Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[Owein Walker]

How to interpret the movement of Armies ... points or areas?

Ukraine
I have been following the events in Ukraine, where we can now access daily maps of what each side says their position is. And, I start thinking about the "topology" of this front line. Because it is a line. And, even better for anyone understanding war, we can see videos from this line and see what it is really like.

This front line is not decided by the normal process of government: big committees stuffed with expensive civil servants and politicians endless debating where it ought to be, instead the front line is a construct of those individual soldiers behind the line, and really represents "the area which we control ... where our troops can reasonably confidently move and operate.

This is a very interesting construct, because in most places there is no actual physical "line", instead it is something that those soldiers on the ground recognise as "our" space. And, looking at the way these lines move over time, the one thing that is clear, is that any area that become "cut off" from "our space" is in big trouble. And by "cut off", what is meant is that they are no longer in contact with their own space through area held by them.

How Roman armies are viewed by historians
I want to contrast that view of real armies in the field, where they control an "area", which is "theirs", with the way historians write about history, which is not necessarily incorrect, but is clearly a different perspective.

So, when Agricola heads toward the Caledonians, it is seen as a single army, existing at some "point" on the map, which moves as a single point .... in the manner of a "join the dots" campaign between encampments.

The result, is that historians of Roman armies, hardly ever talk about the physical space being controlled by the army, except in terms of "the conquest of Gaul", which is assumed to have gone from the concept of a few dots moving around the map, suddenly to the total conquest of a mass area.

A realistic view of Roman Armies
So, I want to propose a realistic view of Roman armies. The main purpose of an army, is not to fight battles, but to control an area. As such the main occupation of an army, is not fighting battles, but instead to harass an area of enemy land until resistance stops and they are in control of that area. That "harassment" might simply be the threat of battle, it may be literally "rape and pillage" or taking captives. Or it might be a series of small engagements flattening all settlements that resist.

So, when a Roman army advances to the next encampment. This is not just an overnight stay. Instead, it is a new base from which to harass the enemy, subdue the local population and take control over the next chunk of land. That new chunk of land, is likely to have been 15-30miles around the camp. That area would take perhaps 1-2weeks to subdue, because there are only so many small settlements that can be raised in a day and ... slowly executing all who resist ... does take time, and you need the news to sink in to those thinking of resisting.

But, basically, a Roman army advancing, is one that was constantly sending out patrols, not just around the area that it was taking control of, but throughout the whole area which it had taken control of, in order to maintain control. That is how the supplies lines were kept safe, by constantly patrolling and harassing the enemy in the controlled areas, so as to maintain a contiguous area of control from the army back to the "home areas" where it is certain of resupply.

The problem with Suetonius
Suetonius was no different from any army: he didn't want to be cut off ... which is to say, he wanted to have control of a contiguous area of control through which Romans had no problems travelling, right the way back to Rome.

What we know of the battle is that the Britons either held or threatened (meaning the Romans did not have control) of London, St.Albans, the area of the Ninth Legion and by the failure of other legions to come to Suetonius' aid, it is clear numerous other parts of Britain were either not under their control ... or were close to being lost.

All we are actually told, is that Catus felt Gaul was safe. So, any analysis of the position of Suetonius, starts with Suetonius in London, and needs to explain how he was going to have a contiguous area of Roman control from Gaul, to whatever position Suetonius picks as his "seat of war".

I've said Suetonius went south of the Thames, because the Thames immediately creates an area of Roman control that extends from the South to Gaul ... job done.

Others wish to have Suetonius move north. So, the question I have to them is this: where is the area of Roman control that secures their supply lines from Gaul? Unless you can answer that simple question, then no proposal is adequate.

Rivers Matter
And just to rub in the importance of rivers, I've been looking at the front line in Ukraine, and it is immediately obvious that even today, Rivers are very important. They still create effective barriers which armies use to help them control an an area and stop enemy incursion. The idea that a river like the Thames or Dnieper would be totally overlooked by a competent general, whether Roman or modern, is is beyond absurd.

I will give you my answer, but first ask yourself, Why would the residents of London Need to be fit and strong to keep up with SP if they were only going to cross the River Thames, to safety? And if not to safety, then the River is no longer the barrier you suggest. I cannot understand why their health would matter unless they had to travel a considerable distance at some speed. Please also note SP and the civilians met up with his available reinforcements after London and after St Albans were lost, which puts him at least 30 miles away.