He placed the eighth legion so close to the ninth, as to almost make one of the two, and ordered them to support one another. He drew up on the field eighty cohorts, making a total of twenty-two thousand men. He left two cohorts to guard the camp. He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P. Sulla, and of the center to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his post opposite Pompey. At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of the enemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing might be surrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a single cohort from each of the legions composing the third line, formed of them a fourth line, and opposed them to Pompey's cavalry, and, acquainting them with his wishes, admonished them that the success of that day depended on their courage. At the same time he ordered the third line, and the entire army not to charge without his command: that he would give the signal whenever he wished them to do so." De Bello Civili, 3:89

This is the extent that mentions how he formed at Pharsalus against Pompeius Magnus. So exactly where did you read Caesar was had only four ranks?

(Edit)
I just read the Frontinus source and see where you're coming from. Never heard about him before and will do some research but it still sounds fishy. Here's why:

Each unit/century/cohort/legion would have had different strengths. Some had been hit harder by fighting/disease/desertions over time than others. I don't see how they could have done it with an even 4 man deep solid formation. As evidence Caesar (or Hirtius) says this:

"He placed the eighth legion so close to the ninth, as to almost make one of the two,
and ordered them to support one another." De Bello Civili, 3:89

The 9th Legion was hit hard at Dyrrachium so Caesar had them reinforced not by pulling men from other units to beef them up but by putting them CLOSER to a legion with better strength (8th)
So maybe they couldn't muster many ranks. But others would have been able to.

BTW, This line also heavily implies that there was normally an interval/gap separating legions or at least their cohorts.
Thus proving that units weren't in one continuous line. And that Frontinius simplified it in his description. (Isn't he known for questionable sourcing?)

Macedon wrote:

Polybius and every other Greek writer never described the first line of the Romans as anything else than a continuous, virtually uninterrupted line.

"In front he placed the hastati with certain intervals between the maniples and behind them the principes, not placing their maniples, as is the usual Roman custom, opposite to the intervals separating those of the first line, but directly behind these latter at a certain distance owing to the large number of the enemy's elephants. 8 Last of all he placed the triarii. On his left wing he posted Gaius Laelius with the Italian horse, and on the right wing Massanissa with the whole of his Numidians. 9 The intervals of the first maniples he filled up with the cohorts of velites, ordering them to open the action, 10 and if they were forced back by the charge of the elephants to retire, those who had time to do so by the straight passages as far as the rear of the whole army, and those who were overtaken to right or left along the intervals between the lines." Polybius, 6:9,7-9, describing Zama

"He stationed the Roman cavalry close to the river on the right wing and the foot next to them in the same line, placing the maniples closer together than was formerly the usage and making the depth of each many times exceed its front." Polybius, 3:113, describing Cannae

I could keep going on, Polybius and Livy both make EXPLICIT references to gaps/intervals between units of each line but I am too exhausted search anymore. You need to actually read Polybius.

Macedon wrote:

The fact that the army now was subdivided in cohorts instead of maniples played little role in the battle itself.

"In the mean time, being informed that Thermus the praetor was in possession of Iguvium, with five cohorts, and was fortifying the town, but that the affections of all the inhabitants were very well inclined toward himself, he detached Curio with three cohorts, which he had at Ariminum and Pisaurus. Upon notice of his approach, Thermus, distrusting the affections of the townsmen, drew his cohorts out of it and made his escape; his soldiers deserted him on the road, and returned home. Curio recovered Iguvium, with the cheerful concurrence of all the inhabitants. Caesar, having received an account of this, and relying on the affections of the municipal towns, drafted all the cohorts of the thirteenth legion from the garrison, and set out for Auximum, a town into which Attius had brought his cohorts, and of which he had taken possession, and from which he had sent senators round about the country of Picenum, to raise new levies."
De Bello Civili, 1:12

Again I could keep listing them over and over again how Caesar gave orders for attacks to cohorts, meaning they are now the tactical instrument, but again I am tired. It seems to me legions were not administrative units similar to how division are in the US Army. So here is a link to an electronic copy of Caesar's commentaries.
http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/pub...eComm.html
Go to this link, open one of the books, hit Control + F (find) and type "cohort'. Do the same for "line" and "century" Prepare to have your entire argument destroyed.

Macedon wrote:

Where did you come up with these numbers again? I do not doubt you but where does Plutarch describe a German army 500,000 men strong on the battlefield?

"For no sooner had word been brought to the people of the capture of Jugurtha than the reports about the Teutones and Cimbri fell upon their ears. What these reports said about the numbers and strength of the invading hosts was disbelieved at first, but afterwards it was found to be short of the truth. For three hundred thousand armed fighting men were advancing, and much larger hordes of women and children were said to accompany them, in quest of land to support so vast a multitude, and of cities in which to settle and live, just as the Gauls before them, as they learned, had wrested the best part of Italy from the Tyrrhenians and now occupied it." Plutarch, Life of Marius, 11:2

My bad, I meant 500,000 total. 300,000 warriors with another couple hundred thousand women and children.

