02-09-2023, 02:56 PM
This is presented using the 21st Century Combat Estimate methodology. This is because I am more familiar with it and also that I do not know how the Roman Army of the First Century AD conducted staff work. The seven questions of the Comat Estimate seem to be fairly timeless and at least form a basis for covering the situation in order to present options to the commander. I suspect that a similar process took place at the consilium held by Suetonius Paulinus before embarking on the campaign. This is a summary though a more academic paper with references and reasoning may follow later on Academia as suggested.
What do I think happened based on this assessment?
I think Suetonius Paulinus chose to attack the Iceni at first to put down the revolt and secure the Province. He had to do so in order to mask the Roman blunders in the complete mishandling of the annexation. Fortunately for him he had a scapegoat in Decimius Catus. Later his plan changed to the counterstroke option.
Paulinus probably set off by the fastest means (ship?) to Wroxeter and issued his orders to assemble the army and march on the Iceni. Unfortunately, no plan survives first contact with the enemy. Meanwhile, the Iceni resist and perhaps chase off, kill or besiege the Procurator’s force somewhere in Iceni territory. They know that severe retribution will follow very soon and so they move with their best household troops against the closest Romans – the 9th Legion. Cerialis marches to meet them with a vexillation thinking he is going to suppress the rebellion and maybe rescue the trapped Roman delegation. His forces are ambushed in a forest or forced to fight on unsuitable ground (marsh?) and the infantry are wiped out. The Iceni then besiege the rest of the 9th Legion and attached auxiliaries in its forts and camps. Or, perhaps, Cerialis sends out his cavalry on raids forcing the Iceni to block him. Thus, though the Iceni gain a significant success, the weapons and equipment of the slain Roman infantry they also lose a significant number of their best warriors. This effectively delays the Iceni doing much more than muster the levy while containing the 9th Legion in its forts.
News of the (exaggerated?) success against Cerialis spreads and the Trinovantes put their plan into motion. Part of this is the psychological warfare of omens, hysteria etc. that Tacitus mentions. I think that a significant number of veterans at Colchester want to build fortifications but are refused and suspecting what is about to happen they evacuate to London with their families – hence the later request to Catus for support. Anyway, the Trinovantes plan takes several days in preparation and assembling forces before they attack Colchester.
The Iceni and Trinovantes may well be dealing with seaborne raids by the Fleet on their coastal towns and villages. I do not see an important and mobile asset like the fleet being allowed to stand idle.
Now the mystery of the 2nd Legions lost command. I think it possible that the Legate was tasked with securing King Cogidubnus’ support. The request would be accompanied by inducements. The thrust would be that the 2nd Legion is on its way to London and they would need the King’s support in the form of his warriors. However, once they departed with their escort, the tribes to the west became restive and the Praefectus Castrorum had to suppress them before marching on London through their hostile areas.
The Field Army, meanwhile, sets off from Angelsey resupplies, absorbs reinforcements. It now hears of the defeat of Cerialis. Paulinus continues to London because he needs the 2nd Legion and Cogidubnus’ warriors. He passes through St Albans. Maybe he hears from some veterans from Colchester of the evacuation caused by the refusal of the town officials to allow the building of defences? The inhabitants of St Albans have time to evacuate and many do. He forced marches on to London (a long day’s march). On arrival the 2nd Legion is nowhere to be seen but he finds the veterans from Colchester and Cogidubnus and his men. He also hears of the destruction and slaughter at Colchester. Without the Roman infantry of the 2nd Legion and its auxiliaries he realises that he cannot hold and win at London. Urban warfare then, as now, incurs heavy casualties and is particularly difficult.
The Trinovantes are close in on London. Cogidubnus agrees to offer protection to any of the Londoners who want to move south of the Thames. He also agrees to block the Thames crossings and provide some of his warriors, particularly cavalry, to Paulinus for the field army. London largely empties of civilians. However, a number do stay and Tacitus and Dio both describe their fate.
