The Makedonian phalanx -- why such depth?

[Paullus Scipio]

Sean wrote:

I also think that the most natural way to interpret Polybius's phalanx is as 16 ranks deep with 2 cubits per file. No comment on the other sources!

...despite Paralus/Michael expanding the topic, and using secondary sources, it is worth reminding ourselves that we are trying to discuss the depth of the Macedonian phalanx, and originally looking at the evidence of Polybius/Kallisthenes ( the latter an eye-witness), as given in XII.19-22. I don't think there is any need to "interpret" what is said, for it is quite categorical.( see my post March 17):
". For with the proper intervals for marching order a stade, when the men are sixteen deep, will hold sixteen hundred, each man being at a distance of six feet from the next. "

Paralus wrote:

Polybios, like Thucydides, is not free from error.

Agreed -that is not in dispute, but whether he is mistaken about something as fundamental as the depth of a standard military formation is another matter, and I don't believe he is wrong in this instance. He categorically tells us a "16 deep phalanx" is in 'normal'/open formation, each man 6 feet from the next. Elsewhere, (XVIII.28-30) in describing the pro's and cons of the phalanx, he tells us that a "16 deep phalanx", when closed up, is pretty formidable, and that the rear ranks add to the force of the charge, and prevent the front ranks facing about - he does not refer to the exact depth in this paragraph, nor does he need to, because, in my view, his readers would know that a "sixteen deep phalanx" would close up (to 8 deep) before charging.

....just in this battle. Problem is I’m not interpreting anything Polybios has written; I’m simply stating what he has clearly said.

What he clearly states, referring to this battle, is that when standing 16 deep, the men are 6 feet apart ( see above and March 17 post) and that in battle they fought 8 deep

He then goes on to describe what the task of the other eleven phalangites is: the sheer pressure of their bodily weight in the charge and keeping the missiles off with their “serried mass of pikes”.

No he doesn't - there is no reference to 'eleven',( that is an assumption by you) just the ranks beyond five, and this could easily mean the rear three ranks. In fact nowhere does Polybius ( or anyone else for that matter) actually say that the Macedonian phalanx ACTUALLY fought 16 deep.. The only categorical statement is the one I keep referring to, namely that the "sixteen deep phalanx" in 'normal' ( open) formation actually fought eight deep in close order.

Note that the Macedonians were “still” being led on “in close array” - not open order - whilst Darius’s forces are in “distant view”. Evidently, to be "still led" they had been led to this point “in close array”. Distant would not imply under 100 yards as Arrian clearly indicates that they came within range of the darts only after they had been led on in close array and in measured step until, one presumes, the Persians were no longer “distant”.

....There is no need to speculate on what is meant, for Polybius/Callisthenes is quite specific. Having told us that the sixteen deep formation is in open order, he tells us this formation was adopted ( from 32 deep - double phalanx) some 8,000 yards from the Persian front...
"9 From all this it is quite plain that when Alexander made his army sixteen deep the line .......20 After this he says that Alexander led on his army in an extended line, being then at a distance of about forty stades from the enemy.". According to our source, later still :"He tells us that Alexander, on approaching the enemy, made his line eight deep".
Arrian makes no mention of the formation changes, and the 'close array' is simply a modern translators terminology, hence irrelevant.
That same passage is translated thus by De Selincourt in the Penguin edition:

Alexander rode from one end of his line to the other with words of encouragement for all, addressing by name, with proper mention of rank and distinctions, not only the the officers of highest rank, but the commanders of squadrons and companies; even the mercenaries were not forgotten, where any distinction or act of courage called for the mention of a name, and from every throat came the answering shout: "Wait no longer -forward to the assault !"
The Persian army was in full view; still ,however, Alexander moved forward in line at a deliberate pace, for a too-rapid advance might have thrown the line out of dressing and caused a break somewhere; but once within range of missiles....

No 'distant view', no 'close array'. The point is that Arrian does not describe the formation changes at all, and in any event the account of the eye-witness Callisthenes, with it's detailed remarks about depth, is surely to be preferred to that of Arrian writing in the the second century AD, in this instance. This is the more so when this passage is simply a standard 'battlefield speech topos', which may preserve a few accurate details - Curtius' version of the 'battlefield speech' is similar, but not the same. Incidently, Curtius, unlike Arrian, does refer to the changing formations, telling us that:
" The Macedonian army advanced in thirty-two ranks; for the narrow place did not allow the line to be extended more widely.Then the folds of the mountains began to widen and open a greater space, so that not only could the infantry take their usual order, but the cavalry cover their flanks"
"usual order' here most probably means 'normal order' ( i.e. open), and 16 deep. Notice too that he doesn't bother to mention that in battle they were 8 deep.

