The 300 again (but this time armour etc.)

[Phalanx300]

Regarding Kleombrotos and Leuktra, Paul Cartledge summises/suggests that the 300 Hippeis were indeed present and fell to a man around their King. Their number was usually considered outside the usual Morai structure/organisation and therefore makes analysing the figures difficult. Did the 400 Spartiates (of 700 present) killed at Leuktra include all the 300 (assuming they were present)?

If they were present they would certainly fight to the death for their king, after the king fell the Spartans even pushed the Theban line back just to retrieve the kings body.

It would seem to me that it would be an even bigger disgrace for a Hippeis then a ordinary citizen to run and abandon your king. (Thermopylae?)

[Paralus]

I think there was an obvious change in Spartan policy following the Peloponnesian War. Sparta suddenly had an empire and commitments abroad whether she liked it or not.

Certainly Lysander and his fellow travellers thought so: what was Athens is now ours and to be secured by tight oligarchies. The “commitments abroad” are a slightly different matter.

Sparta had, over a period of a year or more, negotiated an alliance with the Great King which bore fruit in the last decade of the fifth century. In return for Persian ships and money – the engine and oil of victory – the Greeks of Asia Minor would be quietly returned to their status of 480. This was to become the irreducible cornerstone of any offer of Persian largesse for some fifty years.

How to reconcile that with the propaganda of “liberator of the Hellenes”? Fraught with difficulty as Sparta would find to its cost. A series of limp “aggressions” in the early 390s culminated with Agesilaos, thirty Spartiates, 2,000 neodamodeis and allies spending a couple of years ravaging one satrap’s province or another depending upon which “treaty” was in effect with whom. A great panhellenic invasion it was not. A continuing and growing annoyance it was – particularly as one side seemed to have reneged on the alliance.

The Great King’s reaction was direct and pointed: he gifted Conon a fleet and money. Cnidus was the result and the Spartans suffered a rude wake up call. It wasn’t until Athens, emboldened by this turn of events, began supporting anti-Persian causes and deporting itself in the manner of the previous century that the King accepted Antalcidas’ entreaties and switched sides. Short of money, and with a new Spartan fleet in the Hellespont, Athens came to the King’s negotiating table and accepted the King’s terms and his appointed interpreter of the peace – Sparta. The price, as with Sparta’s initial alliance, did not vary (Xen. Hell. 5.1.34):

“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands…”

There would be no more Spartan panhellenic flag waving in the eastern Aegean or Asia. The Great King had restated his terms baldly and they were immutable. As Athens would find out during the dark years of the Social War, he would not resile from enforcing this non-negotiable claim.

Traditionally, they did not like venturing very far from their southern Greek peninsula, and taking full-scale Lakedaimonian armies into Asia Minor would have been resisted. The resulting strategy seemed to revolve around confederate armies of adventurers, mercenaries and some state troops - led by a Spartan king or general (and staff).

Aside from the perfunctory forays of Dercylidas and Thibron, the only “major” Spartan army was that of Agesilaos (above). This was hardly “Spartan”. The thirty Spartiates or “advisors” totalled the Spartan contingent. This was a Spartan flag-waving exercise: her troops were needed closer to where it mattered, sweet home Peloponnesus.

I'm guessing now, but because Agesilaos's armies tended towards these amalgamous forces, the usual call-up routines (age-groups etc.) were long since dispensed with and actual Spartan troops (be they any variant of Spartiate citizen) would be limited with liberated troops instead wherever possible.

That particular army of Agesilaos was such: it included Xenophon’s mercenaries (as Coronea shows) and it was, in no way, a “home army” of Sparta or the Peloponnesian League. The call up of age classes was still practised as the prelude and aftermath of Leuktra shows.

The Peloponnesian League had, by this time, been thoroughly re-organised due to the discontent of the allies. The alliance was divided – like a sort of federation – into ten parts. There was now an entire reckoning system for the levying of troops and equating light armed/hoplites/cavalry. This now saw Sparta fielding armies of 18,000 or so (Diod. 15.31.1-2 – alliance; 32.1 & 34.1 numbers).

Regarding Kleombrotos and Leuktra, Paul Cartledge summises/suggests that the 300 Hippeis were indeed present and fell to a man around their King. Their number was usually considered outside the usual Morai structure/organisation and therefore makes analysing the figures difficult. Did the 400 Spartiates (of 700 present) killed at Leuktra include all the 300 (assuming they were present)?

Cartledge (Sparta and Laconia p 251) indeed supposes that the 300 hippies were there. He then points out that this means in the four morai only 400 homoioi were present. The corollary to this is that the others are periocoi or neodamodeis (or similar). The mirage Spartiate might well see many a perioicic hoplite and “freed” helot: it was strong even at this stage. Even if the hippies are not 300 strong at this battle the numbers say much about Spartan oliganthropy.

In Asia he also had several thousand Peloponnesian League troops as he anticipated Philip and Alexander's desire for the great Greek aim of a war or revenge on Persia.

