10-29-2012, 01:43 AM
Renatus wrote:
I will revise what I said:
I suspect that those allowed to accompany him were those thought wealthy and influential enough and those with the strength and skills necessary to assist in the reconstruction of the province and its structures after the suppression of the revolt. Even so, there would probably have been conditions attached, predominantly that they would be able to keep up with the column and not slow it down in any way. This would probably mean that those sufficiently wealthy would have had their own horses or horse-drawn transport and those on foot would have needed to have had the stamina to keep pace with the soldiery. The column would not have slowed down for those who could not keep up.
As to your specific comments:
Although the Romans may have had plenty of people to reconstruct the province, I fail to see why this should preclude Paulinus from taking with him those from London with similar abilities.
Horse-drawn transport need not have slowed the column down; it depends upon the type of transport. Light carts, for instance, would not have been a problem. I would expect Paulinus to have had mules, so anything capable of keeping pace with the mules would have been all right.
Be careful with translations. Tacitus does not say that Paulinus received “all” who wanted to go with him. A literal translation is ‘those accompanying he accepted in part of the column’ (comitantes partem agminis acciperet). This is less inclusive than Church and Brodribb would have it. Nor are the three exceptions exhaustive; what about the sick, for instance? The Loeb translation is ‘he . . . embodied in the column those capable of accompanying the march.’
I am not sure that we are adressing the underlying problem here. The rich and wealthy would have left once they saw that the Procurator had fled. They could rebuild their lives anywhere. The word would have got around immediately after he had gone.
I never said that people of ability were precluded. I just don’t believe that was a criteria for them to go with Paulinus that you stated in your original argument.
This fascination with speed I find difficult to comprehend. Both you and Nathan state that the horde were actually coming very slowly towards London but Paulinus needs to race away from a horde that is moving at about 5 miles every two days where as the refugees would have been travelling at ten miles per day plenty of time to escape.
I suppose pick your translation applies but I would have thought even with yours and the Loeb translations he took refugees that could travel with him into the column and left.
This of course does not answer the question “why take them at all?"
As has been stated by others this is atypical behaviour for those times.
Renatus wrote:
I thought that we had covered this. The Ninth was going to the relief of Colchester, not attacking the homelands. Likewise, had Paulinus had the troops, he would have gone for the rebels’ army first and devastated their homelands afterwards, as he did after the final battle.
I am not suggesting that he was going for the homelands, I never have. Typical Roman tactics would suggest that they would have gone to beat the opposing army (or in this case horde). What I have said is that the Ninth were ambushed on the borders of the Iceni on their way to Colchester. I have not said that the Ninth were marching on the Iceni but that they were going past their territory.
The other reason is that the Brythons tactics were more guerrilla tactics where they were highly successful in ambush and siege warfare not massed formations where they knew they were likely to get beaten.
Everything points to that set of tactics in this war.
Once Paulinus was retreating the Brythons were still in their element of pursuing and harrying.
Renatus wrote:
That assumes that the Iceni came down Watling Street, which I doubt that they did.
No reason to doubt that at all.
Renatus wrote:
I hope that I misunderstand you! You seem to be suggesting that Postumus, though well aware of Paulinus’ perilous position, refused to go to his aid but remained at his base to secure an escape route for himself and his legion. This changes what could conceivably be characterized as an honourable misjudgement into an act of mutinous cowardice.
Not at all. It would have made sense for him to have secured the port to receive re-inforcements from Gaul. As I have maintained the Romans were very stretched with a possible countrywide uprising which everyone was trying to keep in check.
Perhaps he had already sent for re-inforcements and was waiting for them to arrive before setting off. It comes back to the question why was he in charge? Why would the officers of the Second be with Paulinus and if they were why wouldn't Paulinus have sent them to get the Legion?
Postumus would have been one of the most courageous men in his Legion. He stayed where he was because of his bravery and trying to perform for Rome. It was just that events conspired against him. What we need to understand is what those events were.
