06-23-2010, 08:06 PM
At risk of further confusing what has become a rather lengthy and diverse thread, I'd like to return (at least for a bit) to the 'rebooting' discussion that Paullus Scipio/Michael tried to start up back on June 17 (a galliant effort, that!). He there gives us a very good review of the pre-Philip II army of Macedonia. There's not too much I can add to his very apt comments, though a couple of points might be worth mentioning in light of what would later develop under Philip. The first is that the earlier Macedonian infantry probably included, in addition to traditional peltasts, some small number of troops with longer, thrusting spears. This is based on similar spearmen being present with the surrounding Thracian tribes (see Best's Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare). The other point is that the spearmen employed unsuccessfully by Arrhabaeus against Brasidas in 323 are described by Thucydides as being "Lyncestian hoplites" (4.121.3), thus suggesting that they were native Upper Macedonians. While we can't completely rule out his use of 'Lyncestian' as a generalized term, Thucydides seems elsewhere to be quite specific in noting the presence of mercenaries, including his comment in the very next sentence following (1.24.4) where he describes the approach of "Illyrian mercenaries." This leads me to think that it's at least somewhat more likely that the historian actually meant just what he wrote and that these 'Lyncestian' hoplites were spear/aspis- armed locals. Such a suppositon is important in that Arrhabaeus was a maternal ancestor of Philip II and both his experiment with providing skirmishers with heavy arms and the causes for its failure might have had a significant influence on Philip's own military reforms some 65 years later.
In the winter of 359/358, Philip had just come off of a small, but throne-saving victory over a force of Athenian-backed mercenaries under the pretender Argaios in which he had had to settle for a negotiated solution post-battle due to the inability of his much more numerous but lightly armed infantry being unable to overcome hoplites holding a defensive position. This must have added to his knowledge gained about Greek warfare during a hostage stay in Thebes (where he became familiar with the phalanx tactics of Epaminondas) as well an appreciation of the reforms of Iphicrates, that Greek military innovator being Philip's adopted brother. Iphicrates had earlier increased the size of a mercenary battle formation for use in Egypt by arming skirmishers with a pike and small shield that they might make up one wing of his phalanx. Combining all this, Philip created a phalanx of his own, most probably with hoplites (local and mercenary, probably built upon a small bodyguard that he already had on hand) on one wing and pike-armed 'phalangites' (again, likely both local and mercenary) on the other. To this he was able to add lance-armed shock cavalry off his flanks, presumeably supporting these last with a porton of his remaining light infantry that he reformed to provide a coherent and better-trained screening force.
In all this, the horsemen were pure Macedonian, while Philip's brother Iphicrates seems to have provided the core idea for equipping the phalangites and Epaminondas was the source of the key tactics. These last included the concept of using hoplites on an 'offensive' wing (the left for Epaminondas and the right for Philip II) to carry the field while the center and other wing played defense, keeping the enemy at bay. Epaminondas did the latter rather awkwardly by 'refusing' those portions of his phalanx, while Philip's method more effectively used the long pikes of his phalangites to avoid 'shield-on-shield' contact until the offensive 'shock' troops could win the day in conjunction with the heavy 'shock' cavalry to which they were linked.
The foregoing is very 'quick and dirty', designed only to get some ideas out there for discussion rather than argue them in detail. The two most vital areas of contention are (a) the hoplite/hypaspists argument that has raged on this thread for some time (obviously, I believe here that the weight of the argument from all data sources, including the context of Philip's background in Thebes and with Iphicrates, favors the idea that hypaspists in Philip's day were essentially traditional hoplites where pitched battle was concerned) and (b) the 'defensive' nature of the phalangite. Since (b) has not been extensively discussed in this thread, I'll throw out a few ideas on that subject to get things started.