Changing the subject, slightly, to the enigmatic one of where the Greek mercenaries etc that made up a third of Alexander's Heavy Infantry were, it may be significant that it is often assumed that it is just Greek cavalry that is sent to the left to bolster Parmenion's command, but Arrian actually says Alexander "sent the Peloponesian troops and other Allied divisions round to Parmenio on the left", so it is a distinct possibility that the Greek Hoplites formed the left flank of the whole infantry line...... D

[Paralus]

... Polybius/Kallisthenes ( the latter an eye-witness), as given in XII.19-22. I don't think there is any need to "interpret" what is said, for it is quite categorical.( see my post March 17):
". For with the proper intervals for marching order a stade, when the men are sixteen deep, will hold sixteen hundred, each man being at a distance of six feet from the next. " ….there is no reference to 'eleven',( that is an assumption by you) just the ranks beyond five, and this could easily mean the rear three ranks. In fact nowhere does Polybius ( or anyone else for that matter) actually say that the Macedonian phalanx ACTUALLY fought 16 deep.. The only categorical statement is the one I keep referring to, namely that the "sixteen deep phalanx" in 'normal' ( open) formation actually fought eight deep in close order.

That last is an assumption by you based on an interpretation of Polybios’ clear words to suit it. We will have to agree to disagree on your categorical assumption that the Macedonian phalanx always delivered its charge eight deep.

I have not assumed that Polybios is referring to eleven rather I make the deduction based on the plain fact of his statement “From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is sixteen deep”. There is no need to suppose he means eight at all. Should he have he might have stated so or added: “after it has closed up”. He clearly indicates the charge here is by a “whole phalanx when sixteen deep”.

To literally apply your statement with reference to “marching order” would see the Macedonian infantry only ever march sixteen deep. Polibios actually clarifies this by saying “the proper intervals for marching order a stade, when the men are sixteen deep, will hold sixteen hundred, each man being at a distance of six feet from the next” to calculate the space occupied by sixteen men. He might as easily have stated “when 32 deep” – as the infantry plainly also marched in this order as well – to calculate the space taken in that fashion. It does not follow then that sixteen deep is only ever for marching and not ever for delivering a charge.

To go back to 357/6 and Philip’s battle against the Illyrians. The term for the Macedonian file was “dekad” and the phalanx made up of “dekades”. The clear implication is that it was originally ten men. Did Philip then, when marching on Bardyllis, go from “open order” ten deep to “closed up” five deep?

Changing the subject, slightly, to the enigmatic one of where the Greek mercenaries etc that made up a third of Alexander's Heavy Infantry were, it may be significant that it is often assumed that it is just Greek cavalry that is sent to the left to bolster Parmenion's command, but Arrian actually says Alexander "sent the Peloponesian troops and other Allied divisions round to Parmenio on the left", so it is a distinct possibility that formed the left flank of the whole infantry line......

No, that is plainly wrong as Arrian is clearly speaking of horsemen:

As Alexander advanced, he found that the ground spread out a little in breadth, and he accordingly brought up his horsemen, both those called Companions, and the Thessalians as well as the Macedonians, and posted them with himself on the right wing. The Peloponnesians and the rest of the allied force of Greeks he sent to Parmenio on the left...

If he means infantry, as you infer, then Parmenio himself – until Alexander transfers the Thessalians – is the only cavalry on the left. Further, a few lines later, Arrian inconvertibly states these are cavalry:

Meantime when Alexander perceived that nearly all the Persian cavalry had changed their ground and gone to his left towards the sea, and that on his side only the Peloponnesians and the rest of the Grecian cavalry were posted there, he sent the Thessalian cavalry thither with speed...

One final interesting aside - and I have to say that I prefer Diodorus’ version of the bribing of Apollonides, more the One-Eyed’s style – but nevertheless the source material excerpted and condensed here had to be believable.

Polyaenus 4.6.19:
Antigonus was encamped opposite to the enemy, who were commanded by Eumenes, and his force was inferior in numbers. While frequent embassies passed between the two camps, Antigonus directed that, as soon as the next embassy arrived, a soldier should abruptly introduce himself, panting, and covered with dust; and inform him, the allies were at hand. Antigonus, hearing this, jumped up in pretended jubilation, and dismissed the ambassadors. The next day he extended the front of his army twice its former length, and advanced beyond the trenches. The enemy were informed by their envoys of the arrival of the allies, and when they observed the phalanx so much extended, which they supposed had a similar depth, they did not dare to hazard an engagement, but made a precipitate retreat.

