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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
People who are very entrenched in their ideas often resort to anger when those ideas are challenged. As long as it's only the ideas which are challenged, and the disagreements are polite, there should be no problem with the conversation. Needless adjectives are, well, needless.
M. Demetrius Abicio
(David Wills)

Saepe veritas est dura.
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Well, here's some music to calm you all down. I was pointed in its direction by the twitterati this morning (including the omniscient/omnipresent Adrian Murdoch). Note track 8, which seems rather appropriate under the circumstances!

Mike Bishop
You know my method. It is founded upon the observance of trifles

Blogging, tweeting, and mapping Hadrian\'s Wall... because it\'s there
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Quote:Well, here's some music to calm you all down.
And this from the bloke who tossed the pebble into the pond in the first place!
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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This is a very difficult thread to leave when there are such excellent insights and people who are genuinely prepared to discuss the archeology and texts......and of course music lovers! Smile

Hi Renatus:

Many thanks for putting such a believable and logical explanation together.

Of course you wouldn’t necessarily expect me to agree with you entirely but there is much that I can support.....


Renatus wrote:

London was a major commercial centre, perhaps the major commercial centre, in the province. It was a wealthy town and thus a tempting target for the Britons. For the Romans, it was probably the administrative, as well as a mercantile, centre and, therefore, not to be given up except in the most dire of circumstances. Its significance, therefore, was both material and symbolic.


I can appreciate that London was the Roman Administrative centre with a strong commercial side but how much wealth would have been left after the administrators and wealthy had already evacuated I think is a moot point even before Seutonius Paulinus arrived.

The difficulty I have in believing that London was a prime target for the Brythons is partially based on the fact that they should have overrun London at least a week before SP arrived.

The excuse that they were a drunken mob does not fit with the logistics at all or that this was a “knee jerk” reaction to Boudica getting beaten. This was a planned and combined operation (possibly with the backing of the Druids) and in this case they could have been in London 5 days after sacking Colchester even taking into account a fair amount of looting and celebration.

The fact that SP arrived at London before them was because it was not a prime target for them and therefore not part of their strategy. If we assume that he was there for 2 days or so the Brythons would not have marched on London for over 2 weeks.

The second reason is that if the warriors went to London they would have left open the Western and Northern borders of the Iceni and the Trinovantes to the Romans as they progressed down Watling Street and could have been approached from Leicester, St Albans or London.

The third reason is that although it was an administrative centre for the Romans, that made it important to the Romans but not to the Iceni or the Trinovantes. There was no real benefit to them as an Administrative Centre or as a trophy until they had secured their own lands.

Renatus wrote:

If they had not proceeded with their campaign but had withdrawn within their tribal boundaries to await Roman retaliation, they would not only have lost the impetus generated by their earlier successes but would have handed the initiative to the Romans.

I find this hard to accept

The standard Roman tactics would have been to attack full on as you say yourself state “... it is most unlikely that the Romans would consider launching a punitive raid into the enemy’s territory whilst it still had an army active in the field. They would defeat the army first....”

I can understand the Romans mustering at London but then to have advanced onto the Trinovantes homeland to Colchester to bring them to battle but as you rightly say he didn’t have enough men.

I think that this point actually answers your point that the standard Roman tactic would have been to beat the army in the field – NOT wait for the Brythons to come to them.

Renatus wrote:

(Incidentally, the Ninth was not attacking the rebels’ homelands, as you seem to suggest. Tacitus makes it quite clear that it was advancing to the aid ( in subsidium adventanti) of Colchester. and then take retaliatory action against its homeland to deter future insurrection – I think the term is atrocitas, which says it all).

I have misled you into thinking that I was suggesting that Cerialis was attacking the Homelands. I was proposing that he was on the way to Colchester using a direct route from Longthorpe via Godmanchester via Cambridge through Haverhill and Sturmer then Long Melford to Colchester.

He was attacked at Sturmer (there are references to a battle here) because he used a route that bordered the Iceni territory and coincided with the Icknield Way and fell foul of the border patrols that called down the Iceni warriors.

I think that possibly Cerialis possibly retreated to the fort at Great Chesterford which was about 6 miles from the running battle.

Renatus wrote:

First, he could have marched out to confront the advancing rebels with the forces that he had but, in doing so, he ran the risk of suffering the same fate as Cerealis and the Ninth.

Totally agree!

Renatus wrote:

....Or (and I am beginning to favour this explanation) he may have decided simply to preserve his army for future action, even if this meant exposing the town to occupation and devastation.

