Philip II of Macedon: Sent by Apollo

[Spartan JKM]

"I had arrived at this result, for no other hypothesis would meet the facts."

- Sherlock Holmes, in A Study in Scarlet



"...Such was the end of Philip, who had made himself the greatest of the kings in Europe in his time, and because of the extent of his kingdom had made himself a throned companion of the twelve gods. He had ruled 24 years. He is known to fame as one who with but the slenderest resources to support his claim to a throne won for himself the greatest empire in the Greek world, while the growth of his position was not due so much to his prowess in arms as to his adroitness and cordiality in diplomacy. Philip himself is said to have been prouder of his grasp of strategy and his diplomatic successes than of his valor in actual battle. Every member of his army shared in the successes which were won in the field but he alone got credit for victories won through negotiation.

Now that we have come to the death of Philip, we shall conclude this book here according to our original statement. Beginning the next one with Alexander's accession as king we shall try to include all of his career in one book..."

- Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.95

Greetings all

Just about twenty months have passed (now two years, as of my writing here on RAT) since this thread, one I have always wished to return to address some issues of disagreement etc. I initiate here discussions about Philip II of Macedon, whose broad legacy involved the formation of a new political organization in the form of a Greek monarchy in 337 B.C. Basically, and from a modern perspective, this was not conducive to the effectuated ideal of 'rule of the people' (kratos > demos), but far more so for the direction of a new military instrument for conquest from a single will. This condition was, of course, for better or worse depending on one's values resting on an immense study of Philip II against 'liberty and equality'. He didn't 'unite Greece' in the sense they could decide their own future with added 'security' as part of a common community; the League of Corinth (anachronistically described), or Community of the Greeks (to koinon ton Hellenon) instituted by Philip as the largest representative body in Greek history, was essentially based on a constitutional standing which prevented, in theory, any future civil strife and internecine war among the Greeks (the 'league' was an enforced peace). The glue that held the League intact was not so much Philip's military power but the deterrent of possible isolation which he established.

For the most part, Philip failed in any 'realignment' of Greek political thought, in terms of an attempted reconciliation of local 'nationalism' with a true Greek national unity, evidenced by the strife amid much of Greece against Macedonian rule immediately after his and Alexander's death. The failure to keep the peace at home and gain enthusiasm for a campaign against the Achaemenid Persian Empire abroad was not caused merely by any lack of time for his policies to work themselves out, but the fact that his power came far more on the battlefields than in any of the diplomatic circles, thus those who 'accepted' his terms could not really risk facing the alternative. Philip had designed a standing army which could campaign just about anywhere, thus anyone who had hitherto been relatively safe (eg, the Aetolians against Athenian invaders in 426 B.C.) due to natural bounds etc. were now compelled to accept what Philip wanted. The Common Peace he established was not only based on his military power, but on Greek diplomatic practices and inter-state conciliation, both of which were commonly acceptable to most of them. Alexander and the his successors would renew many of the agreed conditions.

Forgive me in advance, as there may be redundant comments, information and discourse out of order, terseness, and an overall 'rough' syntax upcoming: this has been compiled piecemeal from various scattered writings I have jotted down impromptu from time to time. I had a bit of chip on my shoulder in response to an irascible poster. Please forgive me in advance (they don't behave like that here on RAT, where the scholarship is too high for uncivil behavior). Anyway, this project should have really belonged over here initially. But most of all - the upcoming is loooooooong, thus I don't expect anyone to get to it anytime soon. There's no hurry. Take your time; it isn't going anywhere. You all are terrific to correspond with

Open up enthusiasts! All the quotes henceforth are from various threads on twcenter.net, all relevant to the great king of Macedon Philip II, not to mention the father of the most famous man of action, perhaps, of all time - Alexander the Great.

...From what I've learned about Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great, it seems Alexander's achievements are overrated. Firstly, I'll begin with the Macedonian army. It was Philip of Macedon who made the important military reforms. He introduced a proffessional army, which was not a new concept in the Hellenistic world, but still a concept only known to the Spartans (the size of the Spartiate army was never more than 8000 at any battle though). Philip's levies, armed with a sarrissa, a 5 meter pike, compared to the 2 and a half meter doru, the spear of the hoplites. It was Philip who developed the "Western" style of combat - heavy infantry and heavy cavalry…

Perhaps an over-simplification, but yes - well opined (IMHO). That Alexander is 'overrated' is, of course, a matter of private conviction, not to mention entailing criterion, not a verdict resting on any 'objective basis' - an interpretation which could be argued as a subjective claim (people do that often - 'I look at the facts' talk), in an interpretative context, in itself (arguably). What is less well know than Philip's time as a hostage in Thebes (probably between 368-365 B.C.) is that Philip was also a hostage in Illyria (Diodorus, Historica Bibliotheca, Book 16.2.2; Justin, Historiarum Philippicarum Libri XLIV, Book 7.5.1), although the surviving accounts don't agree completely on specifics: Diodorus has Amyntas III, soon after his defeat at the hands of the Illyrians in 383 B.C. (for the second time in a decade), impelled to hand over his infant son Philip to them as a hostage as part of their exacted tribute; Justin, however, states that Philip was ransomed not until at least fourteen years later, by Amyntas' successor Alexander II, and sent by him to 'the Illyrians' as a hostage (part of a 'purchase of peace'), and then thereafter ('some time later’) sending the boy to Thebes. Information from Plutarch seems to indicate what modern historians have extrapolated, that Philip was 'received as a hostage' by Pelopidas in Thebes through the political machinations of Ptolemy of Alorus, a monarchical regent of Macedon (the scarce evidence prevents clarity here) until 364 B.C. (Life of Pelopidas, Ch. 26.4).

Regardless, Philip's 'rudiments of education' on his path to being a master of political and military science etc. could very well have been affected, too, by his time in Illyria (if not too young); he would have eyed things invaluable among his 'captors' in aiding his understanding on how to tackle them in 358 B.C. (though we don’t know if he was captive of the Dardanians, specifically), where his first victory over them revealed maturity and tactical genius, and the dawn of Macedonian military greatness. However, that theory is based on an assumption that he was housed with similar conciliation as he was in Thebes, something we can ever know. But he was royalty, hence almost certainly wouldn’t have been 'afflicted' in any manner by the neighboring Illyrians.

…Demosthenes was not a disinterested scholar at the Lyceum writing about the nature of the Macedonian state, and its leaders.

Demosthenes was an Athenian patriot, nationalist, supporter of democracy and political leader; who had identified Philip as the single greatest threat to Athenian interests, friends, and continued existence as a free state of the first order. For much of his earlier career however, a fair section of the Athenian population and other political leaders, a majority in fact did not agree with his view. Thus one needs to consider that Demosthenes very much needed to draw the darkest picture of Philip he could in order to motivate the Athenians to his pint of view. Secret promises of traded cities are rather far fetched – but they served Demosthenes need to suggest that Athens could only trust Philip when a spear was at his throat.

The point of my scenario was not what was; but rather to simply note that if Demosthenes saw Persia and not Macedonia as the greatest threat to Athens - the Great King and not Philip would surly have suffered the wrath of his oratorical talent…

Philip II never really 'suffered' as the prime target of Demosthenes' wrath, whose genius was basically more blinkered than that of the great Macedonian; Philip proved every bit as masterly in artfully dressed diplomacy, prevaricated politics, and particularly the human quality of eloquence (invaluable to effect action in the Greek world) as much as any figure of his age. Demosthenes was a complex, controversial, ambiguous, and influential giant of his time. He was indeed an incorruptible patriot who kept himself at the head of affairs because, mainly, he was too strong for his opponents in the Assembly, including the more, in my opinion, admirable and no less patriotic Aeschines. I don't have the right to lay down compulsory parametric standards, but Demosthenes' exhortations should be taken with 'caution' depending on what one wishes to make of them; his authoritative arguments were lain with brilliant cogeneration, and he did indeed travel to places to gain more for verisimilitude for his cause than mere hearsay. But his persuasions in establishing the final coalition against Philip was not solely due to his persuasive oratory; plenty of Greeks warred against Philip who carried no deep affection for Athens. The growth of Philip's organized power simply held many contrasting interests of those who decided to oppose him in the final clash. For all in all, Demosthenes, not benefiting from any past precedent to gauge the severity with what he had to deal with, failed to fully grasp what Philip was all about - which was far more than any dubitable elements of northern 'barbarism', corruption, and bribery. Perhaps it was a lost cause, though - how to unite within Greece what was needed to face up to the military power of a new national state, lead by a master of war and politics. As it were that simple...

Peter Green aptly, though perhaps a little too tersely, wrote in his terrific study, Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C., Pg. 33,

"…The shifty Athenian demagogues who lied and shuffled would find that they had met a more charmingly persuasive liar than themselves. The hotheads who prated of patriotism and liberty would see both cut down to size by troops trained on deeds rather than rhetoric…"

I have drawn the links from Demosthenes' Speeches etc. from perseus.tufts.edu (the link may not stay available on this post after some time).

That Philip II was an exceptional army creator was exuded by Demosthenes, tacitly revealing the composite and balanced nature of Philip's aggregate army amid his forensic requirements as a patriot to his state; it is from the oratorical energy of Demosthenes we see that a precious surviving glimpse from a contemporary that Philip had developed the most formidable army Greece had ever seen by the early 350s B.C. The upcoming quotes are taken out of context for my own 'forensic' purposes, of which those of Demosthenes are with an overlying derisiveness of Philip (I have provided the url links). But separating that from the gains of insight on the building stages of Philip's work, they ring true, as they are in agreement with other surviving fragments and passages from the times. The famous speeches began in 351 B.C., and throughout his admonitions to his Athenian audiences (he soon was admitted into the Amphictyonic Council), Demosthenes made references to Philip's capacity to 'seize an opportunity' (First Olynthiac, Speech 3), his 'restless activity' (First Olynthiac, Speech 14), and his 'insatiable ambition' (Second Olynthiac, Speech 18, albeit proclaiming this attribute being 'among his many faults')

Demosthenes, Second Olynthiac, Speech 15, c. 349 B.C., in as close as the great orator comes in a favorable comment on Philip,

"For indeed Philip by all that might be deemed to constitute his greatness, by his wars and his campaigns, has only reduced his country below its natural level of insecurity. You must not imagine, men of Athens, that his subjects share his tastes. No: glory is his sole object and ambition; in action and in danger he has elected to suffer whatever may befall him putting before a life of safety the distinction of achieving what no other king of Macedonia ever achieved."

Demosthenes, Second Olynthiac, Speech 17, c. 349 B.C.,

"...it is not difficult to see how the majority of the Macedonians regard Philip. As for his household troops and foot-guards*, they have indeed the name of admirable soldiers, well grounded in the science of war; but one who has lived on the spot, a man incapable of falsehood, has informed me that they are no better than other soldiers."

*Demosthenes voiced the term pezhetairoi, but in his context he was not pertaining to Philip's infantry as a whole; even though Demosthenes didn't seem to have a clear idea what the term denoted exactly, he knew of their existence. His connotative way of describing them appears more apposite to the hetairoi (Companion Cavalry), who made up more so the king's circle of intimates as well as being 'well grounded in the science of war'. But there existed the agema (the King's Bodyguard, which could comprise elements of both horse and foot), which included the most privileged of the hypaspistai, who were indeed the 'foot-guards', not the regular phalangitae (the exact nature of the restructuring and dated nomenclature are obscure). The hypaspistai in function, though perhaps not yet in name, are clearly present in Philip's victory over Bardylis:Diodorus relates this in the battle as Philip commanded the right wing 'which consisted of the flower of the Macedonians serving under him' (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.4.5), and in their tactical conjugation Philip used his cavalry for flank and rear attacks, hence this comment from this great thread bites the dust:

Did he exploit wing cavalry – what the evidence?…

...Overall cavalry simply does not figure that much in Philips battles. Alexander looks like the one on really elevated the decisive cavalry charge to the pride of place in the Macedonian system.

This is demonstrably false, containing no gray upcoming. The first part of this retort was not in connection to anything specified about Chaeronea, to which there exists no direct supporting evidence from the surviving ancient records. This is exactly what was written here which was quoted and responded to:

I think that one of the most overlooked contribution to the greatness of Alexander was his army. An army that his father, not he, created. It was his father that trained sheep herders into hardened soldiers. It was his father that redesigned the Macedonian phalanx with Sarissas and exploited wing cavalry. It was King Philip that crushed the Greek city-states and made the League of Corinth (with his sons help). In no way am I implying that he was a greater commander, he wasnt, but he did plenty. And Alexanders army was very well trained, without them I dont know if he could have got as far as he did. Then again, even when he mixed his Macedonian troops with Persians the army still did well. Makes me think Alexander could have won with any army, eh?

That's a succinctly accurate assessment, from my view. Philip most certainly did redesign the Macedonian phalanx with sarissai and indeed exploit winged cavalry. It is clear from ancient military writers that he introduced the wedge formation to his mounted tactical doctrine, which facilitates wheeling, thus employed for flank and rear attacks on the enemy lines - like a 'flight of cranes' (Asclepiodotus, Techne Tactica, Book 7.3, from whom we get the earliest treatise on tactics of Greek warfare before the 1st century B.C.) I'll get to much of this. Diodorus clearly states what the underlying entailment of Philip's tactics were (the veritable 'hammer and anvil' maneuver), in describing Philip's military prowess in his first major battle:

Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.4.5,

"...Philip, commanding the right wing, which consisted of the flower of the Macedonians serving under him, ordered his cavalry to ride past the ranks of the barbarians and attack them on the flank, while he himself falling on the enemy in a frontal assault began bitter combat..."

Demosthenes, On the Chersonese, Speech 11, c. 342 B.C.

"For I need not tell you that Philip owes his successes to nothing in the world more than to his being the first in the field. For the man who always keeps a standing army by him, and who knows beforehand what he wants to do, is ready in an instant for anyone that he chooses to attack..."

Demosthenes, Third Philippic, Speech 47, c. 341 B.C.

"…while practically all the arts have made a great advance and we are living today in a very different world from the old one, I consider that nothing has been more revolutionized and improved than the art of war."

Demosthenes, Third Philippic, Speech 49, c. 341 B.C.

"...most disasters are due to traitors, and none are the result of a regular pitched battle. On the other hand you hear of Philip marching unchecked, not because he leads a phalanx of heavy infantry, but because he is accompanied by skirmishers, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and similar troops."

On whole, we see scattered data expressed by Demosthenes illustrating that by 340 B.C. Philip had developed a standing army which included the tactical use of diverse units which could be coordinated on the battlefield, pivoting on the phalanx as the tactical base of variegated action of the specialized functions of each arm (that this was not eulogistic on the part of Demosthenes doesn't diminish whatsoever the capacity of the of the army he is describing), not to mention a developing siege train which included new advances in artillery equipment and methods.

Part of Philip's military innovations was the creation of a standing force of infantry out of native materials, hitherto a comparative weak arm in Macedon. But all this alone wouldn't suffice - it took superior fighting skills within that tandem along with a supreme engineer of its potential. This is where the intense drill administered into his troops by Philip, as soon as he gained the reins of power, come into effect. Hence, on the plain at Chaeronea, although deprived of the variable to flank the army of the Greek coalition, it is inconceivable that the upcoming occurred, other than bloody:

…a bloody infantry slugging match that Philip and Alexander finally won…

The Greek line was deployed obliquely with the Athenians, on the left, ascended along higher ground and thrust forward. Both flanks were secure, abundant water supply for both ensured, and communications to the south solid. Philip could win this only through subtlety.

To cite a tactical example, this wasn't at all akin to the Battle of Coronea, fought in 394 B.C. amid the Corinthian War, which involved some Theban hoplites bursting through their Spartan enemies in a 'forward retreat' (Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 4.3.19), not unlike though much less numerous than the 10,000 or so Roman legionnaires effected against Hannibal at the Trebbia, in 218 B.C. Philip II rethought his army, state, and foreign policy with a means far removed from the 'hoplite slugfests'. He devised the phalanx to be a veritable human mobile fortress - a stable base from which his other arms, primarily his cavalry, delivered tactical offensives. The phalangitae ('phalangites') of his devised phalanx were not geared to fight at close quarters individually, but rather drilled to act in unison to a higher degree than previous hoplite tactics, the main advantage in that their sarissai could keep hoplites in check: drawn up sarissai in close order presented a wider killing zone with a dense array of spear-points impenetrable for an enemy to breach. But it couldn't be just ignored, thus the enemy had to try to fight it. Moreover, Philip anchored his strike arm, the hetairoi, to the phalanx with the specialized hypaspistai (singular, hypaspist, a term probably applied later, but not their basic function), elite infantrymen who were basically a cross between a hoplite and a peltast. With that said, however, he certainly envisioned flexibility and balance to face multiple strategic and tactical challenges.

In a basic hoplite manner, the sarissa would otherwise not only be useless, but counter-productive. It was unsuited for sieges, ambushes, mountaineering action, urban clashes, and skirmishing. Philip defeated the Illyrian enemy infantry in a defensive formation with cavalry as a striking arm, but not from striking upon their front as being the paramount assault - this is where some proponents of the 'no Macedonian cavalry at Chaeronea' argue from the wrong angle, in that they stress that cavalry could never break a steady infantry line, which is quite true. Philip used the wedge formation, and 'gaps' opened up at Chaeronea, where he had 2,000 of his cavalry. However, not every situation is the same, and here Philip was prepared to rely less on the cavalry, as this point in Boeotia didn't afford what those he fought on in Thessaly (he led 3,000 cavalry with 20,000 infantry at the Crocus Plain, a proportion more prominent with cavalry) and Dobruja did, as well as more difficult lines to keep open. As was a feature of the grand tactical maneuvering of Hannibal over a century later, Philip designed his cavalry tactics to effectuate strikes against infantry flanks and rear, hence his introduction of the wedge formation into his cavalry doctrine; think of the gaps opening up in the allied line mentioned by Diodorus, whose account is based on points of fact; it is the brevity, not inaccuracy, of our lone continuous narrative on Chaeronea which causes the equivocal problem. But tenable scenarios can and have been constructed. For example, Diodorus, who didn’t know he would survive and the voluminous works from which he drew on eventually would not, tells us of the longevity of the fight before a tipping point favored the Macedonians, hence Philip's stratagem wasn't necessarily expected to be paramount from the beginning. Very likely, initial harassing measures were attempted with his hypaspistai and lighter cavalry etc., meant to entice the allied right down before his battle line, came to no effect, other than getting them 'hotfooted'.