One imagines, had the tactic not worked, that Antigonus will have been forced to advance eight deep in open order before “closing up” to fight 4 deep?

[Paullus Scipio]

Michael/Paralus wrote:

We will have to agree to disagree on your categorical assumption that the Macedonian phalanx always delivered its charge eight deep.

...I don't make any such categorical assumption at all, and for example, if you read my article on the battle of Sellasia in "Ancient Warfare", you will see that I believe the Macedonian phalanx initially formed up with it's two component units one behind the other, 32 deep, then finally 16 deep in 'Epallelos'( interlocked phalanx)/ locked shields at 1 cubit/18 inches or so per man..... which is pretty certain because of the physical constraints of the saddle on which this combat took place. However the manuals do tell us that fighting was carried out in 'close order' at 3 ft/2 cubits per man generally.

I have not assumed that Polybios is referring to eleven rather I make the deduction based on the plain fact of his statement “From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is sixteen deep”. There is no need to suppose he means eight at all. Should he have he might have stated so or added: “after it has closed up”. He clearly indicates the charge here is by a “whole phalanx when sixteen deep”.

I'm afraid he does no such thing...as I pointed out in my previous post, in this passage Polybius doesn't say, indeed no author says, that the Macedonians actually fought 16 deep. There would be no need to add "after it has closed up" because it is clear from the the previous paragraph that he is talking about a 'close order' phalanx, and if my hypothesis is correct then his readers would know that a 16 deep phalanx in 'normal'/open order with the men 6 feet apart ( as Polybius categorically states) would close up to 8 deep to fight.

To go back to 357/6 and Philip’s battle against the Illyrians. The term for the Macedonian file was “dekad” and the phalanx made up of “dekades”. The clear implication is that it was originally ten men. Did Philip then, when marching on Bardyllis, go from “open order” ten deep to “closed up” five deep?

I would say "Yes" ! As I have mentioned, Xenophon refers to 4 deep as Hoplite 'battle formation', and I believe this battle , fought when Philip was so young and newly to the throne, was before his 'reforms' introducing the sarissa and that the macedonians fought, like their Illyrian enemies with longche and pelta.

I must point out that this is only one of several pieces of evidence that led me to believe that the hypothesis of thinking that when Greek authors referred to depth, it is with the troops in normal/open order and that all knew the formation closed up prior to fighting.

No, that is plainly wrong as Arrian is clearly speaking of horsemen:

Quote:As Alexander advanced, he found that the ground spread out a little in breadth, and he accordingly brought up his horsemen, both those called Companions, and the Thessalians as well as the Macedonians, and posted them with himself on the right wing. The Peloponnesians and the rest of the allied force of Greeks he sent to Parmenio on the left...

If he means infantry, as you infer, then Parmenio himself – until Alexander transfers the Thessalians – is the only cavalry on the left. Further, a few lines later, Arrian inconvertibly states these are cavalry:
No, since the word used is 'force' or 'division',(depending on translation) and not the word 'cavalry' as later (see below)the implication, I believe, is that the whole contingent, Horse and foot, is meant. Later, when talking of the impending cavalry battle, greek cavalry are specifically referred to.... put this implication together with other evidence and the idea that the Greeks were nearly all on the left flank ( with some, peltasts most likely, on the right flank), and this becomes a distinct possibility, and certainly a little more likely than that Alexander, badly outnumbered, left out of battle altogether one third of his Heavy Infantry, and to cover his front thinned his phalanx to a 'half depth' of 8 in close order ( assuming for a moment that your postulated 16 is normal) but we have been over this previously.....

Quote:Meantime when Alexander perceived that nearly all the Persian cavalry had changed their ground and gone to his left towards the sea, and that on his side only the Peloponnesians and the rest of the Grecian cavalry were posted there, he sent the Thessalian cavalry thither with speed...

At all events, I believe we have exhausted all the evidence regarding Polybius/Callisthenes, and it cannot be denied that at Issus at least, Alexander's Phalanx fought 8 deep in close order.

I'm off to the Sunshine Coast for four days as of now to beachcomb etc!

[Paralus]

...I don't make any such categorical assumption at all, and for example, if you read my article on the battle of Sellasia in "Ancient Warfare", you will see that I believe the Macedonian phalanx initially formed up with it's two component units one behind the other, 32 deep, then finally 16 deep in 'Epallelos'( interlocked phalanx)/ locked shields at 1 cubit/18 inches or so per man..... as I pointed out in my previous post, in this passage Polybius doesn't say, indeed no author says, that the Macedonians actually fought 16 deep. There would be no need to add "after it has closed up" because it is clear from the the previous paragraph that he is talking about a 'close order' phalanx, and if my hypothesis is correct then his readers would know that a 16 deep phalanx in 'normal'/open order with the men 6 feet apart ( as Polybius categorically states) would close up to 8 deep to fight.