A great general’s great decision. Totally dispassionate but tempered with the option for people to be taken under his banner to be evacuated.

Interestingly a totally different attitude to how he treated the local population where little quarter was given at all.

Renatus wrote:

The danger, of course, was that he would, in effect, be supplying the rebels and enabling them, if they were so minded, to continue their depredations without having to worry about finding food. If he destroyed the stocks, the rebels’ advance would be slowed down by the necessity for them to forage as they went along.

I can appreciate Robert’s argument re the wealth and food and the attractions that would slow the Brythonic army down but at the end of the day I think that the danger of leaving supplies, arms and wealth which might be used against him later would have outweighed the benefits and having to find food would have slowed them down considerably.

Some of the archaeology would indicate that SP was using a burnt earth policy on his route away from London. Syon Park has indications of burnt grain, Staines was also burnt around this period (all a bit tentative I appreciate) and Silchester also.

Much of the warrior class would have been extremely mobile and SP must have been confident that he had enough time (even though he would have been travelling at about 10 miles per day with the burden of the refugees) to get away. Otherwise he would have been caught and harried putting him atthe same risk of Cerialis or Varus.

This is another reason against the Brythons advancing on London forcing him to evacuate because if that was the case and he had to leave quickly he would have left the refugees to save his army.

Renatus wrote:

In the event, if Dio is to be believed, none of this worked. The plundering of London did not delay the rebels overmuch and Paulinus realised that they were coming upon him much faster than he had anticipated, forcing him to give battle with the forces that he had unreinforced. He was fortunate and astute enough to be able to choose a battle site that suited his limited resources and disadvantaged the enemy.

Although I agree with this statement I think that it is underestimating Seutonius Paulinus’ genius. He was one of the best generals of his age, him and Corbulo, as Tacitus states.

I am coming to the opinion that as Tacitus states (but as I have previously ignored) “he resolved to quit the station, and, by giving up one post, secure the rest of the province. “

So perhaps we can say that he was not merely fortunate to find a battle site but that he had one planned all along.

If that is the case getting the Brythons to follow and attack him was genius indeed.

To a degree Dio makes us think that he was panicked into fighting but this does not reflect the records of the general.

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Hi Deryk,

Welcome back. As you say, it is unlikely that we will agree on everything but, at least, if we both put forward our arguments, others can decide whether they prefer one or the other, or neither.


Quote:I can appreciate that London was the Roman Administrative centre with a strong commercial side but how much wealth would have been left after the administrators and wealthy had already evacuated I think is a moot point even before Seutonius Paulinus arrived.
Tacitus does not tell us how many (if any) of the wealthy left London with Catus Decianus nor how much of their portable wealth they were able to take with them. In a sense, it doesn’t matter; the Britons would have perceived it to be a place where wealth could be found for the taking, even if the cupboard was bare by the time they got there. Also, although its being the administrative centre may have been of greater importance to the Romans than to the Britons, nevertheless it would be the place where government revenues were collected and the Britons may have been eager to get their hands on them. Again, we do not know if Decianus emptied the coffers before leaving but the Britons would not have known that either.


Quote:The difficulty I have in believing that London was a prime target for the Brythons is partially based on the fact that they should have overrun London at least a week before SP arrived.

The excuse that they were a drunken mob does not fit with the logistics at all or that this was a “knee jerk” reaction to Boudica getting beaten. This was a planned and combined operation (possibly with the backing of the Druids) and in this case they could have been in London 5 days after sacking Colchester even taking into account a fair amount of looting and celebration.
I wondered about that myself. However, we do not know how long the rebellion had been brewing before it burst out into open revolt. Clearly, the inhabitants of Colchester had sufficient warning to get a plea for assistance to Decianus and for him to send 200, admittedly poorly armed, troops in response. (As a digression, who were these troops? My guess is that they were the legionaries seconded to the governor’s officium, who had probably left their battle equipment at their base fortresses and had only their sidearms with them.) They also were able to get a similar request to Cerealis. Probably, reports of the impending revolt were sent to Paulinus at the same time, either directly or relayed to him by Cerealis, and he may have been well on his way down Watling Street when news of the fall of Colchester reached him. It seems evident from Tacitus’ account that Colchester had fallen before Cerealis and the Ninth had arrived on the scene and that the rebels had turned to meet them. This would have further delayed their departure for London.

