07-30-2009, 06:40 AM
Steven/Antiochus wrote:
...indeed he expressed similar views, ("Maharbal was right when he told Hannibal after Cannae that he did not know how to use a victory" ( A History of Warfare; London 1968) and in addition to those you mention, countless others have blindly followed this view, while the real facts have been there for all to see...
...were anyone in any doubt as to Hannibal's siege skills, they have but to consider the siege of Saguntum which was the proximate cause of the War. Anyone who has visited the acropolis of Saguntum will know that it is a vast place, almost as large as the city itself, perched on a huge plateau with cliffs for sides, large enough to pasture animals and with plenty of water - an impregnable place in fact. Much to the astonishment of the Saguntines, and of Rome, Hannibal captured the place in eight months, after a regular siege. Indeed Roman confidence in its impregnability was such that it was in no hurry to send aid, ( justifiably so, contrary to those ill-informed critics who criticise Rome for so-doing) and the Saguntines seem to have been equally confident in defying Hannibal.
Most of these assumptions that Hannibal was no good at sieges, or had no siege train ( he could easily build one on the spot any time and often did so - see above ) stem from the rhetorical flourish put into Maharbal's mouth ( the Carthaginian cavalry commander ) by Livy referred to above. None of them seems to have thought that Hannibal, arguably quite possibly the Greatest Military Commander in History, knew his business well.
Consider the following facts:
Carthage 149-146 BC: population probably 200-250,000 ; took 80,000 Roman troops 3 years to capture despite the city having first surrendered all its weapons. Surrounding country supportive of Rome and able to provide food and supplies.
Syracuse 213-212 BC: population probably 250-300,000; took 50,000 or more Roman troops 1 year to capture, by an unexpected lucky ploy on a Syracusan Feast day after all attempts to take the city by assault had failed, and the Romans resigned themselves to starving the city out over years....surrounding country able to supply food and supplies.
Rome 216 BC: population probably 300-500,000 ( i.e. nearly twice the size ) garrisoned by two legions totalling 8,000 troops plus 1500 troops at Ostia, plus a Legion of marines, and another consular army in Cisalpine gaul (c.20,000) which could have reached Rome before Hannibal had settled into a siege......not to mention Rome's Italian allies and their manpower, or Rome's ability to arm its citizens ( consider the 8,000 Volones) !!..... Surrounding countryside hostile, unable to provide food and supplies with Roman armies and their Allies loose.... Hannibal's army, mauled by 8,000 casualties at Cannae probably numbered no more than 32,000 Infantry and perhaps 8,000 or so cavalry effectives. Hannibal would have been outnumbered and trapped between Rome and it's armies.
Readers here need not be a Hannibal to work out that an attack and siege of Rome would be futile, and meanwhile the fruits of the Cannae victory would be thrown away as the Army wintered outside Rome's walls, hungry and cold ( instead of in Italy's second city, Capua), awaiting the arrival of more Legions from Spain, Sardinia and Sicily in the Spring.......
Nor was the Senate frightened that a siege by Hannibal could succeed. In 211 BC Hannibal actually DID march on the city, though it was a desperate feint, to try to draw Roman armies away from the siege of Capua. According to Polybius (IX.6-7) not only did the three armies surrounding Capua stay put, but the Consuls boldly led the troops in the city out to confront him. His bluff had been called, and he withdrew, harried by the Romans.....
Obvious really, isn't it ? And all this information was readily available to all those 'Historians' who blindly followed one another without considering the original sources and their information, as Steven/Antiochus has pointed out......
Quote:If memory serves me correct, I think Montgomery of El Alamien also makes this claim in his book on warfare.
...indeed he expressed similar views, ("Maharbal was right when he told Hannibal after Cannae that he did not know how to use a victory" ( A History of Warfare; London 1968) and in addition to those you mention, countless others have blindly followed this view, while the real facts have been there for all to see...
