Spartan Mora regiments at Battle of Plataea

[PMBardunias]

this whole subject of 'perioikoi …has baffled every famous scholar on the subject for over a hundred years....

This disuades me less than it probably should 8)

This passage has long puzzled scholars, since whether we are talking "eireis/priests" or "eirens/youngsters", it makes no sense for them to have been buried separately.

I too see no support for them being buried seperately. What would make the whole passage make sense and confirm much of our conjecture is if the word copied down as eireis or eirens was neither of those, but another that was meant to indicate Periokoi. A quick look at "Eir-" shows that there are many whose meaning could have been tied to a label for periokoi:

eire ,
1. assembly, place of assembly

eirxis , eôs, hê,
A. fencing in, IG12.94.8.

eirô1 [The Root is prob. !ser, cf. Lat. sero, serui, seira] to fasten together in rows, to string, êlektroisin eermenos a necklace strung with pieces of electron, Od.

I leave it to others with more knowledge of greek to hunt down possible words, but you can see how any of these could have their meanings co-opted to mean something in connection to "troops assembled from periokoi", "dwellers around-surrounding", or "men formed in ranks."

If the Spartiates stood the Tegeans to their immediate left were the perioici (and other subgroups – if in existence) on the far right? It might be more likely they formed the rear half of the “Lacedaemonian” phalanx.

Could be, or it could be that there were whole units of Spartiates alternating with Perioic units- I don't hink you can tell the difference form this quote. It begs the question of how best to from a phalanx from the three elements that were probably available to Lakedaimonians at the time: Spartiates, dis-/uninfranchised Spartans, and Perioci. We may be correct in assuming a quality gradient that follows in that order.

So how do you mix your elite troops with your less skilled troops. One obvious and attested way is to give a cutting edge to each file of a few men and finish them off with a file-closer, while packing the lesser men in ranks 3-7. This is suggested many times in sources. One problem with this is that the "half-file" leader and the man behind him should be elites as well if they were to ever find themselves doubled to the front, thus ranks 1,2,5,6, and 8 need to be elites! (That sentence was a gift to Paul for dragging him into this).

Another way is to keep your best men in discrete units and range them alongside lesser units. This might sound weak, but for evidence we need only look to the manner in which the Thebans pulled the Sacred band from all along the front of their phalanx and put them into their own unit. Now the whole reason for the Sacred band and the picked troops of other polies was to try an achieve the professionalism of Sparta, so we might expect their deployment to be influenced by Sparta as well. The question is whether they were following Sparta in spreading them like a veneer or following Sparta by bringing them into a single unit (Or both, with Spartans having a single all Spartan unit around the King that inspired the second deployment).

You'll notice I am not answering any of these questions, simply posing them.

For a good analogy to the many meanings of lakedaimonian, I would point you to the appelation "American." The term most commonly refers to Citizens of the USA, but just as rightly referes to anybody from the 2 major continents of the western hemisphere.

[Paralus]

If the Spartiates stood the Tegeans to their immediate left were the perioici (and other subgroups – if in existence) on the far right? It might be more likely they formed the rear half of the “Lacedaemonian” phalanx.

Could be, or it could be that there were whole units of Spartiates alternating with Perioic units- I don't hink you can tell the difference form this quote. It begs the question of how best to from a phalanx from the three elements that were probably available to Lakedaimonians at the time: Spartiates, dis-/uninfranchised Spartans, and Perioci. We may be correct in assuming a quality gradient that follows in that order.

The first thing is that the “unwashed” classes of citizenry that appear in the Cinadon story were unknown in Thucydides’ army (and he seemed to know eough about Sparta) or Herodotus. Bastards will always have been about; foreigners (like Xenophon's sons) likely not at this early stage; and one doesn’t suspect a large amount of “defaulters” based on land aggregation: the sheer number of Spartiates (if the figure is near reliable) militates against it. In any case, it seems that the numbers indicate that these groups likely did not form part of the Spartiate levy at this time: Herodotus describes the Lacedaemonian army as 10,000 hoplites, a figure franked by the 5,000 homoioi and 5,000 perioicoi ordered out to meet them. Nothing would suggest anything other than 5,000 homoioi of the 8,000 available?

As to brigading, the Thebans used the Sacred Band “in the forefront of danger” after their display at Tegyra. This suggests the position where the attack would be made – in the case of Leuktra on the left and as the “spear point” of the column. In Spartan terms – especially in the “classical” years (Nemea River and at Leuktra) that would be the right (or with the king at Mantinea 418). As the “Laconian army” occupied the right wing at Plataea it is a safe bet (safer than the Melbourne Cup) the 5,000 homoioi occupied the right wing. I don’t see weakening the whole by interspersing units of separate periocoi.

