Rome versus Pyrrhus

[antiochus]

Mr Campbell wrote:
Only that I have no interest in the ages of hastati, principes and triarii.

Regardless, I’m sure if the numbers were wrong you would have made it known.

Mr Campbell wrote:
There are many reasons why a scholar "cannot, or has not been able to, successfully interpret" an ancient source, and not all of them involve deceit. It's not that every previous reader was incompetent, ignorant or deceitful. Just that they didn't realise the implications of what they were reading.)

I think the reason why they miss information is that they have a theory first and only see and understand what they are reading when it complies with that theory. Take that old chestnut Hannibal did not or could not attack Rome because he lacked siege equipment. This theory is postulated by Dodge, De Sanctis, Morris, Lamb, Bradford, Dorey and Dudley, Strauss and Ober, Armstrong, Michael Grant, Sinnigen and Arthur, Boak and Liddell. If memory serves me correct, I think Montgomery of El Alamien also makes this claim in his book on warfare.

Now the fact remains no ancient author states Hannibal did not have a siege train, and a careful reading of the primary sources gives a different picture. Appian (Hann. 5.29) reports the use of siege engines in Hannibal’s attack on the town of Petilia shortly after the battle of Cannae. Livy (23. 16.11-12) mentions siege weapons used by Hannibal during one of his attempts at capturing Nola in 216 BC. The assault failed and Hannibal moved onto Acerrae, where he prepared for an assault. In addition, the town was circumvallated (Livy 23. 17. 4-6). Livy (23. 18. 8-9) notes later that year Hannibal used mantelets and dug saps during the assault on Casilinum. In 215 BC Hannibal made an attempt to capture Cumae. During the assault phase Livy (23. 37. 2-3) describes the use of a high wooden tower by the Carthaginians. During the storming of the citadel of Tarentum, Hannibal used artillery and siege engines in the attack (Livy 25. 11. 10) (Polybius 8. 34. 1-2) and (Appian Hannibal, 6. 33). Moreover, to top it all, Livy reports that during the attack on Locri the Carthaginians build their siege equipment on the spot (Livy 29. 7.4).

Now to protect your theory that Hannibal had no siege engine, the technique of “bricking” comes into play. Here you use only those references in the primary sources that reinforce your theory and literally brick out those that debunk it. So in order to try to understand why Hannibal did not attack Rome, some modern historian invents a reason in total disregard to the primary sources. The tragedy is other historians blindly follow such an unsubstantiated theory. When you follow the paper trial, academics appear to rely more on secondary sources than primary sources. When you rely on secondary sources, you help spread the mistakes of the previous author, and in doing so, when challenged, you cannot defend your stance, as you have no idea how the original author came to such conclusions.

Mr Campbell wrote:
Similarly, few scholars (in my experience) state their case with "audacity", but rather with neutrality, occasionally even humility. Your experience seems to have been different, which is why I was interested to see examples cited.

Neutrality!!!! Humility!!!! Such commodities are in short supply. Take for example Daly, “Cannae, The experience of battle in the Second Punic War,” Gregory Daly. Preface page ix,

“Most previous work on Cannae has been concerned with such matters as tactics, the topography of the battlefield, and the strategic role of the battle in the context of the Second Punic War as a whole. Since the publication of The Face of Battle, John Keegan’s groundbreaking study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme, military historians have begun to pay attention to the experience of battle for the individuals who did the fighting. Recent studies of Cannae in this mould include articles by Victor Hanson and Martin Samuels, as well as Philip Sabin’s important study of battle mechanics in the Second Punic War (Hanson,1992; Samuels, 1990; Sabin, 1996).

Wait for it, here comes, the humility and neutrality.

Daly continues: “While useful, these articles are all lacking in some way. Hanson’s article is mainly concerned with recreating the experience of Cannae for individual soldiers, and, being extremely short, does not make a serious attempt at analysing the battle’s manoeuvres in any broader sense. Samuels recognises the fact that it is impossible even to begin to understand what happened at Cannae without a solid understanding of the opposing armies; unfortunately, his analyses of the respective armies are fraught with problems, which in turn devalue his conclusions. Sabin’s article is a very useful investigation of battle mechanics in the Second Punic War as a whole, skilfully blending the broad Grand Tactical perspective with the more immediate Keegan-style approach, but owing to brevity does not deal with Cannae or any other battle in detail, instead emphasising features common to the war’s many battles.”