Macedon wrote:

The sources seem to agree that 6-10 is normal, 4 is possible but rare (when an army is very experienced AND less in number than the enemy, in training (Vegetius) etc). Barbarian depths are very rarely attested but again, there is no reason to think that they deployed very deep. A unit 50 deep needs 2,500 men to be just 50 men (maybe 50 yards) wide. I know that this is a later source but Sextus Grammaticus in his Gesta Danorum for example, describes the Danish (Viking) wedge as 10 ranks deep.

The time period I am referring to is the mid Republic (2nd Punic War), to 104-100 BC (Cimbri War), to the exploit of G. Julius Caesar in Gaul and the Civil War. And what sources detailing ROMAN formations in the mid to late Republic?

Macedon wrote:

I have still to see one example of how Polybius suggests that a fragmented phalanx was used by the Romans during combat.

If you look at my diagram that I made what I describe is not a fragmented phalanx or an articulated phalanx. It is maniples, then later cohorts, that are used as independent fighting blocks of men to strike wholes in other phalanxes. The front maniples and then later cohorts are used as wedges to break a line, they are supported by others behind them covering their gaps who can support them by attacking. Nothing fancy, about as simple as it can get, but to me it makes sense.

I have read till my eyes are blood shot and can't find ANYTHING that specifically tells how the Romans fought exactly. The more I read the more I realize that almost everything that many people assume about Romans was later created by other historic secondary sources based on the few primary ones from the ancient world. Don't get me wrong, Connolly, Goldsworthy, Momsen, brilliant dudes. But it doesn't mean everything they wrote was correct. The same sources they had access to we now have access to.

I used sources to defend my argument. Can you please do the same. Since this thread is about as off topic as it can get, please post your sources with a brief summary so this topic can just die off already.

Once again, we need to rename this thread. Can a moderator just copy everything since page 2 and post it into another thread topic? I am not doing it cause this argument is going nowhere fast.

[Macedon]

This is the extent that mentions how he formed at Pharsalus against Pompeius Magnus. So exactly where did you read Caesar was had only four ranks?

Not at home yet,so I will be brief for now. Not only Caesar wrote about that time... Check out Frontinus and Polyaenus for more info.

"In front he placed the hastati with certain intervals between the maniples and behind them the principes, not placing their maniples, as is the usual Roman custom, opposite to the intervals separating those of the first line, but directly behind these latter at a certain distance owing to the large number of the enemy's elephants. 8 Last of all he placed the triarii. On his left wing he posted Gaius Laelius with the Italian horse, and on the right wing Massanissa with the whole of his Numidians. 9 The intervals of the first maniples he filled up with the cohorts of velites, ordering them to open the action, 10 and if they were forced back by the charge of the elephants to retire, those who had time to do so by the straight passages as far as the rear of the whole army, and those who were overtaken to right or left along the intervals between the lines." Polybius, 6:9,7-9, describing Zama

"He stationed the Roman cavalry close to the river on the right wing and the foot next to them in the same line, placing the maniples closer together than was formerly the usage and making the depth of each many times exceed its front." Polybius, 3:113, describing Cannae

I could keep going on, Polybius and Livy both make EXPLICIT references to gaps/intervals between units of each line but I am too exhausted search anymore. You need to actually read Polybius.

I wrote "I have still to see one example of how Polybius suggests that a fragmented phalanx was used by the Romans during combat."

Maybe I should have said "during the melee" to make myself clearer.

You can see that these are formations BEFORE the commencement of the battle. No one doubts that this formation was used before the actual clash of the lines took place. What most agree (among whom myself) is the fact that these gaps were closed after the light infantry retired. I will provide you with Polybius' own descriptions once I get home. The way armies deployed before the clash of the lines and how they fought was different. A pike phalanx would march in open order and before the clash would change to close or compact order. This would happen because the order used during melee is not what the ancients called "natural order", the order that facilitated marching and maneuvering. I will come back to this, don't worry. As far as your innuendo is concerned, I will let it pass, I want to consider it a misunderstanding on my part.

"In the mean time, being informed that Thermus the praetor was in possession of Iguvium, with five cohorts, and was fortifying the town, but that the affections of all the inhabitants were very well inclined toward himself, he detached Curio with three cohorts, which he had at Ariminum and Pisaurus. Upon notice of his approach, Thermus, distrusting the affections of the townsmen, drew his cohorts out of it and made his escape; his soldiers deserted him on the road, and returned home. Curio recovered Iguvium, with the cheerful concurrence of all the inhabitants. Caesar, having received an account of this, and relying on the affections of the municipal towns, drafted all the cohorts of the thirteenth legion from the garrison, and set out for Auximum, a town into which Attius had brought his cohorts, and of which he had taken possession, and from which he had sent senators round about the country of Picenum, to raise new levies."
De Bello Civili, 1:12

Again I could keep listing them over and over again how Caesar gave orders for attacks to cohorts, meaning they are now the tactical instrument, but again I am tired. It seems to me legions were not administrative units similar to how division are in the US Army. So here is a link to an electronic copy of Caesar's commentaries.
http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/pub...eComm.html
Go to this link, open one of the books, hit Control + F (find) and type "cohort'. Do the same for "line" and "century" Prepare to have your entire argument destroyed.