Although I would hesitate to dismiss the rebels as simply a drunken rabble, I doubt that the revolt was as planned and co-ordinated as you would like it to be. Tacitus has a telling description of it: (in the Loeb translation) “ . . . the enemy neither took captive nor sold into captivity; there was none of the other commerce of war; he was hasty with slaughter and the gibbet, with arson and the cross, as though his day of reckoning must come, but only after he had snatched his revenge in the interval.” This suggests more of a rampage than an ordered advance and contains the implication that the Britons knew the consequences of not pressing home their advantage while they had the opportunity.


Quote:I can understand the Romans mustering at London but then to have advanced onto the Trinovantes homeland to Colchester to bring them to battle but as you rightly say he didn’t have enough men.

I think that this point actually answers your point that the standard Roman tactic would have been to beat the army in the field – NOT wait for the Brythons to come to them.
I don’t understand. I was not suggesting that Paulinus would wait for the Britons to come to him, except to the extent that he had to wait for reinforcements before advancing himself.


Quote:I am coming to the opinion that as Tacitus states (but as I have previously ignored) “he resolved to quit the station, and, by giving up one post, secure the rest of the province. “
I do not recognise the quotation, unless it is a very free translation of the passage about abandoning London, which you have referred to. Can you give a reference?


Quote:To a degree Dio makes us think that he was panicked into fighting but this does not reflect the records of the general.
I think “panicked” is putting it too strongly but Dio’s comment that Paulinus was compelled to give battle against his better judgement has the ring of truth about it. Even great generals can miscalculate and I believe that Paulinus did on this occasion. Tacitus’ statement that he “prepared to abandon delay and contest a pitched battle” (Loeb again) has the appearance of making a virtue of necessity. His account of the battle also makes it look all too easy. Dio’s hard-fought battle is probably nearer the truth. Given the discrepancy in numbers, it may well have been what the Duke of Wellington might have called “a damn’d close-run thing.”
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Quote: If their ultimate goal was to drive the Romans from the country, they would have needed the assistance of the majority of the other British tribes. To gain this, they would need to have demonstrated that they were carrying the battle to the Romans and that they were doing so successfully. If they had merely freed their own territories from Roman control and then remained within their homelands, it would have indicated to the other tribes that this was simply a local dispute and they would not have been encouraged to join in. Moreover, Boudica might have been quite keen to get into the territory of the Atrebates to demonstrate to the other tribes what happened to those who backed the wrong side.
I'm not sure if the Iceni thought about it that way - of course the ejection of the Romans was the main goal, but the unification of the british tribes behind that cause may not have been. Do we even know they attempted this, and if so, why it did not come about, even after the fall of Londinium?

Quote:Robert makes the excellent point that, once they had secured enough plunder, the less politically committed elements of the rebel army would tend to drift away
Thank you! :-)

Quote: Or (and I am beginning to favour this explanation) he may have decided simply to preserve his army for future action, even if this meant exposing the town to occupation and devastation.
he may have intended both. I think a defense of the town would have been extremely difficult at best: even if the troops could have reached it in time, provisions for both troops as well as civilians would not have been present to ensure holding it during a long siege. In the meantime, the army would have been the focal point of every Briton eager to get back at the Romans.

Quote:In the event, if Dio is to be believed, none of this worked.
We ca't know that. It is possible that, although the rebels continued on, their numbers inded diminished, allowing Paulinus not to be overrun. In any case, it did not cause more tribes to flock to Boudicca's banner.
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
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Quote:The excuse that they were a drunken mob
Before any more ink is spilled about that 'mob' thingy, let's get down to earth about it. My remark was "the Iceni or their allies, who came at the Romans in a classic ‘mob-army’ fashion", nothing more. I never wrote anything else, so all conclusions about it are not mine. My remark was intended for the tactical battlefield formation, not about their army being a mob, drunken or out of control. So please, desist from making my comment into a general negative comment about the British forces.

The British did not come at the Romans in orderly, controlled infantry formations. That better?