Whilst I dismiss figures of 300,000 or more Persian troops, it is likely that the Greeks were outnumbered where they counted it: hoplites. Their hoplite army was outnumbered by the Persian array and the regent Pausanias might well have thought that spreading the cutting edge – three or four deep – made best use of the Greeks’ best troops.

I don’t believe there was a half file leader in the Plataean phalanx. That, though, is an entirely different subject.

[PMBardunias]

As to brigading, the Thebans used the Sacred Band “in the forefront of danger” after their display at Tegyra. This suggests the position where the attack would be made – in the case of Leuktra on the left and as the “spear point” of the column.

Plutarch seems clear to me. Perhaps there is reason to doubt him, but I don't see why on a point like this. The most important point is that they were not simply a veneer for poorer troops, but a single unit. Where they were used is a second concern.

3 Gorgidas, then, by distributing this sacred band among the front ranks of the whole phalanx of men-at?arms, made the high excellence of the men inconspicuous, and did not direct their strength upon a common object, since it was dissipated and blended with that of a large body of inferior troops; but Pelopidas, after their valour had shone out at Tegyra, where they fought by themselves and about his own person, never afterwards divided or scattered them, p389but, treating them as a unit, put them into the forefront of the greatest conflicts. 4 For just as horses run faster when yoked to a chariot than when men ride them singly, not because they cleave the air with more impetus owing to their united weight, but because their mutual rivalry and ambition inflame their spirits; so he thought that brave men were most ardent and serviceable in a common cause when they inspired one another with a zeal for high achievement.

[Paullus Scipio]

Paralus wrote:

And whereas I would not dispute Herodotus’ lack of travel to some places in his “History”, I imagine he likely visited Plataea.

...in fact, Herodotus makes it fairly plain he had almost certainly NOT visited Plataea - in speaking of the graves he says "...so far as my information goes..." and "...which I am told.." (H. IX.84 )

Herodotus goes on to list the contingents over to the left wing held by the Athenians. We have 5,000 homoioi alongside of whom, to their left, are the Tegeans. In both instances Herodotus uses the term Spartiate.

I don't think this interpretation, which is the other piece of information on which your "rear ranks" hypothesis rests, can be correct either.We have seen already that Herodotus is quite capable of overloking 'perioikoi' altogether (Thermopylae)....but here he does not, fortunately. In elaborating the Greek line he says:-
( H.IX.29) "The order was as follows: on the right wing were 10,000 Lakedaemonians, of whom the 5,000 from Sparta were attended by 35,000 light-armed helots - seven to a man (there are a couple of things to note here. First, all authorities doubt the '35,000' figure for the Helots....it may be that each 'homioi' was allocated 7 helots to his 'Kleros', and H. has applied this to guess the number of helots present, but they would not all have followed their master to the battlefield. Second, the 'Spartan' army need not have been all 'Homioi', for it may very well have included 'hypomeiones' as well as 'Homioi' despite H.'s assumption.....and the secretive Spartiates were not going to disillusion H. or anyone else that there were fewer than 8,000 'Homioi' ( if there were ! ). Next to themselves the Spartans ( spartiatoi/spartiates) stationed the Tegeans - 1,500 'Hoplites'- as a tribute of respect to their worth...

Naturally it is the 'spartiates' who do the ordering/choosing, nor should it be taken any more literally than if he had said 'next to the spartans[read spartan army], Pausanias stationed the Tegeans'...the natural meaning is that the Spartiates/Homioi stationed the Tegeans next to the 10,000 strong Spartan/Lakedaemonian army, and I really don't think one can infer 'perioikoi' in rear ranks from this passage.
As to 'perioikoi' joining in the ranks of the Spartan 'Morai', why would this be done, when there were obviously plenty of non-homioi Spartans? Surely one would expect 'spartan' manpower to be drawn on before 'strangers' ? Then there were practical matters. The Spartan advantage was that they were 'professional' soldiers who were constantly drilled to perfection by practice -practice-practice. How could a 'perioikoi' 50 miles away join in this ? ( and rest assured, anyone familiar with drill will tell you that you can't mingle 'trained' and 'untrained' or chaos is the result.Nor can you train 'separately' and then come together) In addition, 'periokoi', or at least their upper classes seem to have had estates/kleroi allocated to them at some time, but not Helots, therefore they needed to work/manage their estates/farms themselves and couldn't train in Sparta anyway. Non-Homioi 'Spartans could readily be required to drill daily ( perhaps after work...c.f. English yeomen being required to practice archery).That this professional drill/teamwork was their forte, we are told again and again by Herodotus, most notably when the exiled Spartan King Demaratos tells Xerxes: "..fighting singly, they are no worse than other men, but fighting together they are the best soldiers in the world." (VII.104.4). Were the ranks filled up with non-professional 'perioikoi', and the 'Homioi' no better fighters than other men, where would the Spartan advantage lay ? ...Further, as the Thebans discovered, and Paul B. has referred to, simply putting a 'hard edge' on the front of the phalanx simply did not work....

