The Charge of the Macedonian Phalanx

[rocktupac]

There are numerous passages which report the "charge," or something akin to quick movement/flexibility, of the Macedonian sarissa-phalanx.

(See for example: Appian Syr. 6.35; Curtius 4.15.15, 8.14.18; Diodorus 18.17.4; Plutarch Eum. 16.4; Polybius 2.69.9, 5.85.9, 11.15.2-3, 11.16.1, 18.29.1, 18.30.1, 18.30.4, 18.30.11; also see: Arrian An. 1.6.1-4; Curtius 3.2.13-14; Diodorus 17.58.4; Livy 33.8; Plutarch Philop. 11.1 (see see Plut. Philop. 9.2ff. for the introduction of the sarissa by Philopoemen); Plutarch Alex. 33.3; Polybius 11.15.2-3.)

What do you think about this? Do you consider the Macedonian sarissa-phalanx to be a quicker-moving/offensive force? Or do you consider it to lumber about, following the cavalry and pinning the enemy in position so the cavalry can ride in? Is this the "anvil" and the cavalry is the "hammer"?

[Paralus]

Not to mention Arrian 3.14.2:

Alexander wheeled round towards the gap, and forming a wedge as it were of the Companion cavalry and of the part of the phalanx which was posted here, he led them with a quick charge and loud battle-cry straight towards Darius himself...

"That part" will have been the hypaspists and the brigade of Coenus (at least) as well as the Agrianes and javellin men. Quick charge can hardly mean walk (though I don't have the Greek) and that these were phalangites (or sarissa-armed) is made clear in the follwing line:

For a short time there ensued a hand-to-hand fight; but when the Macedonian cavalry, commanded by Alexander himself, pressed on vigorously, thrusting themselves against the Persians and striking their faces with their spears, and when the Macedonian phalanx in dense array and bristling with long pikes had also made an attack upon them...

It would seem clear that the phalanx - at least of Alexander's day (prior to 21'+ lances) - was possessed of an agility lost by Polybius' day. Its only near terminal moment cam at Issos when stranded crossing the river. Even so the hypaspists seem to have come to its aid in rolling left. The evolutions of 335 in Illyria also speak to this. The phalanx was not a passive formation but an attacking one. Certainly the mobile cavalry used it in an anvil type fashion but it would be wrong to think of it as simply a "pinning" force. As you say, there are far too many descriptions of its "charge" or, in the classic sense, of "falling heavily upon".

That later is a favourite topos of Diodorus who describes the argyraspids in that fashion but Polybius also uses it to describe the assault, uphill, of the Antigonis phalanx at Sellasia. Here the Spartans were shovelled back onto their fortifications by the double phalanx "closing up the ranks of their pikes" and falling upon them.

[hoplite14gr]

They probably translate "Ephodos" as "charge" which is correct.
Yet the charge is not necessary to be delivered in full speed.
I know from personal experience that spear armed phalanx can charge at a jog.
I will tall you more about the pike phalnx if a test that I plan in August takes place.

I belive though that since most hellenistic phalanxes were poorly trained they could execute fewer staff
than their predecessors.

Kind regards

[Macedon]

What do you mean with "a quicker-moving/offensive force"? The phalanx was a line of pikemen who moved against the enemy or waited for the enemy to move against it, as did all infantry armies of the era. Philip's and Alexander's pikemen fought in the same way as did the men of Antiochus, Antigonus or Ptolemy. Of course the men of Alexander were veterans before even they crossed the Hellespont and this surely enhanced their ability and endurance within and without the battle, but Hellenistic armies should not be perceived as having received less training than the levies of Philip. They trained for years and fought in different formations as was the case in Magnesia, where the training of the phalangites is excelled by Appian. Polybius also presents the Macedonian phalanx as a well trained body of men, singling out the peltasts of Philip etc. The Macedonian phalanx could act offensively as easily as it could defensively, although these characterizations are not really correct. We usually use the term "offense" to denote that an army is moving against the enemy and "defense" for armies who await the enemy with patience. But this is not quite right. To stay your ground was a tactic employed due to many factors and had nothing to do with defense. Maybe you planned to push the flanks because of superiority of cavalry or had better skirmishers, archers, occupied advantageous terrain or wished to employ any kind of stratagems as described by Polyaenus and Frontinus. So, you could stay your ground in the center or a flank and attack in another place. Phalangites were used both ways, as for example in Sellasia, where one phalanx occupied the high ground while the enemy phalanx charged forward. Now, if with "quicker moving" you mean the ability of pikemen to march long distances, this would more have to do with experience and training as far as the phalangites were concerned but it would also have to do with a number of other factors but again there would be little if any difference with other types of armored infantry. If with "offensive force" you mean the ability to actually win the battle,then I also strongly believe that the phalanx was very "offensive". Its strength was great and very hard to withstand.