Although we can appreciate that the British were fighters, we can by no means conclude anything about the combat quality of every member of this army, simply because we do not know this. The Roman army can be ccepted as being professional soldiers, but we know next to nothing about who accompanied Boudicca's army. Elderly, boys, lots of non-combatants or men simply eager for plunder may have been part of it, or even a large part. The tribes had, after all, been 'decommissioned' for some time, so the battle-readiness may have been quite a bit lower than 17 years earlier.
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
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Quote:
Renatus post=321518 Wrote:If their ultimate goal was to drive the Romans from the country, they would have needed the assistance of the majority of the other British tribes. To gain this, they would need to have demonstrated that they were carrying the battle to the Romans and that they were doing so successfully. If they had merely freed their own territories from Roman control and then remained within their homelands, it would have indicated to the other tribes that this was simply a local dispute and they would not have been encouraged to join in. Moreover, Boudica might have been quite keen to get into the territory of the Atrebates to demonstrate to the other tribes what happened to those who backed the wrong side.
I'm not sure if the Iceni thought about it that way - of course the ejection of the Romans was the main goal, but the unification of the british tribes behind that cause may not have been. Do we even know they attempted this, and if so, why it did not come about, even after the fall of Londinium?
I think that Tacitus gives something of an answer. After describing the Romans' treatment of Boudica, her daughters and the Icenian nobles, he goes on (in the Loeb translation): "Impelled by this outrage and the dread of worse to come - for they had now been reduced to the status of a province - they flew to arms, and incited to rebellion the Trinobantes and others, who, not yet broken by servitude, had entered into a secret and treasonable compact to resume their independence."

So, Boudica seems to have persuaded at least some tribes to join her. As I suggested before, others were probably sitting on the fence, waiting to join the side that seemed to be winning. There was probably insufficient time between the fall of London and the final confrontation, possibly only a matter of days, for many (or any) others to join in. It would have been very different, I suggest, if Paulinus had been defeated.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Renatus wrote:

The Britons would have perceived it to be a place where wealth could be found for the taking.....again, we do not know if Decianus emptied the coffers before leaving but the Britons would not have known that either.


I do agree with both these points.

It does however raise an issue about the relative definition of wealth. The wealth of any tribe would have had to have been based in the land that they were able to hold. Without land they were in fact tenants. So to my way of thinking the real riches lay in the land where future wealth could be generated from. I think that they would guard this first.

Renatus wrote:

......I wondered about that myself. However, we do not know how long the rebellion had been brewing before it burst out into open revolt. Clearly, the inhabitants of Colchester had sufficient warning to get a plea for assistance to Decianus and for him to send 200, admittedly poorly armed, troops in response.

I, like you, expect that some resistance had been building for a period of time for the inhabitants of Colchester to send for troops from London to have been there before the Brythons attacked.

It would also seem logical for messages to have been sent to the Ninth Legion headquarters as well and probably Cerealis would have sent them onto Seutonius Paulinus.

As Cerealis was the local commander in charge of the Eastern part of the Province it seems that he felt that the situation was serious enough to take with him a force strong enough to protect Colchester or even disuade the tribes from attacking.

Renatus wrote;

Probably, reports of the impending revolt were sent to Paulinus at the same time, either directly or relayed to him by Cerealis, and he may have been well on his way down Watling Street when news of the fall of Colchester reached him.

I don’t think the timeline fits. Tacitus suggests that the news of the rebellion reached SP in Anglesey. In that case it is likely that it took at least a day to have got there from Cerealis.

So if SP had left 1 day after he had the message (and that would have been pretty tight timing) Cerealis would have already left Longthorpe on the day after he got the message.

Cerealis was possibly ambushed as he was travelling possibly into the 2nd day of the journey and SP would have travelled around 30 miles maximum.

You state that:

It seems evident from Tacitus’ account that Colchester had fallen before Cerealis and the Ninth had arrived on the scene and that the rebels had turned to meet them. This would have further delayed their departure for London

Even if the Ninth wasn’t ambushed and arrived at Colchester on the 3rd day and was beaten in a pitched battle this would not have delayed the Brythons very long.

Colchester would have been lost and the Ninth destroyed by the time SP had travelled 50 miles – 200 to go to London – another 8 days at least and probably more and that is at the most optimistic.

Renatus wrote:

I doubt that the revolt was as planned and co-ordinated as you would like it to be. Tacitus has a telling description of it: (in the Loeb translation) “ . . . the enemy neither took captive nor sold into captivity; there was none of the other commerce of war; he was hasty with slaughter and the gibbet, with arson and the cross, as though his day of reckoning must come, but only after he had snatched his revenge in the interval.

Although you state:

This suggests more of a rampage than an ordered advance and contains the implication that the Britons knew the consequences of not pressing home their advantage while they had the opportunity.

It of course be applied to SPs response in the aftermath ofthe main battle that led to his recall.

Renatus wrote:

I don’t understand. I was not suggesting that Paulinus would wait for the Britons to come to him, except to the extent that he had to wait for reinforcements before advancing himself.

My apologies – I misunderstood you.

Renatus wrote:

I do not recognise the quotation, unless it is a very free translation of the passage about abandoning London, which you have referred to. Can you give a reference?