The sarissai Philip provided for his phalangitae were their primary weapons to stymie an enemy in front from responding effectively to his striking units pivoting around his phalanx. But it's even more flexible than that, with a variety of battle contingents in mind. Though no details survive, other than the raw fact that Philip did defeat the Scythians of Dobruja in 339 B.C. (or the Saka tyaiy Paradraya, the Scythians of 'Europe; Skudra to the Achaemenid rulers who held some previous sway here); Justin, Historiarum Philippicarum Libri XLIV, Book 9.2, and an anecdote from Sextus Julius Frontinus, Strategemata, Book 2.9.14), it can be inferred that he did so with an amalgam of infantry and cavalry. Somehow he compelled the Scythians, who fought mainly as horse archers, to stand and fight rather than move with their mobile methods they thrived on, probably exploiting probably the topography and perhaps some strategic guile (Justin mentions his 'subtlety' in defeating them, for whatever that's worth), as he did to the 10,000 Athenian led mercenaries the following year at the Pass of Gravia.

Justin, Historiarum Philippicarum Libri XLIV, Book 9.2,

"...Philip...broke up the siege of Byzantium, and entered upon a war with the Scythians, first sending ambassadors to lull them into security, by telling Atheas that 'while he was besieging Byzantium, he had vowed a statue to Hercules, which he was going to erect at the mouth of the Ister [the Danube], requesting an unobstructed passage to pay his vow to the god, since he was coming as a friend to the Scythians.' Atheas desired him, 'if his object was merely to fulfill his vow, to let the statue be sent to him,' promising that 'it should not only be erected, but should remain uninjured,' but refusing 'to allow an army to enter his territories,' and adding that, 'if he should set up the statue in spite of the Scythians, he would take it down when he was gone, and turn the brass of it into heads for arrows.' With feelings thus irritated on both sides, a battle was fought. Though the Scythians were superior in courage and numbers, they were defeated by the subtlety of Philip. 20,000 young men and women were taken, and a vast number of cattle, but no gold or silver. This was the first proof which they had of the poverty of Scythia. 20,000 fine mares were sent into Macedonia to raise a breed..."

That we read from Justin that Philip was 'subtle', effectively 'luring them into security' somewhat correlates with one of the suggested methods in facing the 'Scythians' in the famous Byzantine military manual of the late 6th century A.D., the Strategicon of Maurice; to the Byzantines of the 6th century, the reference to the 'Scythians' denotes more broadly the various nomadic tribes north of the Black Sea and through to the central Asian steppes whom they were aware of. Notably, the Avars were arriving on the Danube by this time. However, Justin's comment that the Scythians were superior in 'courage' to Philip (numbers, yes) cannot be blatantly true, relatively, given the supreme valor of the Macedonian army by this time (see footnotes on pg. 153 of Robert E Gaebel's fine Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World).

Frontinus, Stratagemata, Book 2.8.14,

"Philip, on one occasion, fearing that his troops would not withstand the onset of the Scythians, stationed the trustiest of his cavalry in the rear, and commanded them to permit no one of their comrades to quit the battle, but to kill them if they persisted in retreating. This proclamation induced even the most timid to prefer to be killed by the enemy rather than by their own comrades, and enabled Philip to win the day"

At the risk of picking and choosing (from my view, not necessarily a pejorative act when assessing ancient historiography), Frontinus perhaps misunderstood, or purposely misrepresented a tactical condition undertaken by Philip to fit into his chapter on 'restoring morale and firmness'. Remember - the imperfections of the writers of the 'stratagem genre' (Frontinus, Hermogenes, Polyaenus, Clement of Alexandria, and Julius Africanus) do not necessarily reflect historical fiction with their examples of past generals' actions they provided for their didactic examples; how they presented them as models of a categorized chapter may not be fully based on fact, hence we can extract some facts from some of their historical inaccuracies. Here with Frontinus, his overlying reason for the example of Philip's battle dispositions appears too far removed with Philip's ultra-harmonious relations with his men (after all, right after this event, they forsook all their spoils from this successful campaign to get him to safety after he had been seriously injured against a clash with the Thracian Triballi), but there's no reason to discard the tactical arrangement as described, as Polyaenus' clues to Philip's tactics at Chaeronea do not lack credibility, though absent from the only continuous narrative on the great battle, but very general, narrative from Diodorus.

Philip's arranging of his cavalry behind his infantry to face the Scythians can again be equated to another viable tactic presented in the Strategikon, in which it suggests when facing 'Scythian nations' in battle, a tactical mixture of infantry and cavalry, with the cavalry placed behind the infantry, should be carried out. The Strategicon is commonly considered the premier treatise on combined-arms approach to war before the modern age. Thus this is sharply applicable to what we briefly read about Philip's engagement with the Scythians, which we know he won. Hypothetically, Philip's wide and deep advancing battalions of pezhetairoi, which could deflect missiles with the various angles of sarissai being held by the rear ranks (from the fifth of sixth rank back)over the front ranks (though this would hardly be like a solid kevlar umbrella!) ranks would be supported by auxiliary specialists both defending the vulnerable points of the mobile fortresses and applying pressure on the Scythians, giving the horse-archers little recourse. Philip somehow must have been able to compel on them a fight on terrain which diminished their mobility, perhaps at some point rupturing their circle of archery fire with swift shock action (cavalry against cavalry) piecemeal, presuming they carried that very tactic of theirs out; whatever truly occurred, his tactics brought them to bay. It can be assumed many Scythians simply rode away in controlled flight. It is no coincidence that, eleven years later, Alexander employed a tactical coordination of various troop types to defeat a Scythian force on the banks of the Jaxartes (Tanais) River, in which the descriptions from Arrian (Anabasis Alexandri, Book 4.4) and Quintus Curtius Rufus, (Historiae Alexandri Magni, Book 7.9) reveal a mastery of combined arms (see also John Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great, Pgs. 236-241). It must be kept in mind, of course, that though the concept is analogous, the enemies described by the Byzantines were not exactly the same as those Philip faced over nine centuries earlier. But the term 'Scythian' remained, albeit more generically placed.

Maurice's Strategikon, Book 11.2, Dealing with the Scythians, That is, Avars, Turks, and Others Whose Way of Life Resembles That of the Hunnish Peoples, Pgs. 117-118 (translated edition by George T. Dennis, 1984), Pgs. 117-118

"…They are fickle…in the event of battle, when opposed by an infantry force in close formation, they stay in their horse and do not dismount, for they do not last long fighting on foot…Level, unobstructed ground should be chosen, and a cavalry force should advance against them in a dense, unbroken mass to engage them in hand-to-hand fighting…If an infantry force is present [that which is opposing the 'Scythians'], it should be stationed in the front line in the customary manner of the nation to which it belongs. The force should be drawn up according to the method…with the cavalry posted behind the infantry…Post a numerous and capable force on the flanks…"

The first judgment reflects the same political bias Ammianus Marcellinus displayed in describing the Huns, but aside from that, we are availed good data here; such tactical potentialities would have been perfectly suited to Philip's army in 340 B.C., greatly enhanced with his fertile military mind at the helm. Revising Frontinus and Justin, coupled with the snippets from the Strategikon on how to fight the 'Scythians', we are availed a cogent hypothesis, and we know he certainly defeated the Scythians handily.



Above: Scythian warriors characteristic of the 4th century B.C. (Alexander the Great at War, edited by Ruth Sheppard, Pg. 180).

Regarding the almost certain controlled retirement that Philip effected to break the articulation of the enemy phalanxes of the Greek coalition's army at Chaeronea, hence the Macedonian left was able to exploit the gaps which began to occur in the Greek ranks (remember, Philip's battle line was refused with his own wing thrust forward, and the Greeks' alignment was also en echelon with their left thrust forward. Thus Philip and the Athenians, hypothetically, came into contact with each other before those did on the other two sides of each side. Moreover, something to think about it - Diodorus neither mentions the word 'cavalry' in his few sentences concerning Pelopidas' tactical victory over Alexander of Pherae in 364 B.C., yet we know the cavalry were there. We'll get to that):

...Umm no or at best that what might of could of happened but it requires an assumption of brilliance by Philip and ignorance by the Greeks…

Fiddlesticks. Literally, Philip was indeed brilliant and the Greeks ignorant to what he was devising, but trying to sell that they were 'stupid', thus coming across 'presumptuous' on the 'apologist of Philip' is a misrepresentation - a twisting forensic tactic the likes of Demosthenes may use with his skillful way with words. What 'it' requires is merely the simple understanding of part of what Diodorus flatly states (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.85) - something indubitable: Philip II had the advantage in generalship, as well as a more seasoned force; if any of the 10,000 or so Athenians, of which about 6,000 were hoplites, had any battle experience, it would have been a small amount among the mercenaries swiftly mauled by Philip while under the command of the Athenian-backed pretender Argaeus (Phocion was not here, hence his small elite force which saw action in Euboea and Megara may or may not have been at Chaeronea; if they were, their impact may have helped, presumably, in keeping the Athenians standing fast in the face of Philip's probable and initial attempts to entice them from their stout position), over two decades prior in 359 B.C. (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.3), and, more so in the case of set battle experience, those who fought three years before at Mantinea against Epaminondas, where about 6,000 Athenian hoplites were present. Chares and Charidemus were sent mercenary troops (what and whom they already commanded is unknown) in the Chalcidice and Chersonese, respectively, within 349-348 B.C. (2,000 peltastai to Chares with 30 ships, 4,000 peltastai and 150 cavalry to the latter with 18 ships) - all peltastai, revealed in the works of the famed atthidographer Philochorus (Felix Jacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker, Ch. 328 Fr. 49-50; a partial and brief mention occurs in Diodorus, Book 52.9). On the same events, Demosthenes voiced that the 4,000 troops were 'citizen troops' among '10,000 mercenaries' (instead of the 6,000) etc sent to the Chalcidice (On the Embassy, Speech 266). Chares' troops who were victorious under him on land six years earlier in Phrygia were almost entirely mercenaries, and Demosthenes, in presenting his First Philippic (351 B.C.), in reference to mustering citizen troops to oppose Philip, only 2,050 Athenians are proposed (Speech 21).



Above: A cavalryman of the prodromoi, or 'Scouts' (alternatively termed sarissophoroi, or 'Lancers', who wielded a slightly longer cavalry lance than the xyston of the Companion Cavalry, though this image doesn't help in gauging that aspect). The social and local origin of the prodromoi is unknown. Perhaps they were drawn from the least affluent of the Macedonian gentry, if so most likely Upper Macedonia (cf. Guy Griffith, A History of Macedonia, Volume II, Pg. 412). They disappear from historical record as of 330 B.C. The two men on foot in the image are a couple of Foot Companions (presumably) in hunting fatigues (Sheppard, Pg. 108).

Diodorus' claim that Philip had the advantage in numbers at Chaeronea probably reflects the source material (all of which he seemingly followed and compressed uncritically) on this section of Philip's career, that of the Athenian historian Diyllus, probably a bias source favoring Athens (cf. Nicholas Hammond, Studies In Greek History: A Companion Volume to A History of Greece to 322 B.C., Pg. 536; but certainty should never be pressed). This is contradicted by Justin (Historiarum Philippicarum Libri XLIV, Book 9.3), who epitomized Gnaeus Pompeius Trogus, a major source for Philip II, thus his title Historiae Philippicae, which consisted of 44 books. Trogus, it seems, followed the works of Theopompus, whose historical work was centered around Philip II (the Philippica needed to be abridged from 58 to 16 books by Philip V of Macedon a few generations later, in order to remove the content not involving Macedon).

The allies (mainly one of Thebes and Athens) were content with a stout blocking position, with their phalanxes on higher ground with flanks and rear secure by natural obstacles. Thus the only way for Philip to win was to breach the articulation of their battle line: enticing them off and rendering them enfiladed, with his drilled army to carry out a balanced tactical strategy, is more than sensible. Diodorus' undetailed account necessitates revision (mainly filling in some gaps, forgive the pun!), however conservative one wishes to be about it.

There were no serious defects, let alone any ineptitude, displayed by the Greek coalition which faced Philip at the onset of the battle. They were guilty merely of not being under the command of a single authority, a handicap under these conditions against a martially ingenious monarch. Apart from his mastery as a general and the supreme capacity of his army, Philip possessed an astuteness on human nature which aided all his successes. In the final campaign, he knew that a mixed yet combined force of citizens from two large and several small Greek states, to which mercenaries were added, was very unlikely going to be under the tight control of a command structure that could match his, hence almost surely not going to exercise equal caution and foresight with the tactics to stop him (their field strategy was adeptly carried out, but with no significant adaptive recourse). Phocion and Timoleon were not here, and Chares had proven his prior inability to cooperate viably with other generals. Moreover, Demosthenes himself implied a lack of good generalship on the battlefield at Chaeronea (On the Crown, Speeches 94 and 245; despite the issues of blame and guilt per se, one could claim good generalship if it had been overtly so. However, the newly discovered Hyperides speeches, revealed that this prominent Attic orator defied some of his colleagues in the Assembly, particularly those who sanctioned the execution of Lysicles, the Athenian general at Chaeronea:

Hyperides, in defending the loss as Chaeronea, revealed besmirched in the famous Archimedes Palimpsest in the 2006 findings,

"For we chose the noblest policy and we believed it necessary to free the Greeks by taking on the risks ourselves, just like before...

...One must assign the start and the suggestion of every risk to those who make the motion, but the outcome of these things is to be assigned to chance...

...Diondas proposes the opposite happened: not that Demosthenes be praised for his policy but that I give a defense because of chance..."

Thus his audience hears the historically common line of defense for a military failure with 'chance' and 'circumstance', which is never actually without merit, and in this case effulgent when delivered by a forensic artist.

The result of the Battle of Chaeronea, one of unquestioned decisiveness (Lysicles was executed for the loss, and the stipulations of the upcoming League of Corinth were imposed to Philip's likening due to the battle's result, so don't even attempt the 'Chaeronea itself wasn't really that decisive' balderdash), shows that the Athenians didn't remain where they were initially deployed. The 'rupture of the solid Boeotian front', to their left, described by Diodorus, can only have come from the superior sarissai armed Macedonian infantry in tactical unity against the drawn up hoplites en echelon, perhaps deeper in the Theban tradition (though probably not 25 deep, as they needed extension); Plutarch tells us of the fate of the Theban Sacred Band, that 'the 300 were lying, all where they had faced the long spears of his [Philip's] phalanx'. Of course, one can be cynical and try to claim that a 'phalanx' could signify a generic battle line and not necessarily the close order infantrymen (cf. the untenable proclamation, specifically, in the otherwise fine thought-provoking articles by Minor M. Markle III). But here that would be untenable, IMHO; the Macedonian phalanx, devised by Philip II, contains no other definition than that of a compact order of infantrymen constituting a mobile fortress, serving as the stable base of the offensive pivot and maneuver for his cavalry and lighter troops (Demosthenes said he even used archers).



Above: the plain of Chaeronea looking directly east at Mt. Parnassus. No major silting of the ground has occurred since, thus this photograph shows the viability for cavalry maneuvering on the battlefield 2,347 years ago. The image comes from livius.org.

Minor M. Markle III, Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon (American Journal of Archaeology, Vol. 82, No. 4, Autumn, 1978),

"…Diodorus' words offer insufficient support for the theory that Philip was the first to arm the Macedonian infantry with the long lance, chiefly because of the ambiguity of the term 'phalanx'. This noun is used from Homer onwards to denote any line of battle, especially the hoplite formation but also the front formed by cavalry…"

This is not very sustainable by Markle, who offers no theory of his own as to whom did arm the Macedonian infantry with the 'long lance'. There can be practically no doubt that when Diodoros writes 'Macedonian phalanx' he is referring to the phalanx armed with sarissai. I feel no ancient reader would have been left in any confusion about what 'sort of phalanx' Diodoros was discussing. The fact that Polybius, writing a little over a century earlier, titled his essay concerning the strengths and liabilities of the 'phalanx' against the legion simply as Advantages and Disadvantages of the Phalanx in his title (the Histories, Book 18.28), not Advantages and Disadvantages of the Sarissa-Armed Phalanx, bears this out. If one feels there remains any obscurity, one can look at Diodorus' words centered around 'devised':

Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.3.1-2,

"...[Philip] having improved the organization of his forces and equipped the men suitably with weapons of war, he held constant maneuvers of the men under arms and competitive drills. Indeed he devised the compact order and the equipment of the phalanx, imitating the close order fighting with overlapping shields of the warriors at Troy, and was the first to organize the Macedonian phalanx..."

If Philip's phalangitae were even a little different in mechanics than basic hoplites, even the abridging Diodorus (for Book 16, particularly) would not have written 'devised' in relation to Philip's 'compact order and equipment'; Diodorus was certainly referring to the phalanx armed with sarissai of Philip's time. The 'appropriate weapons of war' which required 'constant maneuvers and drill' could be nothing other than the new sarissai, more appropriate now for tackling the various and tough Illyrians in 'compact order', who probably weren't armed exactly like Greek hoplites either, but possibly wielded longer spears than the basic dory; the Macedones were often defeated by Illyrians before Philip II, who held sway over much of Upper Macedonia at the time of Philip's accession in 359 B.C.

Markle, Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon,

"...I have examined all the evidence for the sarissa and its concomitant small target, both their specifications and use in battle, and I have proved that the Macedonians continued to use the hoplite panoply..."

Markle's articles don't mention the Amphipolis Decree, which states anything regarding equipment similar to hoplite panoply only to officers. We'll get to that, too.

Markle, Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon,

"...Cavalry was first employed as an assault force against the flanks of a hoplite phalanx by Pelopidas against Alexander of Pherae at Cynoscephalae in 364, and Epaminondas, having deployed his cavalry on both wings with the oblique phalanx of his hoplites in the center, ordered his horse to charge the enemy hoplites in flanks and rear at Mantinea in 362. Philip was obviously indebted to both Pelopidas and Epaminondas for his use of cavalry in 358, and the Illyrians were prepared for such tactics, for, threatened with an attack of horse on their flanks, they formed themselves into a square (Diod. 16.4. 6). There seem to have been no surprises in this battle, certainly no indication of the use of any new infantry tactics..."

