New Book from Adrian Goldsworthy: How Rome Fell

[sonic]

German historians read English books, but American and British historians do not read German.

That's more a cultural failing, since the learning of languages is still not deemed important in many British schools. Thankfully, I learned the basics, but still remember having to 'plough' through Hoffman at University.

Another aspect is that the British have a great tradition of writing biographies, but it was only in the 1970s that historians like Moses Finley showed the importance of the social sciences and their methodology.

Yes, and I'm writing biographies ... Sorry

It may be that Cartledge did not agree with you about Weber's 'merciless' analysis and decided instead that he agreed with Meyer. Or maybe that he has not read Weber and has failed to recognise that there are concerns regarding the analysis.

Weber's analysis is irrefutable, and Meyer - who was a really great scholar - admitted as much. I am afraid that your second option is the right one: Cartledge has never read a book on method, which makes one ask how he can have become a professor in Cambridge.

Different expectations, I'm afraid.

Too often have I read works in which authors contradict themselves logically without appearing to realise it.

That's just bad writing, Ian. A good editor should notice that sort of thing.

A good editor... an extinct race. I am happy to own a book by a Dutch ancient historian containing more than 250 factual errors, more than half of them easily spotted by an editor up to his task.

Not all editors miss things: some read the books and then ask pertinent questions. (That's another £5 please Phil.)

[Robert Vermaat]

I think maybe you're being a bit mean there.

I happen to be one of those who struggled through University to find that I have no great talent for writing fluently, standing before a class of uninterested people (of any age) or write about the history of (relatively) well-paying but otherwise uninterested companies. So if I’m confronted by those who can write very well (I give them that!) but did not care enough to devote their time to the bare bones of historical study (I was told here on this very forum that History is not a science) and therefore are unable to do proper research before they write, then I can be harsh.

I agree wholeheartedly that anyone can (and should be able to) write a book, if they are lucky enough to have the time, a publisher etc. Tuchman and others like her should be regarded as superb examples of what can be done by 'self-taught' historians.

There are no ‘self-taught historians’. One becomes a historian only after completing an academic study in History and receiving the degree. Otherwise, one is ‘just’ a writer of books with a historical content.

Now I’m being mean. Right, but mean.

[Jona Lendering]

There are no ‘self-taught historians’.

I couldn't agree with you more (although I am willing to make an exception for Edward Gibbon). Historian is a job like any other job. There are no self-taught surgeons or self-taught judges; and even the owner of the pub around my corner has to have a certificate that he knows the basic rules about hygiene. But people like Tom Holland pretend that they can be historians, even though they are unable to define what a fact or an explanation is. Typically, they only use the hermeneutical approach, and make all possible mistakes. I am not saying professional historians never make these mistakes, but at least they have had courses of theory, and have at least once heard that -for example- the hermeneutical approach is very tricky.

[Robert Vermaat]

(although I am willing to make an exception for Edward Gibbon).

Should you? I thought that Gibbon studied history at Oxford?

[Jona Lendering]

I thought that Gibbon studied history at Oxford?

No, he did study over there, but "bewildered himself in the errors of the church of Rome", and his father sent him to Switzerland. As a historian, he was inspired by people like Montesquieu and Voltaire (whom he met), and especially Winckelmann - although it is uncertain whether he read the German's works. However, the idea to revive historiography by adding philosophical history and antiquarianism, is originally Winckelmann's.

Perhaps Gibbon could create his works because he was not professionally taught and always remained an outsider. The same can be said of Winckelmann: of lowly birth, homosexual, a German in Italy - the ultimate outsider.

[Epictetus]

I just finished this book. The UK title is The Fall of the West: the Death of the Roman Superpower. The title reflects Goldsworthy’s thesis: the Western Empire did in fact “decline” and “fall” and he gently scoffs at those who speak of a “transformation” instead.

Goldsworthy tackles an old topic in an old way: the fall of the West in a narrative history. Just like Gibbon, Goldsworthy begins with Marcus Aurelius and proceeds from there. This is familiar territory to everyone. He details emperors and battles, usurpers and barbarians. He semi-politely side steps such issues as culture, economics, demographics, law, philosophy or religion, explaining that there simply isn’t enough information about some of these topics to draw reliable conclusions. This is questionable, as he himself sometimes makes statements based on flimsy evidence if that is the only evidence available. It may have been better to just state that war and politics would be the primary topics of the book.