In conclusion, the Macedonian phalanx was a versatile weapon and could be employed in a number of ways, offensively or defensively.

[rocktupac]

What do you mean with "a quicker-moving/offensive force"?

What I meant was that it should be considered to be more of an attacking force (at least originally, as used by Philip and Alexander), used to charge or attack an enemy's line, rather than a slow-moving or cumbersome force (often described as an "anvil" to which the cavalry would be the "hammer" used to strike the decisive blow). For some modern thoughts on the Macedonian sarissa-phalanx and it being a slow-moving force see (listed is a mix of books and articles): "The Greek and Macedonian Art of War" by F.E. Adcock (p.26); "The Generalship of Alexander" by A.R. Burn (p.148); "Philip II and Macedonian Imperialsim" by J.R.Ellis (pp.56, 58); "Alexander the Great" by Robin Lane Fox (p.73); "Arms and Armor of the Greeks" by A. Snodgrass (p.119). I'm certain there are many others.

But it bothers me to read over and over again that the Macedonian phalanx was this slow-moving and lumbering force, used to keep the enemy back while the cavalry on both of its flanks swung around and delivered the decisive blow. I think this idea mainly comes from the poor descriptions we have of Alexander's main battles and from the emphasis the extant authors place on Alexander's role in those battles. Little attention is given to the sarissa-phalanx in the battles and therefore, in the modern descriptions of the Macedonian army, the role of the sarissa-phalanx is misdiagnosed.

[Paralus]

Philip's and Alexander's pikemen fought in the same way as did the men of Antiochus, Antigonus or Ptolemy. Of course the men of Alexander were veterans before even they crossed the Hellespont and this surely enhanced their ability and endurance within and without the battle, but Hellenistic armies should not be perceived as having received less training than the levies of Philip. They trained for years and fought in different formations as was the case in Magnesia, where the training of the phalangites is excelled by Appian. Polybius also presents the Macedonian phalanx as a well trained body of men, singling out the peltasts of Philip etc.

That the men of Alexander’s army were veterans is correct. Justin clearly describes them as such and, given the small number who returned home as newly-weds, there is no real reason to doubt the general statement.

Whilst the general nature of the phalanx was the same in Hellenistic times, it seems clear – going by Polybius’ claims – that its agility had lessened. This likely has as much to do with lengthening sarissae as with training. The point about the Seleucid phalanx is well made. This was a phalanx that had been in use for some decades and obviously was well drilled. Its failure at Magnesia was due to the fact that it was isolated and that it attempted retirement from the field with elephants.

Elsewhere I’m not certain we can make the same claims. Polybius describes Ptolemy IV creating and training a phalanx from scratch for Raphia. It won the day though it might better be said that Antiochus, in the tradition of Demetrius Poliorcetes, threw it away in a overly spectacular cavalry charge.

With the Antigonids there clearly were arrangements in place for the recruitment and training of the phalanx. The “Amphipolis Regulation” and the Drama / Cassandreia Conscription spell out various regulations – even unto the age of those in the peltasts (hypaspists) and its agema. That their phalanxes were as good or well trained as those of Philip II and Alexander is, though, debatable.

The phalanx work at Sellasia was a standout and, it might be presumed, that Doson had the time necessary (and experience given his initiation into his role) to put an experienced phalanx into the filed. Certainly the peltasts / caetrati will, one thinks, be as “professional” a lot as were their predecessors, the hypaspists. That his predecessors had access to such well trained phalanxes is another question. Gonatas limped from defeat to defeat with the occasional victory interspersed. It’s unlikely that when he finally settled into his royal role Macedonia, after decades of war and turmoil, had the necessary trained manpower.

