tactical battle field entrenchments

[Goffredo]

Hi guys<br>
<br>
on occasion I wonder how often the romans used entrenchments and obstacles in the many battles they fought over their long history. I am thinking especially of the small scale battles that History (with capital H) does not report. How often a small roman contingent could stage a successsful fight against a larger less organized group by making best usage of all their know-how.<br>
Note that I am not thinking of camps being under siege, but of the romans deploying themselves behind artificial obstacles (trenches, palisades,...) in ways to constrain the movements of the enemy; e.g. if you are surrounded at least don't make yourself vulnerable to attack from all sides!<br>
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We know of great Sulla using entrenchments to avoid envelopment by far numerous enemy armies in Asia Minor.<br>
I am of course sure that bright generals used the landscape to do such a thing (think of the battle against the Iceni when the outnumbered romans kept their sides and rear covered by forming up infront of a forest).<br>
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But if there was no forest, river, whatever, near by? What could romans do if a battle could not be avoided and they had to fight on short notice without the option of forcing the enemy to fight on chosen ground?<br>
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I really don't think they would simply form up their "thin red lines" and hope for the best. I suspect they, being a very practical people, would do what was possible to hinder, break the lines and possibly try to direct them into certain directions. I suspect the palisades the legions carried on campaign could be used not only to build a camp for the night but could be used in preparing a battle field against superior numbers.<br>
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Any comments? <p></p><i></i>

[Anonymous]

It would seem to me, that the key to Roman battlefield success was in its ability to maneuver and have small unit line flexibility. All other factors being nearly equal, the Romans would prefer to choose the field and use their flexibility to gain success.<br>
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Their nightly March Camp fortifications were use to prevent night and surprise attacks when the legion was not deployed. I would suspect that a legion facing a superior enemy would prefer to maneuver in order to flee or chose a more advantageous position then to besieged in a March Camp. As noted in the first post, a smaller Roman Army could enhance its position by building field fortifications to protect flanks and to channel an enemy advance into a selected Roman “Killing Groundâ€ÂÂ

[Anonymous]

For a good example of a Roman General's tactics, you can not do any better than read Ceasar.<br>
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Check out B.G. 2.8 as a good instance of the preparations when a smaller number of Romans met a larger force.<br>
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Mind you, I guess that we should not consider Ceasar typical in any manner.<br>
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Kevin <p></p><i></i>

[Goffredo]

Hi<br>
I agree with Goldsworthy in thinking that Ceasar wass(!)typical! He was very good, but he was good at what a typical roman general was expected to do.<br>
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ciao <p></p><i></i>

[Caius Fabius]

Caesar's troops used field fortifications to channel and impede the enemy. Peter Connolly showed us the remains of some of the trenches and fieldworks dug by Caesarian forces against the Helvetii during the Roman Army Tour 2002. <p></p><i></i>