Phalanx

[fhaggis]

Hi,

I got a question about the Phalanx. Everyone knows that they where vurnable from the sides and back. Buyti don't know why. Surley they had spears protruding from the sides and possible the back like the front? Basically like a square formation?

Cheers

[hoplite14gr]

Discipline and moral.
If they were not engaged frontally they would turn to face the enemy.
If the panicked they fled.

But if you had psiloi in broken ground or orchards facing their right unprotected side they could pin them down an left them volunerable your own heavy troops counter attack.

Kind regards

[fhaggis]

Thanks for the reply.

I'm still unclear though, what i meant was when they where attacked from the front did or could they also face the sides etc?

[Matthew Amt]

The phalanx, like most any other ancient formation, was designed to go forward and fight an enemy to its front. For several centuries the most likely opposing force was another phalanx. So if they simply collided head-on, as was typically the case, there wasn't much immediate worry about flanks or rear. Certainly if hoplites at one end of the line saw the enemy moving around them, they could turn in that direction, but unless that was done in a very orderly and disciplined way it could be very disruptive to the rest of the line. That leads to panic, and to losing the battle! So any decent general arranged his army to prevent that in the first place (using geography to protect flanks, etc.) But generally speaking, all the troops faced forwards, because that's where the enemy was.

Khaire,

Matthew

[fhaggis]

I understand what your saying but to me it's a bit to simple.

Basically if you get men around the side they coulldn't really counter you without throwing the phalanx into disarray. To me any good general would try to maximise on this i.e send men to attack the sides of the Phalanx.

This leads me to the conclusion that either the generals where not very good or the Phalanx was much more advanced than thought?

[Matthew Amt]

I understand what your saying but to me it's a bit to simple.

Basically if you get men around the side they coulldn't really counter you without throwing the phalanx into disarray. To me any good general would try to maximise on this i.e send men to attack the sides of the Phalanx.

Right, but like I said, any good general would take a few simple steps to prevent that. If the flanks of your line end at a river or woods or other natural obstacle, it's too hard for any significant body of troops to get around the end. Or you can place cavalry or light infantry at the flanks, to repel any force trying to outflank you. Or you can "refuse" your flank, either bending it back or arranging units in echelon, to cover the flank that way. Also remember that any force breaking off to try to outflank the enemy is itself in danger of being cut off and chopped up.

This leads me to the conclusion that either the generals where not very good or the Phalanx was much more advanced than thought?

Well, not all generals were very good! One of the advantages of the phalanx was that all a general had to do was check off a few basics, then aim his troops forwards and go. It also worked well with non-professional hoplites, who knew the basics and had a little training, but were not strictly enough trained or disciplined to carry out fancy maneuvers. Trying to outflank another army might lead to your own phalanx coming apart! A very good general had to keep this in mind--his troops might not be good enough to accomplish anything really clever that he tried. But it is also true that a phalanx was not a solid mass of robots or idiots! It was organized in units and files, and was sometimes used in more complex formations.

Remember, basic linear tactics were standard procedure from about 2500 BC into the 20th century. Outflanking the enemy was always recognized as a winning move, but it just wasn't as easy to accomplish as you might think.

Khaire,

Matthew

[fhaggis]

Again thanks but...

You seem to rely on the fact that there would be woods, rocks etc on the flanks that a General could place his troops. But i doubt this was usually the case. If it was then why would you attck a phalanx that had secure flanks which would mean yours where not secure?

Cheers

Haggis

[PMBardunias]

Surley they had spears protruding from the sides and possible the back like the front? Basically like a square formation?

You must think beyond the single unit. While each component part might be 16 ranks x 16 files, if you approach from the front you have a more or less continuous line for hundreds of meters. If you approach from the flank you face 16 men. You then easily surround them and "roll up" the whole line.

Attacking the rear of an already frontally engaged has the immediate effect of limiting their mobility. Ancient battles swayed back and forth as one side pushed the other back, then the other rallied. You could tell who was winning by the way the dust cloud angled. The inability to give ground was one of the worst things that could happen, you end up crushed into too small a space and men cannot fight properly. Also, the order of men from front rank to read was designed to put the best fighters in front and the steadies, perhaps oldest, men in the rear. Reversing this order is problematic.

