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01-24-2003, 10:07 PM

In preparation for a lecture I'm due to give on the Varusschlacht, I'm attempting to reconcile what (we think!) we know of the archaeological evidence with the written record- specifically Dio's account. Briefly, I'm assuming that Varus started out from his summer camp in the Minden area, but while actually on the march was informed that the improved track SW back to the Lippe River was cut- very likely where it passed through what is now known as the Teutoburger Wald. He was then convinced to about-face and detour west on a route which ultimately would end with the finishing off of his column at Kalkriese. I can certainly elaborate on all of should anyone wish (I've calculated column lengths, march rates, have access to a really great series of large scale old german maps, etc, which I'd be happy to share) but will for the moment cut to the chase: I can get everything to work out reasonably well, but only if I do not have to take the 'wall' on the Kalkrieseberg into consideration. Problem is, the entire time line is thrown off, and the 'logic' behind my reconstruction compromised if we assume the Germans built the damned thing for purposes associated with the Varusschlacht, or indeed within the timeframe of either the four-day battle itself or the immediate events leading up to it. I mean, why would they even need the beast? The Romans would already be neatly sandwiched between the mountain and the bog immediately to the north, and they had been doing quite nicely beating up the Roman column for the past few days sans walls and such. I personally am comfortable thinking of that wall in a civilian context and not tied at all to the timeframe of the battle. For instance, up here in New England we use such berms all the time to divert run-off or snowmelt coming off hills around lower-lying buildings and such. Why would the Germans in the area not do the same to protect the sandy track which ran round the base of the Kalkrieseberg? Certainly this would explain the chalk core, lack of a ditch and the interred donkey- this last if it were constructed at any time (decades, centuries?) after the battle. So, my questions are (whew!): a) is there anything out there detailing this wall that I can reference? b) do any informed souls on this forum have any commentary on this issue?

Caius Fabius · 01-25-2003, 02:11 AM

I have a one (+) hour lecture by a German Army Colonel at the KalKreise site on video. He gave a simple theory for the "wall" including the very little time it took to build for German "soldiers" who had been trained by the Romans to build forts. Why did the Romans end up there? Because they were following their (German) scouts, who were leading them by the nose into the ambushes, while pretending to help them escape. According to the lecture, bones of more than 30 mules were found at in the nearby pits, and hundreds of human bones. The bones were almost exclusively of men between the age of 18 and 40, and mules of 3-10 years old. 
To the right as you approach the berm, you have a swamp. To the left was supposed to be impassable woods. Supposedly the Germans blocked the main path with the berm. The berm could have been created in mere hours by men trained by the Romans to build marching forts. 
 
Since we don't have any unbiased (or first person) accounts, and since the actual site is doubted by some historians, this may or may not be the main battle site, BUT the mule that the berm collasped upon was found with a Roman style mule bell, and there were non-local herbs stuffed into the bell, possibly to mute the sound. 
 
The other telling evidence for this area being the terminus of the battle is the great number of coins from this period, found in the area, some with Varus's countermark stamped upon them. The unusual amount of coins is indicative of this area having lots of Romans who left their money, during the proper year. 
 
I should think it would be easy to lead a Roman commander (or any commander) into ambush after ambush, down to a virtual killing floor, if his trusted scouts were doing the leading. Some research says that Varus had some of these German scouts in his "family" or patronage since his sucessful campaigns in the Palestine region; so he may have had even more trust in them! Varus was not a green military commander. If you look at his career, he had won some actual military victories in "Palestine", even if he was related to Augustus, it didn't make him incompetent. (Although to write history you need a scapegoat for the horrible Roman defeat.) His main mistake was trusting "his" Germans. (The German lecturer went on and on about German honor, but changed the subject when he was asked "how honorable was 'Hermann'?"!) Varus didn't make that mistake in Palestine. 
 
I could make a copy of this video, but the sound is not good enough to use in a classroom, since there were other simultanious lectures going on, in different langauges and the Kalkreise museum has some annoying sound effects as well. "Just before class started, I looked in the big book where all the world's history is written, and it said...." Neil J. Hackett, PhD ancient history, professor OSU, 1987

01-26-2003, 02:15 AM

Thanks for the input. 
I hope you don't mind my taking issue with a number of the points you bring up (although you don't you actually say that you buy them either, do you...), but this is all a great help in coelescing my thinking on the matter. 
 
If my sitemap is correct, the 'wall' runs more-or-less parallel to the track across the base of the Kalkrieseberg, ie: not across it and in position to block the trail. Also, according to the density of the archaelogical finds it's positioned actually before the very start of the so-called 'killing zone'; in other words, it appears that the Roman column was well beyond it when the last of them finally went under. As far as it being built by 'Roman-trained' Germans, well, I just don't see this. For one, it is a most unRoman wall, what with no ditch and a chalk core (this last would to me indicate some attempt at permanence). As far as throwing it up in a few hours, what- does our Colonel assume that his ex-Roman German auxiliae made sure to take their dolebrae along? I have not seen published before where the berm collapsed on the mule- only that the mule was found under it. If the berm is shown to have 'collapsed' on the mule's corpse, then it only indicates that it was in existence at the time of the mule's arrival. If no collapse in indicated, then the berm was built after the mule died. Either way, there is no tie-in here of the berm to the battle. 
 
