Quote:From John Lendon s view (expressed in his article "Rhetoric of Combat"), Romans relied more on psychological factors in warfare and Greeks - on tactics and training.
I believe his point is, rather, that Caesar's "conceptions about what was important in battle [descriptions] are so very different from ours, and so different too from those of his Greek predecessors" (p. 278). He takes the Battle of Pharsalus as an example to demonstrate Caesar's emphasis on his troops'
virtus (bravery) and
animus (morale). Caesar uses
Crastinus as the role model: "the high
virtus of Caesar's soldiers is confirmed" (p. 279).
Lendon knows that Caesar attributed his victory to superior tactics (compare
Frontinus, Strat. 2.3.22), but he is intrigued by Caesar's own emphasis on
animus and
virtus in his account. He analyses Polybius and "the Greek tradition of tactics" to point up the difference, noting that, when Polybius asks himself why the Romans have prevailed in warfare, "it is to questions of formation and armament that he naturally turns" (p. 283).
Caesar is only too aware of the importance of deployment and manoeuvre, and Lendon concedes that he is using Greek concepts of battle when he writes about
vis or
impetus. He then studies Xenophon and "the Greek tradition of military psychology" to uncover the roots of Caesar's use of psychological factors, noting that "in contrast to Xenophon's enthusiasm for military psychology, the austere Polybius looks first to tactics and only second to psychology to understand battles" (p. 294).
His conclusion (in this part of the article) is that "to Caesar morale was not to be ignored, nor was it a sporadic, occasional concern: to Caesar morale was a constant preoccupation" (p. 295). "No ancient writer who had actually seen a battle gives psychology a larger role in his battle descriptions than Caesar" (p. 296). "Caesar deploys and maneuvers for psychological reasons" (p. 298). "Finally, in the event of defeat, the general turns immediately to restoring the crushed
animus of his soldiers" (p. 299).
Turning to
virtus, he shows that Polybius and Xenophon were dismissive of courage as a factor in battle, whereas it is a key factor for Caesar (e.g. the
Pullo and Vorenus episode). Lendon has a lengthy and interesting discussion of how "warfare is a contest of masculinity" (p. 310), and how Romans of Caesar's generation struggled to reconcile the acceptance of stratagem with the gut feeling "that proper battles were won by
virtus" (p. 316).
There is much more besides, and the article's insight into Caesarian battle narrative makes fascinating reading. Lendon does not so much contrast morale vs. tactics, as highlight Caesar's appreciation of
virtus as a factor alongside morale and tactics. (I think.)