What does that have to do with what I wrote? I think that being overly defensive of a position makes you misinterpret what people say. Did I say that there were no cohorts? I just said that IN THE BATTLE ITSELF, there was little difference whether there was a cohort beside a cohort or a maniple beside a maniple. Thee are subdivisions and are of course used organically, but in the line, even a legion beside a legion makes little difference in the way the subunits are arrayed. Outside the melee, I said the same thing you say and i think this time VERY CLEARLY. How can you destroy my argument if you do not even know what that is?

Where did you come up with these numbers again? I do not doubt you but where does Plutarch describe a German army 500,000 men strong on the battlefield?

"For no sooner had word been brought to the people of the capture of Jugurtha than the reports about the Teutones and Cimbri fell upon their ears. What these reports said about the numbers and strength of the invading hosts was disbelieved at first, but afterwards it was found to be short of the truth. For three hundred thousand armed fighting men were advancing, and much larger hordes of women and children were said to accompany them, in quest of land to support so vast a multitude, and of cities in which to settle and live, just as the Gauls before them, as they learned, had wrested the best part of Italy from the Tyrrhenians and now occupied it." Plutarch, Life of Marius, 11:2

My bad, I meant 500,000 total. 300,000 warriors with another couple hundred thousand women and children.

Well... as you see even these numbers have nothing to do with a specific battle or army. Plutarch mentions that these men came in a number of hostS. That of course means that any battle would have been against much inferior in number forces.

The time period I am referring to is the mid Republic (2nd Punic War), to 104-100 BC (Cimbri War), to the exploit of G. Julius Caesar in Gaul and the Civil War. And what sources detailing ROMAN formations in the mid to late Republic?

OK. Yet, in order to analyze even this period, you should study the manuals too. As I said, the mechanisms are not (that) different and will help you, me, us understand what we are discussing better.

If you look at my diagram that I made what I describe is not a fragmented phalanx or an articulated phalanx. It is maniples, then later cohorts, that are used as independent fighting blocks of men to strike wholes in other phalanxes. The front maniples and then later cohorts are used as wedges to break a line, they are supported by others behind them covering their gaps who can support them by attacking. Nothing fancy, about as simple as it can get, but to me it makes sense.

Such an arrangement of a line is fragmented. The battleline can have gaps under circumstances and is still called a line. A phalanx can be any line, even one with gaps. If you want to use the terminology that has the phalanx only be the way the Greeks fought, we can use that. For example the word Arrian uses for "legion" is "phalanx". Again, I have to say that nowhere have I read of any Roman army fighting in what you call a "manipular formation", while I have seen explicit examples of Greeks fighting thus.

I have read till my eyes are blood shot and can't find ANYTHING that specifically tells how the Romans fought exactly. The more I read the more I realize that almost everything that many people assume about Romans was later created by other historic secondary sources based on the few primary ones from the ancient world. Don't get me wrong, Connolly, Goldsworthy, Momsen, brilliant dudes. But it doesn't mean everything they wrote was correct. The same sources they had access to we now have access to.

I disagree with many in many issues. Gosh, they even disagree with each other! We have loads of information though that one has to piece together and, again to my opinion, you should absolutely not shun the military manuals of other eras. They occupy with problems and give explanations to situations that were common with those you research. In order to evaluate the effects of large gaps in the battle line, you should read how they were used even in other eras.

I used sources to defend my argument. Can you please do the same. Since this thread is about as off topic as it can get, please post your sources with a brief summary so this topic can just die off already.

Once again, we need to rename this thread. Can a moderator just copy everything since page 2 and post it into another thread topic? I am not doing it cause this argument is going nowhere fast.

I will, once I can. I am now only writing on the fly. Why don't you start another thread? It is only fitting that you set the original argument to be discussed.

[Robert Vermaat]

Why don't you start another thread? It is only fitting that you set the original argument to be discussed.

Bryan started a new thread: http://www.ancient-warfare.org/rat.html?...&id=297429

I think we should end this one, and start anew there. And please guys, keep it factual and civil, and READ what the other member wrote!

[Crispvs]

Macedon,

I wonder if you would like to comment on the mechanism for relieving the first line in battle which I proposed on page 2 of this thread? For the record, my 480 strong cohort was simply being used to demonstrate a principle and I was assuming throughout that my proposed cohort formed part of a continuous front.

Crispvs

[Macedon]

Of course, I commented here

[jkaler48]

Has any new information turned up since four years ago?