It is a translation that I picked up as follows:

At that place he meant to fix the feat of war; but reflecting on the scanty numbers of his little army, and the fatal rashness of Cerealis, he resolved to quit the station, and, by giving up one post, secure the rest of the province.

Or

Uncertain whether he should choose it as a seat of war, as he looked round on his scanty force of soldiers, and remembered with what a serious warning the rashness of Petilius had been punished, he resolved to save the province at the cost of a single town.

but as you can see the idea was to give up London to save the the country for the Romans.. therefore SP had a plan! - allegedly...

Renatus wrote:

His account of the battle also makes it look all too easy. Dio’s hard-fought battle is probably nearer the truth. Given the discrepancy in numbers, it may well have been what the Duke of Wellington might have called “a damn’d close-run thing.”


I have a problem with Dio's version of events re the battle because of breaking the force into 3 - which would give 3500 per group which is really too small....

BUT I think that it was a close run thing with most of the dead being the baggage train...

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Robert Vermaat wrote:

The British did not come at the Romans in orderly, controlled infantry formations. That better?

That is perfect..... Smile


Robert Vermaat wrote:

The Roman army can be accepted as being professional soldiers, but we know next to nothing about who accompanied Boudica's army. Elderly, boys, lots of non-combatants or men simply eager for plunder may have been part of it, or even a large part. The tribes had, after all, been 'decommissioned' for some time, so the battle-readiness may have been quite a bit lower than 17 years earlier.


You are definitely correct about the Roman army and probably right about the Brythonic army. You would expect it to be made up of Warrior Bands, young men who just wanted to fight, the baggage train and of course there may have been a lack of battle readiness even for the Warriors however we have to acknowledge that they had already beaten the Ninth Legion - or was this an ambush?

As this was definitely an ongoing war with the Brythons still "under arms" months after the defeat of Boudica, the battle must have must have broken the fighting forces (the Warrior Bands) but not the fighting spirit.

A surprising outcome really.....it would also seem to imply that successful occupation relied on the co-operation of the local population which was only achieved after SP left and the new Governors took office.

Renatus wrote:


As I suggested before, others were probably sitting on the fence, waiting to join the side that seemed to be winning. There was probably insufficient time between the fall of London and the final confrontation, possibly only a matter of days, for many (or any) others to join in.


I expect that after London this is exactly what happened... that the tribes did join Boudica's banner to confront the Romans.

There was a time that I would not have thought that the Brythons would have stood a chance against the Roman might, even if they defeated SP however the more I look at the scenario the more I have come to think that the Romans really were stretched and this is why this battle was so important.

Kind Regards- Deryk
Deryk
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Quote:
Renatus post=321518 Wrote:In the event, if Dio is to be believed, none of this worked.
We ca't know that. It is possible that, although the rebels continued on, their numbers inded diminished, allowing Paulinus not to be overrun. In any case, it did not cause more tribes to flock to Boudicca's banner.
I take your point to some degree. However, I maintain that, if the hope was that the rebels would stop their advance at London or that they would delay long enough for Paulinus to link up with his reinforcements, the ploy failed. If, on the other hand, Paulinus expected that, the longer he drew out the campaign and the further he drew the rebels from their homelands, the more would be induced to desert, it may have been, at least partially, successful. Whether the desertions would have been in sufficient numbers to have had an appreciable effect upon the outcome of the battle must remain a matter for speculation. Deryk believes that after London other tribes would have joined the revolt. Certainly, the fall of three major centres of Romanisation – Colchester, London and Verulamium – would have been an incentive for them to do so but I still doubt that there would have been sufficient time for them to muster their forces and proceed to join the rebel horde before the final battle took place.


Quote:Renatus wrote;

Probably, reports of the impending revolt were sent to Paulinus at the same time, either directly or relayed to him by Cerealis, and he may have been well on his way down Watling Street when news of the fall of Colchester reached him.

I don’t think the timeline fits. Tacitus suggests that the news of the rebellion reached SP in Anglesey.
I set out below an extract from Nathans’s hypothetical chronology originally posted here:


Quote:AD61 - March – After questioning the terms of Prasutagus's will, Procurator Catus sends men to flog Boudica and rape her daughters. Boudica vows revenge and begins to muster her forces.

April – Iceni begin mobilisation, uncovering caches of 'decommissioned' weapons. Catus, informed of this, sends a message to Governor Paulinus at his campaign headquarters at Wroxeter.

May 1st – Paulinus begins his campaign against the Ordovices, marching north and west from Wroxeter.

May 10th – Boudica holds giant tribal assembly. Message sent to Catus from Colchester.