I will read your piece: I have back-ordered the mag.

You will excuse me then for thinking that it is your assertion that the Macedonina phalanx fought eight deep: this appears to be the import of the interpretation (hypothesis - unproved) you apply to Polybios.

I will agree to disagree with the interpretaion you apply to Polybios' words to support your hypothesis as there is the possibility it is incorrect.

No, since the word used is 'force' or 'division',(depending on translation) and not the word 'cavalry' as later (see below)the implication, I believe, is that the whole contingent, Horse and foot, is meant. Later, when talking of the impending cavalry battle, greek cavalry are specifically referred to.... put this implication together with other evidence and the idea that the Greeks were nearly all on the left flank ( with some, peltasts most likely, on the right flank), and this becomes a distinct possibility.....

Again, this is wrong. It is clear that Arrian is referring to cavalry. His final statement of the dispositions - just prior to engagement - makes this quite plain:

On the left wing the infantry consisting of the Cretan archers and the Thracians under command of Sitalces were posted in front; and before these the cavalry towards the left. The Grecian mercenaries were drawn up as a reserve for all of them.

The afforementioned units (previous post) were cavalry ordered out to Parmenion just as the Companions, Thessalians, et al were ordered out to the right.

At all events, I believe we have exhausted all the evidence regarding Polybius/Callisthenes, and it cannot be denied that at Issus at least, Alexander's Phalanx fought 8 deep in close order.

Agreed. We disgree on the reason it did so.

I'm off to the Sunshine Coast for four days as of now to beachcomb etc!

And I shall, for Easter and the following week, be on the Gold Coast. The children will occupy Wet'n'Wild Water World, Dream World, Sea World and Warner Bros Movie Land and I will occupy the adult theme park Liquor Land. I shall be found in Twocans staging mock phalanx battles with empty black beer bottles in, most likely, loose drinking order...6 deep.

[Paullus Scipio]

Arrian II.9

On the left wing the infantry consisting of the Cretan archers and the Thracians under command of Sitalces were posted in front; and before these the cavalry towards the left. The Grecian mercenaries were drawn up as a reserve for all of them.

...this is the translation you posted. De Selincourt in the Penguin version translates thus....

In the van of the Infantry on the Macedonian left were the Cretan archers and the Thracians, under Sitalkes, with the cavalry on the left wing in advance of them; all units had a proportion of foreign mercenaries assigned to them.

Can any of our Ancient Greek speakers elucidate? I think the former version, as posted by Paralus perhaps makes more sense. On the left flank, the cavalry - Peloponnesians and other Allied Greek cavalry,( c.750) together with the Thessalians (2,100) behind these the Cretan archers and Thracian peltasts (6-7,000) - a skirmish line of light infantry; and supporting all these, the Greek Hoplites (7,000). These troops, under Parmenio, comprise the left wing and thus, as I said, the Hoplite Heavy Infantry formed the left of the Heavy Infantry Line (Phalanx).

It must be said that the only time (AFIK) when the depth, in battle, of Alexander's Phalanx is categorically stated is here when we are told it fought Eight deep in close order ( as opposed to 16, which I believe is the 'normal'/open order of the manuals). Similarly, the only passage I know that refers to the actual depth of a Hoplite 'battle formation' is Xenophon's four deep ( as opposed to the 8,10, or 12 we hear of in Herodotus and Thucydides - excluding the Thebans).Since we know that the way in which the Greeks/Macedonians formed 'close' order was for the rear half of each file to move up beside the front half, thus 'doubling' the number of men on the same frontage and halving the depth, the hypothesis I have put forward here ( only in part !!) is the one which fits all the known facts best.........at least until some more information comes to light !! D

[PMBardunias]

Since we know that the way in which the Greeks/Macedonians formed 'close' order was for the rear half of each file to move up beside the front half, thus 'doubling' the number of men on the same frontage and halving the depth,

I don't think we can state that doubling by interposing half files is the way they formed close order. Aelian makes clear that there are various ways of "doubling" in the same space and of extending and contracting the line. The one he describes in the most detail is the moving of alternate men in a file forward and to the side, like shuffling cards- second man in a file becomes the first in a new one.