[Paullus Scipio]

Ghostmojo/Howard wrote:

On another subject though, I am not certain, however, Herodotos forgot about the Perioikoi at Thermopylai (as I have said elsewhere on this forum). I'm not convinced they were there in the first place. Leonidas was able to take his personal bodyguard with him as an advance force. He was not able to mobilise the whole army - nor did he have the power to do so. I take that as being an inability to mobilise the Perioikoi as well - unless he merely picked up volunteers along his march (which seems unlikely to me). The Spartan state decided on mobilisation of its citizenry and upon those who were foresworn to follow - i.e. the Lakonian dwellers around, some of whom were yeomanry hoplites like much of the rest of central and southern Greece. Why would they necessarily follow without being forced to by their Spartan masters (unless seized by some panhellenic spirit)? Surely that missing 1000 could be accounted for elsewhere and especially with Diodorus not being entirely reliable. If the Perioikoi had been persuaded, I think a matching figure of 300 might have been more likely - like for like as at Plataia? Is it not also possible approximately 1000 men came from no especially definable origins - just various smaller places within the Peloponnese, and possibly elsewhere, en route to the pass?

....this seems like an attractive idea at first sight, but alas, there are a number of major objections to it. Firstly the 'Constitution' tells us that the King's power was paramount in war, so he had the power to mobilise as many as he thought necessary... and that this was so at this time is proven by Diodorus' anecdote:

Leonidas, when he received the appointment, announced that only one thousand men should follow him on the campaign. And when the ephors said that he was leading altogether too few soldiers against a great force and ordered him to take along a larger number, he replied to them in secret, ....... There were, then, of the Lacedaemonians one thousand, and with them three hundred Spartiates, while the rest of the Greeks( actually Peloponnesians) who were dispatched with them to Thermopylae were three thousand.

Leonidas, then, with four thousand soldiers advanced to Thermopylae. The Locrians, however, who dwelt in the neighbourhood of the passes had already given earth and water to the Persians, and had promised that they would seize the passes in advance; but when they learned that Leonidas had arrived at Thermopylae, they changed their minds and went over to the Greeks. And there gathered at Thermopylae also a thousand Locrians, an equal number of Melians/Malians, and almost a thousand Phocians, as well as some four hundred Thebans of the other party; for the inhabitants of Thebes were divided against each other with respect to the alliance with the Persians. Now the Greeks who were drawn up with Leonidas for battle, being as many in number as we have set forth, tarried in Thermopylae, awaiting the arrival of the Persians.

[translation courtesy Lacus Curtius site]
.....thus Herodotus' missing thousand are almost certainly these 'perioikoi', and it should be noted that the Lakedaemonian Kings had more power over the 'perioikoi' than over Spartans....in a very real sense they were "King's men".
The unknown ( probably Ephorus) source drawn on by Justin, Diodorus and Trogus preserves accurate detail in parts, more than Herodotus who drew largely on Athenian sources, and so is reliable here, especially as it accords in numbers ( 4,000) with the epigram recorded by Herodotus ........

[Paullus Scipio]

Paralus/Michael wrote:

The first thing is that the “unwashed” classes of citizenry that appear in the Cinadon story were unknown in Thucydides’ army (and he seemed to know eough about Sparta) or Herodotus. Bastards will always have been about; foreigners (like Xenophon's sons) likely not at this early stage; and one doesn’t suspect a large amount of “defaulters” based on land aggregation: the sheer number of Spartiates (if the figure is near reliable) militates against it. In any case, it seems that the numbers indicate that these groups likely did not form part of the Spartiate levy at this time: Herodotus describes the Lacedaemonian army as 10,000 hoplites, a figure franked by the 5,000 homoioi and 5,000 perioicoi ordered out to meet them. Nothing would suggest anything other than 5,000 homoioi of the 8,000 available?

Given that the 'Homioi' were the 'aristocracy' of Sparta - landowners who had no trade other than professional soldier ( see e.g. Agesilaus famous anecdote of asking the potters, butchers etc to stand up ), it rather begs the question of who performed all the myriad other trades and professions in Sparta. Clearly overall manpower in Sparta itself consisted at all times of rather more than the 'Homioi'.......Nor is the fact that Herodotus uses the word 'Spartiates' of them conclusive that they were all, in fact, 'Homioi' - even at this early date it is possible that some were 'Hypomeiones', but that the secretive Spartiates wished it believed that there were 8,000 of them - which by comparison with Athens seems unlikely, for the Hoplite forces of each were roughly the same size and Athens did not have anything like 8,000 landowners equivalent to 'Homioi'.