Quote:Now the fact remains no ancient author states Hannibal did not have a siege train, and a careful reading of the primary sources gives a different picture. Appian (Hann. 5.29) reports the use of siege engines in Hannibal’s attack on the town of Petilia shortly after the battle of Cannae. Livy (23. 16.11-12) mentions siege weapons used by Hannibal during one of his attempts at capturing Nola in 216 BC. The assault failed and Hannibal moved onto Acerrae, where he prepared for an assault. In addition, the town was circumvallated (Livy 23. 17. 4-6). Livy (23. 18. 8-9) notes later that year Hannibal used mantelets and dug saps during the assault on Casilinum. In 215 BC Hannibal made an attempt to capture Cumae. During the assault phase Livy (23. 37. 2-3) describes the use of a high wooden tower by the Carthaginians. During the storming of the citadel of Tarentum, Hannibal used artillery and siege engines in the attack (Livy 25. 11. 10) (Polybius 8. 34. 1-2) and (Appian Hannibal, 6. 33). Moreover, to top it all, Livy reports that during the attack on Locri the Carthaginians build their siege equipment on the spot (Livy 29. 7.4).
...were anyone in any doubt as to Hannibal's siege skills, they have but to consider the siege of Saguntum which was the proximate cause of the War. Anyone who has visited the acropolis of Saguntum will know that it is a vast place, almost as large as the city itself, perched on a huge plateau with cliffs for sides, large enough to pasture animals and with plenty of water - an impregnable place in fact. Much to the astonishment of the Saguntines, and of Rome, Hannibal captured the place in eight months, after a regular siege. Indeed Roman confidence in its impregnability was such that it was in no hurry to send aid, ( justifiably so, contrary to those ill-informed critics who criticise Rome for so-doing) and the Saguntines seem to have been equally confident in defying Hannibal.
Most of these assumptions that Hannibal was no good at sieges, or had no siege train ( he could easily build one on the spot any time and often did so - see above ) stem from the rhetorical flourish put into Maharbal's mouth ( the Carthaginian cavalry commander ) by Livy referred to above. None of them seems to have thought that Hannibal, arguably quite possibly the Greatest Military Commander in History, knew his business well.
Consider the following facts:
Carthage 149-146 BC: population probably 200-250,000 ; took 80,000 Roman troops 3 years to capture despite the city having first surrendered all its weapons. Surrounding country supportive of Rome and able to provide food and supplies.
Syracuse 213-212 BC: population probably 250-300,000; took 50,000 or more Roman troops 1 year to capture, by an unexpected lucky ploy on a Syracusan Feast day after all attempts to take the city by assault had failed, and the Romans resigned themselves to starving the city out over years....surrounding country able to supply food and supplies.
Rome 216 BC: population probably 300-500,000 ( i.e. nearly twice the size ) garrisoned by two legions totalling 8,000 troops plus 1500 troops at Ostia, plus a Legion of marines, and another consular army in Cisalpine gaul (c.20,000) which could have reached Rome before Hannibal had settled into a siege......not to mention Rome's Italian allies and their manpower, or Rome's ability to arm its citizens ( consider the 8,000 Volones) !!..... Surrounding countryside hostile, unable to provide food and supplies with Roman armies and their Allies loose.... Hannibal's army, mauled by 8,000 casualties at Cannae probably numbered no more than 32,000 Infantry and perhaps 8,000 or so cavalry effectives. Hannibal would have been outnumbered and trapped between Rome and it's armies.
Readers here need not be a Hannibal to work out that an attack and siege of Rome would be futile, and meanwhile the fruits of the Cannae victory would be thrown away as the Army wintered outside Rome's walls, hungry and cold ( instead of in Italy's second city, Capua), awaiting the arrival of more Legions from Spain, Sardinia and Sicily in the Spring.......
Nor was the Senate frightened that a siege by Hannibal could succeed. In 211 BC Hannibal actually DID march on the city, though it was a desperate feint, to try to draw Roman armies away from the siege of Capua. According to Polybius (IX.6-7) not only did the three armies surrounding Capua stay put, but the Consuls boldly led the troops in the city out to confront him. His bluff had been called, and he withdrew, harried by the Romans.....
Obvious really, isn't it ? And all this information was readily available to all those 'Historians' who blindly followed one another without considering the original sources and their information, as Steven/Antiochus has pointed out......
"dulce et decorum est pro patria mori " - Horace
(It is a sweet and proper thing to die for ones country)
"No son-of-a-bitch ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country" -Â George C Scott as General George S. Patton
Paul McDonnell-Staff
(It is a sweet and proper thing to die for ones country)
"No son-of-a-bitch ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country" -Â George C Scott as General George S. Patton
Paul McDonnell-Staff