He also describes the wholesale lateral movement of troops to close up or space out. This appears to have been done at Cynocephale for example: "he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right." One of the tacticians described this as halving their frontage and doubling their depth, thus the man on the left end of the line had to hustle right over a long distance! We could argue whether they ended up in close or opened order, but the point is that men were expected to make such gross lateral movements on the field of battle.

Xenophon describes in great detail the doubling you mention, so I have no doubt it is real. But clearly this is more than a means of moving from opened to close order or else you could only double once- then you would be in close order. Note that when he does this fictionally in the Cyropaedia they achieve a final depth of 6 ranks. But in the same time period we have Spartans increasing their depth by countermarching whole units behind allied units on the battlefield.

I don't necessarily believe that because they could double down to 6 or 4 that this means they normally did so. They could simply decide to deploy the 12 or 8 ranks of the prior double in close order, with opened order for the 24 or 16 rank stage, if they had no intention of making their ranks so shallow.

I think clearly there there were many possibilitiesfor how these things were done, but we should also note that rather complex phalanx-like formations can be created without extensive drill. The hoplites of many cities might not have known anything beyond getting into a group with their clan and standing behind or next to certain relatives. Perhaps one reason that only Spartans could fight effectively alongside anyone as we are told.

[Paullus Scipio]

Paul B. wrote:

I don't think we can state that doubling by interposing half files is the way they formed close order. Aelian makes clear that there are various ways of "doubling" in the same space and of extending and contracting the line. The one he describes in the most detail is the moving of alternate men in a file forward and to the side, like shuffling cards- second man in a file becomes the first in a new one.

...I did not mean to imply it was the only possible way, though it is the only way we know of for the earlier Hoplite period. It should be remembered that Aelian/Asclepiodotus/Arrian or rather their common source was writing of the Hellenistic phalanx in it's final and most sophisticated form, and the most complex drills devised....

He also describes the wholesale lateral movement of troops to close up or space out. This appears to have been done at Cynocephale for example: "he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right." One of the tacticians described this as halving their frontage and doubling their depth, thus the man on the left end of the line had to hustle right over a long distance! We could argue whether they ended up in close or opened order, but the point is that men were expected to make such gross lateral movements on the field of battle.

Cynoscephalae, in 197 BC against the Romans is one of the last battles of the Hellenistic Phalanx, and significantly is the only battle ( that I can recall off the top of my head), where such lateral movement is described, and in this instance it is for a very specific reason, namely that the Right half of the Phalanx occupied a ridge line ( the Ground of Tactical Importance) until the Left half of the Phalanx came up, then closed up laterally to make room for the left half.....
This highly risky manouevre was carried out with the Romans a considerable distance away, somewhere at the foot of the ridge, and with a peltast screen in place to cover it. It can be regarded as the 'exception which proves the rule', and the marching up of half-files to form close order was the most common/typical way of closing up for action, precisely because it did not involve a change of frontage....

The reference to the thinly disguised 'Spartans' getting to 6 ranks deep in close order in Xenophons Cyropaedia is another piece of evidence for my hypothesis, by the way - Spartans are commonly described as "12 deep" which again would refer to normal/open order, before they closed up to 6 ranks deep for the clash of battle.....

[Paralus]

Before we go any further, I should note that I don’t – inherently – find anything wrong with files filling space to “close up”. I just don’t think there is enough evidence to hang my gonads on it.

...I did not mean to imply it was the only possible way, though it is the only way we know of for the earlier Hoplite period. It should be remembered that Aelian/Asclepiodotus/Arrian or rather their common source was writing of the Hellenistic phalanx in it's final and most sophisticated form, and the most complex drills devised....

I disagree with the notion expressed in the last sentence. Polybios makes great play of the phalanx’s vulnerabilities and drawbacks and seeks to explain the Greek loss to Rome. Put simply, he describes its charge as irresistible as long as it maintains integrity. That, he avers, is impossible on anything other than cleared level ground. Off such ground it is want to fall apart. As well, he states it is only good for the charge and only in the one direction; it cannot manoeuvrer due to its pikes nor cannot it defend itself if breached in any fashion. It cannot disengage and face about and it most certainly cannot cope with creeks or rivers.

Cynoscephalae and Pydna ‘prove’ his argument (whether by design or not – the descriptions of both are his ultimately).

Despite Polybios’ derision of Kallisthenes, and unless the historical tradition which has come down to us is worth nought, Alexander’s phalanx demonstrably coped with all of the above. If Polybios is to be believed, the Hellenistic phalanxes of Philip V and Perseus were nothing near as skilled or flexible as that which Philip II bequeathed Alexander.

It is difficult to see that which Polybios describes performing the show at Pelium.