In any event, giving a breakdown of a national army of a 'poleis' is not the norm in either Herodotus or Thucydides.....for example,we are not told how many of Athens Hoplite force are from each class/strata of society - 'Hippeis', 'zeugitae' and so on, and notably in Athensthe amount of 'landholding' to qualify as a Hoplite, and thus be on 'the List'/Katalogos to qualify as a fully enfranchised citizen ( c.f. Homioi ) was set about twice as high as necessary . Thus there were plenty of 'Thetes' ( loosely equivqlent to 'Hypomeiones'? ) lower in society who did not qualify as Athens 'Hoplite Class', but who nevertheless served as 'Hoplites' ( Socrates was one such). Sparta was surely no different in drawing on its manpower - all the way down to 'Helots' as we have seen, when necessary. If Herodotus and Thucydides did not feel it necessary to explain the internal make-up of Athens or other state's armies by 'class', why should they have done so in Sparta's case ? ( even if they knew, unlikely in any event)

[Paralus]

If Herodotus and Thucydides did not feel it necessary to explain the internal make-up of Athens or other state's armies by 'class', why should they have done so in Sparta's case ? ( even if they knew, unlikely in any event)

Thucydides knew - don't worry. He - like other ancient authors - wasted few words over Athens' thetes and "lower classes". That his knowledge of Sparta was more than reasonable is shown by his treatment of the city in his history.Your dismissal of him [and Herodotus] "even if he [they] knew, unlikely in any event" ignores the wealth of information that resides in Thucydides' history about Sparta. His use of many Spartan patronymics, as one example, indicates that his knowledge might have been "more likely in most events" than you'd allow.

I do not see that the later "subclasses" made up the Plataean army; this is Sparta in her pomp and those will have been, at his time, largely - if not totally - unnecessary.

There is much preceding that I'd likely take issue with but - I've written it all before and repetition is boring.

In fact, I still await the enumerating of the periocoic forces that were at Mantinea (418) and, more so, Leuktra. It seems the "Spartans" fought both battles without their assistance.

[Paullus Scipio]

If Herodotus and Thucydides did not feel it necessary to explain the internal make-up of Athens or other state's armies by 'class', why should they have done so in Sparta's case ? ( even if they knew, unlikely in any event)

Thucydides knew - don't worry. maybe..but that goes against his own words: "The secrecy with which their affairs are conducted meant that no-one knew the numbers of the Spartans..." (V.68 regarding Mantinea) He candidly admits he didn't/couldn't even know overall spartan numbers, let alone individual contingents, especially when all were 'uniformly' displaying lambdas on their shields. How could he or his informants possibly tell? And his informants couldn't either ( who may have observed the seven 'units' but wouldn't have had time or leisure to count shields in each)..... The secretive spartans certainly weren't spilling any state secrets.... He - like other ancient authors - wasted few words over Athens' thetes and "lower classes". That his knowledge of Sparta was more than reasonable is shown by his treatment of the city in his history.Your dismissal of him [and Herodotus] "even if he [they] knew, unlikely in any event" ignores the wealth of information that resides in Thucydides' history about Sparta.Errr...no, I was relying on his own words ( see above, and above comments on his sources of information) His use of many Spartan patronymics, as one example, indicates that his knowledge might have been "more likely in most events" than you'd allow.

I do not see that the later "subclasses" made up the Plataean army; this is Sparta in her pomp and those will have been, at his time, largely - if not totally - unnecessary. And your unequivocal evidence for that would be.....?

There is much preceding that I'd likely take issue with but - I've written it all before and repetition is boring.

In fact, I still await the enumerating of the periocoic forces that were at Mantinea (418) and, more so, Leuktra. It seems the "Spartans" fought both battles without their assistance.

Well, at Mantinea Thucydides says: " Now at last the Spartans moved quickly and came to the help of Tegea with their entire force both of citizens and helots in greater numbers than any other occasion..." Pretty unequivocal, eh? :wink: No 'perioikoi' at all....unless like Herodotus he has 'forgotten' them. I would agree that Thucydides knew a good deal about Sparta - after all he gets numbers of 'lochoi' pretty right, just didn't realise there were two 'lochoi' to a Spartan 'division/unit/Mora.( and from his words, clearly knew something was wrong with his calculations).
Like Xenophon, he must have known that 'perioikoi' were not spartan citizens, so one must presume he uses the word correctly...and logically therefore, only spartans were present ( it takes a while to round up 'perioikoi from 80 plus 'cities/villages' ). This is one of the pieces of evidence for thinking that 'perioikoi' didn't generally serve against 'internal' enemies in the peloponnese..... Similarly, for whatever reason, Cleombrotus' expeditionary force, which was to the north of Thebes, does not seem to have included 'perioikoi' either....unless they were 'overlooked'. None of our four sources refer to 'perioikoi'. ( perhaps, in all likelihood, they were retained for the defence of Lacedaemon/Lakonia).
On balance of evidence therefore, I agree with you...