I beg to differ with Markle, despite his overall values and cogent style. In Philip's first major battle being referred to, The Illyrian army was wiped out by 70%, and I seriously doubt that the 3,000 survivors would have agreed with Markle's verdict, either - that nothing new was seen in this battle. Philip certainly had an education, but the Dardanian king and his tough warriors, even if somewhat apprised by any Greek linguists from the more southerly regions of Greece on the nature of oblique formations and their appended cavalry tactics etc., used at battles fought the previous decade, it would have been nothing more to them than mere academics; why did Bardylis form his army into a square, a defensive measure, Markle could have further asked himself. The answer lay not in being that they were prepared for 'such tactics' of coordinated cavalry and infantry, but more likely the opposite, a response to what he suddenly noticed - something strikingly novel and threatening manifest in the arms of this new Macedonian army, under their new king. After all, the Illyrians are described as confident of victory, further indicated by the fact they didn’t dispose themselves with lines of retreat. Yet as the battle commenced they undertook a defensive measure. Certainly, a New Model Army of Macedon under this new and innovative-thinking monarch, had germinated in 359 B.C. The unforeseen greatness of Macedon had dawned.

Neither Epaminondas nor Pelopidas ever took up a challenge to assault an infantry square of hoplites, let alone smite, pierce a side of, and then stove in the breach with the use of a tactical concert of spearheading infantry followed by cavalry (the latter perhaps wedge-formed, even this early). Not even close.

At Cynoscephalae in the summer of 364 B.C. (fought near the modern village of Bekhides, in the prefecture of Magnesia, Thessaly), Pelopidas showed his mettle as a tactician, when he squared off and bested the Thessalian tyrant Alexander of Pherae, who led a powerful army. But the aforementioned comparison with this tactical victory by Markle with Philip's victory over the Illyrians is misleading (though no tactical situations are ever intrinsically the same), in the sense that Pelopidas presaged anything Philip achieved in his victory over the Illyrians. Interestingly, and to reiterate more fully, Diodorus (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 15.80.) writes nothing of any 'cavalry' with Pelopidas, apprising us in a factual but very general few sentences, without specifics regarding arms and tactics - much like with his piece on Chaeronea. Yet nobody would ever claim that Pelopidas' cavalry were not instrumental in this battle against the tyrant Alexander of Pherae, primarily not only because common sense dictates that Pelopidas wouldn’t have not planned on making use of his cavalry, an arm he had used with success (just like Philip had leading up to Chaeronea), but that Plutarch provides a more thorough account in which he makes the cavalry issue very clear. But Philip II of Macedon was not one of Plutarch's choices for his Lives, hence his own comments on Chaeronea, never mentioning Philip's cavalry, which were merely passing comments amid works dealing with another topic.

Pelopidas' tactical conduct was improvised in the face of an unexpected encounter, which saw Alexander gaining a ridge in a solid position, as his rear and right (he was facing south) were protected by the steep banks of the Karamatlis River and the high ground of the ridge; his left was not protected by nature, but he was in a superb defensive position, and in front of him lay opened land conducive to a downhill grade for attacking if need be. After Pelopidas' cavalry swept away and pursued the enemy cavalry, Plutarch tells us that Alexander at first beat back Pelopidas' allied Thessalian infantry attacks, to which Pelopidas called back his pursuing horse - hardly a simple task amid battle - and ordered them to 'charge upon the enemy infantry where it still held together' - clearly, though not stated, when they returned here to the main fight. Right after he sent the herald to recall his cavalry (he obviously didn't wait for them, though not specified), Pelopidas, intrepidly coming 'with his shield' to the front-line himself, attacked Alexander of Pherae's positions uphill himself, yet still was thrown back after a few initial charges; but the combination of Pelopidas' vigor, which was overtly affecting the spirit of his men, and the sight of the returning cavalry, Alexander and his men retired 'step by step', in answer to which Pelopidas crested the hill. Plutarch continues,

"…Pelopidas, looking down from the heights and seeing that the whole army of the enemy, though not yet put to flight, was already becoming full of tumult and confusion, stood and looked about him in search of Alexander. And when he saw him on the right wing, marshaling and encouraging his mercenaries, he could not subject his anger to his judgment, but, inflamed at the sight, and surrendering himself and his conduct of the enterprise to his passion, he sprang out far in front of the rest and rushed with challenging cries upon the tyrant. He, however, did not receive nor await the onset, but fled back to his guards and hid himself among them. The foremost of the mercenaries, coming to close quarters with Pelopidas, were beaten back by him; some also were smitten and slain; but most of them fought at longer range, thrusting their spears through his armor and covering him with wounds, until the Thessalians, in distress for his safety, ran down from the hills, when he had already fallen, and the cavalry, charging up, routed the entire phalanx of the enemy, and following on a great distance in pursuit, filled the country with their dead bodies, slaying more than 3,000 of them..."

This is almost certainly not entirely objective on the part of the famous native of Chaeronea, but we get a very good gist here: we see an admirable control of integrated infantry and cavalry. But in interpreting that the cavalry 'charged up and routed the entire phalanx' (certainly an exaggeration, if taken as a cavalry rout of Boetion cavalry over mercenary hoplites at the ready), they didn't 'come up' the ridge and do so at the top; they were already ascended and 'charged up' to the point where the battle was being waged. Thus cavalry did not appear until a point when Pelopidas' body was being extricated, thus after the foremost of the mercenaries had been beaten back. Alexander of Pherae had not rallied his men fully before Pelopidas charged upon him, which he did speedily as he saw them in a tumultuous and confused state (ie, they were noisily disorganized). The comment by Plutarch in reference to most of Alexander's men fighting 'at longer range, thrusting their spears through his armor' is quite obscure: how could they thrust their spears through Pelopidas' armor, even if meant metaphorically, at 'longer range'? Did Plutarch err with these words, or perhaps did a translation do so, meaning to state hurled rather than thrust (a few translations read the same way)? Go figure. In my opinion, the rout of Alexander of Pherae's infantry by the Boeotian cavalry and their allies unraveled as it did because the former were unaligned with many already retiring. It seems, however, Alexander of Pherae's left flank was assailable without an attacker impeded by natural obstacles (see John Buckler, The Theban Hegemony, Pgs. 175-182, for an overall outstanding analyses on this clash; but, in my opinion, not entirely convincing in his statement that Pelopidas' cavalry blow 'adumbrates the tactics of Alexander the Great at Issus and Gaugamela', if not only in regards to cavalry pursuit), hence Markle cannot be totally dismissed in his claim that Pelopidas used his cavalry as an assault force on the flanks (though not plural) of hoplite infantry here. But nothing in what I deem (thus subjectivity) a revisionist hypothesis of Plutarch's account, our lone fundamental one for this fascinating clash, evinces that Pelopidas' cavalry struck at Alexander of Pherae’s left phalanx. It seems almost certain that they arrived to the fight after they ascended the ridge, now devoid of enemy soldiers, and only after Pelopidas had fallen, and with Alexander, probably, in retreat. Regardless, Pelopidas' tactical management of both arms was clearly superb, and only his heroic death is what rendered this battle a strategic victory for Alexander of Pherae. But the tactical victory wasn't effectuated with the same scientific mastery of the two coordinated arms that Philip II showed in his first battle. Pelopidas' tactics at Cynoscephalae were more impromptu and against an opponent who didn't display such a high degree of stalwartness. I do not press this though. The evolutionary use of combined arms of foot and horse was becoming increasingly novel and imaginary by these times, and the two Theban greats surely impressed upon Philip II. Markle is correct about that, intrinsically speaking.

In the preliminaries leading up to the Battle of Mantinea two years later, an Athenian cavalry force, surely the hippeus (hippeis seems a more generic term for Greek cavalry), and whom had just defeated some Corinthians, impressively bested a mounted force of Thebans and Thessalians, sent ahead of Epaminondas' main army along the road from Tegea towards Mantinea. Moreover, in the main battle, the Athenian hoplites repulsed a flanking movement upon their right side (the Athenians occupied the left side of the allied army against Epaminondas) by Epaminondas' hamippoi (lightly armed infantry specifically trained to fight alongside cavalry) and peltastai, once the latter’s cavalry were pursuing the Spartan horsemen. Epaminondas did not attack any enemy infantry at Mantinea from flank and rear with his horse; it was an integration of horse and foot on his part which defeated the enemy cavalry. The account from Xenophon has some holes, but what happened was that Epaminondas' victorious cavalry, after they had about-faced in their pursuit of the fleeing enemy horse and Epaminondas had fallen in battle, they were heading back and happened to pass 'through' enemy fleeing hoplites! It’s possible the Boeotian horse were in this position - directly behind the enemy line - because they had circumvented them or perhaps had actually ridden through the Spartan phalanx itself, who had possibly opened up gaps in their own ranks (as at the irregular clash at Tegyra against Pelopidas thirteen years prior) to allow their defeated cavalry to withdraw.

Xenophon tells us that they 'did not pursue and kill either horsemen or hoplites', and 'slipped back timorously, like beaten men, through the lines of the flying enemy'. However leery we should be when reading Xenophon's accounts of reverses of those he didn't like, if the Boetion cavalry attacked the enemy hoplites in flank or rear, we would at least get a glimmer of that reflection. There's nothing, and no reason to assume they would (unlike with Philip's usage of his various arms he had built up leading up to the clash on the plain of Chaeronea. Markle doesn't seem to have caught on to this, however intrinsically peculiar it may read. They didn't appear to assault the flanks and rear of the enemy foot at all, let alone in a concerted manner with their infantry and cavalry as Philip II purposed and succeeded with. Regardless, all this reveals the capacity of the two great Theban generals in their imaginative generalship, as well as the tactical capabilities of the Boeotian horsemen when inspiringly led.

…The sources do place Alexander on the Macedonia left. In charge well maybe, but Diodorus does provide the note that he was accompanied by Philips most trusted generals (presumable Parmenion and/or Antipater). Did a young Alex pick the moment to attack or perhaps a slight nod from Parmenion. Alexander did become the ‘the Great’ but at Chaeronea he was just ‘the kid’ and one whose position as heir was not all that stable.

The real point is that no source mentions cavalry at all, period. No charges, flanking etc…

I agree with the intimation that the more seasoned generals of Philip's were in command of the Macedonian left, but perhaps giving even less a nod to the Prince. But the continued nonsense, forgive me, ending with this proposed real point…period is indicative of forensic tactics (one who disagrees with me could lay the same judgment on me; opinion is not something that can be proven 'false', hence people will argue with anything they wish to).

We are not told if either Philip or Alexander were on foot or horse at Chaeronea, or any tactical thinking on either side by any surviving source ...

[Spartan JKM]

Continuation…

If Onomarchus won the first of two 'field battles' against Philip, commandeering against an outnumbered expeditionary force (even with some Thessalians aiding Philip), a second set battle, in the same time frame, would not have been necessary. Any 'set battle' would reveal at least some spattering of archaeological evidence, however much it was 'cleared' afterwards, let alone a basic idea of where it was fought (beyond 'somewhere in Thessaly'). Philip did not lose two set battles against Onomarchus; I realize some Philip 'detractors', if you will, revel over those three words from Diodorus, but he clearly, while compressing his work, was too vague and superficial. There must have been some indeterminate brushing and skirmishing in some form to produce a feeling within both sides of a Macedonian advantage in potential, and Philip fumbled with his force, seemingly sans cavalry, as he fell into a skillfully laid ambush by a stout commander with numerically superior and well equipped forces (the appropriated Delphi treasures were paying for Onomarchus' force quite well). The 'field artillery' (certainly non-torsion machines) employed by Onomarchus had an indelible impact on Philip, who went on to raise the standards of a 'siege train' of the time, which Alexander directly benefited from. But he couldn't have been outnumbered substantially here in Thessaly, as Onomarchus doubtless had to leave Delphi and Phocis defended, as well as garrisons in Boeotia, before venturing north.

Some apprising of detail is needed here. That Philip didn't capture Perinthus and Byzantium is not profound, in my opinion, of any chink in his armor. Alexander could have achieved nothing more substantial under the same conditions. At Perinthus (we have much less detail about the siege of Byzantium), Philip coordinated a tactical integration of siege methods, including the rotating use of his men in divisions with attacking relays, thus keeping up the pressure day and night while preventing fatigue and a loss of morale. He built 120 ft. siege towers which exceeded the towers of the defenders; the walls were undermined with sappers and battered by rams, with no lack of success; his new gastraphetai (torsion arrow shooters) swept the battlements of its defenders, who were presumably also stymied by the lead balls delivered from slingers (more accurate than stones; excavations at Olynthus revealed that Philip armed slingers with lead balls). The capture of Perinthus was 'imminent' (Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.75.1). He called off the siege because it became more trouble than it was worth. It was a formidable natural obstacle, and Philip didn't have a sufficient fleet to blockade the Perinthians when they received outside help from Byzantium, who in turn received aid from Athens (Phocion arrived, who two years later actually advocated talks with Philip) and the Great King Artaxerxes III. Moreover, once Macedonian assault troops breached the city, the inhabitants could but time for the outside help by fighting with determination in house to house combat - each tier of houses rose up the hill like the layout of a theater, thus affording them a wall-like line of defense they didn't have to build, after the Macedonians destroyed a second wall built inside the city following the initial breach from Philip's various machines. Once the dislodging of the row of houses could be effected, the surviving Perinthians simply took continued their defense along the next tier. With no substantial outside help and continued resolve on the part of the besieger, as the case at Tyre eight years later (where the stone throwing lithobolos was fully utilized), Perinthus would have fallen. But history is about what happened, not 'should have', 'could have', or 'probably would have' happened.

But there's more to Philip's strategic designs on these actions, in my opinion - something subtle and more concealing than revealing; when the Byzantines sent invaluable aid in equipment and counsel etc. to Perinthus in the face of his assault, he then divided his force to attack their city, and then went on to attack Athenian colonies in the Chersonese. A nighttime assault breached the walls of Byzantium, but ultimately failed because the defenders were awakened by barking dogs (perhaps somewhat there for such a purpose). How, we may wonder, could Philip hope to succeed against two strongly fortified cities simultaneously when he had his hands full with the first, with his whole force concentrated on that alone? Byzantium, less than fifty miles eastwards along the coast, would have received news (they were already indirectly involved by aiding Perinthus with supplies and equipment, thus communications were certainly solid) of his coming, meaning he couldn't hope to surprise them (they already knew full well he was besieging their neighboring Perinthians). The fact the Byzantines sacrificed some of their siege engines for Perinthus’ defense depleted them some, but they presumably still had plenty against Philip's half-force (we read nothing of the city between them, Selymbria, but surely he left troops near there to keep them in check). But aid to the besieged arrived in all forms of resource-material from Chios, Rhodes, Cos, and the Great King Artaxerxes III (Alexander would later claim, though probably not true, that Persian soldiers marched into Thrace upon arriving with their aid to Perinthus; cf. Arrian, Anabasis Alexandri, Book 2.14.4).

Demosthenes himself was here a year earlier on an embassy, bringing the Byzantines back into an Athenian alliance, thus Athens was eager to help. But in fact their fleet under Chares arrived mainly to secure safe passage for their grain fleet coming from the Propontis (the Black Sea). It seems that Phocion's arrival, taking over from Chares (held in suspicion by those in Byzantium), who went off to an assembly with the Persians, was welcomed in Byzantium. His men, perhaps some or all were the same crack men who distinguished themselves eight years prior in Euboea, were 'well behaved' once inside, and proved to be 'most spirited in the struggles for the city's defense' (Plutarch, Life of Phocion, Ch. 14); the Bosporus was a vital artery, though certainly not exclusive, to Athens’ lifeline. By threatening Athens’ Pontic trade in the capture of their ships and supplies, Philip could tip the balance at sea a little. He achieved just that - seizing all 230 corn-ships at Hieron, on the eastern side of the Bosporus; he released the fifty ships not Athenian, availed his army any extra supplies, and used the timber of the captured ships (upon destroying them) to build more siege engines. Moreover, the sale of the contents not exploited deprived Athens a year of her average revenue. Chares came back and easily forced Demetrius, the Macedonian admiral, out of the Straits. But the damage was done, and Athens' resolve to resist Philip was total now. Furthermore, a fabricated letter purposed to be intercepted by the Athenian fleet, told of a Thracian insurrection against Philip, indeed was read by the Athenians, prompting them to rush to the Thracian shore. This act enabled Demetrius to get out of the Propontis. Despite the political exhortating of Demosthenes, in claiming a decade later that Philip's act caused the war between Macedon and Athens, the Athenians seemingly declared war on Philip before the capture of the corn-ships, and he on them in writing, though apparently they hadn't realized it yet (Theopompus, from Felix Jacoby's mammoth Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker 115 no. 217 and 292; Philochorus, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker 328 no. 162). This is revealed, though not evidenced concretely, by a lack of any reference to the substantial act in the speech delivered by Demosthenes at the time, relayed by Anaximenes (via the 19th century classicist Karl Muller, Fragmenta Graecorum Historicorum, no. 390). But it's all a little obscure to know for sure. To the Greeks (and his detractors), the lifting of the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium appeared to be a glorious victory over Philip. The fact he even split his force further to assault Athenian colonies on the Chersonese shows his aim was not all about capturing Byzantium. He could have ordered reinforcements from the Chalcidice or even Macedon at any time. He simply and smartly didn't allow any false hubris to take the place of wasting more money, men, and materials with operations which carried less value than dealing with the Dobruja Scythians (he perhaps was now eyeing Asia) and back in Greece itself, where he realized a coalition could be now realized against him more seriously.

When Philip lifted the sieges and subsequently defeated the Scythians, was attacked by the Triballi during which he suffered a serious injury which his men attended to at the price of their vast loot (it seems a Macedonian cavalry lance is what struck him amid a melee - an antiquated example of friendly fire), the Macedonians returned home in the the summer of 339 B.C. Their position was actually stronger than when they had departed two years earlier; Philip had added more scope to his influence, including the commercial sphere, and Athens' maritime capacity was diminished (though stronger than anything he could put to sea, which he knew full well). He was now in a more solid position to face an Athenian-led coalition against him. Thus his failures to capture the cities of Perinthus and Byzantium conceal the fact that he had goaded the Athenians very smartly, effectively lengthening the gap between his and their positional potential. The results, for the most part, bore this out (yes, Tyche always comes into play, too).