Even though this is telling a traditional theme in a traditional way, I found I was very interested. I’ve never read Goldsworthy before and thoroughly enjoyed his prose. It is very simple, but clear and direct. For instance, I liked this sentence, which is a good example of his style:

The restless, aggressive and very numerous Germans were always trying to push westwards into the rich lands of Gaul and beyond.

The sentence also demonstrates a very large portion of the book: military affairs. This makes sense based upon Goldsworthy’s past works. I confess that previously I’ve never paid special attention to such issues and so learned a lot about the Late Roman army.

When issues get complicated Goldsworthy helpfully supplies charts, not only of army hierarchy but even the civilian administration. In fact, the enormous and complicated bureaucracy, both civil and military, is frequently damned.

He points to internal decay as the reason for Rome’s fall. Emperors were more concerned about personal safety than the public good. As examples Goldsworthy cites all the times an emperor left a dangerous frontier to instead focus on an internal usurper. The massive bureaucracy was a system of patronage that bred corruption and incompetence. The layers of ministers were so bad that that often the emperor simply didn’t know what was happening. Goldsworthy does not believe that the enemies Rome faced were any more formidable than those of earlier periods, so dismisses this argument. As the point where it all starts to go bad, he cites the civil war after Commodus' death. This is an old conclusion, but of course is still perfectly valid.

In both the front and the back of the book Goldsworthy briefly draws parallels regarding the world today, especially America’s place as the sole superpower. These sections, while interesting, seem somewhat out-of-place, and I wonder if the publisher asked for something like this to be added and they were just tacked on.

I also can’t conclude without mentioning Goldsworthy’s strange treatment of Lucius Verus. Twice he inexplicably names Lucius Verus as the Caesar to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Later he correctly identifies them as co-emperors. After that, while counting the number of emperors in a time period, Goldsworthy gives two numbers – one if Verus is counted as emperor, and one if he is not! I honestly have no idea what the confusion is in regards to Lucius Verus. As far as I know, no one has ever doubted Verus’ status, so I have no idea why Goldsworthy gives such bizarre contradictory statements about him.

Overall, I can’t claim that this book is groundbreaking in any sense of the word. It is instead decidedly old school, but this is precisely one of its charms. It was riveting and I couldn’t put it down. I definitely recommend it.

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi David,

Thank you for a great review.

For instance, I liked this sentence, which is a good example of his style:

The restless, aggressive and very numerous Germans were always trying to push westwards into the rich lands of Gaul and beyond.

The sentence also demonstrates a very large portion of the book: military affairs.

And it also demonstrates his mindset. That rather outdated view of 'land-hungry tribes, pushing across the borders, threatening an endangered West'.. I don't think that the Germans were more (or less) aggressive than any other enemy of Rome. And geographically, when you look at the maps, the Germans were not so much pushing westwards as they were pushing southwards. From Scandinavia to Italy, Spain and Africa is not exactly pushing into the West.. But that's the Anglo-Saxon worldview of course, and also pushing modern buttons: The West Under Attack! Beyond Gaul was Britain of course (and America ), and Goldsworthy is writing for readers from those lands..

In fact, the enormous and complicated bureaucracy, both civil and military, is frequently damned.[..]
The massive bureaucracy was a system of patronage that bred corruption and incompetence. The layers of ministers were so bad that that often the emperor simply didn’t know what was happening.

A huge bureaucracy for those times, but totally incomparable to modern bureaucracies, and very incompetent. Teachers had to apply to the emperor for their salaries - how much of a bureaucracy is that? Also, as mentioned elsewhere on this forum recently, the total budget of the Roman state was rather small comparable to the gross national product. A few rich folks had a comparable income to that annual budget.. I agree that this was a problem, but that was more due to the corruption and other signs of an incompetent system than to the sheer size of it I think. One can look at this as a failed attempt of the Roman state to rule the empire, or as a sign of a bad society, which I think is how Goldsworthy looks at it. But what he did not do (I think, still have to read it in full) is to compare this to the 'other' empire, which i think developed its bureaucracy into an even more complicated and sizeable system. Yet, it survived.