It seems the "Spartans" fought both battles without their assistance.

[Ghostmojo]

Ghostmojo/Howard wrote:

On another subject though, I am not certain, however, Herodotos forgot about the Perioikoi at Thermopylai (as I have said elsewhere on this forum). I'm not convinced they were there in the first place. Leonidas was able to take his personal bodyguard with him as an advance force. He was not able to mobilise the whole army - nor did he have the power to do so. I take that as being an inability to mobilise the Perioikoi as well - unless he merely picked up volunteers along his march (which seems unlikely to me). The Spartan state decided on mobilisation of its citizenry and upon those who were foresworn to follow - i.e. the Lakonian dwellers around, some of whom were yeomanry hoplites like much of the rest of central and southern Greece. Why would they necessarily follow without being forced to by their Spartan masters (unless seized by some panhellenic spirit)? Surely that missing 1000 could be accounted for elsewhere and especially with Diodorus not being entirely reliable. If the Perioikoi had been persuaded, I think a matching figure of 300 might have been more likely - like for like as at Plataia? Is it not also possible approximately 1000 men came from no especially definable origins - just various smaller places within the Peloponnese, and possibly elsewhere, en route to the pass?

....this seems like an attractive idea at first sight, but alas, there are a number of major objections to it. Firstly the 'Constitution' tells us that the King's power was paramount in war, so he had the power to mobilise as many as he thought necessary... and that this was so at this time is proven by Diodorus' anecdote:

Leonidas, when he received the appointment, announced that only one thousand men should follow him on the campaign. And when the ephors said that he was leading altogether too few soldiers against a great force and ordered him to take along a larger number, he replied to them in secret, ....... There were, then, of the Lacedaemonians one thousand, and with them three hundred Spartiates, while the rest of the Greeks( actually Peloponnesians) who were dispatched with them to Thermopylae were three thousand.

Leonidas, then, with four thousand soldiers advanced to Thermopylae. The Locrians, however, who dwelt in the neighbourhood of the passes had already given earth and water to the Persians, and had promised that they would seize the passes in advance; but when they learned that Leonidas had arrived at Thermopylae, they changed their minds and went over to the Greeks. And there gathered at Thermopylae also a thousand Locrians, an equal number of Melians/Malians, and almost a thousand Phocians, as well as some four hundred Thebans of the other party; for the inhabitants of Thebes were divided against each other with respect to the alliance with the Persians. Now the Greeks who were drawn up with Leonidas for battle, being as many in number as we have set forth, tarried in Thermopylae, awaiting the arrival of the Persians.

[translation courtesy Lacus Curtius site]
.....thus Herodotus' missing thousand are almost certainly these 'perioikoi', and it should be noted that the Lakedaemonian Kings had more power over the 'perioikoi' than over Spartans....in a very real sense they were "King's men".
The unknown ( probably Ephorus) source drawn on by Justin, Diodorus and Trogus preserves accurate detail in parts, more than Herodotus who drew largely on Athenian sources, and so is reliable here, especially as it accords in numbers ( 4,000) with the epigram recorded by Herodotus ........

But is Diodoros more reliable than Herodotos? H not only drew upon Athenian sources but also directly upon Spartan - one of whom he categorically lists as a source: a certain Arkhias (a leading aristocrat) who he actually met in Sparta itself. It is of course possible he neglected to mention the Perioikoi but unlikely, as he goes into such detail about contributors to the army elsewhere. Regarding the assembling of the force at Sparta, the occurence of the Karneia has to be added as a context to this since the whole army was forbidden to march until after that festival - plus the Olympic games were also affecting other Greek states' ability to send troops. Leonidas' secret response (according to D) about the 300/1000(?) to the ephors was that 'they were indeed too few to prevent the barbarians getting through the passes, but that they were very many for the deed that they were setting out to do' - which is of course intended to suggest he knew he wasn't returning and believed the oracle (also consider his parting words to Gorgo); although some of this could have been embroidered after the event to suit what happened.