It remains open just what Agesilaos might have thought he was "anticipating". Certainly it was not ever any "great Greek aim" and just as certainly Philip II - and more so his son - did not set about a Persian invasion because he wished to avenge the Greeks. If there ever was such a thing as a "great GReek aim" it was belting the blokes next door and winning the greatest atheletic competition of all time: war and hegemony. The Greeks were far more interested in what, increasingly, became petty beligerence against other Greeks than they ever were in any supposed "retribution" or "revenge" against Persia. After the death of the great panhellenist - Cimon - Athens, under the pragmatic Pericles, reached the detente known as the "Peace of Callias". Revenge, as Athens found, was a dish best served when someone else was paying. Worse, erstwhile fellow diners - scraping olive oil from their hands with a xyele, might stick you with their xiphos whilst you tucked in...

[Ghostmojo]

I suppose you have to accept that Agesilaos was a bit of an adventurer and unusually for a Spartan had a high degree of charisma. He also placed much emphasis on distributing favours. Whilst his wanderings in Asia Minor lacked the grand vision later associated with Philip and Alexander - and he was of course prone to recall from Sparta - I suspect he had a hankering after the great adventure that would have been reducing the Great King's empire. He did after all question many Anatolian leaders as to why they called the Persian emperor 'great' in the first place...

[PMBardunias]

It remains open just what Agesilaos might have thought he was "anticipating".

Surely he was simply raising money by plundering and extorting Asia minor. A second hope would be to extend the hegemony to Persian territory. But taking over the Persian empire would have been obviously beyond the limited Spartiate manpower to control- the need for harmosts alone would probably depopulate Sparta! Even the Macedonians could not hold what they conquored.

scraping olive oil from their hands with a xyele, might stick you with their xiphos whilst you tucked in...

Please tell me you don't buy the line that the Xyele was a strigil.

[Paralus]

scraping olive oil from their hands with a xyele, might stick you with their xiphos whilst you tucked in...

Please tell me you don't buy the line that the Xyele was a strigil.

Pardon for the tardy reply: been in Melbourne (windy, cold bleak city in winter/spring).

No, not really. What I don't buy is the notion that it was a homoioi weapon - that was the xiphos. It appears an "implement" (trying to find a way of describing it other than a weapon) used by the boys undergoing the agoge. The notion of it being a Spartan curved sword rises out of a couple of mentions in Xenophon's Anabasis if I recall (can't remember the passages). One was about boys who'd fought and the one died of a xyele wound and the other an aside about a people who killed using a sickle-shaped weapon (some type of scimitar) which was similar to the xyele. One might have to scan the book methinks.

Either way, it was not designed to primarily be a weapon, that was the hoplite's xiphos. The mention was to highlight the "nationality" of Athens' "turncoat" erswhile partner.

Surely he was simply raising money by plundering and extorting Asia minor. A second hope would be to extend the hegemony to Persian territory. But taking over the Persian Empire would have been obviously beyond the limited Spartiate manpower to control- the need for harmosts alone would probably depopulate Sparta! Even the Macedonians could not hold what they conquored.

Oh yes indeed: plunder and extortion aplenty. There can never have been any real plan to march "up country" and topple the Great King thus assuming control of his empire. As Athens in the previous century had learned, the Greeks were absolutely uninterested once the “Persian threat” had been quarantined. Panhellenic dreamers aside, the Greek poleis were not even lukewarm on any great Greek adventure in the east. Sparta was not capable – militarily and, more so, politically – of mounting such an invasion and, as you point out, was in no position to manage such an empire. In fact, it was severely stretched in holding that which fell to it after Athens’ defeat without Persian intervention as the history of the early fourth century shows.

That did not stop Agesilaos trying to look the part. Nor did it stop his relentless pursuit of Spartan hegemony via support of “pro-Spartan” factions within the Greek poleis and a policy of isolating and defeating opposing blocks – especially Thebes. Spartan ineptitude on the field at Leuktra – as much as Theban innovation – cost him his final gamble as well as costing his city dearly. Thebes was thoroughly isolated as Athens watched and the Beoeotian poleis watched even closer. Defeat here will have been Thebes’ end and Agesilaos’ crowning achievement. It did not, of course, work out that way.

[PMBardunias]

One was about boys who'd fought and the one died of a xyele wound and the other an aside about a people who killed using a sickle-shaped weapon (some type of scimitar) which was similar to the xyele.

There are a couple of such references, but yes, the Xyele was not the short sword as some would have it. It was a spoke-shaver- probably tied in the past to making spears and javelins. The name implies wood-working. The perfect emblem for a strapping young Spartan. It could be lethal, as, I think it was Clearchus or one of the Spartans associated with the 10,000, learned when he killed a fellow agogite.

Sparta was not capable – militarily and, more so, politically – of mounting such an invasion and, as you point out, was in no position to manage such an empire. In fact, it was severely stretched in holding that which fell to it after Athens’ defeat without Persian intervention as the history of the early fourth century shows.