As examples Goldsworthy cites all the times an emperor left a dangerous frontier to instead focus on an internal usurper.

A rather odd view. What was an emperor to do if not deal with the usurper? Of course, there's a weak system of government and succession behind it, and Goldsworthy would have done better to address that than blame the emperor for looking out for his personal safety.

Goldsworthy does not believe that the enemies Rome faced were any more formidable than those of earlier periods, so dismisses this argument.

I think this is a weak and debatable argument. The Sassanid Persians were perhaps not more formidable than their Parthian precursors, but they had different political goals and were much more aggressive towards to Romans. Also, the development of the German 'supertribes', who also developed their organization and military tactics, surely made them into a much more formidable enemy than their ancestors had been.

In both the front and the back of the book Goldsworthy briefly draws parallels regarding the world today, especially America’s place as the sole superpower. These sections, while interesting, seem somewhat out-of-place, and I wonder if the publisher asked for something like this to be added and they were just tacked on.

Of course he does, it's fashionable today. Compare this to Luttwak, for instance. We’ve discussed this before on this forum and I think there are very few grounds for comparison because the underlying examples differ too much. But it sells. :|

[Epictetus]

That rather outdated view of 'land-hungry tribes, pushing across the borders, threatening an endangered West'. I don't think that the Germans were more (or less) aggressive than any other enemy of Rome.

Yes, I agree. I quoted that sentence out of context just to illustrate his writing style, but he was speaking of earlier times when there were more raids and less land-grabbing. He points out that once some raids had success, this encouraged more and more raiders. So I think that his point is that they did not become more aggressive, but they were opportunistic. As Rome weakened and the percentage of successful raids increased, this encouraged more attacks. Think of it like a gambler who has a lucky streak going and decides to keep gambling instead of taking a break.

I agree that this was a problem, but that was more due to the corruption and other signs of an incompetent system than to the sheer size of it I think.

I suppose his point is that inefficiency and corruption increased with size. As an example he gives a case in Africa where a citizen got fleeced by an official and had to go through multiple layers of bureaucracy before reaching the honest emperor with his petition. Crooks along the way derailed his complaint and the victim was executed for bringing a “false” charge. Later it was revealed that the victim had been right all along, but of course it was too late for him. With a smaller bureaucracy it would have been easier to reach the emperor.

What was an emperor to do if not deal with the usurper?

True, but let me quote something from the book:

[Stilicho] was promptly executed, once again ordering his men not to protect him. His end was dignified, especially since it was rare for a senior Roman commander to accept death rather than take the chance of fighting a civil war. Perhaps he realised that he had been utterly outmanoeuvred and that his own position was now too weak for him to have any prospect of winning a struggle with Honorius. However, it is hard not to want to believe that he put the good of the empire before his own fate. It may even be true.

I suppose the idea of “dying for your country” seems a bit odd to us in this context, as he was not fighting a foreign foe. Regardless, Goldsworthy is clearly captivated by the idea and seems to admire Stilicho for not putting the Empire through another civil war in order to save his own skin. I think that he is implying that the same concept should apply to an emperor: sometimes it is best for everyone involved to fall on your sword instead of putting the Empire through a civil war.

I suppose he thinks that foreign foes should be dealt with first. He also semi-praises the break-away Gallic Empire and Zenobia’s Palmyrene Empire when they dealt with external foes instead of trying to march on Rome.

By the way, here is another thing I forgot to mention: Goldsworthy follows that newer idea of having one footnote for every paragraph and there listing all his sources. I have a habit of looking at other sources mentioned in footnotes when I read something, but this can be problematic in this format. A long paragraph may have 10 different sources in the footnote. Sometimes help is given for specific sections, but other times you are left to sift through each and every source to find which one you are looking for. It is rather frustrating.