Regarding the King's paramount power in war - some observers suggest during the period of the Persian Wars the king lost the right to declare war (although clearly this may well have been after Thermopylai) and more and more their executive power was shared with the Ephorate (even regarding foreign policy and 'overseer' campaign advice). A clear distinction had long been drawn between the kings power in war and in peace - at home and on the field of battle. They certainly exercised greater power outside the borders of Lakedaimon - but once back inside could be called to account and even trial based upon their foreign activities. Very few kings ever rose to anything we would recognise as autocratic monarchical preeminence - save the pretensions of Agesilaos II and revolution of Kleomenes III. However, their powers are remarkably like certain functionaries of Rome with power over life and death in the battle arena - but severe curtailments within Sparta. I seem to recall that the Spartan assembly (ekkleisia or apella) was at least involved in the decision that Kleombrotos I should embark upon his fateful campaign against Thebes in 371 [size=85:2ryhlavo]BC[/size]. Both Thoukydides and Xenophon suggest the regular function of the assembly in the decisions about warmaking (although Agis II's departure for Mantinea in 418 [size=85:2ryhlavo]BC[/size] seems to have been news to them) and of course the army age-group call-up was the prerogative of the Ephors. There is also the business of King Pausanias having to persuade three Ephors to let him take a Spartan force to Athens, and even the army that marched on Athens in 510 BC was sent by the city under its chosen commander (Kleomenes I).

Whilst not enjoying the virtual absolute power and authority of another Greek basileios like Alexander III or Pyrrhos I - the Spartan kings were clearly more than Aristotle's hereditary generals. Like the Makedonian and Epeirote monarchs, they possessed charisma and of course were more specifically not only of devine descent - but actual high priests themselves with direct connections with Delphi. Leonidas I must have had some conflicting emotions as he considered the various roles alloted to him. Cartledge at least believes Herodotos' assertions that the king could make war on whoever he chose to be false. The constitutional adjustments following fiasco of Kleomenes I and Demaratos in Attika in 506 [size=85:2ryhlavo]BC[/size] surely bear that out. The decision to make war surely would have had to have been agreed by both kings sitting within the Gerousia, and alongside the Ephors? I think Agesilaos II was the first king to be allowed the distinction of commanding both army and navy - the latter previously prescribed to an appointed Navarch.

[PMBardunias]

Then there were practical matters. The Spartan advantage was that they were 'professional' soldiers who were constantly drilled to perfection by practice -practice-practice. How could a 'perioikoi' 50 miles away join in this ?

This is a problem, but a bigger problem to me is that the basic unit of enomotia seems to be tied into the Syssition system. Since niether Perioci or non-citizens could be in the syssitia, this is problematic. I have a hard time believing that they would comingle so intimately in war when they could not in life. If the ranks of hoplites were composite, I'd be more likely to accept a scheme by which they marched in homogeneous groups, then deployed one behind the other- perhaps a reason to be able to double down to 4 ranks?

[Ghostmojo]

I agree Paul. There would be more than an element of elitism within the homoioi ranks (even probably shared by hypomeiones, mothakes, etc.) and down-nose-looking towards the perioikoi - but - I think it is entirely conceivable any enomotia would array itself to allow the Spartans to form the forward ranks with periokoi similarly mirroring this format in the rear ranks. I'm prepared to admit, however, that the phalanx would probably need Spartiate file closers (in order to execute certain manoeuvres) and there is always the issue of ancient sources mentioning even perioikoi fighting in the front ranks alongside their Spartiate 'brothers'. An alternate arrangement might possibly be alternate files A = 8-12 deep Spartiatoi / B = 8-12 deep Perioikoi ... AB AB AB etc. or perhaps BAB BAB BAB etc.*

ABABABABABA000000AAAAAAAAA
ABABABABABA000000BBBBBBBBBB
ABABABABABA000000BBBBBBBBBB
ABABABABABA000000BBBBBBBBBB
ABABABABABA000000BBBBBBBBBB
ABABABABABA000000AAAAAAAAA
ABABABABABA000000AAAAAAAAA
ABABABABABA000000AAAAAAAAA

alternate filed000000back-ranked

Regarding training - isn't possible/probable/certain, given that Spartans garrisoned various locations around Lakonia and Messenia, and Kythera - that localised training took place periodically of perioikic units under Spartiate monitoring? There would certainly need to be Spartan leadership of these subordinate units - they couldn't be allowed to form seriously weak links in the chain.

Of course this mingling would probably be at a later date than Plataia, which I have to keep reminding myself is what this thread was about.



(* or conceivably ABBA if they wanted a good old sing-song!!! :lol: )

[PMBardunias]

The Cinadon incident is so pertinant to this discussion that I've pasted it below. Clearly hypomeiones were in the army and given positions of responsability. Xenophon portrays a 100:1 ratio of non-spartiates to Full Spartans in the Agora (perhaps true since many Spartiates would be elsewhere). The disgruntled classes included: autoi mentoi pasin ephasan suneidenai kai heilôsi kai neodamôdesi kai tois hupomeiosi kai tois perioikois.