Cynoscephalae, in 197 BC against the Romans is one of the last battles of the Hellenistic Phalanx, and significantly is the only battle ( that I can recall off the top of my head), where such lateral movement is described, and in this instance it is for a very specific reason, namely that the Right half of the Phalanx occupied a ridge line ( the Ground of Tactical Importance) until the Left half of the Phalanx came up, then closed up laterally to make room for the left half.....

This highly risky manouevre was carried out with the Romans a considerable distance away, somewhere at the foot of the ridge, and with a peltast screen in place to cover it. It can be regarded as the 'exception which proves the rule'

I shall have to go look for more! In any case that leaves it, in a sense, one all.

Here the phalanx is definitely ordered to double its depth and close up…to the right. The “peltasts” referred to are part of the phalanx and not a screen – both are ordered to close up to the right. The light infantry, from memory, are engaged below and that which is not is deployed on the phalanx’s wings rather than in front.

The question is: why if the rest of the phalanx is still coming up from camp does Philip order this? So as to deliver a charge. Polybios also notes, in passing, that this wing was successful as they were “superior in the weight of their formation”.

[Paullus Scipio]

Paralus/Michael wrote:

Before we go any further, I should not that I don’t – inherently – find anything wrong with files filling space to “close up”. I just don’t think there is enough evidence to hang my gonads on it.

...For the earlier period, I believe there is sufficient evidence, particularly in Xenophon, as to leave little doubt....

I disagree with the notion expressed in the last sentence. Polybios makes great play of the phalanx’s vulnerabilities and drawbacks and seeks to explain the Greek loss to Rome. Put simply, he describes its charge as irresistible as long as it maintains integrity. That, he avers, is impossible on anything other than cleared level ground. Off such ground it is want to fall apart. As well, he states it is only good for the charge and only in the one direction; it cannot manoeuvrer due to its pikes nor cannot it defend itself if breached in any fashion. It cannot disengage and face about and it most certainly cannot cope with creeks or rivers......Despite Polybios’ derision of Kallisthenes, and unless the historical tradition which has come down to us is worth nought, Alexander’s phalanx demonstrably coped with all of the above. If Polybios is to be believed, the Hellenistic phalanxes of Philip V and Perseus were nothing near as skilled or flexible as that which Philip II bequeathed Alexander.

Well, the manuals certainly represent the epitome of the full evolution of Greek/Hellenistic drill. As to what the Macedonian style phalanx, especially the later ones, could and couldn't cope with depended on too many factors, not just it's drill standards. However, at Sellasia, the Macedonian phalanx ascended mountains, before, on their right tackling a Spartan fortified camp, and on their left ascending a mountain, marching over the crest and tackling the Spartan phalanx in a fairly narrow curved saddle....all of which gives the lie to the 'flat ground only' idea, or that the later Macedonian phalanx was necessarily worse than it's Alexandrian forebears. These are demonstrably incorrect cliches. Polybius' remarks are generalisations, and should be recognised as such....though I would agree that clearly what he says is generally true.

The “peltasts” referred to are part of the phalanx and not a screen – both are ordered to close up to the right. The light infantry, from memory, are engaged below and that which is not is deployed on the phalanx’s wings rather than in front.

Sorry, my usage of the term was careless - you are quite correct that 'Peltasts' was the elite unit of the phalanx, and to avoid confusion I should have used another term for the Light/medium troops who were mercenary and Thureos armed ( but who are referred to by the old term 'peltasts' in the manuals). Technically 'mistophoroi' or 'thureophoroi' is probably better.....
My memory was also incorrect regarding their deployment. Earlier, a skirmish between them and Macedonian cavalry, and the Roman velites and their supporting cavalry had gradually built into a battle which swayed to and fro up and down the slopes of the ridge.Ultimately, Philip received them ( his advanced force of mecenary thureophoroi and cavalry and light missile troops) into his ranks ( i.e. the Phalanx in open order) and ordered them to deploy to the right wing. Only then did Philip order the Peltasts and Phalanx to double their depth and close up to their right. When this manouevre was complete the Romans moving up the slope were quite close, and Philip ordered his men to lower their pikes and charge. The Roman light troops also withdrew through the maniples, and so the Phalanx crashed into the Legions. Given the downhill charge and their compactness into a sort of column etc it is hardly surprising that the Phalanx prevailed.

[MeinPanzer]

Sorry, my usage of the term was careless - you are quite correct that 'Peltasts' was the elite unit of the phalanx, and to avoid confusion I should have used another term for the Light/medium troops who were mercenary and Thureos armed ( but who are referred to by the old term 'peltasts' in the manuals). Technically 'mistophoroi' or 'thureophoroi' is probably better.....