[Rumo]

I suppose his point is that inefficiency and corruption increased with size. As an example he gives a case in Africa where a citizen got fleeced by an official and had to go through multiple layers of bureaucracy before reaching the honest emperor with his petition. Crooks along the way derailed his complaint and the victim was executed for bringing a “false” charge. Later it was revealed that the victim had been right all along, but of course it was too late for him. With a smaller bureaucracy it would have been easier to reach the emperor.

This is one of several things in the book I found poorly argumented. The author keeps asserting the bureaucracy was massive or swollen or inefficient without actually showing it was so. Well, maybe it was massive, but the empire was massive, too.

The episode in question, as Goldsworthy admits, "was exceptional. Corruption on such a scale did not pervade the entire administration of the empire and in the end due process caught up with the surviving conspirators."

However his comment that "the imperial view was limited and the increase in bureaucracy had if anything made it more distant, for all information was filtered and refined by others before it reached the emperor himself" doesn't seem to be justified. Did any Roman emperor get unmediated knowledge of all damaging raids occurring in all remote corners of his empire?

[Robert Vermaat]

I suppose the idea of “dying for your country” seems a bit odd to us in this context, as he was not fighting a foreign foe. Regardless, Goldsworthy is clearly captivated by the idea and seems to admire Stilicho for not putting the Empire through another civil war in order to save his own skin. I think that he is implying that the same concept should apply to an emperor: sometimes it is best for everyone involved to fall on your sword instead of putting the Empire through a civil war.

I wonder whether he read that situation right. Was Stilicho so very self-sacrificing? His family also bore the brunt of his death and he might have tried saving them. We were not there and we can only rely on damning or flattering commentators. I doubt that Stilicho was such a very nice person, given some of his previous actions.
As to Goldsworthy, I do think that in this case he aims too high. Given human nature, self-presevation comes first to most of us, and it cannot be held as a treat of a dying empire.

I suppose he thinks that foreign foes should be dealt with first. He also semi-praises the break-away Gallic Empire and Zenobia’s Palmyrene Empire when they dealt with external foes instead of trying to march on Rome.

Here, I am positive that he did not read the situation right. The Gallic and Palmyrene 'empires' do not seem to have been interested in marching on Rome, but rather more in making the best situation for their own region. With that, i think they are rightly seen as precursors of what happened later in the West (especially), when control over Rme was seen as less desirable than control of your own region. The Palmyrenes weren't Romans to begin with, but the Gauls (the provinces) had clearly different ideas than earlier usurpers. And of course stable and safe borders were part of those ideas.

By the way, here is another thing I forgot to mention: Goldsworthy follows that newer idea of having one footnote for every paragraph and there listing all his sources.

Goldsworthy or his publisher perhaps?

How do you feel that Goldsworthy treats the question that should be asked with any theory about the fall of the West: why did the West fall and the East survive? He seems to mention a lot of things that would normally be the same for both parts of the empire.

[mcbishop]

By the way, here is another thing I forgot to mention: Goldsworthy follows that newer idea of having one footnote for every paragraph and there listing all his sources.

Goldsworthy or his publisher perhaps?

Most publishers don't give a damn about what's in footnotes/endnotes, just where you put 'em (most hate footnotes these days, some hate all notes and ban them - I refuse to write for the latter). Coulston and I used one (end)note per paragraph for both editions of B&C as it is tidier and less fussy than one for each citation (and I also made it a rule that there was no discussion in the notes, just references). It's a typesetter/book design thing in me, I'm afraid; just like books that use underlining make me scream manically and attack the book with some form of power tool. Possibly an over-reaction, but hey, it's good for stress. ;-) ) When I typeset the Haverfield bio for Phil Freeman (published by Oxbow, who are always content to let me set my own books) he used footnotes and there are some massive ones in there that carry on for pages - this can cause some page layout software to fall over and whimper, so endnotes are often a practical solution, and one note per paragraph a logical economy.

Mike Bishop

[Lindsay_Powell]

Goldsworthy's book nicely complements Peter Heather's 'The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians, Oxford University Press, 2006.

[Like sonic (posting of Tue 17 Feb 2009, 17:06 ), I too am lucky to "have an understanding editor" (the same one, I believe) who recognises that learning about people and events in history can be valuable just for the compelling stories they represent.]