Hellenika 3.3.4

This Cinadon was a young man, sturdy of body and stout of heart, but not one of the peers.5 And when the ephors asked how he had said that the plan would be carried out, the informer replied that Cinadon had taken him to the edge of the market-place and directed him to count how many Spartiatae there were in the market-place.6 “And I,” he said, “after counting king and ephors and senators and about forty others, asked `Why, Cinadon, did you bid me count these men?' And he replied: `Believe,' said he, `that these men are your enemies, and that all the others who are in the market-place, more than four thousand in number, are your allies.'” In the streets also, the informer said, Cinadon pointed out as enemies here one and there two who met them, and all the rest as allies; and of all who chanced to be on the country estates belonging to Spartiatae, while there would be one whom he would point out as an enemy, namely the master, yet there would be many on each estate named as allies. [6] When the ephors asked how7 many Cinadon said there really were who were in the secret of this affair, the informer replied that he said in regard to this point that those who were in the secret with himself and the other leaders were by no means many, though trustworthy; the leaders, however, put it this way, that it was they who knew the secret of all the others--Helots, freedmen, lesser Spartiatae, and Perioeci; for whenever among these classes any mention was made of Spartiatae, no one was able to conceal the fact that he would be glad to eat them raw. [7] When the ephors asked again: “And where did they say they would get weapons?” the informer replied that Cinadon said: “Of course those of us who are in the army have weapons of our own, and as for the masses”--he led him, he said, to the iron market, and showed him great quantities of knives, swords, spits, axes, hatchets, and sickles. And he said, the informer continued, that all those tools with which men work the land and timber and stone were likewise weapons, and that most of the other industries also had in their implements adequate weapons, especially against unarmed men. When he was asked again at what time this thing was to be done, he said that orders had been given him to stay in the city.
[8] Upon hearing these statements the ephors came to the conclusion that he was describing a well-considered plan, and were greatly alarmed; and without even convening the Little Assembly,8 as it was called, but merely gathering about them--one ephor here and another there--some of the senators, they decided to send Cinadon to Aulon along with others of the younger men, and to order him to bring back with9 him certain of the Aulonians and Helots whose names were written in the official dispatch. And they ordered him to bring also the woman who was said to be the most beautiful woman in Aulon and was thought to be corrupting the Lacedaemonians who came there, older and younger alike. [9] Now Cinadon had performed other services of a like sort for the ephors in the past; so this time they gave him the dispatch in which were written the names of those who were to be arrested. And when he asked which of the young men he should take with him, they said: “Go and bid the eldest of the commanders of the guard to send with you six or seven of those who may chance to be at hand.” In fact they had taken care that the commander should know whom he was to send, and that those who were sent should know that it was Cinadon whom they were to arrest. The ephors said this thing besides to Cinadon, that they would send three wagons, so that they would not have to bring back the prisoners on foot--trying to conceal, as far as they could, the fact that they were sending after one man--himself. [10] The reason they did not plan to arrest him in the city was that they did not know how great was the extent of the plot, and they wished to hear from Cinadon who his accomplices were before these should learn that they had been informed against, in order to prevent their escaping. Accordingly, those who made the arrest were to detain Cinadon, and after learning from him the names of his confederates, to write them down and send them back as quickly as possible to the ephors. And so seriously did the ephors regard the matter that they even sent a regiment of cavalry to support the men10 who had set out for Aulon. [11] When the man had been seized and a horseman had returned with the names of those whom Cinadon had listed, the ephors immediately proceeded to arrest the ser Tisamenus and the most influential of the others. And when Cinadon was brought back and questioned, and confessed everything and told the names of his confederates, they asked him finally what in the world was his object in undertaking this thing. He replied: “I wished to be inferior to no one in Lacedaemon.” Thereupon he was straightway bound fast, neck and arms, in a collar, and under scourge and goad was dragged about through the city, he and those with him. And so they met their punishment.

[PMBardunias]

Here's a figura from Figueira:

Population Patterns in Late Archaic and Classical Sparta
Thomas J. Figueira
Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-), Vol. 116 (1986), pp. 165-
213

[Paralus]

It is entirely possible that the perioici were deputed to “homeland defence” – anything is possible given the equivocal nature of the source material. There seems – mostly – to be a regiment or two of the army generally left at home (or at least those above 35) with whom they might have been deployed. Certainly you would not leave the city’s defence in the hands of helots and perioici alone.

The unequivocal evidence comes down to times of crisis for Sparta: the Athenian occupation of Pylos and the battle of Plataea. In both instances Sparta is clearly described as mustering the perioici as part of the army to confront the crisis.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War Sparta musters an army of invasion at the Isthmus (as with Plataea). Thucydides, at 2.11.1, has Archidamus address his generals with the following words:

‘Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both within and without Peloponnese, and the elder men among us here are not without experience in war. Yet we have never set out with a larger force than the present; and if our numbers and efficiency are remarkable, so also is the power of the state against which we march.

“We have never marched out with a larger force than the present” is, one thinks, Thucydides’ method of conveying the size of this force. Just how large it was it not readily attainable but, if the above is true, one needs to go back to Plataea to find a comparison. All Thucydides tells us just what the muster was for this force at 2.10.1:

The several states were ready at the time appointed and assembled at the Isthmus; the contingent of each city being two-thirds of its whole force.

