Alternate Caesar History

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

While I can't dispute your assessment of their perception of the physical sizes of the world, i would imagine that Caesar was possibly the only Roman who would have succeeded against the Parthians.
I doubt he was uninformed of their abilities, as he would have information from the survivors, and also there would be spies and information available to him from his local friends from the east.
He was not without resources and contacts. He was also not as easily distracted as Anthony, and also would have had him with him I imagine, as well as a good cadre of loyal officers and men.

It is a mistake to compare him to the others, because he simply was a cut above the rest, however much a person may find him disagreeable. As we all know, a flock of crows can down an eagle, but the eagle is not diminished because of this...

As to the Dacians, were they as organized in Caesars time as they were in the later period of Trajan, when the world was more aware of the dangers of the Roman military machine, and was adapting to counter it..

[Jona Lendering]

I also wonder if Caesar could have won a victory against the Parthians.

What would a victory have looked like?

Occupation of some land would have been the minimum to come home with. That might have been achieved through a victory and a march on Ctesiphon, as all later Roman campaigns show. After that Caesar would have placed another king on the Parthian throne, who could legitimately conclude a peace treaty. Caesar, who had to keep an eye on Rome, may have liked to proceed to the Persian Gulf, but I think that his Roman interests remained his top priority.

The real point is: what country was ready for annexation. To go east of Syria, across the Euphrates, made little sense. It merely put Rome's eastern flank to danger. However, a second reorganization of the east, similar to Pompey's enterprise, seems a reasonable idea. Galatia and a part of Cappadocia might have converted into provinces, and king Ariobarzanes III Eusebes might have been compensated with Armenia and some part of Cappadocia - say Commagene. Deiotarus of Galatia, an usurper anyhow, might have been made king of Osrhoene and Adiabene or something like that. A reshuffle like that might be a result to come home with and had the additional advantage of being presentable as surpassing Pompey.

All this, of course, under the assumption that Caesar would actually win all his battles and sieges.

[Theodosius the Great]

As to the Dacians, were they as organized in Caesars time as they were in the later period of Trajan, when the world was more aware of the dangers of the Roman military machine, and was adapting to counter it..

I was going to mention this point too. The Dacians, IMO, were probably not as strong at the time of Caesar. And, conversely, the Romans were much stronger than they were in Trajan's time (i.e. Caesar's legions were experienced). So, I DO think Dacia would have been a pushover by the time he was Dictator. BTW, I agree with the rest of Gregg's points.

~Theo

[M. Demetrius]

The Dacians and other peoples of the East hadn't been a pushover earlier in time, iirc, but it wasn't because they were so good, it was because of poor military strategy on the part of the Roman generals.

[Robert Vermaat]

Those who see the Dacians as the next target forget that the Alps had not been brought under Roman control - if not Parthia, the next logical step for Caesar would have been the Danube.

[Jona Lendering]

Those who see the Dacians as the next target forget that the Alps had not been brought under Roman control - if not Parthia, the next logical step for Caesar would have been the Danube.

And yet, an attack on Dacia was Caesar's initial plan, until the Helvetians decided to move, and gave Caesar an excuse to do something else. Note the location of his legions in the Spring of 58: in the east of his province, ready to move along the Drava, cross the Danube somewhere near Mursa (Osijek), and attack Dacia from the west.

[Robert Vermaat]

And yet, an attack on Dacia was Caesar's initial plan, until the Helvetians decided to move, and gave Caesar an excuse to do something else. Note the location of his legions in the Spring of 58: in the east of his province, ready to move along the Drava, cross the Danube somewhere near Mursa (Osijek), and attack Dacia from the west.

True. But that was 58. After the conquest of Gaul, Caesar's focus had swept west, and securing the Upper Danube by conquering the Alps (as we see was the logical next step for Augustus) meant securing the flank of Gaul. Just a guesss, of course.

[Jona Lendering]

True. But that was 58. After the conquest of Gaul, Caesar's focus had swept west, and securing the Upper Danube by conquering the Alps (as we see was the logical next step for Augustus) meant securing the flank of Gaul. Just a guesss, of course.

I see what you mean; yes, you are right. Once the Romans had reached the Rhine, Raetia and Vindelicia were doomed.

[Theodosius the Great]

the next logical step for Caesar would have been the Danube.

Next logical step ? Between the second Punic War and the time of Augustus the Romans don't seem to have followed a logical plan of expansionism. Like the city of Rome itself the Empire seems to have grown organically without much careful planning. Out of necessity they conquered much of the Iberian peninsula and Macedonia within the space of a few years but didn't bother to establish secure land routes to their new provinces. If they wanted to pursue a logical plan to expand I would have thought Gaul was the obvious choice rather than Dacia (in 58) or Syria. But Gaul wasn't even on the agenda until the Helvetii caught Caesar's attention.

Caesar's thinking seems to revolve around what action would gain him the most glory - an opportunist's mentality. Conquering the upper Danube area isn't exactly the best prospect with this aim in mind since it was impoverised and wild. A thankless task at best, IMO. Dacia had vast gold reserves, OTOH.

Augustus, IMO, was thinking more like the responsible monarch that he was, being concerned with holding and securing a stable empire to leave to his inheritors. Completing the conquest and subjugation of Spain and Gaul was the most logical next step before thinking about further large conquests.