Sorry to pick at this debate, but why do you think the troops referred to as "peltasts" in the manuals were thureophoroi?

[Paullus Scipio]

That's a tricky question, Ruben, and might lead us into yet another debate !! (
I'll try to be brief here.
Suffice to say that what the manuals are trying to do is divide Infantry into three basic types: viz, 'Hoplites'/Heavy infantry/Infantry of the line, who are shielded, armoured and either spear or pike armed ( Macedonian style) and fight hand-to-hand; Light Infantry are 'the opposite' to heavy, being un-armoured,shieldless and who use slings, arrows or javelins to fight at a distance. In between are 'Medium troops/peltasts' who are more lightly equipped than the Heavy Infantry, and who can both fight at a distance/skirmish and hand-to-hand if necessary. As described elsewhere, the thureos was adopted following the Gallic invasion of Greece. The thureophoroi who in effect succeeded the peltasts in the third century are sometimes termed euzonoi ( light troops) and fulfill the role formerly taken by peltasts.
For example Plutarch, describing the Achaean citizen troops following the adoption of the Thureos says they skirmished from a distance, but were ineffective at close quarters, and that their tactics were peltastikes (peltast-style). They were evidently not a great success as 'hand-to-hand' fighters, and it is probably significant that those Greek poleis ( cities) that experimentally replaced their Hoplites with Thureophoroi usually quickly re-equipped as a 'Macedonian-style' phalanx. By the 2nd century BC, the typical mercenary seems to have been mainly this type.

[MeinPanzer]

That's a tricky question, Ruben, and might lead us into yet another debate !! (
I'll try to be brief here.
Suffice to say that what the manuals are trying to do is divide Infantry into three basic types: viz, 'Hoplites'/Heavy infantry/Infantry of the line, who are shielded, armoured and either spear or pike armed ( Macedonian style) and fight hand-to-hand; Light Infantry are 'the opposite' to heavy, being un-armoured,shieldless and who use slings, arrows or javelins to fight at a distance. In between are 'Medium troops/peltasts' who are more lightly equipped than the Heavy Infantry, and who can both fight at a distance/skirmish and hand-to-hand if necessary. As described elsewhere, the thureos was adopted following the Gallic invasion of Greece. The thureophoroi who in effect succeeded the peltasts in the third century are sometimes termed euzonoi ( light troops) and fulfill the role formerly taken by peltasts.
For example Plutarch, describing the Achaean citizen troops following the adoption of the Thureos says they skirmished from a distance, but were ineffective at close quarters, and that their tactics were peltastikes (peltast-style). They were evidently not a great success as 'hand-to-hand' fighters, and it is probably significant that those Greek poleis ( cities) that experimentally replaced their Hoplites with Thureophoroi usually quickly re-equipped as a 'Macedonian-style' phalanx. By the 2nd century BC, the typical mercenary seems to have been mainly this type.

I should first note that I am only working from Asclepiodotus, as I think that his manual is the only one that can be verifiably linked to any true Hellenistic military practice.

Firstly, Asclepiodotus does not say that the psiloi are shieldless. He says merely that they A) fought at a distance using "javelins and slings, and in general those missiles which we call 'long-distance missiles'" and B) did not wear greaves or cuirasses.

Secondly, Asclepiodotus is explicit about the peltasts actually carrying peltai, as he states that they are lighter than the hoplites in part because "the pelte is a kind of small, light shield." These are clearly the more flexible, often elite troops that we find in Hellenistic armies and who did often form up with the phalanx, but who could also fight in a looser manner.

As you yourself say, we have some mentions of thureophoroi from the literary record as euzonoi. Since Asclepiodotus' category of psiloi doesn't exclude thureophoroi (since the commonest equipment we see them with is thureos, helmet, sword, and spear or javelins), but his category of peltasts explicitly does, it is only logical that the thureophoroi are included in the former category, and not the latter.

[Paullus Scipio]

As I said, I would not wish to get into yet another digression on the subject of peltasts/thureophoroi, but....
Ruben wrote:

I should first note that I am only working from Asclepiodotus, as I think that his manual is the only one that can be verifiably linked to any true Hellenistic military practice

....it is generally reckoned that all three manuals -Ascepiodotus,Aelian and Arrian are drawing on a common single source - sometimes thought to be Poybius lost section on this subject, but the source is more likely Posidonius. Asclepiodotus is mentioned by Seneca as being a follower of Posidonius, and both Aelian and Arrian refer to him.