Certainly Philip V did not when it came to his showdown with Flammininus. Livy, writing for Romans and hence having no reason to deprecate the Roman victory with “excuses” for Philip, provides a description of how poor his manpower resources were (33.3):

Owing to the perpetual wars which had for so many generations drained the manhood of Macedonia there was a serious lack of men of military age, and under Philip's own rule vast numbers had perished in the naval battles against the Rhodians and Attalus and in the campaigns against the Romans. Under these circumstances he even enrolled youths of sixteen and recalled to the colours men who had served their time, provided they had any stamina left. After his army was brought up to its proper strength he concentrated the whole of his forces at Dium and formed a standing camp there in which he drilled and exercised his soldiers day by day whilst waiting for the enemy.

That said, Polybius makes too much of the ground and its unsuitability in this engagement – possibly to support his own view of the phalanx. The reason that Philip V lost here is the fact that “the greater part of his phalanx was still on the march” and never formed into line of battle. That which did – his peltasts and that part of the phalanx with him – succeeded admirably until taken in the rear – nothing to do with the ground.

The ground definitely had an effect at Pydna if the descriptions are correct. Here too it might well be said that the pursuit of the Romans by the phalanx was its undoing. This toom, perhaps, had something to do with decent officers and training.

[Macedon]

Every war and age had its peculiarities. Some kings had veterans abundant, others did not. Some resorted to raw levies and hasty recruitment. The phalanx of Ptolemy at Raphia was not veteran but it certainly was trained by Greek trainers. We should not generalize any comment about the phalanx being badly trained throughout the Hellenistic years as is often said. Even Philip's armies were no match for his later veterans at the beginning. Yet, the phallangites the Hellenistic kingdoms generally used were not less or worse trained than the legionaries of the time. Non veteran legions fought wars as did non veteran cavalry and non veteran Libyans. But non veteran does not mean badly-trained. This is the error many people do in this issue. As for the agility of the phalanx in the battlefield, I do not think that Polybius claims it was less than what it was during Alexander's time. Battlelines did not do any peculiar maneuvers on the battlefield. They fought whoever was posted across from them. They might be employed in an oblique phalanx, in line or in taxeis with elephants among them but essentially they retained their place on the field and fought against the enemy opposite to them.

I also agree with you regarding the Cynoscephalae. Contrary to most experts and even to Polybius' assertion, I do not really believe that the Macedonian phalanx was as heavily disadvantaged on uneven terrain as it is presumed to be. We have to always keep in mind that it was invented by men who lived and fought in a rough land with few and narrow valleys. It excelled in Greece and Italy, in the mountainous Balkans and Asia minor. It was conceived by a man who was a pure pragmatist and would have exploited any weakness and fought against Illyrians and Thracians as well as Aetolian irregulars. Of course it could not be deployed in a totally inimical terrain, but then no battle was waged on mountains or marshes, it was the light troops of all armies that had this task. Disorder was feared in all armies be it Hoplite Greek, Persian, Roman, even barbarian...

So, Scott, my opinion is that the phalanx was not some slow, bulky body of men. It was a battleline which, as all battlelines, marched to fight and could be deployed, redeployed, use various tactical stratagems, push, retreat, open up, close up, do whatever all battlelines did. It was an anvil only inasmuch as the excellent Etairoi usually won the cavalry battle before the phalanx had the time to route the enemy and so usually ended the whole thing... Yet, in Chaeronea, it was the phalanx which gained the victory, in both the Cynoscephalae and in Pydna, the phalanx did a great job pushing the Roman lines etc etc. No, the phalanx was not just a wall to stop the enemy while the cavalry would do all the job...

[Paralus]

As for the agility of the phalanx in the battlefield, I do not think that Polybius claims it was less than what it was during Alexander's time.

Polybius makes more than the one observation regarding the rigidity of the phalanx - in his time. Possibly because it was composed of the young and the older, as Livy describes, Philip V's phalanx seems not to be as well trained as either the Seleucid at Magnesia or Alexander's veterans (Pol.18.26.4):

[...] directing his march towards the part of the field where a struggle was still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians and charge them on the rear. The nature of the phalanx is such that the men cannot face round singly and defend themselves: this tribune, therefore, charged them and killed all he could get at; until, being unable to defend themselves, they were forced to throw down their shields and fly...