Kind Regards - Deryk
I will revise what I said:
I suspect that those allowed to accompany him were those thought wealthy and influential enough and those with the strength and skills necessary to assist in the reconstruction of the province and its structures after the suppression of the revolt. Even so, there would probably have been conditions attached, predominantly that they would be able to keep up with the column and not slow it down in any way. This would probably mean that those sufficiently wealthy would have had their own horses or horse-drawn transport and those on foot would have needed to have had the stamina to keep pace with the soldiery. The column would not have slowed down for those who could not keep up.
As to your specific comments:
Although the Romans may have had plenty of people to reconstruct the province, I fail to see why this should preclude Paulinus from taking with him those from London with similar abilities.
Horse-drawn transport need not have slowed the column down; it depends upon the type of transport. Light carts, for instance, would not have been a problem. I would expect Paulinus to have had mules, so anything capable of keeping pace with the mules would have been all right.
Be careful with translations. Tacitus does not say that Paulinus received “all” who wanted to go with him. A literal translation is ‘those accompanying he accepted in part of the column’ (comitantes partem agminis acciperet). This is less inclusive than Church and Brodribb would have it. Nor are the three exceptions exhaustive; what about the sick, for instance? The Loeb translation is ‘he . . . embodied in the column those capable of accompanying the march.’
I am not sure that we are adressing the underlying problem here. The rich and wealthy would have left once they saw that the Procurator had fled. They could rebuild their lives anywhere. The word would have got around immediately after he had gone.
I never said that people of ability were precluded. I just don’t believe that was a criteria for them to go with Paulinus that you stated in your original argument.
This fascination with speed I find difficult to comprehend. Both you and Nathan state that the horde were actually coming very slowly towards London but Paulinus needs to race away from a horde that is moving at about 5 miles every two days where as the refugees would have been travelling at ten miles per day plenty of time to escape.
I suppose pick your translation applies but I would have thought even with yours and the Loeb translations he took refugees that could travel with him into the column and left.
This of course does not answer the question “why take them at all?"
As has been stated by others this is atypical behaviour for those times.
Renatus wrote:
I thought that we had covered this. The Ninth was going to the relief of Colchester, not attacking the homelands. Likewise, had Paulinus had the troops, he would have gone for the rebels’ army first and devastated their homelands afterwards, as he did after the final battle.
I am not suggesting that he was going for the homelands, I never have. Typical Roman tactics would suggest that they would have gone to beat the opposing army (or in this case horde). What I have said is that the Ninth were ambushed on the borders of the Iceni on their way to Colchester. I have not said that the Ninth were marching on the Iceni but that they were going past their territory.
The other reason is that the Brythons tactics were more guerrilla tactics where they were highly successful in ambush and siege warfare not massed formations where they knew they were likely to get beaten.
Everything points to that set of tactics in this war.
Once Paulinus was retreating the Brythons were still in their element of pursuing and harrying.
Renatus wrote:
That assumes that the Iceni came down Watling Street, which I doubt that they did.
No reason to doubt that at all.
Renatus wrote:
I hope that I misunderstand you! You seem to be suggesting that Postumus, though well aware of Paulinus’ perilous position, refused to go to his aid but remained at his base to secure an escape route for himself and his legion. This changes what could conceivably be characterized as an honourable misjudgement into an act of mutinous cowardice.
Not at all. It would have made sense for him to have secured the port to receive re-inforcements from Gaul. As I have maintained the Romans were very stretched with a possible countrywide uprising which everyone was trying to keep in check.
Perhaps he had already sent for re-inforcements and was waiting for them to arrive before setting off. It comes back to the question why was he in charge? Why would the officers of the Second be with Paulinus and if they were why wouldn't Paulinus have sent them to get the Legion?
Postumus would have been one of the most courageous men in his Legion. He stayed where he was because of his bravery and trying to perform for Rome. It was just that events conspired against him. What we need to understand is what those events were.
Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
