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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
I have been reflecting on a couple of details which have been referred to briefly before but which, to the best of my recollection, have not been linked, at least not here. They may, of course, have been considered, unbeknown to me, elsewhere. Suetonius (Nero, 18) states that Nero considered removing his forces from Britain, in effect giving up the province, although he does not explain why or when. Dio (LXII, 2) says that one of the causes of the revolt was that Seneca had advanced a loan of 40,000,000 sesterces to the provincials and had called it in all at once. Could there be a connection?

Seneca had been Nero's tutor and was probably still privy to his thinking. If he knew that Nero was contemplating abandoning the province, this could have provoked him into calling in his loan while there was still a Roman presence in Britain to enforce his demands. This would place Nero's intention to leave Britain in the period before the revolt and not as a consequence of it. Suetonius says that Nero did not proceed with his plan because that would have reflected adversely upon the glory of his adoptive father Claudius but another reason could have been that to do so would, in effect, have given the rebels what they wanted, the departure of the Romans from Britain. So the idea was shelved, at least for the time being, and was then overtaken by events, the fall of Nero and the rise of Vespasian. Vespasian could well have been strongly opposed to the notion of giving up the province that he had helped gain for Rome 26 years previously.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Is this a suitable celebration of 1500 posts and 100 pages?

Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.[
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I have added a few words to my last post.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
(12-11-2017, 11:44 PM)John1 Wrote: the stonking great Fort at Windridge

How did a small 3-4 hecare temporary camp or enclosure turn into a 'stonking great fort'?

I would like Windridge to be the place where Paulinus camped his army after withdrawing north from London - it's in the right sort of location, just outside the southwestern gate of the town, on the road to (for example) Akeman Street. But we'd need an enclosure of four or five times the size.

If it is Roman, I would guess it's more likely a fortified villa enclosure or a smaller camp from some time during the 400-odd years of Roman occupation. But its discovery (and the discovery of the others around the Nene you've mentioned elsewhere) at least indicates that there are surely many more camps or possible camps scattered all over the south east that we don't currently know about.


(12-11-2017, 11:55 PM)Renatus Wrote: another reason could have been that to do so would, in effect, have given the rebels what they wanted... Vespasian could well have been strongly opposed to the notion of giving up the province that he had helped gain for Rome 26 years previously.

Very possible, I'd say. It's a shame that Dio (as usual) didn't give more detail about the chronology involved, and that Tacitus doesn't mention it at all. More of those 'known unknowns'...


(12-11-2017, 11:57 PM)David Scothorn Wrote: But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know we don't know.

Yep, the Don Rumsfeld approach to history! [Image: tongue.png]


(12-11-2017, 01:58 PM)John1 Wrote: sides steep enough and inaccessible enough to not be threatened by the hordes out flanking him, sounds like a steep sided deep valley to me, dips just don't cut it. With it's bottom wide enough to deploy a large body of troops, ie several hundred metres. Any feature remotely like this would have a water course in it's base

I don't know about 'inaccessible' - Paulinus would not want to isolate his troops at the bottom of a ravine. He would need to keep communication with whatever forces he placed on the high ground to either side, and the cavalry would need a slope they could charge down, not fall down...

In an age of (mainly) infantry combat and hand weapons, even a relatively gentle incline could affect the course of a battle. Paulinus would be looking for a feature that would funnel the rebel advance towards his infantry line and constrict their abiliity to spread out and flank him, while giving him high ground on either side that he could occupy and hold against them. He was also using the terrain available to him - so unless we can transport the campaign a long distance from London, we're probably not looking for Cheddar Gorge or anything similar.

The lack of a water course inside the defile suggests that it was situated on a watershed - with the Romans camped on one side and the Britons approaching from the other - and/or that it was on chalk, which would be dry in summer. The area of Chilterns suits both, of course.
Nathan Ross
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we'd need an enclosure of four or five times the size.
No we don't, it was fortified pre- 61 and post 61 as the garrison for the town,  (BBQ'd in 61) no need for a New Town style camp it is plenty large enough for it's purpose. The absence of a larger camp means either it has yet to be found or Paulinus wasn't working to your "go big or go home" theory. Obviously I favour the latter position.