Now that remark on the "nature of the phalanx" is Polybius' own observation on the phalanx - in general and not this particular one (as are the remarks "promised in book six" that follow on the nature of the phalanx). This is sometimes translated as: "As it is impossible for the phalanx to turn right about face or to fight man to man". This was, as we know, not impossible at all in the time of Alexander or in the period immediately after his death (Diod. 19.43.4):

[Antigonus] ordered him to attack the Silver Shields now that they had been cut off from their cavalry support. When Pithon promptly carried out his orders, the Macedonians formed themselves into a square and withdrew safely to the river...

This was also performed at Magnesia. This never occurred to the phalanx of Philip V nor, seemingly, to that of Perseus a generation later (though the peltasts seem to have fought to the last). In the end, given Roman generals seeking the death of as many of the enemy as possible during the engagement, it might have made no difference. Still, had those argyrapsides of Eumenes been on that field you can bet they'd have "squared up" pronto once it was known they'd been exposed.

[Macedon]

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I am not 100% sure, but I am reading here : "he attacked the rear of the Macedonians, and the (proper) use of the phalangites was impossible because they had faced about and now risked (fought) man to man".

Quite different, isn't it...? Anyways, attacking an enemy on the rear most usually had this effect. This does not mean that they were not trained to about face if necessary under circumstances. We can again talk tactics here, but I just can't see here any comparison to the phalanx of the past. My interpretation of this battle always was that the Macedonians fought 8 deep to be able to cover the necessary frontage to fight against Titus and so were unable to form the amphistomos phalanx necessary to counter an attack on their rear. Had they been 16 men deep, they would have been able to turn and fight more easily, had they endured the first morale shock. We cannot claim that the inability of the phalanx to withstand a rear attack is some weakness that can be ascribed to loss of tactical knowledge. 7 years later, the Seleucids were able to form mobile squares against the Romans. Even a hardened phalanx, and I do not claim that the phalanx of Philip was particularly experienced, would face grave problems under the circumstances. Yet, why are you so sure that Alexander's phalanx would be able to bear a rear attack while engaged? The example you gave is exactly what the Seleucids, successfully to an extend, tried to do in Magnesia, where they were fighting in taxeis 32 deep, and of course the Argyraspides formed a plaision or plinthion, which is not the same thing as about facing while engaged, although these particular men would have been able to perform any maneuver within and without any manual with ease... I cannot imagine more experienced men than them...

[Paralus]

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I am not 100% sure, but I am reading here : "he attacked the rear of the Macedonians, and the (proper) use of the phalangites was impossible because they had faced about and now risked (fought) man to man".

Quite different, isn't it...?

Translations, translations.... From recollection Hammond, in his reconstruction of the battle, has the Roman maniples ascend the ridge the phalanx "charged down" and then take it in the rear. Whilst not impossible, it seems unlikely that Philip's commanders could not see or expect an attack from the rear as their own left had not come up. It is often assumed that a taxis commander (a Coenus, Ptolemy, Perdiccas, etc) commanded from horseback (view and the fact they were nobles) and did so from the rear. If your translation is closer to the English then perhaps the phalangites abandonned sarissae and went hand to hand. In which case death was a certainty.

We can again talk tactics here, but I just can't see here any comparison to the phalanx of the past. My interpretation of this battle always was that the Macedonians fought 8 deep to be able to cover the necessary frontage to fight against Titus and so were unable to form the amphistomos phalanx necessary to counter an attack on their rear. Had they been 16 men deep, they would have been able to turn and fight more easily, had they endured the first morale shock.

They were - depending upon one's view - 32 deep or 16 deep. Polybius clearly describes Philip ordering the phalanx to double its depth and close up to the left.

Yet, why are you so sure that Alexander's phalanx would be able to bear a rear attack while engaged? The example you gave is exactly what the Seleucids, successfully to an extend, tried to do in Magnesia, where they were fighting in taxeis 32 deep..

Not quite. The phalanx of Antiochus did not engage but was rather denuded of its cavalry and light infantry and then isolated. Livy gives much picturesque Roman blood and butchery and Appian gives a somewhat more "restrained" version. Both are agreed to have worked from Polybius. Appian's testimony seems more to the tone of Polybius:

The Macedonian phalanx, which had been stationed between the two bodies of horse in a narrow space in the form of a square, when denuded of cavalry on either side, had opened to receive the light-armed troops, who had been skirmishing in front, and closed again. Thus crowded together, Domitius easily enclosed them with his numerous light cavalry. Having no opportunity to charge or even to deploy their dense mass, they began to suffer severely; and they were indignant that military experience availed them nothing, exposed as they were on all sides to the weapons of the enemy. Nevertheless, they presented their thick-set pikes on all four sides.

