03-19-2009, 06:31 AM
A quick response..... :wink: :wink:
Paralus/Michael wrote:
"Don't have the time at present: off to the Central Coast for the 25th wedding anniversary so this will be quick.
The nub of the problem is that you are deducing that the phalanx only marched in open order. I don't necessarily disagree. This, though, is different and Polybios doesn’t realise it. There is no reason to believe that it was a mandatory matter for the phalanx to assume "close order" only within the last 100 yards.
True, but that this was the norm is all but certain. Heavy Infantry, even against cavalry 100yards away had ample time to ‘close up’. In any event as Alexander advanced, Darius withdrew his cavalry back across the river long before the Phalanx got near, and re-deployed them. The eight deep formation occurs “ as he approached the enemy” (Callisthenes) – just where we would expect them to ‘close up’. Curtius (III.ix.12) refers to the 32 deep formation, then subsequently “their usual order” i.e. 16 deep. (which Polybius tells us categorically was in open order)
Circumstances dictate the tactics. It is highly unlikely that a commander will have marched on the enemy – in possession of the field and with his cavalry deployed across the river in the van – in open order. Alexander, as any decent commander should have, deployed “ready for battle”, that is in close order,
Here is where we differ. I believe it was normal for Greek and Macedonian ( and Roman too, for that matter) to deploy in open order, advance on the foe to within 100-200 yards and only then close up and charge.There are many examples of this 'charge distance' in the literature....
As I understand it, you are postulating that the '16 deep' formation was in close order - but that flatly contradicts what Polybius says, namely that the Macedonian Phalanx was in open order when at this depth -"For with the proper intervals for marching order a stade, when the men are sixteen deep, will hold sixteen hundred, each man being at a distance of six feet from the next" i.e. in open order. Even if what you speculate about Alexander's deployment on this occasion is correct ( and I will come to problems with this shortly), Polybius' statement must still be generally true. Further, Alexander would not, indeed could not because of the rough ground, have carried out his approach march in the close-packed order used for the final "charge/contact".( Recall that he advanced 40 stades/4.5 miles/7.3 km in this extended line)
Then you have the other problem that Polybius refers to, namely that if the Phalanx was already in close order at 16 deep, it can only get to 8 deep by 'doubling' it's frontage - expanding from a front (assuming 20,000 or so) of a mere 1,250 yards to 2,500 yards -which, if the formation halted to do this, would take 20-30 minutes at least. Not to mention that the flanking cavalry/light troops would also have to "shift over" this distance ! Far more likely that the Phalanx advanced 16 deep on a frontage of around 2,500 yards - which is close enough to the 11 stades/2,200 yards Polybius reckons should have been available to them, and incidently 'filling' the field, (or if the Greeks were not in the Phalanx, a mere 1,750 yards/8.75 stades and thus not 'filling the field') - and then finally 'closed up' into 8 deep when close to the enemy, just as described.
until the plain allowed for the deployment of cavalry to the wings. All the source material is consistent here.
This, as well as Polybios’ impossible ground (though I note, in passing, that Alexander’s phalanx did, indeed, cross this ground and the river) necessitated the “leisurely advance” whilst dressing the line.
It is abundantly clear – at Granicus, Issos and Gaugamela (not to mention Hydaspes) that the main battle line of Alexander was his national draft. This is – eventually – made plain at Gaugamela: it is only light infantry that support the cavalry on the wings.
The addressing the men “Greeks, Macedonians, et al” is a motif utilised in both major battles. It does not follow that Alexander rode along the battle line addressing the Greeks as part of the front line. Indeed the sources are clear they did not form a part of this line as they are enumerated. The idea that they have been “forgotten” does not wash: Gaugamela gives an indication as to where they might have been.
Alexander fought his “majors” with his national troops as the front line. To insist otherwise is to conjecture what the sources do not support.