…Suffice it to say: Macedon failed to impress the Greeks and Persians on those occasions…

I disagree. Despite the failure to actually capture Perinthus and Byzantium, both cities knew fully what contributed to their holding out - an amalgam of help and some luck; the military conduct was very viable on the part of Philip, and anyone caught up in the intensity against him would certainly not be 'unimpressed' by his instrument of war. Few defenders standing guard on battlements had ever experienced besiegers atop siege towers looking down on them; Cyrus the Great apparently engineered movable towers in the field (Xenophon, Cyropaedia, Book 6.1.52-55, if not a fancy by Xenophon), and the defenders at Motya, Sicily, in the face of Dionysius I's famous siege, witnessed movable towers exceeding in height their own walls (Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 14.48-54, in some surprising detail from the latter).

...Problem is there is simply no source for cavalry in or at the battle…

Not true. We are told by Diodorus (though brief, many intrinsic aspects we do get from Diodorus are correct, in terms of isolated trivia), that Philip,

"…waited for the last of his laggard confederates to arrive, and then marched into Boeotia. His forces came to more than 30,000 infantry and no less than 2,000 cavalry. Both sides were on the edge for the battle…"

The tactical situation and distance from his bases didn't call for as much cavalry as his earlier battles, but Philip certainly employed them. Diodorus doesn't connote anything suggesting that Philip marched into Boeotia with the described force with some time then passing by, thus the army becoming divided or restructured, etc. (but then again, his brevity has been touched on). The Macedonian cavalry, probably along with some 'laggard' (ie, reluctant) allied horsemen (he was archon of Thessaly, thus it's improbable that some of their superb horsemen, probably not part of the 'laggard' allies, weren’t here), were definitely 'at' the battle, which commenced in the Cephissus Valley, a flat plain stretching across slightly less than two miles; the Athenian position on the allied left was ascended and resting on the Haemon River (a stream, really), while the army's right flank, anchored by the Sacred Band on the far right, was protected by the Cephissus River, thus both wings rested on perennial watercourses (with allied and/or mercenary light armed men certainly ranged along the rising ground to the Athenian left. The more seasoned and more deeply formed Boeotians, presumably, were posted on the right as this was topographically the weaker point in the allies’ defensive line; the rear and left of the army were situated directly before rolling hills. Practically the entire army was situated with a good line of withdrawal if needed via the Kerata Pass. Thus they were ensured a good source of water and lines of communications to Lebadea (modern Levadia), less than three miles to the south. Mounted action was not needed on their part, for reasons including they would just be a hindrance and they knew they were no match for the cavalry of Philip (counter-weighted lances against spears was quite a handicap). Clearly, they were in good standing to stymie Philip for months so long as their respective phalanxes didn't become isolated from their stations - they extended his battle front so as to weaken its capacity to push forward. The initiative was impelled upon Philip to come up with a tactical employment of the army described by Demosthenes. He came up with the answer, something entailing a degree of sophistication and scope far beyond a 'slugfest' of hoplites.



Above: two gastraphetai (or 'belly-bows'); these shot arrows, and the first katapeltikon was invented in c. 399 B.C. (Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 14.42.1, but machines which hurled fusillades were certainly used by the Assyrians many centuries prior. These siege weapons, also used for defensive purposes, were first used in Sicily at the very beginning of the 4th century B.C. Philip II made fine use of them in his day, employing a Thessalian siege engineer (Polyeidus) and instituting a true siege train (Sheppard, Alexander the Great at War, pg. 156). The stone throwing lithobolos made its first significant appearance at Halicarnassus, in a tough siege in 333 B.C.

In response to my sub-comment that the Athenians lacked a seasoned force at Chaeronea:

…I would say all the sources for such a conclusion are basically crap – what make Diodorus such a great judge of troops or leaders - his vast military experience? Admit it his account is the best by default; whenever a Thucydides, Xenophon, or Polybius is available Diodorus is tossed overboard right quick…

Diodorus is all we have for any extant literary continuity on Philip II; forgive me, but it comes across a little sanctimonious to rave on with 'no source supports…', etc.

…The Athenians had been fighting all over the Aegean for years. Their hoplites received multi-faceted two year training before going on the muster rolls. The Athenians fielded a force of Epilektoi that performed superbly at Tamyna (348) and was a key force for Demetrius, they stopped Philip at Thermopylae. Rather why not green Thebans? What the last major fight they were in, how bout he last victory of the Sacred Band? Better yet what about the Corinthians when was the last time they took the field?

I don’t buy the green and inexperienced argument…

The fact (perspective alert!) is not for sale. They had garrisons in Attica and Aegean ports, and indeed recently landed in Euboea, but nothing constituting battle-hardness in large numbers. From the end of the Peloponnesian War until the Battle of Crannon (322 B.C.), Athens had never fielded more than about 6,000 citizen hoplites (the approximate figure for both their contributions in hoplite citizen soldiers at Chaeronea and Mantinea, the latter in 362 B.C.). One need not have been an expert in military science, or even a soldier for that matter, to know through a little erudition whether or not troops of a huge assembled army were green or not, and the events of Philip's reign reveal no substantial Athenian battle-hardening on land. The Athenians had not 'been fighting all over the Aegean for years', in the sense they had a seasoned army on land; the fighting of 357-355 B.C. resulted in the failure of the Second Athenian Empire, and it was all at sea, save for the hostilities on Euboea, where they suffered defeats and lost allies. But Euboea was reacquired in 341 B.C.

…Chares managed to have a long career, the Assembly had little patience for fools or failures yet Chares kept his head over a very long career indeed.. He scored major victories in Asia Minor and against Philip…

A long career mostly as a malefactor, in my opinion. But certainly not lacking in courage. He supported the oligarchs in the civil strife on Corcyra in 361/360 B.C., which hardly boded well with Athens' allies, as far as democratic institutions are supposed to consequent. We lack a detailed record, but in the summer of 353 B.C. (or 352 B.C.) Chares apparently defeated a mercenary force allied to Philip in Thrace, commanded under one Adaeus 'the Cock', probabaly near Neopolis (Theopompus, Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker no. 115 Fr. 249). But within a year thereafter, Philip had struck deep into the Thracian kingdom of Cersobleptes and reduced it as a vassal to his growing Macedonian Kingdom. By 349-348 B.C. Chares and Charidemus effected nothing throughout the Athenian attempt to dislodge Philip from the Chalcidice, where when Philip did force some military action, a force of Olynthian cavalry deserted them. Less than a decade earlier, Chares' land assault on Chios failed (not entirely his fault, probably, mostly due to circumstances), and his naval attack on the Chians in a storm off Embata, against the wishes of his three colleagues, hence only a third of the Athenian fleet was used (he attacked 100 enemy ships with his 40), he lost shamefully, which was blackened further in that he attempted to have them prosecuted. Too much profuse corruption followed Chares' career to completely accept that it was 'non dutiful' other than strategically sound judgment on the part of Iphicrates, Menestheus, and Timotheos, the last of whom who was fined exorbitantly; the other two withdrew from Athens' circle, who seemed bent on self-destruction: they let a couple of terrific generals of the age 'slip away like water' (John R. Hale, Lords of the Sea: the Epic Story of the Athenian Navy and the Birth of Democracy, Pg. 273). Chares did not score 'major victories' in Asia over Philip whatsoever. Philip was never 'in Asia', other than on the east side of the Bosporus for a quick operation in 340 B.C., where it was he who scored the success in capturing the corn fleet from Chares' charge (previously mentioned), and the latter's moving up into the Bosporus merely compelled the weaker Macedonian fleet to get out of there, and then out of the Propontis by way of a clever stratagem; Chares ravaged Hellespontine Phrygia in 355 B.C. in helping Artabazus' revolt (for lack of money following his recent failure, thus the troops he commanded were certainly not Athenian hoplites etc.), and substantially defeated the Great King's general Tithraustes (a 'sister to that of Marathon', boasted Chares (Plutarch, Life of Aratus, Ch. 16.3). But Artaxerxes III merely pulled off what was accomplished against Agesilaus II nearly four decades earlier - threatening to help those discontented in Greece itself against the invading state in his territory, thus impelling Chares' recall.

The Athenians could never recover Amphipolis, after they lost it to Brasidas in 424 B.C. (resulting in Thucydides' exile and Cleon's defeat and death), when they were prosperous and powerful. Athens always could benefit from a central position and a strong fleet, but in the 350s B.C. she achieved practically nothing by arms, and her revenues were dropping significantly. Again, they never 'stopped' Philip at Thermopylae, as if their 'presence' of 5,400 men (400 mounts) constituted a 'victory' to relish over him. Philip simply came, saw, and retired. The Athenians are only named as being at Thermopylae, but along with them 1,000 Lacedaemonians and 2,000 Achaeans were also collectively sent to aid Phayllus, the Phocian general; even if 8,000 hoplites or so were stationed guarding Thermopylae, Philip would have outnumbered them significantly, thus he could have pinned them (his men were armed with much longer pole weapons than the allied Greeks, the opposite case with Persians in their costly victory 128 years earlier; a major reason Xerxes was so mauled amid his frontal attacks was that his soldiers' spears were shorter than the Greeks) in front and circumvent them by the now not so 'secret pass' (it never was, really), if he was resolved to do so. It would have been no child's play, and much has to do with the consideration that he could get battered more than it was worth; this is where that 'break through' was solely necessary, which he didn’t specifically design his phalanx for; there wasn’t a lot of room or higher ground for the holding force and they probably could not have been drawn out. But his decision to turn back also carried political grounds with issues needing his attention in the north. Central Greece could wait. Time was on his side.



Above: it required assiduous drill and cohesive discipline to make effective use of in action of Philip's tactical unity with his phalanx and the other arms (Sheppard, pg. 83)

Leading up to the final campaign, Philip achieved the only successful penetration into central Greece, beyond Phocis, by an invader not holding Thermopylae, where he indeed showed his guile and swiftness with his army, in 339 B.C. (Herodotus informs us that the Thessalians often attacked Phocis by circumventing Thermopylae in earlier times; the Histories, Book 7.215). The Macedonians force under Parmenio outwitted the 10,000 mercenaries under Chares and Proxenus guarding the Gravia Pass with a ruse: a letter dispatched was intended for them to intercept, stating that Philip needed to head back north, hence caused them to be off guard during their vigil. Parmenio then blasted through and took Amphissa. Central Greece was now open to Philip. Not necessarily 'inept', but not very vigilant. A period of guerilla-style war then took place in 338 B.C. around the Cephissus valley; the events are obscure on record, but Philip was seemingly unsuccessful in forcing the Cephissus River to undermine the allied positions in a surprise attack. Demosthenes' boast of Athenian success was a reflection of his forensic requirements, and it served the object of raising morale in Athens:

Demosthenes, On the Crown, Speech 216,

"…thereby, men of Athens, they showed a just appreciation of your character. After the entry of your soldiers no man ever laid even a groundless complaint against them, so soberly did you conduct yourselves. Fighting shoulder to shoulder with them in the two earliest engagements, the battle by the river, and the winter battle, you approved yourselves irreproachable fighters, admirable alike in discipline, in equipment, and in determination. Your conduct elicited the praises of other nations, and was acknowledged by yourselves in services of thanksgiving to the gods."

A 'battle' by the river? Another 'battle' in winter? I don't think so; that would have been trumpeted from the rooftops of Athens beyond only Demosthenes’ and a handful of others’ knowledge. But he knew what he was doing with his politics. Macedonians were stymied in some scouting and skirmishing, sent over by Philip while looking to force his way into southern Greece. Perhaps it was similar to what Hannibal often excelled at in the Second Punic War - poking away at an enemy in a manner to whet their appetite for a battle, instilling some falsely placed confidence into the enemy command. Food for thought.

The epilektoi were a small elite unit, perhaps quantitatively the same as a lochos, and you peculiarly omit the fact that Phocion won over the Euboeans from a position of higher ground next to a deep ravine, thus he hardly was enfiladed when attacked (and he wasn't exactly facing Philip). But his cavalry was still routed and many of his men deserted; later in Byzantium and the ravaging afterward, Phocion, a terrific commander, and his men certainly never gained any experience in a set battle. It doesn't take a 'great judge of troops or leaders' to know whether or not a state had been battle-hardened, and Diodorus had before him full accounts we don't benefit from. If any Athenians possessed any battle experience at Chaeronea, it would have been a small number among the mercenaries swiftly mauled by Philip under the command of the Athenian-backed pretender Argaeus (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.3), the indecisive 'close combat and skirmishing with no important pitched battle' amid the month long clash with the Boeotians on Euboea (Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.7.2), but no action occurred at Megara in 343 or 342 B.C., where Phocion marched under arms and built walls from their city to the sea. But in the case of a set battle, those who fought nearly a quarter century prior at Mantinea against Epaminondas could claim any true experience in a battle, and they actually held up very well, including the hippeus.

But what difference did any of it make? They were ultimately crushed by Philip, despite fighting valiantly. The Boeotians at least learned something from the Phocians of the nature of the pikeman-phalanx, but Athens and the other states certainly had not yet faced it (bad and threatening news travels fast, though, thus word of mouth certainly permeated the allied ranks). But this hardly means many Athenians weren't trained, garrisoned, and battle-ready.

As to the importance of Thebes after Mantinea, they dominated Boeotia, and Boeotia dominated the Delphic Amphictyony; the Third Sacred War was bitter and violent. The Thebans defeated the Phocians at Neon in 354 B.C., then less than a year later bested an increasingly strong Onomarchus near Chaeronea. Many Thebans were among the 10,000 Greeks aiding Egypt against the Great King in 354-353 B.C. The Theban general Pammenes, before quarreling with the Phrygian satrap Artabazus during the latter's revolt against the Great King (Pammenes was executed), showed some success in Asia Minor (he won 'two great battles', according to Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.34.2) in 354-353 B.C. It seems the 5,000 strong Theban force was composed of citizen-soldiers, thus some must have made it home. Thebes was under arms in the Peloponnese until 350 B.C., and pulled out and defeated the Phocians (a night attack and cavalry battle), then the Boeotians were out-slugged by the Phocians near Coronea in 348 B.C. Hence, plenty of Boeotians were battle-hardened from continuous fighting until the conclusion of the Third Sacred War in 346 B.C.; for the next eight years until Chaeronea there is nothing to indicate the Thebans didn't retain some prestige. They were involved in a lot more land fighting than Athens during these times.

Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius are not available here, are they? Just as Ephorus Theopompus, Diyllus, Callisthenes, Marsyas of Pella., Duris, Marsyas of Philippi, etc., haven't survived; all or most of them doubtless wrote plenty which would clear up so much of the 'silence' you keep prancing with.

...What’s ironic is that every source indicates the Persian brought cavalry to Marathon, and one source forgets to mention them actually fighting – result: historians bend over backward to find someplace, anyplace to put the Persian cavalry except at the battle. In comparison at Chaeronea while sources do suggest both sides had cavalry, no source places them in the fight – result: historians bend over backward to find something elegant for the Macedonian cavalry to do – although apparently the Greek cavalry were just spectators…

It's not ironic, in my view, but sensibly proposed deductions with each isolated event; you're generalizing in black and white stereotypes. Marathon and Chaeronea were not similar, and analyzers merely try to infer what happened on the basis of what the Persian and Macedonian craft of war and objectives at hand, due to a paucity of in the surviving ancient literary record, would attempt to primarily effectuate. Philip introduced and practiced the cavalry wedge, certainly an elegant tactic, which became more prominent with Alexander in Asia (among other aspects). Macedon was terrific 'cavalry country', rife with vast plains for the rearing of horses on a scale which almost the rest of Greece would have envied; Philip augmented the strong cavalry tradition in Macedon, which included the added novel tactic of the wedge to their martial horsemanship for no other reason than what it has been described for - to slice through gaps in an enemy's formation, circumvent, and attack the enemy ranks from flank and rear. He almost certainly did this at the Battle of Crocus Field in 352 B.C. against Onomarchus. That any detail of his actual use of it has been lost in the historical record is a shame, but the data from Arrian and Aelian that he did practice it has survived for us to substantiate that it was what occurred in his battles, including Chaeronea, though to a lesser extent than his victories in northern Greece.

There's only one source that 'indicates the Persian brought cavalry to Marathon' - Herodotus, in telling us that Darius I ordered 'that ships of war and transports for horses be built' (The Histories, Book 6.48.2), but not actually that they came on those transports in their initial landing at Attica (such details we cannot expect from the ancients). The couple of snippets from Pausanias and Aristeidas, both writing in the 2nd century A.D., however, imply there were some horses there, but not enough to show that a sizable amount were on the field. But they are not mentioned as actually crossing to Attica with the army (as the case with Philip marching into Boeotia), let alone actually fighting. But the basic tactical course of the action at Marathon doesn't entail their use. The 'bending over backwards' is simply a reflection of the fact that Persians and Macedonians generally counted on their cavalry arms before that of the footman for decisive action. Cavalry simply doesn’t fit into the course of the battle at Marathon, despite the fact that it would be preferable to the Persian-led arms. But they certainly do at Chaeronea, both with terrain and battle mechanics.

There wasn't any purpose for the Greek allied cavalry to be anything other than spectators at Chaeronea, if that at all, given the defensive blockage by the allies. Their positions were designed to be static, and we only read of 2,000 hired mercenary cavalry from Plutarch, attributing words to Demosthenes (Life of Demosthenes, Ch. 17.3; Demosthenes' speech 237 of his On the Crown is the source), with no citizen cavalry at all ('citizen soldiery' writes Plutarch, however) mentioned anywhere at any time, which could have certainly been available. What happened to the Athenian hippeus, I always wonder, who displayed adept mounted action against the Thebans at Mantinea before the main battle. The conclusion must be, unless Athens was 'inept', they would do no good in the actual battle. If the Greek phalanxes were defeated, they had good lines of retreat south through friendly and uneven territory.