"How did a small 3-4 hectare temporary camp or enclosure turn into a 'stonking great fort'?"
a) Them there Gatehouses aren't temporary. 
b) Stonking in terms of a 4ha camp under our Romanist noses for centuries makes it's significance far more stonking than it's obvious scale.... strangely similar to the prospective one at Whilton. Although Whilton does seem to have roundier corners...

 "the discovery of the others around the Nene you've mentioned "
that is so sweet of you, but they are just speculations not discoveries (yet)
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Nathan,

you posted a couple of suggestions for sites, I was going to respond yesterday, then when I tried to find them today I spent literally 10minutes looking everywhere but the right post. That's the problem with a discussion forum - everything is so ephemeral.

You give two sites, but except for the maps, you don't give any details about your thinking for selecting these sites or whether for example you've done a site survey of any form.

And worse ... you've probably posted that information several times ... and I can appreciate you wouldn't want to keep repeating it every time someone new comes along.

Do you have a website where i can find more? If not, perhaps I could start a new section on "suggested sites for the Battle of Watling Street" :Smile on one of my sites?

Or indeed, if other people have their own suggestions and/or websites it would be interesting to list all the various suggestions with information to answer questions like:

1) why this rough location (as in to the nearest 10-20miles)
2) why this specific location (as in this valley)
3) How do you see the battle site in terms of where troops lined up, possible camps
4) what evidence if any do you have suggesting this site
5) what site visits have been made
6) what plans do you have for the future
7) is there any specific help you need - as in are you looking for funding or help to survey
Oh the grand oh Duke Suetonius, he had a Roman legion, he galloped rushed down to (a minor settlement called) Londinium then he galloped rushed back again. Londinium Bridge is falling down, falling down ... HOLD IT ... change of plans, we're leaving the bridge for Boudica and galloping rushing north.
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(12-12-2017, 12:01 PM)MonsGraupius Wrote: except for the maps, you don't give any details about your thinking for selecting these sites

I gave links earlier to my original posts about the two sites, but it's easy to lose these things, as you say!

Here they are again: Dunstable and Tring (both have additional thoughts and information in the discussions following).

I haven't visited either site myself, although there was a brief and inconclusive survey of the Dunstable site a few years back. Possible evidence at the Tring site is mentioned in this post, which has a link to the Cow Roast excavation report.

My overall thinking for both sites is very similar, and in rough precis form goes as follows:

1. Paulinus brought his whole force down to London, rather than doing Webster's supposed 'cavalry dash'. The latter phase of the campaign therefore begins from London, rather than heading off into the Midlands.

2. He needed a position to withdraw to after evacuating London, as he was escorting a large number of civilian refugees. This place needed to be in allied territory, within scouting distance of the rebel advance, on a communication route to potential reinforcements from the west and the north, and close to a defensible position. St Albans meets all these requirements - and why would Tacitus have mentioned it if it wasn't significant?

3. Remaining close to St Albans allowed Paulinus to block or intercept attempts by the rebels to move back towards their own territory via the Iknield Way, which they would have needed to do at some point in order to plant winter crops and avoid famine the following year.

4. Once the rebels approached St Albans, Paulinus pulled back once again and took up a position in the Chilterns, either blocking the route directly (at Dunstable) or threating the rebels from the west (at Tring). Either location would have allowed him to preserve his lines of communication with reinforcements from the west or north. Sited on chalk uplands and on a watershed, both sites would have provided a dry battlefield with water supply for both the Britons (from one direction) and the Romans (on the other), and an easy route of approach for the Britons after they sacked St Albans (which is only 10-12 miles away)

5. By positioning himself at either location, Paulinus would have left Boudica's rebels no option but to confront him directly.
Nathan Ross
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(12-12-2017, 12:25 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote:
(12-12-2017, 12:01 PM)MonsGraupius Wrote: except for the maps, you don't give any details about your thinking for selecting these sites

I gave links earlier to my original posts about the two sites, but it's easy to lose these things, as you say!