All this is, of course, Antiochus' fault - you'd have thought the lad may have taken a pointer from Raphia if not Demetrius Poliorcetes . Placing elephants between the 50 x32 divisions simply exacerbated the melee in retreat. Note the sarissa on every side and the fact that the phalalnx opened to receive the light-armed troops and closed again (file insertion here would necessitate 32 becoming 64 and 32 again). In any case the phalanx had not engaged and was left stranded. The "square" here was likey near enough to that which they were already in.

[...] of course the Argyraspides formed a plaision or plinthion, which is not the same thing as about facing while engaged, although these particular men would have been able to perform any maneuver within and without any manual with ease... I cannot imagine more experienced men than them.

The argyrapsides were the pezhetairoi of Philip and hypaspists of Alexander and had obviously been in service quite some time. At this battle, threatened on their flanks and rear, they formed a square so as to depart from the field "unmolested" by cavalry. This would mean that sarissae were presented on all sides and, one thinks, the rear became the front as the formation backed from the field. In which case, the rear files have faced about and those to the sides have, in some way, "side-armed" sarissae or crabbed. In any case, for them to depart unmolested by Peithon's cavalry they had sarissae protruding form all sides. The difference here is that the argyraspides were quite clearly well engaged when the danger threatened from the flank and rear - not stranded in formation having had their support chased from either side of them. They were able, evidently at the command, to disengage from the rout they were enjoying and form up - in a square - and depart the field with enemy cavalry escort.

If this is difficult to execute eight deep (from your above comment), then it seems they must simply have fought 16 deep??!!

Given this display by the hypsapists, as well as the display - by the entire phalanx - for Glaucias in Illyria (335), I'd reckon the phalanx brigades of Philip II and Alexander III were very capable of battlefield evolutions that may well have dumbfounded Polybius. The fellow is aghast and incredulous at Kallisthenes' description of the phalanx's performance at Issos. Yet it remains a fact that it did deploy on that terrain and it did survive crossing that river (and a later break at Gaugamela). Nothing like the Spartan phalanx that fell apart over a "ditch" for Philoppoemen or the Antigonid phalanxes that Polybius is so intent on describing as rigid and suitable only for flat obstacle free ground and who cannot face about.

[Macedon]

Yep.. Alexander's men were veterans before they even crossed Hellespont. Their ability has to have been far superior to mere trained soldiers. It is like the 10.000. They couldn't just be compared to an averagely trained phalanx of hoplites...

Diodorus says "eis plinthion eautous poiisantes" (19.43), which is easy to translate "they made themselves into a plinthion". A plinthion is a very specific formation in which the lines themselves form a hollow square, which demands that the lines are unengaged in order to form. Much what Crassus did in Carrhae. From his description of the battle, I understand that the silvershields ("At this time the youngest of the Silver Shields were about sixty years old, most of the others about seventy, and some even older; but all of them were irresistible because of experience and strength, such was the skill and daring acquired through the unbroken series of their battles.") were in reality unengaged having routed their opponents from the field.

Regarding the depth of Philip's men, you are right. They seem to have deployed 16 deep (not 32 though, for the numbers would not add up) and in plain close order (not synaspismos). So, when Polybius has them double in depth and closing in to the right, he has files joining and then all doubled files closing in in usual combat density. My bad, I remembered the "pyknosis" part and not the "diplasiasmos". Yet, not being able to answer to a rear attack is still understandable... I also think that Philip would have been on horseback, Perseus was in Pydna too. But he would see Romans in his rear and would presume that they would have been engaged with his phalanx there. Furthermore, to stay his phalanx, it would mean acceptance of defeat, for he would stop fighting the Romans and pushing them downhills. My opinion is that he strove to quickly finish the legion in front of him (he was clearly winning there after all) in order to himself attack the Romans from behind. It was a contest of who would give in first... The Romans though had a distinct advantage in this contest, their reserve lines...

[Paralus]

My bad...

My God George! Any more of that and I'll begin to consider you a Kiwi!

Yes - as I say - the argyraspides ceased the rout, at the command, and reformed to retire. One would not like to meet any of them in a dark Arachosian alley sometime after 316....