May 18th – Boudica’s force moves south into Trinovante territory. Catus sends 200 men from his bodyguard to reinforce Colchester, and another message to Paulinus.

May 20th – Paulinus’s army reaches the Mona Strait opposite Anglesey. Catus’ 200 men reach Colchester.

May 22nd – Catus’ second message (unrest amongst Iceni, gathering forces, threat to Colchester) reaches Paulinus at his camp on the Mona strait.

May 25th – Paulinus’s army crosses the strait and attacks Anglesey.

May 27th – Romans destroy the remaining enemy forces on Anglesey.

May 28th – Romans burn sacred Druidic groves on Anglesey. Paulinus then pulls his army back across the straits, and sends an express messenger to Cerialis to advance to reinforce Colchester.

May 30th – Paulinus begins a rapid march back towards Wroxeter with the Fourteenth legion and several cohorts of the Twentieth.

June 2nd – Paulinus arrives at Chester.

June 3rd – Iceni attack Colchester. Civilians barricade themselves inside the temple. Cerialis, legate of the Ninth Legion at Longthorpe, receives the order to advance in support of Paulinus's main column.

June 4th – Paulinus arrives back at Wroxeter. Cerialis, outpacing the main column with his lightly-equipped force, marches 22 miles from Longthorpe to Godmanchester.

June 5th – last defenders of the Colchester temple die by fire. Message of destruction despatched to London. Paulinus on the march east down Watling Street. Cerialis marches 15 miles to Cambridge.

June 6th – Iceni looting and burning Colchester. Paulinus arrives at Mancetter. Message reaches the Second Legion base at Gloucester, but their Prefect does not give the order to move. Cerialis marches 20 miles on the Via Devana to Wixoe.

June 7th – Cerealis’s force ambushed and destroyed on the Via Devana between Wixoe and Colchester.

June 8th - Paulinus's advance reaches Towcester. Catus flees for Gaul by ship.

June 9th – Paulinus, still on Watling Street, meets Catus’ messenger coming north with news of the fall of Colchester. Catus arrives in Gaul and sends a message to Rome, reporting the imminent loss of the province. Iceni begin to muster outside Colchester and advance south-west towards London.

June 10th – Paulinus marches into St Albans and meets a second messenger with news of the defeat of Cerialis and flight of Catus.

June 11th – Paulinus marches on from St Albans and enters London. He learns that the Second Legion have not advanced to meet him. Iceni plundering in the area of Romford.

June 12th - Paulinus, deciding that London cannot be held, orders the inhabitants to evacuate the city.

June 13th – Paulinus destroys his supplies and retreats from London.

June 14th – Iceni sack and burn London

One may disagree with some of the detail (I doubt that Paulinus would have embarked upon his Anglesey campaign if he had been informed of trouble brewing in the east and I think that account has to be taken of Dio’s statement that, when advised of the rebellion, he took ship, presumably sailing along the North Wales coast to Chester, which may have gained him a little time) but, on the whole, it seems to present a plausible scenario that allows Paulinus to reach London before the arrival of the rebels (just).


Quote:Renatus wrote:

I do not recognise the quotation, unless it is a very free translation of the passage about abandoning London, which you have referred to. Can you give a reference?

It is a translation that I picked up as follows:

At that place he meant to fix the feat of war; but reflecting on the scanty numbers of his little army, and the fatal rashness of Cerealis, he resolved to quit the station, and, by giving up one post, secure the rest of the province.

Or

Uncertain whether he should choose it as a seat of war, as he looked round on his scanty force of soldiers, and remembered with what a serious warning the rashness of Petilius had been punished, he resolved to save the province at the cost of a single town.

The second quotation is from Church and Brodribb. The first appears much older; “feat of war” looks like “seat of war” written with the long s. Anyway, talk of “small armies”, “stations” and “posts” seems wide of the mark. Below is the Latin, followed by my own more or less literal (and, therefore, rather stilted) translation:

Ibi ambiguus, an illam sedem bello deligeret, circumspecta infrequentia militis, satisque magnis documentis temeritatem Petilii coercitam, unius oppidi damno servare universa statuit.

‘There, uncertain whether he should choose that as the base for war, with the insufficient number of soldiers considered and (bearing in mind)* the impetuosity of Petilius, punished with suitably potent lessons, he decided by the loss of one town to save everything.’
* I think that a verb has to be understood here. Other translators seem to think the same.