Hearing that the Iceni have completed their muster and may now be moving to destroy the 9th Legion he heads north again. At some time he probably assessed a number of possible battle sites. This is not as daft as it sounds because I have sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, found myself tactically assessing ground especially when preparing for promotion exams! Near his chosen battle site he now reduces his cavalry screen and allows the enemy scouts close enough to “find” the army. He now has Boudica, the figurehead, and her army in his sights for the counterstroke. Now in his favoured position, he rests and feeds his troops well using up supplies but this, he knows, is all or nothing. He deploys in the traditional way. Perhaps concealing a good proportion in the woods to emerge on command. In this way he entices the Iceni into the killing ground.
The position I would be looking for if we assume the “defile” means hills is as described but I would add looking for an Iceni approach with insufficient water for all the people and animals to drink their fill. Perhaps with a substantial water source behind the Roman line as a further inducement for a frontal assault. This way he reduces the efficiency of the Iceni cavalry and the staying power of the infantry. Especially if he can keep them shouting, cheering and drumming up fervour for a time on, ideally, a hot day. On the other hand if the “defile” is in fact created by one or more water features (lakes or rivers) then that may move the battlefield east towards or into Iceni territory.
His army I believe to be stronger than that given by Tacitus and Dio because in typical Roman way they ignore the contribution made by “most loyal” Cogidubnus to the “massed cavalry on the wings”. In the same way I believe that the combatant element of the Iceni warrior host was very much smaller than Tacitus’ 120,000 because there were “more women than men” present in the speech attributed to Suetonius Paulinus. At a rough estimate I would put the combined forces of Suetonius Paulinus and Cogidubnus at nearer 15,000 and that of Boudica at 60,000 to 75,000 warriors.
As for the battle itself the Romans deploy as described by Tacitus and any available slingers, archers and artillery interspersed or behind and the massed cavalry may have Cogidubnus’ warriors on the extreme flanks. The force is probably drawn up in at least two maybe three lines.
The Iceni would likely be in tribal groups with the best warriors at the front and the least well-armed and armoured behind. The Iceni cavalry are mentioned as being in groups and the commanders, including Boudica, mounted in chariots.
The opening phase would include the speeches beloved of the chroniclers, druids reciting tales and issuing blessings while hurling curses at the Romans. All this building the war fervour of the host by chanting, singing, blowing carnyx horns and suchlike. There was probably some skirmishing between light troops and cavalry.
The tribes advance picks up speed across the plain. As they approach the Roman line, Paulinus’ reserves may be brought out from the woods (or simply stand up). As the rush proceeds up the slope it is compacted as the flanks are drawn in by the defile. On the flanks the cavalry engage and as they wheel, charge and counter charge in a swirling melee they compress the Iceni infantry even more. In the infantry battle the Romans hold and then counterattack pushing the enemy backwards down the slope towards their wagons and womenfolk where the main slaughter takes place. The cavalry, including Cogidubnus’ warriors pursue and complete the rout.
So what about Dio’s 230,000 or so rebels? I consider that he may be about correct if we have:
• An Iceni host in the St Albans/9th Legion area of now 80,000 warriors having suffered losses to Cerialis, 10,000 masking the frontier forts to prevent the 9th Legion attacking its flank and rear and maybe detachments dealing with coastal raids by the fleet.
• A Trinovantes host which engaged the Romans at Colchester and is now plundering the London area. Perhaps about 120,000 warriors.
• Smaller hosts of Silures, Durotriges and Dumnonii totalling about 20,000 occupying the attention of the 2nd and 20th Legions.
From what Suetonius Paulinus is reported to have done I suggest he may have been dealing with several threats simultaneously (as above). He decided to cut off the head of the revolt first (Boudica and her warlike Iceni – the “seat of war” he was seeking?) before switching to the Trinovantes who seemed to be mainly concerned exacting bloody revenge, indulging in torture and rape, destruction and plundering everything. Therefore, I see the battle somewhere around the western side of Iceni territory possibly not far from St Albans or between St Albans and the Northern Frontier forts (Lincoln?) if they were being besieged.
The presence of the womenfolk “wives” is interesting as this was not a migration … or was it? Had the dispossessed Iceni expecting slaughter and destruction decided to move out of the Roman Zone into another area to avoid the anticipated severe Roman retribution – perhaps north to the Parisi or the Brigantes or beyond? Perhaps this explains the need to break through the 9th Legion or defeat Paulinus in a field battle instead of their traditional guerrilla warfare. This may explain why there were so many wives and so much impedimenta with the army.