The Macedonian cavalry needed to work with their 'mobile fortress' in their phalanx to shatter the articulated battle line of the allied Greeks. It could not be done with a frontal assault along two miles; the Greeks wisely forced the Macedonian battle line to stretch, thus thinning their formation more than the latter perhaps wished to, with no hope of riding around the flanks, as Philip had done so often before.

…First: no source supports cavalry charging anywhere at all – just because an older Alexander as king won his battles, that way it does not mean he did so at Chaeronea…

Philip's cavalry tactics do not need to be inferred from Alexander's in Asia, though that indeed strengthens the inferences. In the case of much of Philip's career, the absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence. We need to take a deeper look, and oodles of modern scholarship on Philip holds extremely well, divorced from this claptrap that silence means the hypotheses are wrong. Philip's cavalry were definitely there, certainly with him on this field approximately two miles across - hardly terrain not suitable for cavalry action. But again, they were not going to exploit any flanks of the allied army, whose strategic judgment was sound. This is where the wedge would excel - through those gaps etc. The cavalry action was subtle, exploiting the gaps mentioned by Diodorus, which were opened up by the sarissai armed phalangitae.

We are discussing ancient historiography here, in this case events centering on Philip which didn't involve a commissioned press corps, as Alexander did in Asia. Furthermore, Diodorus' account of Chaeronea, which doesn't mention cavalry with Pelopidas at Cynoscephalae, is a far cry from Polybius’ account of the Battle of Mantinea in 207 B.C., to cite one example of a terrific account of a battle form an ancient author (The Histories, Book 11.11-18), in terms of the acuity of the ancient military historian; there is no mention of topography or tactics at all from Diodorus, and the rivalry with young Prince Alexander belongs to the method of a biographer, not a military writer. Plutarch, thanks to his personal interest in the region, aids invaluably with the terrain.

…the source for Philips’s supposed fake withdraw is the rather unreliable Polyaenus – he contradicts himself on what exactly happened, and is a biased and very late source anyway.…

Goodness, labeling somebody else bias can be potentially so subjective and hypocritical on the part of the 'accuser'. This is egregious. Again, and forgive my temerity, do you think you are never going to get caught with all this claptrap? 'Supposed' and a 'very late source' are not incorrect imputations, but Polyaenus was no later a source for the mid to late 4th century B.C. than Arrian was, thus that is not a valid argument per se; if ancient sources are already suspect with much of their works, and happen to indeed not be a relatively extant source, that adds to any equivocalness. Polyaenus was not necessarily bias in favor of Philip; his example of Onomarchus' skillfully laid ambush of him illustrates action that involved a serious fumble on the part of Philip - an exemplar he easily could have omitted (or 'fabricated' others).

...Now there are of course those delightful quotes from Polyaenus yes they seem to show a calculated victory by Philip and foolish Greeks to boot. Polyaenus is however just about the least credible source you can dig up. He was an author from the second sophistic (that is smoe 400 years removed from the topic at hand and had zero military experience) fishing for an Imperial stipend, styled himself a Macedonian, was writing in hast, and his work more often than not is filled with fanciful trash…

Polyaenus is not sustainable with all 833 of his surviving anecdotes, but specifically with Philip at Chaeronea he provided the clue which fits in sensibly. Indeed, his claim to be a Macedonian had nothing to do with a sense of patriotism, but rather an opportunity in 161 A.D. for appointment in Rome: Polyaenus was a Bithynian (albeit with Macedonian ancestry) with ambitions in the literary field under the patronage of Rome. But that doesn’t mean he totally fabricated his work. A martial response was needed in the face of Parthian aggression in Armenia (a Roman legion was destroyed, perhaps the famous VIII Hispana, along with the death of their commander, the Cappadocian governor Marcus Sedatius Severianus, at Elegeia, Armenia, by the forces of the Parthian king Vologaesus III (Cassius Dio, Roman History, Book 71.2.1). Polyaenus may have already begun his collection of stratagems, but the hastiness of the Strategica reflects a rush to finish it when his opportunity arrived - he exploited his Macedonian roots and the fetish of the 2nd century A.D. on Alexander the Great, making him a trustworthy source from the Romans' view on how to defeat 'Asiatics'. But this is hardly proof that he made things up, however presented ben-trovato. Besides, you don't know anything modern scholars have not touched on, and considering that the underlying theme of Polyaenus is didactic and practical in purpose, not historical narrative, and the common citing of him as a source far outweighs his writing as being 'trash'. He simply provided the vital key which bursts your anti-Philippian agenda-minded balloon. You 'need him' to be wrong, and because he's not above authoritativeness, you have your leverage to assiduously campaign on. It really rings like a political campaign with you. But I could be wrong, something you only truly know.

Contradicts himself? What exactly happened is something neither you, I, nor anyone will ever know. The tactic used to finally defeat the Athenian side of the allied army was certainly not planned from the start, but rather a solution to the contingency of a failure on the part of Philip in luring them down and/or break their defensive solidity with initial assaults along their line with lighter troops. The basics we get from Polyaenus' anecdotes require advance preparation, and Alexander's victory on the Macedonian left was not a foregone conclusion. It was Philip's final maneuver which created Alexander's opportunity. It runs deeper, but the decisive moves are along the lines of how Polyaenus and Frontinus describe them: the Athenians were worn down and they became less patient than their professional enemy, thus falling into the prepared jaws, prepared for the contingency that did arrive. The two of Polyaenus' anecdotes (no other from him exist on Chaeronea) of Philip's maneuver read as follows, passages you are aware of (I cite Nicholas G. Hammond instead of the online source):

Polyaenus, Strategica, Book 4.2.2,

"At Chaeronea Philip, being in formation facing the Athenians, gave way and retired*. The Athenian commander, Stratocles, shouted out 'We must not stop pressing the enemy hard until we drive them into Macedonia', and he did not slacken the pursuit. Philip, saying 'Athenians do not know how to win', was retiring step by step, keeping his phalanx contracted and being protected inside the weapons**. After a little, on gaining higher ground and after exhorting the troops, he reversed direction, charged powerfully at the Athenians, and his brilliant fighting won the victory.”

*The word eneklinen has a connotation of a change of angle, as in its translation 'incline' (Arrian, Ars Tactica, Book 21.3).

**Specifically, their pike-points.

The eminence has been shown to be the rising bed of the River Haemon, identified also as the Lykuressi Stream by Nicholas G. Hammond, in conjunction with the archaeological works of George Sotiriades at the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, Plutarch, judged this as a 'river of blood' in its connection with the battle of Chaeronea on Philip's right and the allied left (Life of Demosthenes, Ch. 19.2). Clearly, judging from this, the Athenians came down from their defensive position. Isolated and using their momentum against them once he rose up an eminence, he could impale them and push them back solidly.

Strategica, Book 4.2.7

"At Chaeronea Philip, realizing the Athenians were impetuous and untrained, and that the Macedonians were experienced and trained, extended his formation a lot**,quickly loosened the Athenians and made them easy to defeat."

*The Greek phrase epi polu can mean 'a lot' in time or space; and in either case it was a subjective judgment made probably by the men who were retiring, while at 4.2.2 Polyaenus wrote it happened 'after a little' time (I state this just in case conon394 jumps on this, and claims this to be the 'contradiction').

Sextus Julius Frontinus, the other great exponent of compiled stratagems of war for didacticism, took it in the former sense, as he states in his Stratagemata, Book 2.1.9,

"At Chaeronea, Philip purposely prolonged the engagement, mindful that his own soldiers were seasoned by long experience, while the Athenians were ardent but untrained, and impetuous only in the charge. Then, as the Athenians began to grow weary, Philip attacked more furiously and cut them down."

Frontinus, translating the original Greek source (Frontinus wrote less than a century before Polyaenus), took the term parataxin to mean 'engagement', (or 'battle'), whereas Hammond takes it as 'formation' (he provided his source in ancient Greek lexica as LSJ s.v. polus III 4 ab, with references). Substantially, Frontinus notes that the Athenians were impetuous only in the charge, something only natural, not necessarily 'inept', for raw troops.

Clearly, there's no contradiction whatsoever; Polyaenus' # 7 is more generalized than his # 2, but merely additional, not contradictory, data. Polyaenus, whose work was didactic, simply apprises us that drill and discipline, in this case in effect for more than two decades amid Philip's ranks, was required for the maneuver to be carried out. We can almost certainly discard any exhortative words attributed to generals from later writers, such as those we read also of Saif ad-Din Qutuz at Ayn Jalut and Oliver Cromwell at Dunbar (both playing on the power of God to bring victory; I seriously doubt either had a powerful enough bullhorn to reach far!). Besides that, two angles, to illustrate two specific exemplars of stratagem on the part of Philip, of the same maneuver are explained very tenably, and from whatever source it was drawn, it unfortunately hasn't survived. Polyaenus did not pull this out of the air. His works are drawn upon, following scrutiny, far more than any 'mumbo-jumbo' in his works would suggest.

…Foot companions were not engineered to break through?…

Absolutely not. They were engineered to not be broken through while pinning the enemy, and break the integrity of the enemy line if they could, in essence rupturing their order to gain an edge with the appended use of other, lighter arms. But not 'break through', particularly not on their own. No hoplite army ever really 'broke through' another. The pezhetairoi were not devised to be a slicing battering ram against an enemy under Philip's methods. Sure, the doctrine was not 'defensive' in the sense that they protruded their sarissai only from entrenchments; its offensive power, in this time, was formidable in pinning or piercing the solidity of the front of an enemy, thus demoralizing them. Hoplites seldom 'broke through' another army of the same structure, and if something analogous occurred it was in an isolated and impromptu manner, as the Thebans did at Coronea in 394 B.C.: attempting to 'push back', yes (however that military parlance is interpreted; the reference to a rugby scrimmage is almost certainly an over-simplification), but the rear ranks of a phalanx were for there for the very prevention of a 'break through' (an attached reserve, if you will). If hoplites on a losing side were pushed back beyond destabilization or out-slugged badly in the front by the enemy, they would simply retire.

…You can hang a brilliant tactical victory of these fragments, or just as easily a bloody infantry slugging match that Philip and Alexander finally won..

Sure. Let's try it. Philip decided, 'let's throw everything to chance against a strong blocking position by numerically superior hoplites, their army echeloned with the left thrown forward and atop rising ground, and on top of that both their flanks are protected by natural obstacles with supply being no major problem. Despite all my reforms with the balancing, let's just try to win an infantry slogfest, even though our equipment and compact order is not designed to do so'. I don’t think so. If you had your druthers, most historians etc. on this subject could very well be out of business. You can hang a slugging match from those fragments all you wish, but it's primarily due to a lack of understanding that the source material available is singularly scanty for an intense period, and a lack of appreciation for the science behind Philip's re-thinking of the phalanx, part of which fell away from close, individual combat on the part of his Foot Companions.

At Chaeronea, a frontal assault by Philip on the allied front had little chance of success, and could have even invited disaster, as the allies with their heavy front en echelon could have, figured Philip, pivoted on their left and compel the Macedonians in a position with the Cephissus directly behind them, leaving them precarious lines of withdrawal if things awry (so long as the Greek lines didn't become isolated). The Macedonian cavalry would have a tough time against hoplite lines not perforated, and presumably the allied Greek cavalry were stationed behind their lines (who all probably joined the ultimate retreat through the Kerata Pass in the actual course of events); to reiterate, the enemy phalanxes were stoutly drawn up obliquely with their right inclining away from the Macedonians. They were afforded a secure water supply on both sides and open lines of communication to their south. This was prudent strategic thinking, designed to be a static defensive hold, and their disposed order fully exploited the asset of each man's body's right side protected by the left half of each hoplon (or aspis) wielded by the hoplite directly to his right. Philip solved the problem by what Polyaenus' source revealed. When Philip retired with his side, the reason gaps didn't open in his own lines, probably, is because his entire line of battle wheeled slowly in conjunction with his controlled retirement to the north west, bringing them into contact with the Greek right as they shuffled to their left to prevent a gap opening due to the Athenians' final approach towards Philip. Sure, nothing supports this from the ancient record, but the surviving accounts were not interested in detail, other than the isolated and specific anecdotes from Frontinus and Polyaenus.

At the battle of Crannon in 322 B.C., to cite an example, we read how the phalangites could not outright decide the issue:

Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 18.17,

"...The Greeks who were encamped against them at this time were far inferior in numbers; for many of them, despising the enemy because of their former good fortune, had gone away to their own cities to look after their private affairs.

Since many soldiers were absent from duty for this reason, there remained in camp only 25,000 foot soldiers and 3,500 cavalry. They placed their chief hope of victory in the latter, because the men were brave and the ground was level.

At last Antipater began to draw up his forces each day and challenge the Greeks to battle. For a while these waited for their men to return from their cities, but since time was pressing, they were forced to come out and stake all. They drew up their lines, placing the cavalry in front of the phalanx of infantry, since they were eager to decide the battle by means of this arm.

When the cavalry had met in battle and the Thessalian horsemen were getting the advantage because of their valor, Antipater led out his own phalanx and, rushing upon the infantry of the enemy, began to make great slaughter. The Greeks, since they were not able to withstand the weight and number of the enemy, immediately withdrew to the rough ground, carefully keeping their ranks. Thus they occupied the higher ground and easily repulsed the Macedonians thanks to their possession of the superior position.

Although the Greek cavalry had gained the advantage, as soon as the horsemen learned of the withdrawal of the infantry, they at once retired toward them. Then, after such a combat as I have described, the battle was broken off, as the scales of victory swung in favor of the Macedonians. More than 500 of the Greeks were killed in the battle, and 130 of the Macedonians..."

We read here that although the phalanx of Antipitar had the better of the numerically inferior Greek infantry in a clash of othismos (probably at least partly a metaphoric description in addressing the mechanics of hoplite battles), he hardly 'broke through' them; they merely withdrew to the higher ground, illustrating that the Macedonian phalanx could not beat what it couldn't catch, hence Philip's scientific methods of an aggregate army involving lighter troops of foot and horse centered around the tactical base of his phalanx, conditions extant but far more marginal in the Greek military world before Philip II, and even more so before the Peloponnesian War. That was a broad assessment, so please spare any 'explanations' to my 'errors' with isolated examples that are not the 'norm'.

…You are basically just assuming Alexander’s tactics against the Persians were the only tactics he could or Philip or any Macedonians could use.

The Greeks certainly expected that hoplites could break through hoplite formations. I don’t see why foot companions could not. Given Markle's work it clear that the Macedonian retained hoplite like troops, and once you remember to ignore the false ideal of the sarissa infantry as being unarmored and using tea saucers for shields I don’t see why they could not go toe-to-toe with hoplites.

The Successors were often used sarissa infantry in frontal attacks and so did Philip.

There is still no reference to cavalry. Again the other point is why the great need to have the Macedonian cavalry do this, that, or the other thing and provoke no response from the Greek cavalry?…

I never stated anything remotely like that, and this is another attack on the straw man from you. I am stating that these tactics were used at Chaeronea, not the same as stating these tactics were used exclusively throughout the history of campaigning by Philip, Alexander, and the Diadochi. The reason why this army was one geared for conquest was it's flexibility (the specialized function of each arm was realized by Philip, no matter how much Alexander added, such as horse archers in the Punjab) and logistic capacity - all lain by Philip. Any 'great need' (trying to make those who disagree with you look 'desperate'? Nice try.), at least on my part, is nothing other than a deep avocation on the military and political historical era. This wasn't a Spartan army, nor Iberian mountaineers. Once I remembering to ignore? Is that some perfunctory decree? Now you're telepathic? No wonder you come across as possessing such 'esoteric' knowledge. What an advantage! No wonder you posses such esoteric knowledge. What an advantage! Foot Companions were not of the same structure as the conventional Greek hoplites. They were vulnerable in way hoplites were not. The Foot Companions of Philip most certainly had a smaller shield and wore no breastplate, perhaps save for the front line phalangitae; are you really suggesting this is a false ideal? How else could they employ their sarissai and maneuver in compact order with effect? The men Philip drilled and trained excessively could go toe-to-toe with hoplites because of the sole advantage in their specialized pole weapons of cornel wood over their counterparts armed with the dory, which actually rendered them toe-to-toe in a more figurative sense; but the idea that the hoplite was inflexible outside the phalanx is not only a myth, but would give them an advantage if the Macedonian phalanx broke even a little and hand to hand fighting ensued. The more inflexible phalanx (and less protected by lighter auxiliaries) of later times proved formidable per se against the Romans under Philip V and Perseus, but the flexibility of the manipular system overall proved superior against more rigid Macedonian armies which by this time, upwards of a century and a half later, had slowly and basically reverted to the tactical doctrine of cavalry as the ancillary arm (circumstances apply, though; they were now not conquering most of Greece, let alone Asia).

We read from Polyaenus, Strategica, Book 4.2.10

"Philip used to train the Macedonians before they were at war. He frequently had them march three hundred stadia under arms with their helmets, shields, greaves, pikes and also their provisions and the equipment necessary for their daily needs."

Clearly, there is no mention of cuirasses or corselets of any kind in connection with the soldiers training 'under arms'. Interestingly, we get a glimpse of where Polyaenus probably drew his information, if not directly. If so, he conforms to what was written, as his anecdote agrees with the list of equipment in the famous Macedonian Amphipolis Code, a military decree dated some time in the reign of Philip V of Macedon (c. 200 B.C.). Presumably, anything analogous could not have been put into policy after Philip II, who just about started all of it:

The Amphipolis Code, Decree 114,

"Those who do not have their required equipment shall be fined according to the following written schedule: two obols for a protective belt for the lower stomach, two obols for a helmet, three obols for a sarissa, the same for a sword, two obols for greaves and a drachma for a shield. In the case of officers the fines are doubled and in addition the absence of a corselet is fined at the rate of two drachmas and a half-corselet at the rate of one drachma."

As we see, a corselet is mentioned only for officers. The Macedonian phalangite who did wear protective armor probably wore the linothorax, a linen cuirass, but a half-breastplate is echoed in the time of Alexander, under a specific stipulation, and only for the front-line men:

Polyaenus, Strategica, Book 4.3.13,

"The Macedonians having fled from the field, Alexander changed the coat of mail into a breast-plate: which was a protection to them, as long as they boldly faced the enemy: but if they fled, they exposed to the foe their naked backs. This had such an effect: that they never afterwards fled; but, if they were overpowered, always retreated in good order."