This generalisation is not correct - each battle involved differing deployments in different situations...I don’t ‘insist’, merely mention it as a possibility. It may be that the speech is a ‘motif’ as you say, but there is no mention of a ‘reserve’ or second line. In fact Arrian specifically has Alexander “ strengthened his right by a contingent of Agrianes and Greek mercenaries whom he drew up in line and so outflanked the Persian left..” Granted these Greeks may be peltasts, it nevertheless demonstrates that the Line did not just consist of native Macedonians, as you assert . Knowing that he was seriously outnumbered, and threatened with outflanking on the hilly/mountainous right, would a competent commander leave one third of his Heavy Infantry out of his Main Battle Line ?
Gaugamela is a special case where Alexander, outnumbered and outflanked, formed up in a large rectangular formation around the baggage to secure his flanks – similar to the later ‘Squares’ against cavalry - and the Greeks, in much larger numbers than present at Issus, and roughly equivalent to the Macedonians, formed the rear of the ‘rectangle’. There is no suggestion in any of our sources that anything similar occurred at Issus...
Paullus Scipio wrote:
How do you arrive at these figures? If the most commonly identified location of the battle is used it was around 3 miles/4.8 kilometres wide at the river between sea and hills. The 20-21,000 man Phalanx, if we include the Greeks, would occupy a frontage of 2,500 yards -2,625 yards, whether in ‘open’ or ‘close’ order, or 1750 yards if the Phalanx excludes the Greeks......
The distance of the field is Kallisthenes’ 14 stades: some 2.5 kilometres.
Actually (Polybius XII.21) says “less than 14 stades” i.e. less than 2,800 yards from sea to the foot of the hills – but we don’t know exactly which part of the gradually widening field Callisthenes was referring to…. Add to which Callisthenes has the river “running obliquely across this space”, so the ‘battle front’ may be much longer…..
Better to go by actual Geography…
Paralus/Michael wrote:
"Don't have the time at present: off to the Central Coast for the 25th wedding anniversary so this will be quick.
The nub of the problem is that you are deducing that the phalanx only marched in open order. I don't necessarily disagree. This, though, is different and Polybios doesn’t realise it. There is no reason to believe that it was a mandatory matter for the phalanx to assume "close order" only within the last 100 yards.
True, but that this was the norm is all but certain. Heavy Infantry, even against cavalry 100yards away had ample time to ‘close up’. In any event as Alexander advanced, Darius withdrew his cavalry back across the river long before the Phalanx got near, and re-deployed them. The eight deep formation occurs “ as he approached the enemy” (Callisthenes) – just where we would expect them to ‘close up’. Curtius (III.ix.12) refers to the 32 deep formation, then subsequently “their usual order” i.e. 16 deep. (which Polybius tells us categorically was in open order)
Circumstances dictate the tactics. It is highly unlikely that a commander will have marched on the enemy – in possession of the field and with his cavalry deployed across the river in the van – in open order. Alexander, as any decent commander should have, deployed “ready for battle”, that is in close order,
Here is where we differ. I believe it was normal for Greek and Macedonian ( and Roman too, for that matter) to deploy in open order, advance on the foe to within 100-200 yards and only then close up and charge.There are many examples of this 'charge distance' in the literature....
As I understand it, you are postulating that the '16 deep' formation was in close order - but that flatly contradicts what Polybius says, namely that the Macedonian Phalanx was in open order when at this depth -"For with the proper intervals for marching order a stade, when the men are sixteen deep, will hold sixteen hundred, each man being at a distance of six feet from the next" i.e. in open order. Even if what you speculate about Alexander's deployment on this occasion is correct ( and I will come to problems with this shortly), Polybius' statement must still be generally true. Further, Alexander would not, indeed could not because of the rough ground, have carried out his approach march in the close-packed order used for the final "charge/contact".( Recall that he advanced 40 stades/4.5 miles/7.3 km in this extended line)
Then you have the other problem that Polybius refers to, namely that if the Phalanx was already in close order at 16 deep, it can only get to 8 deep by 'doubling' it's frontage - expanding from a front (assuming 20,000 or so) of a mere 1,250 yards to 2,500 yards -which, if the formation halted to do this, would take 20-30 minutes at least. Not to mention that the flanking cavalry/light troops would also have to "shift over" this distance ! Far more likely that the Phalanx advanced 16 deep on a frontage of around 2,500 yards - which is close enough to the 11 stades/2,200 yards Polybius reckons should have been available to them, and incidently 'filling' the field, (or if the Greeks were not in the Phalanx, a mere 1,750 yards/8.75 stades and thus not 'filling the field') - and then finally 'closed up' into 8 deep when close to the enemy, just as described.