Here they are again: Dunstable and Tring (both have additional thoughts and information in the discussions following).

I haven't visited either site myself, although there was a brief and inconclusive survey of the Dunstable site a few years back. Possible evidence at the Tring site is mentioned in this post, which has a link to the Cow Roast excavation report.

you didn't say whether it was Ok to put in my website, but as I tried to work through the various links and work out exactly what you were proposing I had to collect the information somewhere. So, I created a new category:

http://mons-graupius.co.uk/index.php/bou...ast-battle

If that's not OK just say.
Oh the grand oh Duke Suetonius, he had a Roman legion, he galloped rushed down to (a minor settlement called) Londinium then he galloped rushed back again. Londinium Bridge is falling down, falling down ... HOLD IT ... change of plans, we're leaving the bridge for Boudica and galloping rushing north.
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(12-10-2017, 11:57 PM)Renatus Wrote:
(12-10-2017, 10:16 AM)Theoderic: Many thanks Michael Wrote: Renatus wrote:

If I get a chance, I'll attempt a literal translation.

Thank you Michael

Here is my effort. Tacitus' style is idiosyncratic and consequently (as you will see) a literal translation reads very awkwardly. Nevertheless, it is usually clear what he is driving at and it is tempting to paraphrase him, rather than to translate him directly, in order to achieve a readable result. This no doubt accounts by the variety of more-or-less free translations that are available. Anyway, I have done my best to follow him as closely as possible. The result is probably not perfect but I don't think that it distorts the original too much.

34.  At this time, the 14th legion, with the veterans of the 20th, and auxiliaries from the nearest, almost 10,000 soldiers, were with Suetonius, when he determined to abandon delay and to join battle. And he chose a position in a narrow defile and closed at the rear by a wood, with sufficient knowledge there to be none of the enemy unless in front and an open plain, without fear of ambush. Therefore, the regular legionary stood in ranks, the light-armed all around, the massed cavalry on the wings.

37.  The unmoving legion at first holding in position and the narrowness of the place as a protection, when it had exhausted its missiles with unerring throwing against the closely attacking enemies, burst forth like a wedge. Likewise the attack of the auxiliaries; and the cavalry with extended lances breaks through whoever was in the way and powerful.

Renatus wrote:

If I get a chance, I'll attempt a literal translation.

That has helped a lot - thank you very much.

Deryk
Deryk
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Renatus translated:

34.  At this time, the 14th legion, with the veterans of the 20th, and auxiliaries from the nearest, almost 10,000 soldiers, were with Suetonius, when he determined to abandon delay and to join battle. And he chose a position in a narrow defile and closed at the rear by a wood, with sufficient knowledge there to be none of the enemy unless in front and an open plain, without fear of ambush. Therefore, the regular legionary stood in ranks, the light-armed all around, the massed cavalry on the wings.


37.  The unmoving legion at first holding in position and the narrowness of the place as a protection, when it had exhausted its missiles with unerring throwing against the closely attacking enemies, burst forth like a wedge. Likewise the attack of the auxiliaries; and the cavalry with extended lances breaks through whoever was in the way and powerful.

It is interesting that Tacitus mentions that he had chosen a place where he could be safe from ambush. This perhaps brings us to the point of why he was concerned about being ambushed. This was a typical Brythonic tactic but if, as has been assumed, SP was moving away from the "Horde" why was he concerned about being ambushed?

The implications are that either SP's force (with the refugees from London) was being harassed by Brythonic cavalry and / or charioteers from the Atrebates or the Iceni  or that there were other enemy tribes that his scouts had located in the countryside ahead?

Tacitus does mention that there were other tribes involved but does not name them but it is likely that the tribes would be from the Midlands rather from the South as Nathan mentions. 

