02-17-2018, 01:20 PM
Nathan wrote:
I would guess a gap of c.1000 metres is about right. Paulinus had 10,000 men, probably about 8000 regular infantry - drawn up eight deep in close formation they would need a space of about that width. I would assume the cavalry and light infantry/archers etc would occupy the slopes or higher ground on the flanks
If we assume that SP had the 14th Legion with him would he not have had the Batavians with him? If this was the case, by extrapolation if there were only 10,000 men would not there have been a greater ratio of mounted men to Legionaries? In other words would the depth of the force have been less than 8 deep or not as wide as 1000 metres? Could the space needed have been narrower?
Nathan wrote:
Even if the Midlands were in a state of rebellion, I don't think we need assume there was any large scale rebel army in the field up there. And against a fully equipped Roman force of ten thousand men, including cavalry, any smaller bands of rebels would not offer much of a threat. So I don't think our theories should be informed by the possibilities of 'other' groups of Britons roaming about the place.
Alchester is only about 22 miles from Tring - a day's steady march - so if Paulinus thought he was in any danger from the surrounding area he would surely have made for the fortifications there, which were apparently large enough to contain his full force, rather than diverting southward into the Chilterns again.
I think that you are probably correct in that a full blown army was not there but the Brythons were notorious for harrying marching columns, operating a guerrilla war (Caesar had major problems during his second expedition) so you wouldn’t have needed that many men (small war bands) to cause a major power, major problems (the Afghan wars and the Indian wars in North America have a parallel).
The problem for the Romans as we have already discussed was bringing the Brythons to a formal battle which they would win everytime but unless the Romans had substantial cavalry many of the Brythons would escape to fight another day - as in fact happened here.
So the key possibly is when and why SP made the decision to fight rather than re-group with his forces in the west. My supposition is that he went west along the Lower Icknield Way, heading for the Goring Gap to Silchester (possibly safe territory held by roman allies) and then to Cirencester via Speen and Wanborough.
The Brythons following him had the option to turn for home at Verulamium by going up Watling Street via Dunstable and then going east along the Upper Icknield Way, or they could follow SP to Tring along Akeman Street, they could have even outflanked him by splitting their force into one group going up Akeman Street to Tring and one going to Tring via Dunstable and then down the Icknield Way to Tring which would have made the Tring site undefendable.
(Of course this is only speculation - but it is possible)
SP’s scouts would have kept him informed of the movement of the Brythons and perhaps it was when the Brythons continued to advance that he made the move to a site where he could not be outflanked yet gave him an exit to Silchester.
It just seems that we should look at all the possible scenarios - as we haven't found that much archeology as yet referring to the battle site - apart from the Tring helmet
I would guess a gap of c.1000 metres is about right. Paulinus had 10,000 men, probably about 8000 regular infantry - drawn up eight deep in close formation they would need a space of about that width. I would assume the cavalry and light infantry/archers etc would occupy the slopes or higher ground on the flanks
If we assume that SP had the 14th Legion with him would he not have had the Batavians with him? If this was the case, by extrapolation if there were only 10,000 men would not there have been a greater ratio of mounted men to Legionaries? In other words would the depth of the force have been less than 8 deep or not as wide as 1000 metres? Could the space needed have been narrower?
Nathan wrote:
Even if the Midlands were in a state of rebellion, I don't think we need assume there was any large scale rebel army in the field up there. And against a fully equipped Roman force of ten thousand men, including cavalry, any smaller bands of rebels would not offer much of a threat. So I don't think our theories should be informed by the possibilities of 'other' groups of Britons roaming about the place.
Alchester is only about 22 miles from Tring - a day's steady march - so if Paulinus thought he was in any danger from the surrounding area he would surely have made for the fortifications there, which were apparently large enough to contain his full force, rather than diverting southward into the Chilterns again.
I think that you are probably correct in that a full blown army was not there but the Brythons were notorious for harrying marching columns, operating a guerrilla war (Caesar had major problems during his second expedition) so you wouldn’t have needed that many men (small war bands) to cause a major power, major problems (the Afghan wars and the Indian wars in North America have a parallel).
The problem for the Romans as we have already discussed was bringing the Brythons to a formal battle which they would win everytime but unless the Romans had substantial cavalry many of the Brythons would escape to fight another day - as in fact happened here.
So the key possibly is when and why SP made the decision to fight rather than re-group with his forces in the west. My supposition is that he went west along the Lower Icknield Way, heading for the Goring Gap to Silchester (possibly safe territory held by roman allies) and then to Cirencester via Speen and Wanborough.
The Brythons following him had the option to turn for home at Verulamium by going up Watling Street via Dunstable and then going east along the Upper Icknield Way, or they could follow SP to Tring along Akeman Street, they could have even outflanked him by splitting their force into one group going up Akeman Street to Tring and one going to Tring via Dunstable and then down the Icknield Way to Tring which would have made the Tring site undefendable.
(Of course this is only speculation - but it is possible)
SP’s scouts would have kept him informed of the movement of the Brythons and perhaps it was when the Brythons continued to advance that he made the move to a site where he could not be outflanked yet gave him an exit to Silchester.
It just seems that we should look at all the possible scenarios - as we haven't found that much archeology as yet referring to the battle site - apart from the Tring helmet
Deryk