Notice how Daly criticises Samuels and Hanson, who wrote academic papers solely on Cannae. Unfortunately, Samuels and Hanson are given no right of reply. It’s too late, the book in the public sphere. It this what you call humility? And what happened to neutrality? So what we learn from this is Daly is in the Keegan school, so therefore, Keegan’s work is groundbreaking. Let’s turn to page 49, The Introduction to the Roman Army. Here Daly, feeling the love, again expresses it with neutrality and humility:

“Samuels’ conclusions are rarely convincing, frequently relying on careless use of primary sources and questionable assumptions about the nature of the relevant armies, as will be shown below. However, their very improbability is demonstrative of the importance of this approach. His attempt to portray the reality of Cannae is entirely dependent upon his analyses of the opposing armies, and as his analyses are flawed, so too is his reconstruction of the battle.”

Is this the cut and thrust methodology you speak of? The discrediting of others in order to strengthen your theory? What I find incredibly interesting is, after debasing Samuels, Daly cites Samuels in over 25 incidents when Daly has the same analyst. For some unknown reason, Samuels “devalued conclusions” are suddenly reputable. And if Daly believes Samuels work contains “questionable assumptions,” then what about Daly’s assumptions littered throughout the book. They are extremely questionable.

So why can’t academia use the primary sources to argue their case? Isn’t it time academia got off its dead horse mounted on a merry go round.

Justin wrote:
This is a good point; I believe it was Don Rumsfeld who said "you go to war with the army you have, not the army you wish you had," so maybe there is no need to reconcile, for example, Ross Cowan's 4,800 man legion with a 5,000 man legion from some other source.

Was it really that hard for an ancient historian to write 4800 men, than it is to write 5000 men?

Justin wrote:
Even today, it's hard to maintain a completely uniform military. For example, how many men are in one US Army regiment?

It still doesn’t rule out the US army has a standardised regiment on paper. Or are you saying the US makes it up on a daily basis?

Sean wrote:
Have you read Nathan Rosenstein's “Rome at War”? He makes a strong argument that the vast majority of Republican soldiers were in their teens and early twenties (whereas in your system equal numbers would be aged 18-27 and 28-36 because there were equal numbers of hastati and principes). I also can't see any practical benefit of assigning men to different units based on their exact age.

He may make a strong argument for you, but were is his proof in relations to the primary sources? If this is the book I remember examining at the university, I wasn’t impressed.

Sean wrote:
Many Romans didn't know their exact age, and there is no garuntee that the number of men in a particular age range would match the number of men needed to fill a particular unit.

How are you sure the Romans did not know their exact age? That is why the Romans developed the census. This allowed them to know how many men they could levy, and the organisation system of the army defined how many men they needed to levy. If the men did not know their age the census would be of no value. Dionysius (4 15 6) on the census asserts the Romans declared their names; property value, names of parents, wives and children and their ages. There are over 10,000 surviving Roman funeral inscriptions giving the age at death, and over 200 epitaphs of marriages recording the ages of the couples. Studies have been done that highlight there was a practice in some regions of Rome of adding two years to their age for each calendar year they lived. Then they rounded their age to numbers ending in 0 or 5. The Roman army is centred on broad age groups rather than specific age groups. Men aged between 18-27 for the hastati is not an exact age, it is a broad age category. And the Roman army loved to end numbers in 0 or 5.

Strabo V 4 and Livy V 33 have the Etruscans organised into 12 cities in each of the three districts. Each city had three consecrated gates and three temples to Jupiter, Juno and Minerva (Serv. in Aen. I 422). Mantua, till late an Etruscan city, had three tribes (Serv.in Aen. X 202). The Bruttians were divided into a confederation of twelve cities (Livy XXV 1). The Iapygians were divided into three branches (Polybius III 88) each of which comprised 12 smaller groups. The Latins had three regions which each region containing 10 cities?

What do all the above have in common? Tripartite division. What does this have to do with the Roman legion? Everything! According to Ovid (yes Ovid Mr. Campbell), the early Roman calendar had 10 months (the vegetation year), then according to Florus, under the reign of Numa it changed to 12 months. This means a new organisation enters the arena. However, rather than throw out the old, the Romans, as is their nature, included the new with the old. You can find this in the organisation of the Roman legion. Taking the 1200 hastati for example, 1200 hastati can be organised into 12 centuries, or 10 maniples of 120 men. The key numbers are 12 and 10. And the number 12 is a tripartite division.