It would also be logical that as SP had been in St Albans which is the perfect place for a rendezvous of the legions to launch an attack on the East of the Country and also a place that held Roman citizens as it was only one of two towns recognised by the Empire; Colchester as a Colonia and Verulamium as a municipium  conferring Latin rights on its citizens.

SP had to protect these people as Governor, especially as he had lost Colchester and the Roman citizens there.

So for him to have left London with one set of refugees he needed to go to St Albans (perhaps still hoping to meet up with the 2nd) and also to protect those citizens. 

As we have agreed SP was a brilliant but cautious / thoughtful General and would have had his scouts deployed around his location and it may well have been that he had knowledge of attackers advancing on his position.

St Albans could not be defended any more than London could (and I am sure that it is stated that he was running low on supplies), so he needed to retire with his men and the London and St Albans refugees either up Watling Street or Akeman Street perhaps burning the granaries as he left to give the impression to those that followed him that he did indeed have plenty of grain.

As he had come down Watling Street the stores in those forts would have been low as he would have used them already.

My supposition is that Akeman Street would have had supplies at the forts between St Albans and Cirencester where he could have food for his force, unfortunately he felt that he was heading into an ambush and chose a place that he could defend.

At Tring there is a valley facing Akeman Street where this is perfectly feasible, a steep sided valley with a water supply contained therin but no river running through the battlefield, that as we all agreed years ago would have been reported.

Like John I think that the defile does imply an extremely steep sided valley so that he could not be outflanked, based not only on woods but also the terrain but would have to be large enough to accommodate his forces and the refugees 

I have yet to find a reason why this valley is being ignored as a valid site.

The Brythons had a water supply of the River Bulbourne and their wagons were probably along the Icknield way where the high land was above the river allowing a view of the battlefield at the valley 1,000 metres wide at its entrance

The valley under Chivery is surrounded by the largest hills in the vicinity, a perfect spot for the Brythons to think that they had trapped a much smaller force in the valley which they could fight especially as they had recently smashed a severely depleted Legion.

Their mistake was that this was a full legion, ready for battle and arrayed properly and according to Tacitus with cavalry on its wings - a force that they never beat in this configuration, as far as we know.
Deryk
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(12-13-2017, 12:46 AM)Theoderic Wrote: It is interesting that Tacitus mentions that he had chosen a place where he could be safe from ambush. This perhaps brings us to the point of why he was concerned about being ambushed. This was a typical Brythonic tactic but if, as has been assumed, SP was moving away from the "Horde" why was he concerned about being ambushed?

The fear of ambush point seems to be relevant to the open plain. I read this to indicate that Paulinus  wanted to be sure that, when he left the protection of the defile, he would not be attacked by enemies emerging unexpectedly from cover. The open plain allowed him to see the whole of the enemy force and to make his dispositions accordingly.


(12-13-2017, 12:46 AM)Theoderic Wrote: At Tring there is a valley facing Akeman Street where this is perfectly feasible, a steep sided valley with a water supply contained therin but no river running through the battlefield, that as we all agreed years ago would have been reported.

Like John I think that the defile does imply an extremely steep sided valley so that he could not be outflanked, based not only on woods but also the terrain but would have to be large enough to accommodate his forces and the refugees 

I have yet to find a reason why this valley is being ignored as a valid site.

You have probably mentioned this before but could you refresh my memory by posting an image of the site?
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
(12-13-2017, 10:16 AM)Renatus Wrote:
(12-13-2017, 12:46 AM)Theoderic Wrote: At Tring there is a valley facing Akeman Street where this is perfectly feasible, a steep sided valley with a water supply contained therin but no river running through the battlefield, that as we all agreed years ago would have been reported.

Like John I think that the defile does imply an extremely steep sided valley so that he could not be outflanked, based not only on woods but also the terrain but would have to be large enough to accommodate his forces and the refugees 

I have yet to find a reason why this valley is being ignored as a valid site.

You have probably mentioned this before but could you refresh my memory by posting an image of the site?

Is this the same site as Nathan suggested or a different site?