I leave that thought with you.
What do I think happened based on this assessment?
I think Suetonius Paulinus chose to attack the Iceni at first to put down the revolt and secure the Province. He had to do so in order to mask the Roman blunders in the complete mishandling of the annexation. Fortunately for him he had a scapegoat in Decimius Catus. Later his plan changed to the counterstroke option.
Paulinus probably set off by the fastest means (ship?) to Wroxeter and issued his orders to assemble the army and march on the Iceni. Unfortunately, no plan survives first contact with the enemy. Meanwhile, the Iceni resist and perhaps chase off, kill or besiege the Procurator’s force somewhere in Iceni territory. They know that severe retribution will follow very soon and so they move with their best household troops against the closest Romans – the 9th Legion. Cerialis marches to meet them with a vexillation thinking he is going to suppress the rebellion and maybe rescue the trapped Roman delegation. His forces are ambushed in a forest or forced to fight on unsuitable ground (marsh?) and the infantry are wiped out. The Iceni then besiege the rest of the 9th Legion and attached auxiliaries in its forts and camps. Or, perhaps, Cerialis sends out his cavalry on raids forcing the Iceni to block him. Thus, though the Iceni gain a significant success, the weapons and equipment of the slain Roman infantry they also lose a significant number of their best warriors. This effectively delays the Iceni doing much more than muster the levy while containing the 9th Legion in its forts.
News of the (exaggerated?) success against Cerialis spreads and the Trinovantes put their plan into motion. Part of this is the psychological warfare of omens, hysteria etc. that Tacitus mentions. I think that a significant number of veterans at Colchester want to build fortifications but are refused and suspecting what is about to happen they evacuate to London with their families – hence the later request to Catus for support. Anyway, the Trinovantes plan takes several days in preparation and assembling forces before they attack Colchester.
The Iceni and Trinovantes may well be dealing with seaborne raids by the Fleet on their coastal towns and villages. I do not see an important and mobile asset like the fleet being allowed to stand idle.
Now the mystery of the 2nd Legions lost command. I think it possible that the Legate was tasked with securing King Cogidubnus’ support. The request would be accompanied by inducements. The thrust would be that the 2nd Legion is on its way to London and they would need the King’s support in the form of his warriors. However, once they departed with their escort, the tribes to the west became restive and the Praefectus Castrorum had to suppress them before marching on London through their hostile areas.
The Field Army, meanwhile, sets off from Angelsey resupplies, absorbs reinforcements. It now hears of the defeat of Cerialis. Paulinus continues to London because he needs the 2nd Legion and Cogidubnus’ warriors. He passes through St Albans. Maybe he hears from some veterans from Colchester of the evacuation caused by the refusal of the town officials to allow the building of defences? The inhabitants of St Albans have time to evacuate and many do. He forced marches on to London (a long day’s march). On arrival the 2nd Legion is nowhere to be seen but he finds the veterans from Colchester and Cogidubnus and his men. He also hears of the destruction and slaughter at Colchester. Without the Roman infantry of the 2nd Legion and its auxiliaries he realises that he cannot hold and win at London. Urban warfare then, as now, incurs heavy casualties and is particularly difficult.
The Trinovantes are close in on London. Cogidubnus agrees to offer protection to any of the Londoners who want to move south of the Thames. He also agrees to block the Thames crossings and provide some of his warriors, particularly cavalry, to Paulinus for the field army. London largely empties of civilians. However, a number do stay and Tacitus and Dio both describe their fate.
Hearing that the Iceni have completed their muster and may now be moving to destroy the 9th Legion he heads north again. At some time he probably assessed a number of possible battle sites. This is not as daft as it sounds because I have sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, found myself tactically assessing ground especially when preparing for promotion exams! Near his chosen battle site he now reduces his cavalry screen and allows the enemy scouts close enough to “find” the army. He now has Boudica, the figurehead, and her army in his sights for the counterstroke. Now in his favoured position, he rests and feeds his troops well using up supplies but this, he knows, is all or nothing. He deploys in the traditional way. Perhaps concealing a good proportion in the woods to emerge on command. In this way he entices the Iceni into the killing ground.