I offer this somewhat awkward reading to avoid our being misled by the choice of words and grammatical changes used by other translators to achieve a more flowing and pleasing translation.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Quote:I doubt that Paulinus would have embarked upon his Anglesey campaign if he had been informed of trouble brewing in the east... when advised of the rebellion, he took ship, presumably sailing along the North Wales coast to Chester

Being a cautious fellow, Paulinus probably wouldn't have turned his army around without firm intelligence. He could have been opposite Anglesey by the time such intelligence reached him, and still have had time to defeat the Druids (possibly a more cursory job than T implies - Agricola had to go back and do it again 16 years later!) and get back to London before Boudica arrived.

As for the ship - Webster made the same assumption. I think it's just Dio thinking that Anglesey's an island, so Paulinus obviously had to sail back to the mainland... no need to imagine a coastal voyage to Deva - which probably didn't exist as a base or a harbour at this stage anyway.

Good work on the 'accurate' translation though - when a text gets this amount of scrutiny it's good to be reminded what it actually says... ;-)
Nathan Ross
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Quote:Being a cautious fellow, Paulinus probably wouldn't have turned his army around without firm intelligence. He could have been opposite Anglesey by the time such intelligence reached him
I was thinking of this:

April – Iceni begin mobilisation, uncovering caches of 'decommissioned' weapons. Catus, informed of this, sends a message to Governor Paulinus at his campaign headquarters at Wroxeter.

May 1st – Paulinus begins his campaign against the Ordovices, marching north and west from Wroxeter.


If Paulinus was that cautious, would he have set off for the most westerly side of the island, having been informed of a potential uprising in the east?


Quote:(possibly a more cursory job than T implies - Agricola had to go back and do it again 16 years later!)
Possibly Paulinus had to abandon his Welsh conquests to conduct the mopping-up operations after the revolt. Tacitus tells us that he united his whole army (contractus deinde omnis exercitus) and kept it under canvas to conclude the war.


Quote:As for the ship - Webster made the same assumption. I think it's just Dio thinking that Anglesey's an island, so Paulinus obviously had to sail back to the mainland
Quite possibly: Dio reads as if he thought that Mona was some distance from the mainland. We should not necessarily dismiss it out of hand, however, but consider whether a sea journey conferred any advantage upon Paulinus. Webster considered that it reduced his land journey to London by some 70 miles, but he was thinking in terms of a cavalry dash.


Quote:Good work on the 'accurate' translation though - when a text gets this amount of scrutiny it's good to be reminded what it actually says... ;-)
Thank you. I was struck, on reading the Latin, that the translations all refer to "the province" and that is obviously what Tacitus means, but he does not actually say it.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Renatus wrote:

‘There, uncertain whether he should choose that as the base for war, with the insufficient number of soldiers considered and (bearing in mind)* the impetuosity of Petilius, punished with suitably potent lessons, he decided by the loss of one town to save everything.’

* I think that a verb has to be understood here. Other translators seem to think the same.



Many thanks for your interpretation and feel that it addresses the main points:

1. SP felt he did not have enough soldiers to advance on the Brythons (bearing in mind the
impetuosity of Petilius).
2. SP felt he did not have enough soldiers to defend London.
3. SP decided to save everything by losing one town.

I feel that your translation shows that SP did have a plan which depended on giving up London as part of that plan. I can however agree with you that he may have had to bring that plan forward or indeed alter it because he was not able to forsee the Brythons actions after London.

I think that it is interesting that Tacitus feels that he needs to explain why SP abandoned London and therefore we should perhaps pay it some attention.


Renatus wrote:

(Regarding Nathan Ross’ Timeline)

One may disagree with some of the detail (I doubt that Paulinus would have embarked upon his Anglesey campaign if he had been informed of trouble brewing in the east and I think that account has to be taken of Dio’s statement that, when advised of the rebellion, he took ship, presumably sailing along the North Wales coast to Chester, which may have gained him a little time) but, on the whole, it seems to present a plausible scenario that allows Paulinus to reach London before the arrival of the rebels (just).

I have great respect for Nathan’s work on this, much of which I agree with but I think that there are a couple of assumptions on the timeline which leads me to a different conclusion, which I will try to address here.

In consequence I will start with Nathan’s date of origin but this diverges regarding the fall of Colchester but follows the journey of SP to London.

Timeline by Nathan Ross

AD61 - March – After questioning the terms of Prasutagus's will, Procurator Catus sends men to flog Boudica and rape her daughters. Boudica vows revenge and begins to muster her forces.

Note: This whole timeline is based upon this starting in March. If this didn’t start until April or May the whole timeline is questioned. It seems unlikely that SP would have supported an action that would have the slightest chance of causing problems in his rear. This might indicate that SP was already on his way to Anglesey which again would have an effect on the timeline.