A coat of mail - now we're receiving a gist of something here. Not only for reasons inessential, but also for monetary considerations, Macedonian phalangitae in the ranks behind the 3rd, or even the 2nd, rank (conjecture), probably wore no armor at all.



The above depiction shows a Macedonian phalangite wearing a linothorox, a light linen cuirass worn over his exomis tunic; greaves were necessary for lower leg protection from the sarissa's spiked butt-end (Ruth Sheppard, Alexander the Great at War, Pg. 81). Right: another fine image from Roy Jones' page.

The Greek dispositions at Chaeronea, to reiterate, show they were confident they could block him for months, particularly as they held the higher ground with flanks secure from even lighter troops (at least for a while; they had their own) and cavalry they knew Philip possessed. Your idea that they were similarly armed is illusory. Besides, who claimed Philip didn’t retain hoplites for multiple purposes? Often, however, Arrian does refer to the phalanx as composed of 'hoplites' (Anabasis Alexandri, Book 1.1.8; 1.6.2; 1.21.1; 1.27.8; 1.28.3-6; 2.8.2). Chaeronea carried a specific tactical object - not with any hoplites charged with anything substantial on Philip's part, unless one wants to claim the hypaspistai were hoplites, which carries a little more weight (no pun again intended!).

…The Successors were often used sarissa infantry in frontal attacks and so did Philip…

I didn't state Philip did not use his phalangitae for frontal attacks. He used them for 'attack and hold', so to speak. Now you're basically supporting what you pedantically derided earlier (there's not a set rule - each situation should be looked at intrinsically); because the Successors did something a generation later, under different and variegated circumstances, Philip did it in his time? Sarissai bearing phalangitae were certainly not armored like hoplites, thus not meant for the same specific tactical objective. The Macedonian shield has been described by Asclepiodotus as, 'eight palms (2 ft.) in diameter and not excessively convex' (Techne Tactica, Book 5.1), which facilitated a denser formation. I don't think any tea saucer of that size has ever existed in the human world. Oh, was that an attempted metaphorical joke of some sort? Basically, the armies of the Successors became hordes of mass armies who made use of elephants, which effectively became somewhat of a 'mobile unit', and monarchical power (gold from Asia), among other aspects. The cavalry gradually lost its importance, in relation to before with Alexander; the phalanx became increasingly heavier and monolithic. Thus the frontal assault -with the intent of pushing forward - became more pronounced. This became a far cry from Philip II's environment, and there's a perfectly good reason why he didn't use it. Moreover, mercenaries came more into play. This disparate tactical issue is invalid in trying to show that Philip would do this at Chaeronea, and not use his cavalry.

The Spartans, who relied more on their vaunted infantry with push of spear than any other state, adopted the sarissa not until more than a century later. The Thebans, particularly Pagondas then Epaminondas, ushered in the tactic of concentration of force, and with the latter a maximum thrust of a reinforced battle line was effected against the traditional weak point of a known enemy, with cavalry exploited more fully than before as a protective force to the infantry. Pelopidas was dashing and astute, but Philip was more on whole far more scientific. The Macedonian pezhetairoi which he devised into the compact order constituted the stable base for the cavalry action. In Alexander's later years (after Gaugamela), administrative changes occurred, and Asiatic troops to each new region were utilized. But the specialized function of each type of arm came from Philip, who intended the sarissa to be an offensive weapon only from the act that it was the weapon of a 'human mobile fortress' which caused substantial changes in methods of attack. The real instrument of decision was the army as a whole; one arm could not carry out a task without the others' specified function. The potential clumsiness of the sarissa when the phalanx was used on its own offensively (ie, without an amalgam of offensive strikes on the same target by light infantry and cavalry) is shown to us by Polyaenus:

Polyaenus, Strategica, Book 2.29, c. late 270s B.C.

"At the siege of Edessa, when a breach was made in the walls, the spear-men, whose spears were 16 cubits [24 ft.] long, sallied out against the assailants. Cleonymus deepened his phalanx, and ordered the front line not to use their weapons, but with both hands to seize the enemy's spears, and hold them fast; while the next rank immediately advanced, and closed upon them. When their spears were seized in this way, the men retreated; but the second rank, pressing upon them, either took them prisoner, or killed them. By this maneuver of Cleonymus, the long and formidable sarissa was rendered useless, and became rather an encumbrance, than a dangerous weapon."

Even if this event did not occur, it is quite tenable in theory. With Philip and Alexander (not exclusively but when exigent circumstances called for it), their footmen bearing sarissai in compact action increased the width of the killing zone, and the number of lethal tips within it; hence breaking the integrity of an enemy formation would create gaps, as well as greatly decrease their ability to face attacks from their flanks and rear. If Philip had defeated the allied army at Chaeronea in the simplistic manner you wish it to be, at least one notable modern scho...

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

OK, wheres the rest then? hock: hock:

Just curious, but how did you manage to get all that in with out a major website malfunction?

I am lucky if I can get 2 paragraphs in without it dissappearing into the eather.....hence my penchant for short and glib posts.... :roll: :oops:

[Ghostmojo]

... but how did you manage to get all that in with out a major website malfunction?

I am lucky if I can get 2 paragraphs in without it dissappearing into the eather ...

Which is exactly what I was thinking!!! :lol: Presumably anybody can join in this detailed dialogue - that is - if you have a few weeks spare in order to both read and respond. Seriously, I think bite-sized chunks are easier to deal with. I thought my own postings to be a bit lengthy at perhaps 5 or 6 paragraphs. I needn't have worried ... :roll:

I wouldn't know where to start (or finish) with that lot since it deals with more than one theme or issue.

The one intial topic that did interest me was of Pan-Hellenic unity - often the illusory dream of the more inspired Greeks. The trouble was always how could you unite a land and people that only had very tenuous links with each other (at least as far as they saw it)? Take my own favourite group - the Spartans.

First and foremost they were Spartiates, of one of the three Dorian tribes - then they were Lakedaimonians - then I suppose they were Lakonians - then Peloponnesians - then Southern Greeks - then finally Hellenes. They had a mistrust of many other Dorian cities (take Argos) with whom they shared blood ties - were, after Chaironeia, implacable enemies of Makedon (who were probably also Dorian-related) - inveterate loathers of Thebes (since the Persian Wars) - continuously watchful of Athens - always weary of allies like Corinth and Tegea - and of course continuous repressors of Messenia - so what chance did other (non-Dorian) Akhaian, Aiolian or Ionian Greeks have?

And that is just the Spartans. Similar analogies could be drawn with Athens, Thebes, Makedon, Thessaly and so on ...

Such myriad layers and levels of fragmentation and sub-division could almost never be overcome. Tragically, with the best will in the world the Greeks could never be united because they saw their country not as Hellas - but as Boiotia, or as Thessaly, or as Attika, or as Epeiros. Greece (or Hellas) was also anywhere which happened to be inhabited by Greeks - including parts of southern Italy, Sicily, Kyrenaica, Spain, Kypros, France, Asia Minor - even the Crimea. The only alternative to this were the various leagues over the centuries (Peloponnesian, Akhaian, Aitolian etc.) and/or the attempts at empire building first by Athens, then Sparta, then Thebes and finally Makedon. None of these were ever popular or ultimately successful. The Greeks were exclusive and distrustful. They hadn't grasped the logic which the Romans were to employ by bringing neighbours into a confederation which promised something by way or return for the new arrivees.

With the Hellenes such ultra-diversity was their fascinating strength - but also their devastating weakness

There is something both sadly depressing and delightfully Monty Pythonesque about the ancient Greeks ... "excuse me, is this the room for an argument?"

"I've told you once ..." :lol:

[D B Campbell]

If you are interested in the correct attribution for the above illustration (after all, it's only polite to give credit where credit is due), it is my own interpretation of the two bow-machines described by the engineering writer Biton, and expertly painted to my specifications by the artist Brian Delf. (btw You have managed to flip the image horizontally, and your scan has a peculiar colour cast.)

[Spartan JKM]

Hi everyone. Thanks for the input. I apologize for not being around as much as I would like.

OK, wheres the rest then? hock: hock: ...

It's coming Byron - piecemeal .

Great post about my Hero!

I have a good book of Epitomes of Philips life, but a great friend give me a great surprise by sending me a great Epitome from the Vatican Archives that my book lacks, and it was about the event when philip lost his eye with more story & mistery behind and opinion about the autor, my book only touch its surface but that one goes beyond.

Thank you; some didn't like it over on twc.net. I am pleased to read this, Gioi! My mother will argue that historical 'heroes' should only be the likes of Aviceena and Da Vinci, etc. But given the (our) criteria of military/political figures, Philip II of Macedon stands out as an amazing figure. From my view, his 'detractors' picked the wrong guy to criticize! 'Vatican Archives'? Interesting. Boy, would I love to peruse the full copies of Marsyas of Pella and/or Theopompus.

...The one intial topic that did interest me was of Pan-Hellenic unity - often the illusory dream of the more inspired Greeks. The trouble was always how could you unite a land and people that only had very tenuous links with each other (at least as far as they saw it)? Take my own favourite group - the Spartans.

First and foremost they were Spartiates, of one of the three Dorian tribes - then they were Lakedaimonians - then I suppose they were Lakonians - then Peloponnesians - then Southern Greeks - then finally Hellenes...

Hi Howard. That's a long one! basically, one asset about Sparta - one that is applicable to any power - was her location: she was invulnerable from the sea (being situated some 30 miles from the Aegean in the three closest directions), and commanded the only land routes south into Laconia from Arcadia and Messinia.

If you are interested in the correct attribution for the above illustration (after all, it's only polite to give credit where credit is due), it is my own interpretation of the two bow-machines described by the engineering writer Biton, and expertly painted to my specifications by the artist Brian Delf. (btw You have managed to flip the image horizontally, and your scan has a peculiar colour cast.)

Thank you Duncan. My apologies and kudos; I thought your name was familiar, but only got a hold of some of your work since this posting. Goodness - what paramount data you have provided; a couple of your books were available on Google Book Previews. I agree when we can identify it: Diodorus can be as hyperbolic as his compressed style can cause obscurity, not to mention a seemingly uncritical usage of his vast sources. But he had his agenda, probably, and didn't know that he alone would be our sole source today. The book from which I scanned that terrific illustration indeed reads, in the description of Brian's illustration which I failed to fully notice (pg. 157 of Alexander at War: His Army, His battles, His Enemies, which is also available here on Google Preview, but not pgs. 156-157!),

"...Besides the original hand-held gastraphetes, the machines shown are the 'mountain' version, presumably for use over rugged terrain, and the the twin-bore version, both created by Zopyrus of Tarentum. (Brian Delf © Osprey Publishing, Ltd)."

I don't exactly how the image came out peculiarly; I have an older HP printer/scanner, and its size forced my to flip the book the only way to fully capture the shot. Perhaps when I cropped it I also tinkered with the contrast or brightness, which I do often with the pics I scan. of course - it's not only polite to give proper credit, but perfunctory I readjusted the contrast which came out in my scanning of Brian's illustration. Let me know if it's better (below amid the post). I was indeed not entirely thorough with my initial definitions of these machines (I first thought the gastraphetes was the mounted machine, then correctly identified it as the hand-held one - but thinking for a short time that the large machines were winches!. Thanks for your scholarship).

There's another discussion on Alexander ('was he overrated?'), to which I again will transpose over some relevant material of mine, including the issue of artillery machines (revised, thanks mainly to Duncan's terrific books).

I'll pick up here (from this thread; my arguments do not begin until pg. 5):

Great stuff everyone!

"...The study of Truth is in one sense difficult, in another easy. This is shown by the fact that whereas no one person can obtain an adequate grasp of it, we cannot all fail in the attempt; each thinker makes some statement about the natural world, and as an individual contributes little or nothing to the inquiry; but a combination of all conjectures results in something considerable. Thus in so far as it seems that Truth is like the proverbial door which no one can miss, in this sense our study will be easy; but the fact that we cannot, although having some grasp of the whole, grasp a particular part, shows its difficulty. However, since difficulty also can be accounted for in two ways, its cause may exist not in the objects of our study but in ourselves: just as it is with bats' eyes in respect of daylight, so it is with our mental intelligence in respect of those things which are by nature most obvious..."

- Aristotle, Metaphysics, 993a-b

OK. Let's continue here

What distinguishes Alexander on a near singular level, as a man of action of the Classical World and a visionary genius, is not only did his military schooling come mainly from his father, whose groundwork with the Macedonian army was a paradigm of professionalism combined with balance, but his erudition in the atmosphere of the ???????? (the 'Academy') came from a man who can be credited with founding formal logic and zoology, among other branches. Hence Alexander was a winner in the lottery of life.

But he never wasted nor took for granted any of it. At the siege of Tyre, for example, we see via hindsight (IMHO) where Alexander could have fumbled badly; but upon deep scrutiny, his moves from the get-go seemed to be the best decision for what he desired to accomplish in the broader scope; now campaigning out of the Hellenic lands, he possessed a clear vision of his immediate and grand objectives. One of the most famous speeches (a manifesto, probably, issued to the army at the onset of the great siege; cf. William W. Tarn, Alexander the Great, Vol. 2: Sources and Studies, pgs. 286-287) extant in ancient historiography is set at the backdrop of Alexander's dilemma concerning Tyre:

Arrian, Anabasis Alexandri, Book 2.17,

"Friends and allies, I see that an expedition to Egypt will not be safe for us, so long as the Persians retain the sovereignty of the sea; nor is it a safe course, both for other reasons, and especially looking at the state of matters in Greece, for us to pursue Darius, leaving in our rear the city of Tyre itself in doubtful allegiance, and Egypt and Cyprus in the occupation of the Persians. I am apprehensive lest while we advance with our forces towards Babylon and in pursuit of Darius, the Persians should again conquer the maritime districts, and transfer the war into Greece with a larger army, considering that the Lacedaemonians are now waging war against us without disguise, and the city of Athens is restrained for the present rather by fear than by any goodwill towards us. But if Tyre were captured, the whole of Phoenicia would be in our possession, and the fleet of the Phoenicians, which is the most numerous and the best in the Persian navy, would in all probability come over to us. For the Phoenician sailors and marines will not dare to put to sea in order to incur danger on behalf of others, when their own cities are occupied by us. After this, Cyprus will either yield to us without delay, or will be captured with ease at the mere arrival of a naval force; and then navigating the sea with the ships from Macedonia in conjunction with those of the Phoenicians, Cyprus also having come over to us, we shall acquire the absolute sovereignty of the sea, and at the same time an expedition into Egypt will become an easy matter for us. After we have brought Egypt into subjection, no anxiety about Greece and our own land will any longer remain, and we shall be able to undertake the expedition to Babylon with safety in regard to affairs at home, and at the same time with greater reputation, in consequence of having appropriated to ourselves all the maritime provinces of the Persians and all the land this side of the Euphrates"

Note: Athens had provided Alexander with merely twenty triremes, much less than the amount they could have donated to the League (Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 17.22.5). But these were probably retained as hostages for the good behavior of the Athenian donors. Unfortunately, little survives other than material from Isocrates of tense events in the mid-late 380s B.C., in which Evagoras of Salamis (on the east coast of Cyprus), aided by the Egyptian pharaoh Hakor and Carian viceroy Hecatomnus (furtively, regarding support from the latter; cf. Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 15.3), rallied much of Cyprus in rebellion against Achaemenid rule before Artaxerxes II mobilized in force to subdue him, culminating in the naval Battle of Kition (modern Larnaca), a victory for the admiral Glos, an Egyptian in Achaemenid service (the son of Tamos, who supported Cyrus the Younger in the famous feud of the brothers in 401 B.C.). Amid this campaign, Evagoras apparently took Tyre by force (Isocrates, Evagoras, Speech 61-63; pg. 152 in this source), by which he doubtless had the support of a strong fleet (assuming Isocrates didn't mean Old Tyre on the mainland; he also spoke of 'Evagoras ravaging Phoenicia'). Of course, the encomium of Evagoras was part of the larger picture of Isocrates' aims in expounding the 'weakness' of Achaemenid Persia, and that the Greeks should unite and drive the Great King's power out of Asia Minor. Only one ship came from Macedon at this juncture, a fifty-oared vessel (one tier with 25 rowers on each side).

But IMHO, it probably wasn't as imminent that the Cypriots would join Alexander as readily as the non-Tyrian Phoenicians surely would, let alone yield to a naval force which ultimately numbered less than what they produced for him (120 ships on their part, yet 104 from the others, or maybe less from one or both, if Curtius is right in putting Alexander's fleet at 190 ships); unlike with the Phoenician city-states other than Tyre, Alexander had not yet held any sway over Cyprus. But they had been under an Achaemenid yoke they tried to throw off, and after the verdict of Issus it seemed a new power was rising in their part of the Mediterranean. But as fortune would have it for Alexander, or by his 'prophetic' strategy, they wound up contributing 120 ships in an eager manner.

...just redesigning the military doesn't win victories, using it effectively is...

...the Other Great Captains of antiquity tended have stood on a platform made by others as well - Did Caesar invent the Roman military system form scratch, the Barca empire and its army were built by Hannibal's father, etc.

Well, superfluous to state, no notable commander has literally ever built anything from scratch. But Philip used the army he devised very effectively; again, Alexander directly inherited an instrument in far more a direct fashion than did Hannibal and Caesar from their affecting predecessors, and the same can be stated in the 'chain of command' with regards to Wanyan Aguda being related to Chinghis Khan, Eric XIV to Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick William I to his son Frederick II (the Great), and Lazare Carnot to Napoleon, etc. Hannibal organized a precision instrument more removed than what Hamilcar and Hasdrubal (the 'Handsome', or 'Bald') had left him, particularly with the restructuring of his heavy infantry in Italy to adapt to his enemy, more so than Alexander did with the army he inherited. But that's all academic, and Alexander didn't need to effect any major reforms. The specialized function of almost every arm was in place from Philip (Philip employed archers, but Alexander added horse-archers at his great victory on the Hydaspes, where the phalanx locked shields and surged forward against the elephants, doing so more than anytime prior). Publius Cornelius Scipio the Younger (Scipio Africanus, as of late 202 B.C.) remedied the Roman army's handicaps against Hannibal with great efficacy.

