Roman soldiers at Teutoburg Wald

[Anonymous]

Thanks for the info...<br>
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I will take a look for it.<br>
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(Based upon the '3 Block' explanation I think I was incorrect about Crulak trying to make a point about the SBCT.)<br>
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Given that this battle went on for several days it seems that it was more than an ambush. Yes, the Germans did surprise the Romans, but the latter continued to underestimate the former and continued to make poor decisions (to say the least) which only served to compound the original problem of marching into the ambush in the first place. Perhaps it was hubris and an assumption that the Germans could not out fight them that lead to the Roman defeat.<br>
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The idea that the small unit leaders lost control, and therefore the battle is an interesting one. I wonder though if we really have enough first hand information to make that determination. Still it does seem clear that the Romans lost the tactical initiative almost immediately and never regained it except for a few isolated units that were either exceptionally lucky, or exceptionally well led, or both.<br>
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Again thanks for the source info.<br>
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Narukami <p></p><i></i>

[John M McDermott]

Well, when you cut off a snakes head and cut the body into several pieces, the pieces will continue to writhe. However, the snake is most assuredly dead.<br>
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By analogy, we can see the Roman army cut into several parts, with no hope of re-unification and no hope of any commands from the head.<br>
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Caught in the killing zone, it had little other course but to die.<br>
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This is so fundamental to an ambush that there are few courses open to an ambushed army. At Quantico, we were taught that an ambushed force is to take immediate, decisive action, if it is to survive. It can attempt to flee the ambush as rapidly as it can or it can immediately assault into the face of the ambush. There is no time to plan, consult or frequently even to issue orders. Subordinate commanders and even individuals must act on their own without direction from above. Soldiers only do this when specifically trained to do so. I believe this type of training ran counter to Roman doctrine and capabilities.<br>
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It is clear that some Romans fought there way out. A subordinate or two must have acted correctly and taken matters into their own hands, and aggressively maneuvered their way out. The rest were doomed.<br>
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Had the Roman army had time to combine and get into tactical formation, they could have defeated the Germans. There arms technology and training were superior. They were denied this opportunity. Credit must go to Herman for seeing the correct tactic and picking his ground carefully. <p></p><i></i>

[Anonymous]

Quite right.<br>
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This was a classic ambush and indeed, the Romans never seemed to recover from the initial shock. Though I think they could have fought their way out had they not continued to underestimate their enemy and misread the situation.<br>
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As a counter, consider the 3-7 Armored Cav and their response to driving into a 'perfect' ambush in April of 2003.<br>
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www.fas.org/man/eprint/biddle.pdf.<br>
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This is a rather long report but you will find a good description of the action at Objective Montgomery on about page 20 or so. The 3-7 Cav read the situation correctly and responded immediately, with decisive results.<br>
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The Romans were also well trained, but as you say. perhaps not for this kind of encounter. I think too there was a good deal of complacency involved here, and it started right at the top with Varus. He set the tone, and his troops paid the price.<br>
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Narukami<br>
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