The position I would be looking for if we assume the “defile” means hills is as described but I would add looking for an Iceni approach with insufficient water for all the people and animals to drink their fill. Perhaps with a substantial water source behind the Roman line as a further inducement for a frontal assault. This way he reduces the efficiency of the Iceni cavalry and the staying power of the infantry. Especially if he can keep them shouting, cheering and drumming up fervour for a time on, ideally, a hot day. On the other hand if the “defile” is in fact created by one or more water features (lakes or rivers) then that may move the battlefield east towards or into Iceni territory.
His army I believe to be stronger than that given by Tacitus and Dio because in typical Roman way they ignore the contribution made by “most loyal” Cogidubnus to the “massed cavalry on the wings”. In the same way I believe that the combatant element of the Iceni warrior host was very much smaller than Tacitus’ 120,000 because there were “more women than men” present in the speech attributed to Suetonius Paulinus. At a rough estimate I would put the combined forces of Suetonius Paulinus and Cogidubnus at nearer 15,000 and that of Boudica at 60,000 to 75,000 warriors.
As for the battle itself the Romans deploy as described by Tacitus and any available slingers, archers and artillery interspersed or behind and the massed cavalry may have Cogidubnus’ warriors on the extreme flanks. The force is probably drawn up in at least two maybe three lines.
The Iceni would likely be in tribal groups with the best warriors at the front and the least well-armed and armoured behind. The Iceni cavalry are mentioned as being in groups and the commanders, including Boudica, mounted in chariots.
The opening phase would include the speeches beloved of the chroniclers, druids reciting tales and issuing blessings while hurling curses at the Romans. All this building the war fervour of the host by chanting, singing, blowing carnyx horns and suchlike. There was probably some skirmishing between light troops and cavalry.
The tribes advance picks up speed across the plain. As they approach the Roman line, Paulinus’ reserves may be brought out from the woods (or simply stand up). As the rush proceeds up the slope it is compacted as the flanks are drawn in by the defile. On the flanks the cavalry engage and as they wheel, charge and counter charge in a swirling melee they compress the Iceni infantry even more. In the infantry battle the Romans hold and then counterattack pushing the enemy backwards down the slope towards their wagons and womenfolk where the main slaughter takes place. The cavalry, including Cogidubnus’ warriors pursue and complete the rout.
So what about Dio’s 230,000 or so rebels? I consider that he may be about correct if we have:
• An Iceni host in the St Albans/9th Legion area of now 80,000 warriors having suffered losses to Cerialis, 10,000 masking the frontier forts to prevent the 9th Legion attacking its flank and rear and maybe detachments dealing with coastal raids by the fleet.
• A Trinovantes host which engaged the Romans at Colchester and is now plundering the London area. Perhaps about 120,000 warriors.
• Smaller hosts of Silures, Durotriges and Dumnonii totalling about 20,000 occupying the attention of the 2nd and 20th Legions.
From what Suetonius Paulinus is reported to have done I suggest he may have been dealing with several threats simultaneously (as above). He decided to cut off the head of the revolt first (Boudica and her warlike Iceni – the “seat of war” he was seeking?) before switching to the Trinovantes who seemed to be mainly concerned exacting bloody revenge, indulging in torture and rape, destruction and plundering everything. Therefore, I see the battle somewhere around the western side of Iceni territory possibly not far from St Albans or between St Albans and the Northern Frontier forts (Lincoln?) if they were being besieged.
The presence of the womenfolk “wives” is interesting as this was not a migration … or was it? Had the dispossessed Iceni expecting slaughter and destruction decided to move out of the Roman Zone into another area to avoid the anticipated severe Roman retribution – perhaps north to the Parisi or the Brigantes or beyond? Perhaps this explains the need to break through the 9th Legion or defeat Paulinus in a field battle instead of their traditional guerrilla warfare. This may explain why there were so many wives and so much impedimenta with the army.
I leave that thought with you.
Alan
Lives in Caledonia not far from the Antonine Wall.
Lives in Caledonia not far from the Antonine Wall.