[Epictetus]

Yes, sorry: I should have said endnote, not footnote.

How do you feel that Goldsworthy treats the question that should be asked with any theory about the fall of the West: why did the West fall and the East survive? He seems to mention a lot of things that would normally be the same for both parts of the empire.

I’ve scanned through the book and found some of his arguments. Hopefully I didn’t miss anything important. Basically, Goldsworthy says that the threats faced by the Western and Eastern Empires in the fifth century were different.

Independent kingdoms
In the West, independent kingdoms were created inside its territory. In the East, its territory remained more-or-less intact. Many threats against the East, such as Attila, later moved West and there settled. “The eastern emperors were not forced to accept the permanent occupation by barbarian groups of substantial parts of their provinces.”

Geography
Geography helped the East survive. The Bosphorus was an obstacle protecting Asia Minor from northern barbarian groups, and of course the situation of Constantinople helped secured it.

Centres of power
And speaking of Constantinople: it was a large, rich and protected capital, bustling with business, government and religious activity. Constantinople was the centre of power in the East. In the West, Ravenna (and earlier Milan) was isolated from a great deal of administrative and spiritual power sources, such as the Senate or Pope in Rome.

Sudden losses of resources
The West faced some sudden, terrific losses. Africa is probably the best example: it was rich and fertile, and when the Vandals took the province it was a massive blow. The loss of Africa meant the loss of a major food supply and tax base. The East was helped by its sheer size. It was fertile, populous and wealthy which helped it to deal with threats and to withstand some blows. It did not face a sudden loss of a province like this until the Arabs took Egypt centuries later. (And it still survived that.)

Money
Since the East didn’t lose any rich provinces, it remained wealthy. It was able to fund defensive works such as the Theodosian Walls and to pay soldiers properly. “The Eastern Empire remained prosperous enough to support a large regular army and the imperial bureaucracy.”

Manpower
The East had “sufficient troops to deal with any problem,” unlike the West which was often forced to use one barbarian group to fight another. This balancing act was precarious. Also, “after Anastasius’ reforms [the East] was less dependent on mercenary and allied contingents or unwilling conscripts.”

Number and severity of external threats
It was easier to deal with one problem (Persia in the East) instead of a number of competing chieftains and kings. Persia was also weak and focussed on internal problems or their own northern borders during much of the fifth century. As such, it was “rarely inclined towards major aggression against their Roman neighbour.” When it did threaten, Persia was more interested in raids instead of permanent occupation of territory.

Number and severity of internal threats
The West had more civil wars than the East, further weakening it. Individuals such as Aetius could become very powerful and this helped start civil conflict. There were fewer civil wars in the East. Instead of a court being dominated by just a few individuals, the East had multiple people powerful enough to act as balances against each other. While the East did have some usurpers, these tended to be small-scale affairs instead of full-blown civil wars.

[Rumo]

David, many of those arguments are unconvincing.

For instance Goldsworthy states (p. 382):

• Some barbarian groups had been permitted to settle in imperial territory from 382 onwards. Of these a portion had subsequently migrated again, invariably moving into the lands of the Western Empire. Inevitably, we hear much less about any group that remained peaceful. Unlike their western colleagues, the eastern emperors were not forced to accept the permanent occupation by barbarian groups of substantial parts of their provinces.

How does Goldsworthy know that all migrating barbarians fled to West or that the remaining ones were not occupying substantial parts of the Roman provinces (compared to the West)?

And we have Jordanes, Getica, 264-7 accounting for several barbarian factions settled in the Eastern Roman territory during 5th and 6th centuries, some of them for quite a long while (like those Goths from the Nicopolitan region). Apparently Jordanes himself chose to "migrate" to Constantinople and become a "good Roman".

Also Goldsworthy gives this description of some Anastasian reforms:

• He seems to have made military service considerably more attractive so that volunteering was enough to satisfy the army’s needs. A little less use would be made in future of mercenary bands and allied contingents

What future? In Procopius' Wars we have many examples of barbarian mercenaries and generals (e.g. Mundus, Chilbudius) fighting for Romans and moreover, the lack of manpower was chronic in the east. Almost every war meant some other frontiers neglected, raided and eventually falling.