Its all Athens fault! :lol: Sparta was more than happy being first among the greeks and riding herd on the helots, then Athens had to go and start Empire building which in turn caused Sparta to react or lose face. She was doomed from the start. As was Athens, who never really had a chance at running a large empire for any length of time with her out of control demos- she was always only as good as her demagoges.

Spartan ineptitude on the field at Leuktra – as much as Theban innovation – cost him his final gamble as well as costing his city dearly.

I don't agree it was Spartan ineptitude at Leuktra. They were probably going to do what they had done at Nemea. The problem was that, like Napoleon, Agiselaos had taught all of his adversaries how to fight by constantly making war on them in direct contradiction to Lycurgus' teachings. There is that Spartan saying where a Spartiate tells Agiselaos after a hard battle that he had been paid well for his teachings, so even the ancients realized this.

If it is true, and I think a case can be made for this, that the Spartans taught the rest of Greece much about warfare, then the question arises of how Greek and in fact western history might have been different but for that teaching? But then again this is true of many things- don't get me started on how Plato ripped off the Pythagoreans who in turn ripped off the Spartans :roll:

yea, I'm just poking Paralus with a stick.

Thebes was thoroughly isolated as Athens watched and the Beoeotian poleis watched even closer. Defeat here will have been Thebes’ end and Agesilaos’ crowning achievement. It did not, of course, work out that way.

It might have if he had been there instead of the wine-swilling boeotiophile Cleombrotus :wink: It would have if he had the army he had at Coronea, ah that cavalry, no matter what Epameinondas planned. Clearly Mantinea was the biggest draw in history. Then again maybe not, since he ran head-long into the Thebans at the end of Coronea when they were probably 25 deep and he had the knowledge of Leuktra prior to Mantinea.

[Paralus]

yea, I'm just poking Paralus with a stick.

Poked and prodded (he, he):

Its all Athens fault! :lol: Sparta was more than happy being first among the greeks and riding herd on the helots, then Athens had to go and start Empire building which in turn caused Sparta to react or lose face. She was doomed from the start. As was Athens, who never really had a chance at running a large empire for any length of time with her out of control demos- she was always only as good as her demagoges …

In fact, as far as the first decade (or a little over) of war was concerned, it was all Sparta’s fault. At least it was in the eyes of he that mattered: the Great King.

Spartan flag waving and plundering of the “provinces on the sea” in Asia Minor started out as a minor annoyance and grew to a serious repudiation of the Great King’s terms. He decided to act and act decisively. Conon was provided with the means (fleet and money) to bring that element of Sparta with Alzheimer’s to heel. Cnidus achieved that perfectly. Persian Darics rebuilt Athens’ walls and helped bankroll the disaffected and disillusioned amongst Sparta’s allies.

The result was Athens, in the thrall of Thrasybulus and his fellow travellers, entertaining visions of the 440s. The Athenian general’s aims and thinking, laid out rather plainly by his actions from 391 down to his death in 388/7, set the Great King to wondering what he might have set in train. Sparta, alarmed at how easily her naval crutch had been kicked, sent Antalcidas Sardis bound with offers of rapprochement and loyalty. In 388 the Spartans appeared in the Hellespont with a splendid fleet fuelled by Darics and set herself astride Athens’ lifeline. The only way forward was the negotiation table that resulted in the accurately named King’s Peace.

The price, as always, was the Greeks of Asia minor and a few eastern Aegean islands. Henceforth the Great King would play arbiter and select his policeman in Greece (the prostatai of the peace). It was not something Xenophon was disposed to record until, that is, Thebes won that position.

The Persians well knew their Greeks. More importantly, they knew their Spartans. Having agreed (for the second time) to forgo any action on behalf of the Asian Greeks and the eastern Aegean, Sparta would present no problem for the Persian King in his sphere of influence. Athens, a city with a demonstrable tradition of maritime power and aggression, was an entirely different amphora of ostraka. The King would diligently watch her moves and support her policeman as and when necessary – even unto instructing Athens to “haul up her ships”.

Artaxerxes' bald demand – in 355 – that Athens recall Chares after his “sister to Marathon” victory during the disastrous Social War was the ultimate example of the whip the Great King held. Athens complied and Chares sailed home with his diekplous between his legs.

It might have if he had been there instead of the wine-swilling boeotiophile Cleombrotus :wink: It would have if he had the army he had at Coronea, ah that cavalry, no matter what Epameinondas planned.

The Spartan tactics at Leuktra might be debated. The problem is that they seem not to have evolved in any fashion. The lessons of the Corinthian war semm ignored and, as you rightly point out, the Theban proclivity for depth was no secret. The Spartans seemed to think that the tried and never changed (as opposed to trusted) would always serve them.

Xenophn’s description of the battle is an exercise in exculpation and excuse making; Ephorus' one of lauding of the Thebans. In between the extant source material reveals, among other things, that Epaminondas’ use of cavalry at this time was innovative. Attention is drawn to the hamippoi he has work with his cavalry. It is just one other differentiation of the Theban from the “staid” Spartans.

There is no arguing the “practice” that Agesilaos gifted the Thebans though.