This would, indeed, correspond to what we know of the Plataean army. I would suggest that it most likely counted Perioici amongst the Lacedaemonian two thirds.

Be that as it may, clearly, Mantinea in 418 was the gravest crisis Sparta had faced since the Persian invasion. Alcibiades, giving note of his abilities, has not only roused Argos to action but has also detached League allies from Sparta and put them into the field. A loss on the field here will have occasioned Sellasia-like results. And, like Sellasia, I rather suspect that the Spartans will have mobilised as many of her resources as possible. To my mind that would include periocic hoplites.

The other possibility here is the use of the term “allies”. At the time of the King’s Peace prior to Leuktra Agesilaos insisted on Sparta’s right to sign on behalf of the allies – included in this was the legal nicety of the periocic “cities”. So to Xenophon describing the return of the army after the calamitous defeat at Leuktra an army that (at 6.4.17) included “those who were forty years beyond the minimum military age”:

And proceeding with very great difficulty, since they were withdrawing at night and in fear and by a hard road, they arrived at Aegosthena in the territory of Megara. There they fell in with the army under Archidamus. And after waiting there until all the allies had joined him, Archidamus led back the whole army together as far as Corinth; from there he dismissed the allies and led the citizen troops back home.

Again, given desperate situation indicated by the call up, I’d think it highly likely periocic hoplites were part of Archidamnus’ force if not the original force under Kleombrotus.

It is just possible that the perioici are referred to as “allies” this being the legal nicety Epaminondas so enraged Agesilaos about.

[Paullus Scipio]

Ghostmojo/Howard wrote:

But is Diodoros more reliable than Herodotos? H not only drew upon Athenian sources but also directly upon Spartan - one of whom he categorically lists as a source: a certain Arkhias (a leading aristocrat) who he actually met in Sparta itself. It is of course possible he neglected to mention the Perioikoi but unlikely, as he goes into such detail about contributors to the army elsewhere.

Diodorus, Justin and Trogus are drawing on an alternative source to Herodotus, probably Ephorus, which is contaminated by "legendary" traditions about Thermopylae but also preserves imporatant details ....don't forget Diodorus/Ephorus and Herodotus are agreed that 4,000 Peloponnesian Hoplites marched north - it is just that H. doesn't tell us who aprox 1,000 of them were, and D. does. You referred to Cartledge earlier - he accepts that the 1,000 or so were 'perioikoi'.

The bottom line from your post appears to be that Herodotus categorically tells us the King's power was paramount in war ( i.e. he could over-rule the Ephors/Gerousia/Assembly of Sparta...or put another way, "had the final say".) Diodorus/Ephorus account of Leonidas' actions would appear to confirm this. Apparently Cartledge does not accept this, on the basis of Herodotus' account of the power struggle between Cleomenes and Demeratus?... perhaps you could elaborate briefly on his reasoning?

Paul B. wrote:

This is a problem, but a bigger problem to me is that the basic unit of enomotia seems to be tied into the Syssition system. Since niether Perioci or non-citizens could be in the syssitia, this is problematic. I have a hard time believing that they would comingle so intimately in war when they could not in life.

Ghost-mojo wrote:

I agree Paul. There would be more than an element of elitism within the homoioi ranks (even probably shared by hypomeiones, mothakes, etc.) and down-nose-looking towards the perioikoi

...It is evident from these sentiments that neither of you gentlemen have seen military service ! D
I would echo Stefanos' comment that it helps if you have "walked the beat"...

In fact, virtually all modern armies, and for hundreds of years, have followed this system pioneered in Sparta. The Officers, and also the senior N.C.O's invariably "mess" ( eat and socialise) in separate 'syssitions'/messes from the men. This began, as in Sparta, because they were usually of different social classes, and Howard is correct in setting out the likely atitudes of 'Homioi' toward their inferiors, and then 'Spartans' toward 'outsiders' etc - but the tradition/custom is still retained today !
Why?
Consider the other 'Poleis'/city-states, where neighbour served alongside neighbour , often taking turns to command with the result that all felt 'equal' enough to debate and even argue with orders.....
Such a thing did not happen in Sparta - where all the 'Homioi' formed the 'officer' class. ( though occasionally experienced officers might protest a 'dumb' order, such as the famous "let them go by" regarding the Thebans). There the lower ranks did not become overly 'familiar' with their superiors, and thus discipline was able to be enforced ! It is for the sake of discipline that it is essential that troops and their officers are kept at 'arms length' to a degree, through the mechanism of separate 'syssitions'/messes. The result, in modern armies at least, is disciplined teamwork...... which the Lakedaemonian Army also had .