02-15-2011, 09:25 PM
The military aspects of Boudica's British revolt in AD61 and the Roman responses to it have received much comment and speculation (not least here on RAT!), a lot of them involving the location of the final battle. But at the risk of further reheating old chestnuts, I'd like to raise a few more questions on the subject.
As we know from Tacitus (Annals / Agricola) and Cassius Dio (Epitome book LXII), Suetonius Paulinus was away campaigning against the Druids on Anglesey when the revolt broke out. Boudica's forces attacked and burned Colchester, then defeated Petilius Cerialis and a vexillation of the Ninth Legion. Paulinus then arrived at London, decided it was indefensible and ordered it evacuated, withdrawing to some undisclosed location, where the Britons, after sacking London and St Albans, were signally defeated. The Second Legion, which had been ordered to support Paulinus, did not move from their base, and their commanding prefect committed suicide when he learned what had happened.
But there is a problem with all this: Anglesey is 250 miles by road from London. Colchester is only 50 miles away. Even considering the relative speeds of Boudica's tribal warband and Paulinus' legions, how did the legate reach London before the Britons, in time to survey the situation, evacuate the town and retreat?
One common suggestion (originally, I think, from Webster in 1978), is that Paulinus took ship from Anglesey to Deva, then sped south on Watling Street with only a cavalry bodyguard, leaving the legions to follow as best they could. He then retreated from London, meeting the legions somewhere on the road and turned to give battle.
Dio mentions Paulinus 'sailing' from Mona (LXII.8), but this could reflect Dio's uncertainty of the distance from Anglesey to the mainland! There is no other reference to cavalry, or a mad gallop down Watling Street. Tacitus says that Paulinus marched 'with wonderful resolution... amidst a hostile population' (Annals 14.33) - which seems to imply a steady measured advance, fortifying camps along the line of the road. When he reaches London, Paulinus is 'uncertain whether he should choose it as a seat of war', which implies that he had the numbers to do so - even if they were 'a scanty force of soldiers', they were not a mere cavalry bodyguard. Besides, would Paulinus really dash into the heart of a tribal rebellion with only a small cavalry force?
A mounted courier, riding at 50 miles a day, would have taken 3-4 days to reach Paulinus from London. Even with his cavalry alone, Paulinus would have taken the same time to get back there again. What were Boudica and her warriors doing for 8 days after the fall of Colchester? London was undefended, presumably wealthy, and the home of hated procurator Decianus. Why delay attacking it?
If we assume, instead, that Paulinus moved with his legions he would have taken even longer - up to 14 days from the straits of Anglesey at a normal marching pace of 18-20 miles per day, or 8 days if a faster pace was adopted (this is following Benario, 'Legionary Speed of March before the battle with Boudicca', Britannia 17, 1986. My calculation of distances uses the very handy distance measuring tool on Wikimapia - it's the little orange ruler in the top left of the frame!). So, if we don't go with Paulinus' cavalry gallop, we're looking at a delay of up to 18 days between the fall of Colchester and Boudica's attack on London!
The current favoured theory for the battle site - at Mancetter - would involve Boudica's force, together with families and baggage, hauling themselves 100 miles up Watling Street, through the territories of two other tribes, just to meet Paulinus in battle. Hard to imagine such dedication in a group that had taken 8-18 days just to decide to attack London!
Could there be a misapprehension here, based on the way Tacitus presents the story? He implies, and most people seem to have accepted, that the attack on Colchester was the start of the revolt, and the first news that Paulinus would have received of it. This is certainly dramatic, but is it likely? We know that the citizens of Colchester had already asked for help from Decianus, and he sent 200 men in response (probably all he had available at the time). Would he not have also informed Paulinus? We don't know how soon before the attack this happened, but the assembly of a tribal warband amongst the Iceni and Trinovantes must have taken some time. It's possible that Decianus, unless he was truly incompetent, could have know of this days, or even weeks, before the revolt broke out into open warfare, and passed the information on to the Governor.