The problem with seeing the pike/sarissa an offensive weapon equal or superior to the spear/dory is that it projected much less kinetic energy into its target. This was a result of both the number of weapon strikes a pike-phalanx could make over a given period of time as well as the force that those strikes imparted. Hoplites facing a phalangite array would have had to stop at the reach limit of the front-rank sarissai. At that point, compared to what they had to absorb from dory-armed foes, they would have received only 75% as many strikes from the phalangies. This is based on the phalangites being ranked at about 2/3 the spacing of the hoplites, but being able to employ only the front rank versus at least two ranks of strikers available to traditional spearmen. As for the strength of those blows, measurements by Gabriel and Metz (1991: From Sumer to Rome. The Military Capabilities of Ancient Armies, adapted by Schwartz in his 2009 Reinstating the Hoplite, p. 80) show that in being restricted to an underhand thrust they would have been much less powerful than those of a dory wielded overhand. In fact, a spear used underhand, as required of the pike, generates only 18.75% the force of an overhand blow at 18 Nm (Newton-meters) versus 96 Nm. (Note that these numbers are for spears only, and the sarissa would have had a greater mass, however, it would have been jabbed with less velocity, and since imparted energy only goes up as a single multiple of mass versus as a square of velocity, spear force cited here probably overstates the force of an equivalent sarissa strike.) Thus, with fewer and less forceful strikes, a phalanx of phalangites could impart perhaps well less than a fifth the offensive force of weaponery that a dory-armed phalanx could bring to bear. And this doesn't even contemplate the phalangites' inability to apply the sort of othismos available to an aspis equipped array. Yet perhaps even more limiting than the relatively lesser strength of a pike-armed attack, there is the problem of where that strength can be directed. Thrusting on low, it would have been very difficult, if not entirely impossible, to direct a strike at the most vulnerable areas of a hoplite opponent - those exposed above or just below the top rim of his aspis. In the words of Gabriel and Boose (1994: The Great Battles of Antiquity, p. 21): "Unless the soldier was fortunate to land a blow directly to the face, under the chin, or in the space between the neck and chest armor, the spear was not likely to be a terribly lethal weapon in phalanx combat, at least as long as one's opponent stood his ground."
Add to all the foregoing the relative lesser mobility and flexibility of a man burdened with a sarissa (even compared to a hoplite who was not very agile himself) and what you get is quite a weak offensive formation against a standard Doric/Greek phalanx. However, it's a very different story when it comes to defense. Indeed, unless he could cut through the intevening layers of pike points (something that got harder and harder to do over time as the sarissa grew in length from 12' to over 20'), then a hoplite couldn't apply any offense himself. In essence, even in Philip's time, pikemen could largely avoid shield-on-shield contact with an enemy front, creating the same sort of 'refusal' dynamic as Epaminondas had employed, only without the difficult-to-apply process of avoiding contact with the enemy all-together (something that failed the Theban fatally at Mantinea in 362; significantly, just a few years before Philip's reforms). Therefore, all-in-all, I feel that the bulk of argument falls on the side of the pike array being a primarily defensive formation dependent on a linked strike arm of elite hoplites and heavy horsemen to project offense onto the enemy along a selected sector of the battle front.
OK, that's it in very, very short form. Hopefully, we can bolster, poke holes in some, or completely destroy all of the foregoing concepts in the days ahead! - Fred
In the winter of 359/358, Philip had just come off of a small, but throne-saving victory over a force of Athenian-backed mercenaries under the pretender Argaios in which he had had to settle for a negotiated solution post-battle due to the inability of his much more numerous but lightly armed infantry being unable to overcome hoplites holding a defensive position. This must have added to his knowledge gained about Greek warfare during a hostage stay in Thebes (where he became familiar with the phalanx tactics of Epaminondas) as well an appreciation of the reforms of Iphicrates, that Greek military innovator being Philip's adopted brother. Iphicrates had earlier increased the size of a mercenary battle formation for use in Egypt by arming skirmishers with a pike and small shield that they might make up one wing of his phalanx. Combining all this, Philip created a phalanx of his own, most probably with hoplites (local and mercenary, probably built upon a small bodyguard that he already had on hand) on one wing and pike-armed 'phalangites' (again, likely both local and mercenary) on the other. To this he was able to add lance-armed shock cavalry off his flanks, presumeably supporting these last with a porton of his remaining light infantry that he reformed to provide a coherent and better-trained screening force.