April – Iceni begin mobilisation, uncovering caches of 'decommissioned' weapons. Catus, informed of this, sends a message to Governor Paulinus at his campaign headquarters at Wroxeter.

Note: I agree with Renatus that if SP knew that the Iceni were raising forces in his rear he would have sent forces to stop this immediately – possibly the Ninth. Roman military thinking would imply this if we look at Scapula’s treatment of the Iceni and surrounding tribes in AD48.

May 1st – Paulinus begins his campaign against the Ordovices, marching north and west from Wroxeter.

May 10th – Boudica holds giant tribal assembly. Message sent to Catus from Colchester.

Note: It would seem logical that if a message was sent to Catus and that he decided to send troops that he would have informed the local commander Cerealis.

May 18th – Boudica’s force moves south into Trinovante territory. Catus sends 200 men from his bodyguard to reinforce Colchester, and another message to Paulinus (and possibly Cerealis).

Note: This is where the major divergence occurs from Nathan’s timeline. If Boudica’s forces moved into Trinovantes territory they would have been about 15 miles away from Colchester. Even with wagons that was a journey of less than 2 days, meaning that they would have attacked Colchester by May the 21st on this timeline.

May 20th – Message arrives with Cerealis. This may have been the turning point when Cerealis legate of the Ninth Legion at Longthorpe acted impetuously and decided to advance in support of Catus’ men.

Paulinus’s army reaches the Mona Strait opposite Anglesey. Catus’ 200 men reach Colchester.

May 21st – The Brythons attack Colchester

May 22nd – Catus’ second message (unrest amongst Iceni, gathering forces, threat to Colchester) reaches Paulinus at his camp on the Mona strait

Colchester destroyed along with its inhabitants.

May 23rd - Cerialis, marches 22 miles from Longthorpe to Godmanchester.

May 24th - Cerealis marches 15 miles to Cambridge.

Parts of the Brythonic Army turn to face Cerealis

May 25th - Cerialis marches 19 miles on the Via Devana towards Wixoe and is ambushed at Sturmer.

The Ninth is destroyed and Cerealis escapes either to the fort at Great Chesterford or perhaps at Wixoe.

Paulinus’s army crosses the strait and attacks Anglesey.


May 27th – Romans destroy the remaining enemy forces on Anglesey

May 28th – Romans burn sacred Druidic groves on Anglesey. Paulinus then pulls his army back across the straits, and sends an express messenger to Cerialis to advance to reinforce Colchester.

May 30th – Paulinus begins a rapid march back towards Wroxeter with the Fourteenth legion and several cohorts of the Twentieth.

Note: There is no definitive record that the Twentieth was at Anglesey. It is assumed because the Twentieth were at the battle with Boudica.

June 2nd – Paulinus arrives at Chester

Note: According to the revised timeline for the destruction of Colchester (May 21st to May 22nd) the Brythons would have been hanging around for 10 days.

June 4th – Paulinus arrives back at Wroxeter.

June 8th - Paulinus's advance reaches Towcester. Catus flees for Gaul by ship.

June 10th – Paulinus marches into St Albans and meets a second messenger with news of the defeat of Cerialis and flight of Catus.

June 11th – Paulinus marches on from St Albans and enters London. He learns that the Second Legion have not advanced to meet him. Iceni and Trinovantes still in their homelands.

Note: The Brythons would have been waiting for Paulinus to attack them for some 21 days.
It would therefore be apparent that their prime objective was NOT to attack London.

June 12th - Paulinus, deciding that London cannot be held, orders the inhabitants to evacuate the city.

June 13th – Paulinus destroys his supplies and retreats from London.

June 14th – Iceni sack and burn London

Note: If the Brythons were in London on the 14th of June they would have been able to harass his retreating column which was loaded down with refugees with their swift moving warbands.


Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Quote:So, Boudica seems to have persuaded at least some tribes to join her. As I suggested before, others were probably sitting on the fence, waiting to join the side that seemed to be winning. There was probably insufficient time between the fall of London and the final confrontation, possibly only a matter of days, for many (or any) others to join in. It would have been very different, I suggest, if Paulinus had been defeated.
I concur with the latter. However, with enough time to prepare, and weeks of victories from Camelodunum to Londinium, there would have been plenty of time for other tribes to decide (as they would already have had plenty of time to discuss their actions before the rebellion had started).
With that said, I still doubt that the unification of all British tribes was an Icenian goal.
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
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