[Robert Vermaat]

I must say that I agree with Drago?, many of these arguments seem flawed or not convincing.

In the West, independent kingdoms were created inside its territory. In the East, its territory remained more-or-less intact.

But which time are we speaking of? I mean, sure, by c. 500 this was a fact, but c. 425 it wasn't. Groups of Germans inside the empire had their own leaders but that very different from them being 'independent kingdoms'. The Goths depended on Roman grain for a very long time, and the Franks did not become a 'kingdom' until the very end of the 5th century. As Drago? already pointed out, large groups of barbarians also settled in the east, and I would add to those the Isaurians, who had to be conquered by force (again, apparently) and who were not the only semi-independent group inside the Eastern empire.

Geography helped the East survive. The Bosphorus was an obstacle protecting Asia Minor from northern barbarian groups, and of course the situation of Constantinople helped secured it.
[..]
And speaking of Constantinople: it was a large, rich and protected capital, bustling with business, government and religious activity. Constantinople was the centre of power in the East. In the West, Ravenna (and earlier Milan) was isolated from a great deal of administrative and spiritual power sources, such as the Senate or Pope in Rome.

It's interesting to see that Milan and Ravenna are mentioned but not Rome, which also was large, rich, and relatively protected, plus connected to administrative and spiritual power (which of course was the basis for its continued importance, diminished or not, throughout the ensuing Middle Ages). And whereas Ravenna is mentioned, it's only seen as isolated, whereas its geographical position would be comparable up to a point with Constantinople. But Constantinople is not seen as 'isolated' by the sea, but rather the opposite! Strange conclusions, but no doubt seen with 20-20 hindsight.

The East was helped by its sheer size. It was fertile, populous and wealthy which helped it to deal with threats and to withstand some blows. It did not face a sudden loss of a province like this until the Arabs took Egypt centuries later.

That is simply incorrect. Recall Adrianople? The East lost Thrace often enough, with enemies marching up to the wall of Constantinople. The Goths also marched through Greece at will for several years, the Huns dominated Pannonia for years and years, and more than once the east lost parts of the entire Balkans to an enemy. That these lands were recovered later (before the 6th century, after which the east also lost immense parts of its territory for centuries) does not alter the fact that the East also suffered territorial setbacks from time to time.

“The Eastern Empire remained prosperous enough to support a large regular army and the imperial bureaucracy.”

What this says is (with the above in mind) 'the East was simply more lucky than the West, because it was able to retain more prosperity over a certain period of time than the West'.

It was easier to deal with one problem (Persia in the East) instead of a number of competing chieftains and kings. Persia was also weak and focussed on internal problems or their own northern borders during much of the fifth century. As such, it was “rarely inclined towards major aggression against their Roman neighbour.” When it did threaten, Persia was more interested in raids instead of permanent occupation of territory.

Again, this is an argument focused on just a short period of time, instead of looking at it for the entire period - and Goldsworthy stresses at the start of the book that to understand why Rome fell, we need to look at the empire from the time of its peak, which is why he starts with Marcus Aurelius. And looking at enemies over the entire period of time, the Persians were a much more formidable enemy than those 'competing chieftains and kings' threatening the Danube and the Rhine. Often enough the Persians had to be bribed for peace before anything could be done about the invading Germans - something not often done the other way round! When Persians were 'weak and focused on internal problems', we are only looking at them during a short timeframe, not the entire period. And after the West fell, during the 6th c., those Persians regained enough strength to become lethal again. Not a good example.

The West had more civil wars than the East, further weakening it. Individuals such as Aetius could become very powerful and this helped start civil conflict. There were fewer civil wars in the East. Instead of a court being dominated by just a few individuals, the East had multiple people powerful enough to act as balances against each other. While the East did have some usurpers, these tended to be small-scale affairs instead of full-blown civil wars.

Again, see the above. This is just looking at the mid-5th c. and after. And even so, is it correct? I say wee can Aetius to Aspar, the Alan 'Man of the East'.