Dio claims that Paulinus had 'already brought Mona to terms' when he learned of the revolt (LXII.8), so there was nothing to detain him from moving against the rebels at once. Would he have waited for the first outbreak, or would he have recognised that a massive tribal assembly close to Colchester, threatening to cut his lines of communication, needed to be confronted at once?
It is possible, therefore, that Paulinus was already on the march down Watling Street with his full force by the time the attack on Colchester actually happened. So what about Cerialis and the Ninth Legion? Could it be that his advance, rather than an independent attempt to relieve Colchester, was part of a combined strategy with Paulinus? The legions moving down Watling Street would form the central division of a three-pronged advance, with Cerialis and Ninth to the east and the Second to the west, all closing in on the rebels around Colchester. In Dio's description of the final battle there is the odd note that Paulinus 'separated his army into three divisions, in order to fight at several points at one and the same time' - this contradicts Tacitus, but could it be that this is Dio's (or the epitomator's) confused reference to Paulinus' initial plan of advance?
If this is the case, the plan went wrong - Cerialis perhaps moved forward too quickly, and his force was isolated and destroyed (Tacitus mentions his 'rashness'). The Second, of course, never left camp. Arriving somewhere close to London, therefore, Paulinus would have learned that Colchester had already fallen (but possibly only a day or two previously), his left wing had been beaten and his right had failed to move. Not surprising, if so, that he considered the troops he had with him (his own central division) to be 'scanty', and withdrew to a position where a small number could more adequately oppose a multitude - he wouldn't need to go far, though, as his troops were already with him. In this light, the suicide of Pœnius Postumus of the Second Legion is entirely justified - his failure had left Paulinus in a dangerously exposed position.
All of this, of course, would argue for a much more southerly location for that final battle, probably somewhere very close to London or St Albans. There would be no need, however, for Boudica's warband to go racing off for vast distances into the Midlands after the Romans!
Certainly this isn't a massively radical suggestion, but it does seem to me a plausible interpretation, and clears up the problem of Paulinus' movements prior to the battle. I'd be interested to learn what others make of it, and any counter-suggestions they might make!
mile:
- Nathan
As we know from Tacitus (Annals / Agricola) and Cassius Dio (Epitome book LXII), Suetonius Paulinus was away campaigning against the Druids on Anglesey when the revolt broke out. Boudica's forces attacked and burned Colchester, then defeated Petilius Cerialis and a vexillation of the Ninth Legion. Paulinus then arrived at London, decided it was indefensible and ordered it evacuated, withdrawing to some undisclosed location, where the Britons, after sacking London and St Albans, were signally defeated. The Second Legion, which had been ordered to support Paulinus, did not move from their base, and their commanding prefect committed suicide when he learned what had happened.
But there is a problem with all this: Anglesey is 250 miles by road from London. Colchester is only 50 miles away. Even considering the relative speeds of Boudica's tribal warband and Paulinus' legions, how did the legate reach London before the Britons, in time to survey the situation, evacuate the town and retreat?
One common suggestion (originally, I think, from Webster in 1978), is that Paulinus took ship from Anglesey to Deva, then sped south on Watling Street with only a cavalry bodyguard, leaving the legions to follow as best they could. He then retreated from London, meeting the legions somewhere on the road and turned to give battle.
Dio mentions Paulinus 'sailing' from Mona (LXII.8), but this could reflect Dio's uncertainty of the distance from Anglesey to the mainland! There is no other reference to cavalry, or a mad gallop down Watling Street. Tacitus says that Paulinus marched 'with wonderful resolution... amidst a hostile population' (Annals 14.33) - which seems to imply a steady measured advance, fortifying camps along the line of the road. When he reaches London, Paulinus is 'uncertain whether he should choose it as a seat of war', which implies that he had the numbers to do so - even if they were 'a scanty force of soldiers', they were not a mere cavalry bodyguard. Besides, would Paulinus really dash into the heart of a tribal rebellion with only a small cavalry force?