...you must realise that Phillip did experience military failures (failed sieges) while Alexander didn't suffer such setbacks even tho they both were using the same type of military...

Yes and no, IMHO. The same type of military, yes - a combined force of all arms ready to fight in any season over all types of country*. But it was still in the building process in 353 B.C., when Philip suffered a humbling experience against the stout Phocian leader Onomarchus, which saw him battered badly in a skillfully inflicted ambuscade. But he was leading an expeditionary and limited force while aiding the Thessalians. A year later, Onomarchus and his tough professional army of hoplites (they were financed by the appropriated Delphic treasures) were crushed in a major battle by Philip, when he resolved to take military action in full gear with his concerted tactics of infantry and cavalry; the developing Macedonian army was still nearly two decades away from what Alexander inherited. The cynosure of the army's sinew was not only the discipline Philip immediately began instilling, but that it became increasingly backed by plunder, foreign tribute, new farmland, and a solid supply of gold. Thus, a standing army could be supported on a vaster scale than the Spartans before them, the only other Greek state which had maintained a standing army.

*Iphicrates, too (before, actually), commandeered and fought with his troops in wintry conditions (Polyaenus, Strategica, Book 3.9.34).



Above: the oxybeles (o???????; 'bolt-shooter') was utilized by Philip throughout his reign as of at least the siege of Olynthus in 349 B.C., where boltheads with Philip's name on them were found. This one is flexion powered. Below: this oxybeles came a little later, with the application of torsion power now applied (both images are from this source).



An interesting look into the issue of supplying the army can be gleaned in a letter from Philip to the Peloponnesians, which was read by Demosthenes in c. 355-354 B.C.; a year or two earlier, the Phocian leader Philomelus had begun to raise a mercenary army, as well as their going rate by 50%, to bolster his numbers (including Spartans; Archidamus III supported the Phocians 'secretly in every respect, providing both money and mercenaries', told by Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.24.2; also in Justin, Historiarum Philippicarum Libri XLIV, Book 8.1, where we read that Athens also aided the Phocians). In 356 B.C., Philomelus seized the The Amphictyonic Council (the common council of Greece), which he felt had imposed disagreeable fines, and appropriated the treasures of Delphi to support his rising army[sup]1[/sup]. He met with success initially, but was defeated by the Thebans at Neon in 354 B.C., thereafter committing suicide, whereby Onomarchus arrived on the scene. Philip schemed his way into all this mess, playing on the sacrilegious nature of the Phocians' acts, and within two years Thessaly was stabilized, Philip was elected archon of its League, and his writ now extended as far south as Thermopylae.

Demosthenes, On the Crown, Speech 157 (the Letter from Philip),

"[Philip, king of Macedonia, to the public officers and councillors of the allied Peloponnesians and to all his other Allies, greeting. Since the Ozolian Locrians, settled at Amphissa, are outraging the temple of Apollo at Delphi and come in arms to plunder the sacred territory, I consent to join you in helping the god and in punishing those who transgress in any way the principles of religion. Therefore meet under arms at Phocis with forty days' provisions in the next month, styled Lous by us, Boedromion by the Athenians, and Panemus by the Corinthians [August/September]. Those who, being pledged to us, do not join us in full force, we shall treat as punishable. Farewell.]"

The failed sieges (in the sense Perinthus and Byzantium were not captured) of Philip's did not include the formidable siege-apparatus which Alexander probably utilized at Miletus, and definitely had at Halicarnassus (not very impressively, given their potential, where they were used just to sweep battlements atop Halicarnassus' walls, but not the walls themselves; perhaps the torsion power was not yet fitted) and Tyre (ultimately, an incredible feat, but not before he suffered some repulses). Actually, Alexander was probably battered as much as Philip was in their respective careers, though the former never on the failing end when a campaign was all over; the fiery son simply was more assiduous at plugging at one object, both because he was more gratuitous with his ruthlessness when opposed (IMHO) and he had less encompassing threats while focusing on an operation (eg., the dispersed Arab marauders on his supply lines during the siege of Tyre were dealt with in ten days).



Above: the renowned Helepolis ('taker of cities', a veritable proto-tank, so to speak: the image comes from here) is famously associated with Demetrius I of Macedon (given the cognomen Poliorcetes, or 'the Besieger'); to Athens, he was indeed Soter ('Preserver'), as he freed the greatest exponents of d?mokratía from the oligarchic (oligarkhía) rule of Demetrius of Phalerum in 307 B.C., who had been appointed by Cassander a decade earlier. The famous but unsuccessful siege of Rhodes, the most strongly fortified city in the Classical World at the time, occurred in 305-304 B.C. But, at the very least, a pedigree of the siege tower was used at Philip II of Macedon's siege of Byzantium, thus ready for operational use in his planned invasion of the Achaemenid Persian Empire, in 335 B.C., following the advance force already sent into Asia Minor. The famous invasion which commenced was probably delayed a year or so because of his assassination, whereby Alexander needed to re-establish order and security in the 'Kingdom'. Below: Philip presumably had this flexion powered bolt-shooter for most of his sieges. This one shot two arrows simultaneously, and was too strong for a man to draw, hence the weapon's slider had to be winched back. The principal of torsion power, a stronger version than the one above, seems to have begun with the artificers of Philip II (the image is from Peter Connoly's terrific Greece and Rome at War, pg. 281).



No question - the imposing military and political acts of Alexander were greatly impacting on an acculturative level. The question can be how much farther and faster did he effectuate a cultural inroad which had been unfurling since two centuries prior; the connection between Hellenes and the western Asiatic peoples, who were not Hellenic, created a cultural melting pot in Asia Minor (where most of the great Hellenic figures in literature and philosophy actually came from). Regarding the same issue with the rickrack of the Punjab and Indus River basin, we read conflicting passages from Herodotus (The Histories, Book 4.44) and Arrian (Anabasis Alexandri, Book 6.24) regarding the degree of Achaemenid Persian expansion into India. But it seems Darius I had gained access to the Indus River Valley to no less a degree than did Alexander's sphere of power, where the latter never established a frontier, let alone secured one. Coupled with the firm stand by his army not to continue east at the River Beas, which witnessed jubilation following the sagely speech of the inveterate Coenus (who died soon thereafter), Alexander did experience military failure.

By the year 341 B.C., the Macedonian army was probably at its pinnacle under Philip’s reign, as spoken by Demosthenes around that year:

Demosthenes, Third Philippic, Speech 9.49-50,

"But now you must surely see that most disasters are due to traitors, and none are the result of a regular pitched battle. On the other hand you hear of Philip marching unchecked, not because he leads a phalanx of heavy infantry, but because he is accompanied by skirmishers, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and similar troops.

When, relying on this force, he attacks some people that is at variance with itself, and when through distrust no one goes forth to fight for his country, then he brings up his artillery and lays siege. I need hardly tell you that he makes no difference between summer and winter and has no season set apart for inaction."

...The notion that the army of Alexander was a sort of hand-me-down isn't a good enough reason to conclude that Alexander's actions are overrated...

I agree with this astute point. It's far too sweeping to give Philip any more than a little credit for what Alexander actually did with the army as its Captain-General. Moreover, Philip may have bequeathed to Alexander the greatest army of conquest ever devised, but he also left him plenty of enemies, as there were no strict laws of right regarding primogeniture. It didn't help that Philip was struck down before he had announced any preferred heir. But it appears he was grooming Alexander, but to stay behind in Macedon as regent during the upcoming great expedition to Asia.

...A commander should be judged on how he lead his soldiers into battle and I think Alexander did a far better job than his father would have...

I concur that the criteria of a commander's success or failure involves the close relation to his/her troops, as well as a capacity to measure up to the martial circumstances of his/her time. But I don't feel there's anything to suggest Philip was any less capable of a virtuoso commandeering performance than Alexander; if we compare grand strategy, Philip's mind was a complete map of the struggles around him, in which he comprehended every present contingency and ordered them in relation to the whole. Tactically, his skillful use of his army against hoplite ones in defensive positions were masterful display of novel adaptability.

…Again I ask, how is this inter-connection and cohesive action of cavalry and infantry any more significant for the outcome of the battle [against Bardylis in 358 B.C.] than Delium or Cyno Cephalae in 362? Or Lechaeum if you count light infantry in? If you want to be consistent, you should argue that Thebans, not Philip, introduced the combined arms strategy…

I guess I wasn't concise enough the last time . Well, I'm certainly not here to try to change people's minds, but if my input is asked or challenged, I'll do the best I can to express my opinions. Much is expounded on how Philip II was inspired by Spartan and Theban systems of war; but as much as he saw their potentialities, he also identified some shortcomings. He visualized a national military instrument from all the scattered parts of various Greek states. Alexander may be the greatest practitioner of arguably the most perfectly balanced and fine-tuned instrument for conquest ever engineered.

I never suggested, let alone outright stated, that Philip introduced a combined-arms doctrine from your loose definition. If you want to count light infantry as a fundamental part of a basic 'strategy of combined arms', it began in the historiography with Gelon, the tyrant of Syracuse, who was asked in 481 B.C. by Greek envoys for his assistance against the impending threat from Xerxes I. But he drove far too high a bargain:

Herodotus, The Histories, Book 7.158.4-5,

"...'I am ready to send to your aid 200 triremes, 20,000 men-at-arms, 2,000 horsemen, 2,000 archers, 2,000 slingers, and 2,000 light-armed men to run with horsemen. I also pledge to furnish provisions for the whole Greek army until we have made an end of the war. All this, however, I promise on one condition, that I shall be general and leader of the Greeks against the foreigner. On no other condition will I come myself or send others'..."

Note: this is the first literary mention of the function of the hamippoi (light infantry intermingled with cavalry to fight other cavalry; the Skiritai constituted the elite light infantrymen who supported a Spartan army, who are first mentioned at Mantinea of 418 B.C.).

With Philip's reforms, both the cavalry and infantry arms on the battlefield were designed to serve as his staple units; the relation between the cavalry and the infantry in Philip's first battle, which saw him pierce and stove the Illyrian left battle line (as they formed their infantry a square, no less), was successful in a unified strike not extant in the battles you are citing.At Delium in 424 B.C., Pagondas did not intend to assault the enemy with concerted cavalry and infantry, nor did it happen. The unexpected twist that turned a tightly fought battle into a route was that Pagondas, to stabilize his reeling left, sent two squadrons of cavalry from his right battle line round a hill out of enemy sight as a diversionary measure. The Athenians thought this cavalry contingent heralded a new army approaching, and they consequently scattered in panic. In the pursuit they didn't effect by any contact, the Boeotian and Locrian cavalry inflicted much slaughter. Pagondas clearly intended to win the battle primarily by infantry mass, elaborated in Epaminondas' tactics at Leuktra over half a century later, when he massed his left against the Athenian right (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 4.96). However, at the Battle of Delium we can see the concept of a mounted reserve ready to face contingencies, and the crude 'flame-thrower' Thucydides mentions which the Boeotians used on the rampart of Delium to dislodge the Athenian garrison (History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 4.100).

At the Battle of Lechaeum, fought in 390 B.C. on the Corinthian isthmus, the adept peltastai under Iphicrates were the only arm involved on the victorious side. Callias' Athenian hoplites took no part in the fighting, other than that their arrival hastened the enfiladed Spartans to take flight. In the action, the Spartan cavalry only came up after the third 'pursuit' by the first classes by the Spartan infantry of Iphicrates' more agile troops, and they effectuated very little, particularly in that 'they did not chase the enemy until they had killed some of them, but both in the pursuit and in the turning backward kept an even front with the hoplites' (Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 4.5.16). The Spartans were the only ones who showed 'combined arms', and in a counter-productive display of management by the Spartan polemarch.

At Cynoscephalae, fought in 364 B.C., Pelopidas' piecemeal attacks on the enemy were remarkably well managed, but he never struck at infantry and demoralized them with a concerted attack from both arms. His cavalry had success against them only when disordered, or even in flight; at Leuctra and Mantinea*, Epaminondas still relied mostly on a concentration of force with his infantry. The cavalry, though utilized more here than the hitherto traditional ancillary role, and with the hamippoi, were still an auxiliary arm. Epaminondas was using more variety, particularly with the innovation of the strategic pursuit; at Lechaeum, the peltastai of Iphicrates were the only arm which won the famous battle. Any cavalry supporting their infantry came from the Spartan side, and only then after the third 'pursuit' of the enemy lighter troops, whose calculated missile-barraging on the heavier hoplite was one major addition to the new dimensions (it had occurred before, notably on the narrow island of Sphacteria in 425 B.C.) of warfare at the turn of the 5th/4th centuries B.C. Philip applied all these lessons on a wider and more balanced scale, which were subsequently taken to a greater scope of operations by Alexander.

*It can be noted that, at Mantinea (362 B.C.), Xenophon tells us that Epaminondas' cavalry 'did not pursue and kill either horsemen or hoplites', and 'slipped back timorously, like beaten men, through the lines of the flying enemy'. It stands to reason that they could only return back through the enemy infantry if they had charged through them initially. However leery we should be when reading Xenophon's accounts of reverses he didn't like, if the Boeotion cavalry attacked the enemy hoplites in flank or rear, we would at least get a glimmer of that reflection. There's nothing to suggest they did anything like Philip's usage of both arms four years later against Bardylis, where the Illyrians drew back their flanks and depoloyed a square in the face of a simultaneous attack of cavalry (flank and rear) and infantry (their left front). That they held for some time possibly means that Philip's cavalry played a harassing role, more than a 'penetrating' one. This was indeed the advent of the great army to come.

In the preliminaries leading up to the Battle of Mantinea of 362 B.C., an Athenian cavalry force, surely the hippeus (hippeis seems a more generic term for Greek cavalry), and whom had just defeated some Corinthians, impressively bested a mounted force of Thebans and Thessalians, sent ahead of Epaminondas' main army along the road from Tegea towards Mantinea. Moreover, in the main battle, the Athenian hoplites repulsed a flanking movement upon their right side (the Athenians occupied the left side of the allied army against Epaminondas) by Epaminondas' hamippoi (again, lightly armed infantry specifically trained to fight alongside cavalry against enemy cavalry) and peltastai, once the latter's cavalry were pursuing the Spartan horsemen. Epaminondas did not attack any enemy infantry at Mantinea from flank or rear with his horse; it was an integration of horse and foot on his part which defeated the enemy cavalry. The account from Xenophon (Hellenica, Book 7.5) contains some holes, but what seemingly happened was that Epaminondas' victorious cavalry, after they had about-faced in their pursuit of the fleeing enemy horse and he had perished in battle, they were heading back and happened to 'pass through' enemy fleeing hoplites! It's possible the Boeotian horse were in this position on the field (directly behind the enemy infantry) because they had initially charged through the Spartan phalanx itself. This strange occurrence was due to opened gaps by the Spartans in their own ranks to either allow their defeated cavalry to withdraw, some of whom may became entangled directly in front of them (not unlike the opening action at Leuctra), or to let the enemy horse simply pass through (as they had done at the irregular clash near Tegyra against Pelopidas thirteen years prior). Regardless, all these clashes reveal the capacity of the three Theban generals in their imaginative generalship, as well as the tactical capabilities of the Boeotian horsemen when commandeered with superb skill. The only 'shock' action by cavalry upon infantry at the ready may be in the studious Tacitus' description of the Sarmatians in Moesia, c. 69 A.D., where the formidable kontoi (which needed its bearer's both hands while attacking while mounted to produce the desired effect, and it was a little longer and heavier than the xyston of the hetairoi) were used (The Histories, Book 1.79).

The asset of the light missile troop against holpites was efficaciously realized by Iphicrates on a greatly affecting level; concentration of force recalls Pagondas and Epaminondas (with cavalry playing more advanced roles than before, however inadvertent), and superb and impromptu cavalry leadership by Pelopidas. But the co-ordination of infantry and cavalry arms with Philip surpasses them. Macedonia was far more conducive as horse-breeding country, particularly for larger and stronger horses, if we can use Macedonian coinage compared with Attic vases and sculptures as a credible guiding point.

...I, personally, think that Phillip would have accepted the peace offerings of Darius...

Yes. Alexander was more about 'total war', if that term can apply to an ancient context; Philip preferred diplomacy and a cunning milking of peoples. Philip would have swept through Asia Minor west of the Halys River, fill his coffers, and probably accept Darius' offers. Hence, Philip would have been content with Tyre's neutrality, as well as sacrificing at the Temple of Melkart at Old Tyre on the mainland. These are, of course, very moot arguments, and the extension of power can certainly augment one's desire for more. It’s possible Alexander's grand designs with the Oecumene (the 'inhabited world') were not entertained until well after the 'liberation' of Asia Minor, perhaps not until the organized resistance of Achaemenid power was suppressed.

...First of all, Tyre was a city on an island, therefore much more difficult to besiege that either Perinthus or Byzantium...

That's too sweeping an assessment, IMHO. To Alexander's favorite seer Aristander, Tyre could only be captured through Herculean efforts; he was reacting to Alexander's proclaimed dream of Heracles' visit to him, in which the demigod’s right hand was stretched out to 'conduct Alexander to the city' (Arrian, Anabasis Alexandri, Book 2.18.1). Philip had been successful in many sieges, but had failed to take Perinthus and Byzantium. Alexander was always chasing his father's ghost, and here an opportunity to outdo Philip provided a further impetus for him.