In all this, the horsemen were pure Macedonian, while Philip's brother Iphicrates seems to have provided the core idea for equipping the phalangites and Epaminondas was the source of the key tactics. These last included the concept of using hoplites on an 'offensive' wing (the left for Epaminondas and the right for Philip II) to carry the field while the center and other wing played defense, keeping the enemy at bay. Epaminondas did the latter rather awkwardly by 'refusing' those portions of his phalanx, while Philip's method more effectively used the long pikes of his phalangites to avoid 'shield-on-shield' contact until the offensive 'shock' troops could win the day in conjunction with the heavy 'shock' cavalry to which they were linked.
The foregoing is very 'quick and dirty', designed only to get some ideas out there for discussion rather than argue them in detail. The two most vital areas of contention are (a) the hoplite/hypaspists argument that has raged on this thread for some time (obviously, I believe here that the weight of the argument from all data sources, including the context of Philip's background in Thebes and with Iphicrates, favors the idea that hypaspists in Philip's day were essentially traditional hoplites where pitched battle was concerned) and (b) the 'defensive' nature of the phalangite. Since (b) has not been extensively discussed in this thread, I'll throw out a few ideas on that subject to get things started.
The problem with seeing the pike/sarissa an offensive weapon equal or superior to the spear/dory is that it projected much less kinetic energy into its target. This was a result of both the number of weapon strikes a pike-phalanx could make over a given period of time as well as the force that those strikes imparted. Hoplites facing a phalangite array would have had to stop at the reach limit of the front-rank sarissai. At that point, compared to what they had to absorb from dory-armed foes, they would have received only 75% as many strikes from the phalangies. This is based on the phalangites being ranked at about 2/3 the spacing of the hoplites, but being able to employ only the front rank versus at least two ranks of strikers available to traditional spearmen. As for the strength of those blows, measurements by Gabriel and Metz (1991: From Sumer to Rome. The Military Capabilities of Ancient Armies, adapted by Schwartz in his 2009 Reinstating the Hoplite, p. 80) show that in being restricted to an underhand thrust they would have been much less powerful than those of a dory wielded overhand. In fact, a spear used underhand, as required of the pike, generates only 18.75% the force of an overhand blow at 18 Nm (Newton-meters) versus 96 Nm. (Note that these numbers are for spears only, and the sarissa would have had a greater mass, however, it would have been jabbed with less velocity, and since imparted energy only goes up as a single multiple of mass versus as a square of velocity, spear force cited here probably overstates the force of an equivalent sarissa strike.) Thus, with fewer and less forceful strikes, a phalanx of phalangites could impart perhaps well less than a fifth the offensive force of weaponery that a dory-armed phalanx could bring to bear. And this doesn't even contemplate the phalangites' inability to apply the sort of othismos available to an aspis equipped array. Yet perhaps even more limiting than the relatively lesser strength of a pike-armed attack, there is the problem of where that strength can be directed. Thrusting on low, it would have been very difficult, if not entirely impossible, to direct a strike at the most vulnerable areas of a hoplite opponent - those exposed above or just below the top rim of his aspis. In the words of Gabriel and Boose (1994: The Great Battles of Antiquity, p. 21): "Unless the soldier was fortunate to land a blow directly to the face, under the chin, or in the space between the neck and chest armor, the spear was not likely to be a terribly lethal weapon in phalanx combat, at least as long as one's opponent stood his ground."
Add to all the foregoing the relative lesser mobility and flexibility of a man burdened with a sarissa (even compared to a hoplite who was not very agile himself) and what you get is quite a weak offensive formation against a standard Doric/Greek phalanx. However, it's a very different story when it comes to defense. Indeed, unless he could cut through the intevening layers of pike points (something that got harder and harder to do over time as the sarissa grew in length from 12' to over 20'), then a hoplite couldn't apply any offense himself. In essence, even in Philip's time, pikemen could largely avoid shield-on-shield contact with an enemy front, creating the same sort of 'refusal' dynamic as Epaminondas had employed, only without the difficult-to-apply process of avoiding contact with the enemy all-together (something that failed the Theban fatally at Mantinea in 362; significantly, just a few years before Philip's reforms). Therefore, all-in-all, I feel that the bulk of argument falls on the side of the pike array being a primarily defensive formation dependent on a linked strike arm of elite hoplites and heavy horsemen to project offense onto the enemy along a selected sector of the battle front.
OK, that's it in very, very short form. Hopefully, we can bolster, poke holes in some, or completely destroy all of the foregoing concepts in the days ahead! - Fred
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