To me any good general would try to maximise on this i.e send men to attack the sides of the Phalanx.

They did, Spartans in particular did or attempted this many times. The problem is that a phalanx does not easily lend itself to the type of small unit tactical flexibility needed to pull off such a manouver. If you bend your line around your enemies flank, often your line on the right extended beyond theirs on the left, then you just expose the flank and rear of your own troops to any enemy troops on the phalanx's flank.

[fhaggis]

They did, Spartans in particular did or attempted this many times. The problem is that a phalanx does not easily lend itself to the type of small unit tactical flexibility needed to pull off such a manouver. If you bend your line around your enemies flank, often your line on the right extended beyond theirs on the left, then you just expose the flank and rear of your own troops to any enemy troops on the phalanx's flank.

Thats what i don't get its clear the drawbacks that you have stated above but if you can see that the no doubt they did. All you have to do is put your Phalanx in front of another, hold it and send a seperate force( not necisarily another Phalanx) to attack the sides, job done. I can't be that simple.

[PMBardunias]

All you have to do is put your Phalanx in front of another, hold it and send a seperate force( not necisarily another Phalanx) to attack the sides, job done. I can't be that simple.

And all they have to do is put an even smaller force on the flank of their phalanx to take you in the rear when you attempt to flank them. Conversely, they can watch as you weaken your phalanx by attempting to pull men off the line to send them to the flank, then hit you quickly while your troops are disrupted by their own attempted maneuvers. This is probably happened at Leuktra and a good indication of how a "smart" general can outfox himself by pushing the tactical capabilities of his army too far. Spartans leaders expected more from their men than was delivered on a number of occaisions- i.e. at mantinea in 418 where 2 whole units failed to deploy as commanded.

[Sean Manning]

They did, Spartans in particular did or attempted this many times. The problem is that a phalanx does not easily lend itself to the type of small unit tactical flexibility needed to pull off such a manouver. If you bend your line around your enemies flank, often your line on the right extended beyond theirs on the left, then you just expose the flank and rear of your own troops to any enemy troops on the phalanx's flank.

Thats what i don't get its clear the drawbacks that you have stated above but if you can see that the no doubt they did. All you have to do is put your Phalanx in front of another, hold it and send a seperate force( not necisarily another Phalanx) to attack the sides, job done. I can't be that simple.

Well, are you sure that your psiloi and cavalry are going to be able to beat their psiloi and cavalry (who will be protecting any flank which isn't anchored on rough ground)? If your cavalry win, will they follow the plan and attack the enemy in the flank, or run off in pursuit? What if some of your troops or their troops rout while all this is going on? If you use your hoplites to form the flank attack, will that weaken your main line too much? There are all sorts of complications which made outflanking the enemy hard to pull off.

Anderson's book Greek Military Theory and Practice in the age of Xenophon has a good write-up of Greek tactics and why they worked the way they did.

[Matthew Amt]

Often it seems to have been pretty simple! Remember that Greece is pretty rough country overall, rocky and hilly. Flat areas large enough for 2 armies to fight are not all that common. So yes, it would be pretty easy to find a space just large enough for your phalanx, with really lousy ground on either flank. Stick your light troops there, and charge. The enemy is doing the exact same thing--that's all they can do! If the two armies were reasonably well matched, they'd probably just tell the light troops to stay put and not get into trouble, since only the hoplites were really considered respectable. Then it could come down to which phalanx can hold together better in the charge. It was pretty common for them to start breaking up upon charging, though of course the Spartans were better drilled and generally better at holding formation.