Intrinsically, yes, as a natural barrier posed to a besieger, Tyre was more difficult a task than Perinthus or Byzantium - but only gauged on relatively equal strengths and the availed technology of the besiegers. Tyre could not have been taken by siege before the arrival of the siege-apparatus which Alexander had thanks to the school of Philip's primary siege engineer Polyidus. Moreover, in assessing this, it should be emphasized that, at the risk of downplaying the ultimately amazing feat achieved by Alexander, Tyre was an island a half-mile offshore actually connected by a sub-littoral spit (or tombolo, from the Latin tumulus, meaning 'mound'), which the likes of the brilliant Diades and Charias exploited (see this interesting link). Polyidus was the inventor of many of the machines (of course there were cruder precedents which spawned out of Syracuse and Athens, etc.) refined by those working for Alexander, and, perhaps most notably, he is responsible for the advent of the famous and aforementioned Helepolis. Alexander was stymied at first by the Tyrians, who adeptly came out to attack the head of his causeway rather than be content with remaining behind their walls: the fire-ship which they constructed and launched against Alexander's causeway resulted in a successful conflagration which compelled him to withdraw and watch his towers burn. Months of work was undone, and he even contemplated raising what was clearly going to be an impossible investment without a fleet. Only then the arrival of 'about' 224 ships (cf. Arrian, Anabasis Alexandri, Book 2.20.1-3; Quintus Curtius Rufus, however, tells us that the fleet which ultimately joined Alexander totaled 190 ships, in Book 4.3.11 of the Historiae Alexandri Magni), which opened up amphibious-siege possibilities for the pupils of Polyidus, was Alexander consequently able to assemble one of the greatest offensive arsenals in ancient siege warfare. The first task was repairing and widening the mole.

Note: if Pliny the Elder can be sustained, the advent of catapults are ascribed to the Cretans and Syrians ('…in tormentis scorpionem, Cretas catapultam, Syrophoenicas…', he writes in his Naturalis Historia, Book 7.56.201). But in the Chinese kingdoms there existed a traction catapult (link and another link with some good data on early Chinese siege warfare). The first significant appearance on record of the quadrireme and quinquereme in action was here at Tyre; Curtius mentions the quadrireme was used to create platforms for missile fire by lashing them together in a manner which the prows were locked together to enable the sterns to be separated with as much space as possible, where the decking was laid (Historiae Alexandri Magni, Book 4.3.14); Arrian mentions that Alexander used 'what quinqueremes he had' in conjunction with 'some' five triremes when he sailed round the island to counter Tyrian sallies (Anabasis Alexandri, Book 2.22.3).



Above: the opening clash of Alexander's siege of Tyre (the intense illustration is from Adam Hook; I obtained it from the book Alexander the Great at War: His Army, His Battles, His Enemies, edited by Ruth Sheppard, pg. 159) shows the head of his causeway, now with slower progress due to deeper water and a muddy bottom, about to be assaulted by the Tyrian 'fire ship' (on the left). The vessel was fitted with two masts toward the front with a double yardarm fixed on each mast. Cauldrons filled with flammable chemicals (probably pitch and sulfur) were hung along the yardarm, the ship was built up on its sides, and the hull was filled with more combustible chemicals, dry branches and wood shavings. The Tyrians also weighed down its stern to raise the bow, thus this 'sailing charge' could run aground onto Alexander's mole. The Tyrians waited for the wind to blow in their favor and launched it towards the mole; the crew of the fire ship ignited the ship and jumped off before the impact, which was now joined by a barrage of missile fire from some of their warships upon the conflagration on Alexander's causeway. The laborers and troops could do nothing, and Alexander had to retire, watching his siege towers burn. Months of work was undone. He needed a fleet more than he may have realized. Below: the Macedonians finally penetrate Tyre's outer defenses in July of 332 B.C. (illustration from Johnny Shumate).





Above: a stupendous illustration from Johnny Shumate (from his page here; his illustrations are wonderful!). See the cauldrons I was writing of? The image vividly captures the Tyrian fire ship colliding with the head of Alexander's causeway. The soldiers in the foreground are probably what the hypaspistai constituted: armed with a standard doru and larger shield than a phalangite. In essence, they were crack infantrymen who could undertake many tasks which hoplites nor phalangitae could not (at least in the function the latter two had been instituted).

...That's funny because one of the three theories in existence about hypaspists, Grote's theory to be specific, is that the hypaspistae were hoplites. But I am sure you were there and eye-witnessed their tactics and equipment...

Oh no, I wasn't there. I was born in the late 1970s A.D., and this occurred in excess of 2,300 years ago; the human life expectancy has increased, but... Oh, never mind, that's way off topic. I am almost certain that nobody alive today was actually there as an eye-witness (yes, I am attempting to be very subtle with my facetious response to the peevishness of this obnoxious poster over there). I enjoy a deep study of the histories of these events, and in primarily deducing from Arrian that Alexander used the hypaspistai to follow up cavalry, storm fortifications, execute night marches, deploy them on the decks of ships for the contingency of hand-to hand fighting (eg, Anabasis Alexandri, Book 2.4.3, 2.20.4-6, ff. 2.23.6, and ff. 3.18.8) , and other operations entailing a high degree of mobility, I feel that they were surely more lightly-armed and equipped than a conventional hoplite, yet probably wielding the same spear. Grote simply gives a wider definition to a hoplite, and doesn't differentiate a spear from a pike, both of which are moot aspects of the historical uncertainties. But we can infer the likelihoods.

George Grote, History of Greece, Vol. 12, pg. 61 (1856 edition),

"...These Hypaspists or Guards were light infantry of the line; they were hoplites, keeping regular array and intended for close combat, but more lightly armed, and more fit for diversities of circumstance and position than the phalanx. They seem to have fought with the one-handed pike and shield, like the Greeks; and not to have carried the two-handed phalangite pike or sarissa. They occupied a sort of intermediate place between the heavy infantry of the phalanx properly so called, and the peltasts and light troops generally..."

The fleets came for Alexander, and the Tyrians soon found themselves blockaded and isolated; Alexander's engineers subsequently concocted an amalgam of shipborne artillery and gangways on larger ships[sup]1[/sup]. More siege towers were brought up, rife with catapults, archers, battering rams, and drawbridges on multiple levels; from within and atop the largest siege towers ever constructed, the powerful lithoboloi fired on Tyre's walls from the edge of the repaired and widened causeway (its breadth of 200 ft. may not be too much of an exaggeration by Diodorus, if at all, as its solidity has held up against erosion for over 2,300 years; it survives today in the form of an isthmus linking the original island to the mainland of Lebanon). The fact the names of Poseidonios, Philippos, Gorgos, Crates, Aristoboulos, and Deinocrates have been preserved reflects the esteem in which they were held. Indeed, Diades became known as 'the man who took Tyre with Alexander'.

Polyidus must be the figure mentioned in a papyrus list of notable engineers (Lat.Alex., col. 8, lines 5-8; the source here is from Duncan B. Campbell, in his superb Besieged: Siege Warfare in the Ancient World, pg. 71),

"The man who built the helepolis at Byzantium and tetrakuklon at Rhodes"

However, Poseidonios is often credited with inventing the Helepolis (but this may be on a nominal basis; the siege tower at Byzantium in late 340 B.C. was the highest yet constructed). Polyidus also apparently invented a zig-zag ('saw-toothed') form of fortifications (Philo of Byzantium, Poliorcetica, Ch. 83.7-10; the source for this is The Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd Ed. Vol. 6, pg. 692 within Ch. 13, titled Warfare, by professor Yvon Garlan), which involved traces (pathways) for the besiegers and laborers to exploit more rugged terrain. The siege tower at Byzantium is an unqualified occurrence, but the mention of Rhodes in connection with Polyidus must pertain to a small event or demonstration, and not the famous siege of 305-304 B.C., which would be too late for the pioneering military engineer.

The siege of Tyre was a breathtaking event of the military history of the ancient world (amorally speaking, of course), not just for the jump in the advancement of military science exercised by Alexander and his engineers, but the stalwart defensive acts and gadgets displayed by the Tyrians (though Diodorus' descriptions of some of the apparatus may be fanciful, as we never read of them again), proving they were far more dependent than a half mile of water to protect them. However, it proved initially as a madcap venture for Alexander.

The development of an elaborate battering ram (ie, the object for ramming being slung on a wheeled support, etc.), probably in the late 6th century B.C., reputedly came from a Tyrian named Pephrasmenos, and one thereafter raised on wheels is attributed to a Carthaginian named Geras (Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Machines, Book 9.14-10.2; Pephasmenos and Cetras in Vitruvius, De Architectura, Book 10.13.1-2. Tertullian also follows the tradition of the Carthaginians as being the agents of such invention, as he tells us in his De Pallio, Book 1.3). Thus the Tyrians Alexander resolved to face certainly showed him they were going to be even tougher than he may have imagined; superfluous to state, he didn't have the benefit of hindsight as we do, but to build a causeway without naval support (in which he had a successful precedent from which to draw from in Dionysius I's siege of Motya 66 years earlier), in full view of the enemy for them to come out and attempt to destroy, betrays any balanced ingenuity on his part. Hence my personal description of the great conqueror as a 'mercurial' genius.

Note: The gastraphetes (???????????; 'belly-bow' or 'belly-shooter') was drawn by placing its end upon the ground and using the loader's body to force back the slider (the other end was shaped in a concave manner, forming a rest to fit round the user's stomach): it was a hand-held arrow-firing catapult (presaging the medieval crossbow). The katapeltikon (??????????? from Diodorus, amid his description of Dionysius I's siege of Motya in 397 B.C.) was a stand-mounted mechanical arrow-firing catapult (kata means 'downward' and peltes is the name of a small shield, hence 'shield piercer' is the technical definition of a catapult). These two early catapults were Dionysius I's primary weapons used in his famous siege, of which the latter, maybe both, were a novelty to the surprised Carthaginians. The invention of the mechanical weapon is credited to engineers of Dionysius I, but we are told that it was inspired by the hand-held version, which was probably invented by one Zopyrus of Tarentum within the last quarter of the 5th century B.C.; for this we are apprised amid some of the engineering works of Ctesibius of Alexandria, Philo of Byzantium (both of the 3rd century B.C.), Biton (fl. 2nd century B.C.), and Heron of Alexandria (1st century A.D.); see again Duncan B. Campbell, this time in his other gem of a book, Greek and Roman Artillery, 399 BC-363 AD, pg. 3).



Above: two gastraphetai (the smaller weapon resembling a large medieval crossbow) and two katapeltikai. Both were in use by the dawn of the 4th century B.C. In this fine depiction, however, we see the mechanical catapults being winched with flexion power (the image is from the illustrator Brian Delf, which I procured from Alexander the Great at War: His Army, His Battles, His Enemies, Edited by Ruth Sheppard, pg. 156).

I feel Robin Lane Fox summarizes the episode quite well, overall, in his Alexander the Great, pgs. 183-184 (echoed by Paul Cartledge in his biography of the same title, pgs. 174-178),

"…But without exceptional leadership no number of new machines would bring Tyre down. Men as well as mules would have to heave these gigantic towers into position, and encouragement rested with Alexander, cut off by half a mile of water from the point at which conventional siege-craft could begin. 'Genius', Napoleon once remarked 'is the inexplicable measure of a great commander'. Before Tyre, Alexander's generalship had been good rather than great; with a characteristic leap forward to meet a challenge, he was now to show for the first time that genius which singles him out in military history…"

Note: I agree that Tyre was a leap forward, and that meeting and overcoming a daunting challenge was characteristic of Alexander; but his heretofore generalship was better than 'good', IMHO, illustrated in his first campaign in the Balkans.

But Alexander had an unprecedented amalgam of siege-apparatus, and newly arrived Phoenician engineers to compliment his corps of Greek ones (this school began with Polyidus, the Thessalian engineer who began with Philip II) more advanced and thorough than Philip was availed eight years prior. Moreover, Tyre was isolated in facing him, unlike Perinthus and Byzantium against Philip, of which both strongholds (Selymbria, situated between them, was seemingly already in Philip's hands) were open to the sea when help came from major powers. Furthermore, Alexander was completely stymied by the first Tyrian counter-attacks, when his causeway reached the point of attack range from both sides. He needed a fleet, and this was not guaranteed when he began construction on the causeway. He was also caught unawares when the Tyrians launched a bold sortie on his Cypriot ships off the north harbor. But in the final analysis, Alexander overcame a daunting task, in which he displayed a measure of patience to add to his flexible military thinking.



Above: the torsion-powered lithobolos (or palintonon, the same as ballista to the Romans), which hurled huge stones. The cutaway (2) shows the 'springs' under the slide posts (I scanned this from Peter Connolly's Greece and Rome at War, pg. 282).

Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 17.40.2-5,

"...[Alexander] marched on towards Egypt, and as he came into Phoenicia, received the submission of all the other cities, for their inhabitants accepted him willingly.

At Tyre, however, when the king wished to sacrifice to the Tyrian Heracles, the people overhastily barred him from entering the city; Alexander became angry and threatened to resort to force, but the Tyrians cheerfully faced the prospect of a siege. They wanted to gratify Darius and keep unimpaired their loyalty to him, and thought also that they would receive great gifts from the king in return for such a favor. They would draw Alexander into a protracted and difficult siege and give Darius time for his military preparations, and at the same time they had confidence in the strength of their island and the military forces in it. They also hoped for help from their colonists, the Carthaginians.

The king saw that the city could hardly be taken by sea because of the engines mounted along its walls and the fleet that it possessed, while from the land it was almost unassailable because it lay four furlongs away from the coast. Nevertheless he determined to run every risk and make every effort to save the Macedonian army from being held in contempt by a single undistinguished city. Immediately he demolished what was called Old Tyre and set many tens of thousands of men to work carrying stones to construct a mole two plethra [200 ft.] in width. He drafted into service the entire population of the neighboring cities and the project advanced rapidly because the workers were numerous..."

Despite Diodorus' account, Tyre was probably pretty much fully independent from Achaemenid rule by this time (other than some tribute, surely), and due to its location off the coast, it may not have fit into a defense strategy against Alexander by Darius, following the painful lesson incurred at the Battle of Issus (as well as its strategic ramifications). It's possible Darius knew Egypt would probably be lost, and he needed all the time possible to organize and train a new army with new weaponry more conducive to facing the Macedonians. Judging by the logistic needs of the huge enterprise, we can believe Josephus when he tells us that Alexander received some 7,000 men and provisions from Sanballat (grudgingly at first), the High Priest of Jerusalem (Antiquities of the Jews, Book 11.8.3-4).

The Tyrians were justified by the results that they could indeed draw Alexander into a long siege. But neither Darius nor Carthage ever arrived. This was fortunate for Alexander, as was the death of Memnon of Rhodes the year prior.

...Secondly, they weren't assisted by anyone because Alexander's srategy hadn't left them anyone to appeal to. He had already subjugated all the Cypriot and Phoenician rulers and made their potentially enemy fleet his own…

I believe you meant to write 'their potentially allied fleet his own', no? Alexander was banking on the fleets joining him once the north-central Levantine coast was his. It was a tenable hunch, no doubt, but the Phoenician (non-Tyrian) and Cypriot crews were still under the command of Pharnabazus, thus many Cypriots (almost certainly none of the Phoenicians, with their home cities submitting to Alexander, would not submit to him) could have joined King Azemilcus when he headed back to Tyre. Moreover, the Persians could have seized many of these crews for their fidelity. But of most significance, Carthage certainly stiffened Tyre's resolve and confidence to defend herself because she promised assistance to her Mother City if Alexander attacked her (Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 17.40, stating merely that Tyre was hoping for Carthage's assistance; Curtius, Historiae Alexandri Magni, Book 4.2.11). Carthage's maritime help, with her powerful capacity in this field, would have been instrumental. But the Carthaginians later reneged after realizing at a point into the siege that the prospects of Tyre's survival were gloomy (cf. Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C., pg. 259); through their envoys in Tyre they told their kinsmen that they couldn’t risk leaving their vulnerable Sicilian theater against Syracuse, although with a prevarication, as we are told this by part of the Alexander Vulgate:

Quintus Curtius Rufus, Historiae Alexandri Magni, Book 4.3.19-20,

"...the Carthaginians, they announced to the Tyrians, were handicapped by a war at home and were fighting not for power but for survival. The Syracusans were even then putting the torch to the crops of Africa, and had made camp not far from the walls of Carthage..."

The last sentence is not true, whether an error in the reportage of Curtius or a prevarication on the part of the Carthaginian ambassadors; IMHO it is more likely the latter, as the overall judicious Curtius knew through Diodorus and Gnaeus Pompeius Trogus (both writing a century earlier, the latter whose works we’ve sadly lost) that Africa was not herself struck until 310 B.C., by the tyrant Agathocles (Historica Bibliotheca, Book 20.3). If war clouds at home seemed too precarious for Carthage to help Tyre[sup]1[/sup], why promise them aid just a few months earlier? Perhaps it hit them that the Macedonian conqueror was not worth incurring the wrath of, should he take Tyre, hence subdue Egypt, and eye them. Regrettably, they had to stay away from the action in the Near East.

Note: Thucydides, in reporting a rallying speech by a Syracusan general to gain Carthage's and others' alliance, one Hermocrates (touching on Carthage's prosperity), in the wake of the Athenian expedition of 415 B.C., tells us of Carthaginian apprehension to Athenian attack (History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 6.34), thus, however hyperbolic this may have been, we can imagine that, more than eight decades later in the face of real threats from the Sicilian Greeks, their concern was justified. Peace was concluded with Syracuse in 373 B.C., but by 338 B.C. Carthaginian influence in Sicily had been seriously reduced to the western portion of the island, mainly due to the great victory won by Timoleon in 341 B.C., on the River Crimmissus.



Above: a reconstruction of the military harbor of Carthage, reflecting the great city-state's naval capacity (from the drawings of Dr. Henry Hurst and Sheila Gibson, again coming from Connolly's great book, pg. 269).

As well as Evagoras' capture of Tyre (probably in the late 380s B.C. by storm), there also existed another precedent for Alexander; the aforementioned siege of Motya by Dionysius I, occurring over sixty years earlier, involved the building of a longer mole than Alexander's to reach an island-fortress, and the Syracusan tyrant had to face Carthaginian naval interference (Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 14.47-53). On the flip side, the water was shallower off western Sicily, and the resistance not as tough.

To reiterate, the stone-throwing catapult, primarily developed for punctuating city walls, was not extant with Philip in 340 B.C., and Perinthus was situated on a peninsula linked by an isthmus (Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.76), and once the walls were breached, the layout of the city's buildings precluded Philip from taking the city as easily as Alexander did Tyre, once their troops penetrated the respective city's walls. My argument in favor of Philip on this point was specific; his two-pronged assault on Perinthus and Byzantium, lasting some two months shorter than Alexander's sie...

[Phalanx300]

Wow some very nice information.

I'm wondering about the Phalangites, if their spears were carried in halves then would it be possible to use the front half as an hoplite spear?