Arrian says:" ....Light troops (psiloi) are the exact opposite in having no body armour,shield,greaves or helmet, but being trained to the use of missiles, arrows, javelins and stones slung or by hand..."

Aelian says:"...on the contrary the light infantry (psiloi) are equipped in the least cumbersome way; they wear neither a coat of mail, nor greaves, nor the heavier kinds of shields; but they use missile weapons, either arrows shot from bows or darts/javelins or else stones thrown from slings or with the hand...."

but elsewhere: "...the equipment of the foot-soldiers is of three kinds - some are completely armed, some just have shields, and some are light-armed troops( psiloi). The completely armed soldiers wear the heaviest armour of all; after the Macedonian manner their shields are round and their pikes are long..."

Clearly, these three 'classes' of troops are the broadest of generalisations. All three manuals say that the 'light/ medium' troops carry a shield lighter or smaller than the round shield of the heavy armed, which whilst it may be true of the argive aspis, isn't true of a Macedonian Phalanx who carry a species of pelta !

If we follow the manuals broad generalisation of 'light/medium'(peltastoi) as being troops who can skirmish in open order, or, thanks to having shields/helmets/some armour can also fight hand-to-hand ( though not able to withstand heavy-armed infantry) then Thureophoroi fall into this category, and are the natural successors to greek peltasts - the original ones. Which isn't to say that the pelta, if defined as simply 'light shield' had disappeared - it continued in use, no doubt, among other peoples but it appears to have been supplanted by the 'thureos', which also replaces the aspis among Greek mercenaries, so that instead of 'mercenary peltasts' and 'mercenary hoplites' as separate types, we now hear only of 'mistophoroi'(mercenaries) as a single category......

[Paralus]

Well, the manuals certainly represent the epitome of the full evolution of Greek/Hellenistic drill. As to what the Macedonian style phalanx, especially the later ones, could and couldn't cope with depended on too many factors, not just it's drill standards. However, at Sellasia, the Macedonian phalanx ascended mountains, before, on their right tackling a Spartan fortified camp, and on their left ascending a mountain, marching over the crest and tackling the Spartan phalanx in a fairly narrow curved saddle....all of which gives the lie to the 'flat ground only' idea, or that the later Macedonian phalanx was necessarily worse than it's Alexandrian forebears. These are demonstrably incorrect cliches. Polybius' remarks are generalisations, and should be recognised as such....though I would agree that clearly what he says is generally true.

Polybios’ remarks on the phalanx are framed by, indeed relate to, the just described battle of Cynoscephalae. It matters little that he precedes them by stating that “as promised here is my description” to paraphrase. The battle just described is the palate for painting the manifest drawbacks – as Polybios sees them – of the formation. The fact is that Philip’s (V) phalanx was not that of Sellasia and it most certainly was not that of Issos or Gaugamela; nor were the peltasts the hypaspists of those battles or Hydaspes. As Livy claims (33.3):

After his envoys had returned from their fruitless mission to Rome, Philip decided to raise troops in every town in his kingdom. Owing to the perpetual wars which had for so many generations drained the manhood of Macedonia there was a serious lack of men of military age, and under Philip's own rule vast numbers had perished in the naval battles against the Rhodians and Attalus and in the campaigns against the Romans. Under these circumstances he even enrolled youths of sixteen and recalled to the colours men who had served their time, provided they had any stamina left.

Polybios is, correctly one thinks, describing a phalanx nowhere near the peak of its prowess. That he then ascribes the ‘qualities’ of this phalanx (and the latter at Pydna) to that of Philip II and Alexander III (in his tirade against Kallisthenes) is a result of the fact that he knows only what he currently sees. Therefore Alexander’s phalanx could not possibly have marched across such a ‘plain’ as at Issos (it demonstrably did); it could not possibly have dealt with a river (it did both at Issos and Granicus) and it most certainly could not deal with being breached (it did both at Issos and Gaugamela.

More importantly its commander in those actions seemed to have little doubt that it would.

[Paullus Scipio]

I agree with every word of your last post, sir! :wink: D

The trouble is that every battle is unique, and the armies that fight each battle too......
My remarks were aimed to counter that common cliche that after Alexander, under the Successors, the Macedonian Phalanx rapidly declined from it's heyday - which is a patently untrue generalisation. Clearly at Sellasia, a hundred years after Alexander, it was as capable as ever.
At Cynoscephalae we see a Roman Army in a high state of efficiency after the Punic wars, ranged against a somewhat depleted Macedonian Phalanx, as you say. ( Philip was also stretched to the limits financially, as well as in manpower)...