A mounted courier, riding at 50 miles a day, would have taken 3-4 days to reach Paulinus from London. Even with his cavalry alone, Paulinus would have taken the same time to get back there again. What were Boudica and her warriors doing for 8 days after the fall of Colchester? London was undefended, presumably wealthy, and the home of hated procurator Decianus. Why delay attacking it?
If we assume, instead, that Paulinus moved with his legions he would have taken even longer - up to 14 days from the straits of Anglesey at a normal marching pace of 18-20 miles per day, or 8 days if a faster pace was adopted (this is following Benario, 'Legionary Speed of March before the battle with Boudicca', Britannia 17, 1986. My calculation of distances uses the very handy distance measuring tool on Wikimapia - it's the little orange ruler in the top left of the frame!). So, if we don't go with Paulinus' cavalry gallop, we're looking at a delay of up to 18 days between the fall of Colchester and Boudica's attack on London!
The current favoured theory for the battle site - at Mancetter - would involve Boudica's force, together with families and baggage, hauling themselves 100 miles up Watling Street, through the territories of two other tribes, just to meet Paulinus in battle. Hard to imagine such dedication in a group that had taken 8-18 days just to decide to attack London!
Could there be a misapprehension here, based on the way Tacitus presents the story? He implies, and most people seem to have accepted, that the attack on Colchester was the start of the revolt, and the first news that Paulinus would have received of it. This is certainly dramatic, but is it likely? We know that the citizens of Colchester had already asked for help from Decianus, and he sent 200 men in response (probably all he had available at the time). Would he not have also informed Paulinus? We don't know how soon before the attack this happened, but the assembly of a tribal warband amongst the Iceni and Trinovantes must have taken some time. It's possible that Decianus, unless he was truly incompetent, could have know of this days, or even weeks, before the revolt broke out into open warfare, and passed the information on to the Governor.
Dio claims that Paulinus had 'already brought Mona to terms' when he learned of the revolt (LXII.8), so there was nothing to detain him from moving against the rebels at once. Would he have waited for the first outbreak, or would he have recognised that a massive tribal assembly close to Colchester, threatening to cut his lines of communication, needed to be confronted at once?
It is possible, therefore, that Paulinus was already on the march down Watling Street with his full force by the time the attack on Colchester actually happened. So what about Cerialis and the Ninth Legion? Could it be that his advance, rather than an independent attempt to relieve Colchester, was part of a combined strategy with Paulinus? The legions moving down Watling Street would form the central division of a three-pronged advance, with Cerialis and Ninth to the east and the Second to the west, all closing in on the rebels around Colchester. In Dio's description of the final battle there is the odd note that Paulinus 'separated his army into three divisions, in order to fight at several points at one and the same time' - this contradicts Tacitus, but could it be that this is Dio's (or the epitomator's) confused reference to Paulinus' initial plan of advance?
If this is the case, the plan went wrong - Cerialis perhaps moved forward too quickly, and his force was isolated and destroyed (Tacitus mentions his 'rashness'). The Second, of course, never left camp. Arriving somewhere close to London, therefore, Paulinus would have learned that Colchester had already fallen (but possibly only a day or two previously), his left wing had been beaten and his right had failed to move. Not surprising, if so, that he considered the troops he had with him (his own central division) to be 'scanty', and withdrew to a position where a small number could more adequately oppose a multitude - he wouldn't need to go far, though, as his troops were already with him. In this light, the suicide of Pœnius Postumus of the Second Legion is entirely justified - his failure had left Paulinus in a dangerously exposed position.
All of this, of course, would argue for a much more southerly location for that final battle, probably somewhere very close to London or St Albans. There would be no need, however, for Boudica's warband to go racing off for vast distances into the Midlands after the Romans!
Certainly this isn't a massively radical suggestion, but it does seem to me a plausible interpretation, and clears up the problem of Paulinus' movements prior to the battle. I'd be interested to learn what others make of it, and any counter-suggestions they might make!
mile: - Nathan
Nathan Ross