I do think it very likely that once Caesar was beyond the Euphrates his enemies in Rome would have seized power and Caesar would have been forced to fight yet another civil war.

Indeed, Sextus Pompeius was still on the loose in Sicily with his forces. He was a rallying point for opposition - it would have been dangerous to leave him behind while campaigning in Parthia. The western Meditarranean Sea was basically under his control.

Moderns tend to forget how much opposition to Ceasar AND Rome remained after Pompey was killed in Egypt. They only remember the disgruntled assassins of Caesar who held no real power.

~Theo

[Gregg]

I wouldn’t count the Dacians out. Arguably the Dacians tended to be strongest and most dangerous when unified under the authority of a powerful king, as they were with Decebalus during Trajan’s time. In fact the Dacians on the eve of Caesar’s invasion were at the peak of their strength, under the rule of arguably their greatest king, Burebista. The Dacian kingdom had reached its largest extent, incorporating much of the Pannonian plain as well as many of the strongest and wealthiest Greek cities of the Western coast of the Black Sea, and Strabo claimed that at this time the Dacians could field an army of 200,000 men. According to Suetonius, Caesar’s reason for attacking them in the first place was because they had recently invaded Pontus and Thrace. In fact the Dacians had also sided against Rome during the Mithridatic war and had defeated a Roman army under Gaius Antonius Hybrida. They had also apparently sided with Pompey against Caesar during the civil war. Clearly the Dacians were powerful, aggressive, and had no fear of Rome.

I should note that Burebista died in 44 BC, after Caesar’s assasination, though it’s not clear if he died of natural causes or was assassinated in some kind of court intrigue. If the latter is the case, we might speculate that an invasion by the Romans would have been sufficient to cement the loyalty of his court and the Dacian nation would have been unified under his rule when Caesar arrived. But such speculation clearly points out just how tangled this kind of historical speculation can get.

As for Caesar’s motivations, he may have seen the Dacians and Parthians as ideal targets. According to Roman political motivation, both had defeated Roman armies and therefore both deserved revenge. He also probably had at least a basic understanding of how powerful these enemies were, and that the over-all campaign would likely take many years. I’ve always leaned toward the opinion that Caesar had many reasons to leave on a distant and long-term military operation, recognizing that the poisonous atmosphere in Rome was having a deleterious effecting his health and longing for life on campaign, where in the past he seemed to thrive. He may also have seen his leaving Rome for a protracted war as having much the same effect on Republican politics as Sulla’s retirement. His presence in Rome was obviously a focus of growing resentment and discontent, and he may have believed that once he was gone, the Republic would return to politics as usual. Appian lends some credence to at least part of this view.

Gregg

[Narukami]

He may also have seen his leaving Rome for a protracted war as having much the same effect on Republican politics as Sulla’s retirement. His presence in Rome was obviously a focus of growing resentment and discontent, and he may have believed that once he was gone, the Republic would return to politics as usual. Appian lends some credence to at least part of this view.

Gregg

That is an interesting bit of speculation.

We know that Caesar could be a subtle player but of course there is no way to know for certain just what he had in mind.

Then too, if this was his ultimate plan, and the Republic did "right" itself and sailed on would it have welcomed him home? Could he trust that to be the case or would the Traditionalists, as personified by Cato, have once again stirred up talk of trials for war crimes and other misdeeds?

Even so, an interesting idea...

:wink:

Narukami

[Epictetus]

Indeed. But I wonder what exactly Caesar would have put in place in Rome? Would he allow free elections, name a legate, or something in between? I think the atmosphere in Rome could depend very much upon what the political situation was after Caesar departed for the east.

[M. Demetrius]

As Dictator-for-life, would he have been required to allow free elections?

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

I imagine he would have appointed 2 acting consuls, to manage things while he was gone.
Ones who he could trust implicitly, even if they were not poular with opposition in Rome.

[Theodosius the Great]

I have often wondered what Caesar might have accomplished- conquest wise- had he not been assassinated. Anyone have any theories? Does anyone believe he would have eclipsed Alexander's achievements in the ancient world.

JFC Fuller, in "Julius Caesar : Man, Soldier, and Tyrant" addresses this very question on page 88 :

"...it took Caesar eight years to subdue Gaul, in extent but a fraction of the Persian empire, which under the Macedonian system was subdued by Alexander in nine. Although the conditions in which these two great conquests were made differed widely, the question remains, could Caesar, or any other general who adhered to the Roman system, have emulated Alexander ? The spade will answer this : a soldier cannot simultaneously dig and march, and should he spend between three and four hours out of every twenty-four in digging, to an enemy who understands the tactical value of time he will make a gratuitous gift of one day out of every seven."

The Romans compensated for their underdeveloped cavalry arm by becoming expert entrenchers, digging fortifications every night and sometimes on the battlefield (e.g. Sulla in the Mithadatic War). In addition, Roman armies tended to live off the land. All this rendered them relatively immobile vis-a-vis the Hellenistic armies of Antiochus. The latter was able to march an army of 50,000 men on an average of 41 miles per day for seven days. (!) (see page 87)

~Theo