Matthew

[nikolaos]

Herodotus' description of the Battle of Plataea gives a fair deal of insight into the reasoning driving the tactical practices of the Greeks at the end of the Archaic period. First and foremost, it would appear that defending the flanks is not a prime mover in the choice of battlefield:

"When they came (as it is said) to Erythrae in Boeotia, they learned that the barbarians were encamped by the Asopus. Taking note of that, they arrayed themselves opposite the enemy on the lower hills of Cithaeron. " (Herodotus 9.19, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/tex ... apter%3D19 )

"Presently they resolved that they would march down to Plataea, for they saw that the ground there was generally more suited for encampment than that at Erythrae, and chiefly because it was better watered. It was to this place and to the Gargaphian spring which was there, that they resolved to go and pitch camp in their several battalions; [3] They took up their arms and marched along the lower slopes of Cithaeron past Hysiae to the lands of Plataea, and when they arrived, they arrayed themselves nation by nation near the Gargaphian spring and the precinct of the hero Androcrates, among low hills and in a level country." (Herodotus Histories 9.25, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/tex ... ht=plataea )

When they plan their move to the Island, it is to both to have access to a water supply and keep the cavalry off of them:

"To that place then they planned to go so that they might have plenty of water for their use and not be harmed by the horsemen, as now when they were face to face with them" (Herodotus 9.51, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/tex ... apter%3D51 )

However, they are not able to make the move immediately, and suffer:

"Having made this plan, all that day they suffered constant hardship from the cavalry which continually pressed upon them. When the day ended, however, and the horsemen stopped their onslaught."

I cannot help but think the horse pressing upon them must have included attacks on the flanks, although this is not explicitly stated. That said, they must have been able to arrange to protect themselves somehow.

Now Herodotus does clearly state that the Persians fighting the Spartans were not co-ordinated in their attacks:

"Now the Persians were neither less valorous nor weaker, but they had no armor; moreover, since they were unskilled and no match for their adversaries in craft, they would rush out singly and in tens or in groups great or small, hurling themselves on the Spartans and so perishing." (Herodotus 9.62, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/tex ... apter%3D62 )

Its also worth noting that the there were 30,000 light troops with the Spartans to help protect them against trouble as well...

Its also my belief that small groups of flankers are largely ineffective against a large formed body, either mobile or not. I've been on both sides of such exchanges in various recreation and re-enactment battles, and have found that the bigger body shrugs off such attacks fairly readily. This is particularly true if they are moving. I once participlated in a poorly co-ordinated attack by 200 men on the flank of a moving formation of close to a thousand. It was like being cheese hit by a flying grater, and by the time the survivors had regrouped the moment was past.

Have fun!
Cole

[Paralus]

Then it could come down to which phalanx can hold together better in the charge. It was pretty common for them to start breaking up upon charging, though of course the Spartans were better drilled and generally better at holding formation.

Indeed. Resolve is all. There is record of hoplites breaking before the Spartans – in their pomp – engaged. The reverse is surely the same: a phalanx must keep its discipline and cohesion in the “charge”. It is here that the Spartans certainly despised their tresantes more so than in the receipt of a charge. They were far more used to delivering such.

I cannot help but think the horse pressing upon them must have included attacks on the flanks, although this is not explicitly stated. That said, they must have been able to arrange to protect themselves somehow.

Certainly I’d think. Herodotus is not terribly forthcoming; nor is he Thucydides.

Its also worth noting that the there were 30,000 light troops with the Spartans to help protect them against trouble as well...fun!
Cole

This based on the number of homoioi? I find this hard to swallow. There is absolutely no record of them ever having participated in the battle. The Greeks – as with the Athenians and Plataeans at Marathon – will have assembled a hoplite army for this battle. It was their way of war. If the “light troops” did anything we have heard little of it.

[fhaggis]

I'm still not convinced. The arguments seem to be that they couldn't get round the sides due to terrain or enemy light troops. I don't believ the terrain was always or ever that bad and it would be just aslikely for one side to defeat the others light trops and then be able to atack the flanks.

Also The Phalanxs where not always the same size so it would be possible to sorround the smaller Phalanx. Imagine you where the last man on the side of the Phalanx, it would be very tempting to try and flank the enemy if you see an open flank.

Therefore i can not see disadvantages for having spears protruding from the sides.

Francis