until the plain allowed for the deployment of cavalry to the wings. All the source material is consistent here.
This, as well as Polybios’ impossible ground (though I note, in passing, that Alexander’s phalanx did, indeed, cross this ground and the river) necessitated the “leisurely advance” whilst dressing the line.
It is abundantly clear – at Granicus, Issos and Gaugamela (not to mention Hydaspes) that the main battle line of Alexander was his national draft. This is – eventually – made plain at Gaugamela: it is only light infantry that support the cavalry on the wings.
The addressing the men “Greeks, Macedonians, et al” is a motif utilised in both major battles. It does not follow that Alexander rode along the battle line addressing the Greeks as part of the front line. Indeed the sources are clear they did not form a part of this line as they are enumerated. The idea that they have been “forgotten” does not wash: Gaugamela gives an indication as to where they might have been.
Alexander fought his “majors” with his national troops as the front line. To insist otherwise is to conjecture what the sources do not support.
This generalisation is not correct - each battle involved differing deployments in different situations...I don’t ‘insist’, merely mention it as a possibility. It may be that the speech is a ‘motif’ as you say, but there is no mention of a ‘reserve’ or second line. In fact Arrian specifically has Alexander “ strengthened his right by a contingent of Agrianes and Greek mercenaries whom he drew up in line and so outflanked the Persian left..” Granted these Greeks may be peltasts, it nevertheless demonstrates that the Line did not just consist of native Macedonians, as you assert . Knowing that he was seriously outnumbered, and threatened with outflanking on the hilly/mountainous right, would a competent commander leave one third of his Heavy Infantry out of his Main Battle Line ?
Gaugamela is a special case where Alexander, outnumbered and outflanked, formed up in a large rectangular formation around the baggage to secure his flanks – similar to the later ‘Squares’ against cavalry - and the Greeks, in much larger numbers than present at Issus, and roughly equivalent to the Macedonians, formed the rear of the ‘rectangle’. There is no suggestion in any of our sources that anything similar occurred at Issus...
Paullus Scipio wrote:
How do you arrive at these figures? If the most commonly identified location of the battle is used it was around 3 miles/4.8 kilometres wide at the river between sea and hills. The 20-21,000 man Phalanx, if we include the Greeks, would occupy a frontage of 2,500 yards -2,625 yards, whether in ‘open’ or ‘close’ order, or 1750 yards if the Phalanx excludes the Greeks......
The distance of the field is Kallisthenes’ 14 stades: some 2.5 kilometres.
Actually (Polybius XII.21) says “less than 14 stades” i.e. less than 2,800 yards from sea to the foot of the hills – but we don’t know exactly which part of the gradually widening field Callisthenes was referring to…. Add to which Callisthenes has the river “running obliquely across this space”, so the ‘battle front’ may be much longer…..
Better to go by actual Geography…
"dulce et decorum est pro patria mori " - Horace
(It is a sweet and proper thing to die for ones country)
"No son-of-a-bitch ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country" - George C Scott as General George S. Patton
Paul McDonnell-Staff
(It is a sweet and proper thing to die for ones country)
"No son-of-a-bitch ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country" - George C Scott as General George S. Patton
Paul McDonnell-Staff