I agree that Varus is the victim of bad press; the ancient sources would hardly have been comfortable blaming his misfortunes on a misappreciation of the actual situation in Germania on the part of higher authority. However, I do not think he would have had all that much faith in any German scouts once the his column came under attack by their brothers and cousins, and even if he did, his experienced and hard-bitten legionary officers would have disabused him in a hurry. If you've got access to a decent map, you can see that- assuming that Varus started from the Minden area- his natural route back to the Lippe River involved moving up the Weser to the junction of the Werre River, then following it first west and then south to Herford, whence he'd leave the river and move SW to a gap in the Teutoberger Wald at Bielkfeld. My 1:850000 map dated 1868 indeed shows no other routes in this area. Anyway, if while on the march he were informed that this route was cut- say at the Teutoberger Wald chokepoint- his only option would have been to aboutface and head back to the junction of the Werre and the Else rivers, then move west along the Else to 
pick up the Haase River and continue west to Osnabreuk. At that point the country opened up and he had some choices again. Now, once moving west, if his column bumped at any point against resistance it could not break through, it would be forced northwest across the Wiehengebergen, and thus to the Hellweg leading inevitably to the Kalkriese gap. Why northwest? because any move towards the south or SW would lead him into trackless rough terrain ending up in the depths of the Teutoberger Wald. What all this shows is that Varus needn't have misplaced his trust in anyone to have wound up as he did. There was a certain remorseless inevitability to the proceedings I think; once stopped from moving SW from the Werre Varus could only go west along the Else. Stopped anywhere along this line he could only wind up at Kalkriese- there were simply no other ways he could go, especially on the 1st day (which would have set the stage for the rest) when he still had his wagons in-train. Even after he'd burned them he'd still have been track-bound; it would have been difficult enough moving lightly-equipped tribal warriors cross country- forget about a gaggle of civilian clerks, merchants, women and children dependents, badly-repacked mules and all the other impedimenta poor Varus was saddled with. In fact, a glance at the map shows that the body of Germans stopping Varus from going south could easily later be the same that stopped him from moving west, and later yet the same again who stopped him for good at Kalkriese. The trick I think is to not make all this too complicated; any tactical planning over distance was simply beyond anyone before the age of electronic communication. In fact, in my personal experience, even with RTs in the 60's it was practically impossible to get a platoon of maybe 25 guys even pointed in the same direction if everybody wasn't line-of-sight. 
 
A couple of years ago I presented a study on the mechanics of a migrating body saddled with wagons and dependents. Therein I showed mathmatically (well, to my satisfaction anyway...) just how vulnerable a track-bound column is to even small numbers of assailants. In essence, it appears that once stuck in an in-column mode, you are really screwed- even worse than you might think intuitively- if stopped from the front, and then attacked even piece-meal from the flanks. Herein I think lay the reason for Varus's downfall; he was simply caught with a baggage-laden column he couldn't get out of the way of his fighting men, and with bad weather and three successive sleepless nights thrown in to boot. I think Arminus's genius didn't lay in the execution of the battle- his success was more or less assured by the simple mechanics of the situation, but in recognition of the potential for it presented by Varus's unenviable position of being stuck in NE Germania with a whole bunch of people/stuff that should have been left back on the Rhine. 
 
Sorry if I've gone on too long, but I love this stuff!

Caius Fabius · 01-26-2003, 09:11 PM

The most telling evidence is the coin evidence, and since many were moved and in private collections by the late 1800's there is little scholastic proof. I was relating the 'evidence" given by one scholar at the site. It is interesting terrain. It is an interesting period. They didn't have maps, they didn't have radio, they didn't have GPS. ("They" being either side.) You can almost state anythinng loudly enough and publish a book and have some possibility of credibility on such a topic, if you put in enough footnotes. 
 
Remember, Germans weren't "Germans" but many different groups of barbarian tribes, so I personally could see how trusting one group to lead you, when attacked by a different group would work. The U.S. military has had a history of this problem, especially if you had built a rapport with the leader over several years of working together. 
We currently have this going on in Afganistan today, and previously in SE Asia (ie. Viet Nam) in the 1950's, 60's and 70's as well as similar problems in Central America. Trying to decide when to stop trusting your trusted native guides and advisors can be a real problem today. Was it any easier in the past? 
The Varus slaughter is surely an interesting item of study, but a visit to the Kalkreise museum will give you many alternate ideas to ponder. If you can manage to find the lecturer we had, it will be interesting. I can find his name on ther video if you wish, but I may not spell it correctly. 
 
"Just before class started, I looked in the big book where all the world's history is written, and it said...." Neil J. Hackett, PhD ancient history, professor OSU, 1987

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