As in this one: https://mons-graupius.co.uk/index.php/bo.../169-tring

I'm getting so confused I'm going to try to keep a list
Oh the grand oh Duke Suetonius, he had a Roman legion, he galloped rushed down to (a minor settlement called) Londinium then he galloped rushed back again. Londinium Bridge is falling down, falling down ... HOLD IT ... change of plans, we're leaving the bridge for Boudica and galloping rushing north.
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(12-13-2017, 10:30 AM)MonsGraupius Wrote: Is this the same site as Nathan suggested or a different site?

Deryk's suggested site is further to the west than mine, and orientated differently.

I believe he originally proposed it here. More details here (and following), with some maps and plans following on from here. There may be other sections of discussion that I've missed - unfortunately a lot of the maps etc are hard to access due to the change of boards.

It's a very good site, although I still have the same problems with it that I had before!

The valley is very constrained, and the Romans would stand a good chance of getting trapped in there. It would hard for Paulinus to retain communication with troops on the high ground, so his force could get split up into separate sections.

The biggest problem though, for me, is that this position appears to be very easy to outflank. As I've said before, the Britons would be approaching the general area along Akeman/the Bulbourne valley, heading north-west. But Paulinus would be positioned futher to the west, facing north or north-east. It would seem quite easy for the Britons to divert west off the line of Akeman, up relatively gentle slopes on to the high ground, which would bring them out behind - and above - Paulinus. If they just followed the Ridgeway up through Wiggington, or Grim's Ditch, they could end up surrounding the Romans completely.

If Paulinus wanted to defend against attacks from this direction, he'd have to split off sections of his already-small force and have them manning fortifications or something to block the route - in effect fighting on two or more fronts, or leaving some troops out of the main battle altogether.

I would agree that the note about ambushes relates to the ground in front of P's position - such a careful general would not place his men in a position where there was any chance of being ambushed from behind.
Nathan Ross
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(12-13-2017, 12:03 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote:
(12-13-2017, 10:30 AM)MonsGraupius Wrote: Is this the same site as Nathan suggested or a different site?

Deryk's suggested site is further to the west than mine, and orientated differently.

I believe he originally proposed it here. More details here (and following), with some maps and plans following on from here. There may be other sections of discussion that I've missed - unfortunately a lot of the maps etc are hard to access due to the change of boards.
Thanks Nathan,

As you say most of the links are broken, so I couldn't follow any of the discussion at all and I've still no clear idea where it was or the orientation.

However I've added what I can about the site (not much) as "Tring2" at: http://mons-graupius.co.uk/index.php/bou...171-tring2
(Happy to change the name if anyone wants)

I presume it follow the same starting scenario as your own?
-> Starting Scenario: Along Watling Street moving out from London
  http://mons-graupius.co.uk/index.php/bou...rom-london

That makes three sites now listed here: http://mons-graupius.co.uk/index.php/bou...ast-battle

I was searching the discussion looknig for other proposals, but only found two sites:

Church Stowe: http://mons-graupius.co.uk/index.php/bou...urch-stowe

Mancestter: http://mons-graupius.co.uk/index.php/bou...-mancetter

But I did find some good posts from Nathan and John1 giving the background which I put as an "Introduction"
http://mons-graupius.co.uk/index.php/bou...troduction
Oh the grand oh Duke Suetonius, he had a Roman legion, he galloped rushed down to (a minor settlement called) Londinium then he galloped rushed back again. Londinium Bridge is falling down, falling down ... HOLD IT ... change of plans, we're leaving the bridge for Boudica and galloping rushing north.
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(12-13-2017, 12:46 PM)MonsGraupius Wrote: I've still no clear idea where it was or the orientation.

This is what I believe to be the relation between my suggested site (Tring/Newground - in red, with an alternative position in orange) and Deryk's (in blue):

   

The 'defile' in Deryk's position is far more pronounced, but I hope the plan demonstrates my objection to it as well - the apparent ease with which the Britons approaching from the Bulbourne Valley could move across the high ground - perhaps following the Ridgeway - and attack from behind the Roman position.
Nathan Ross
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