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Battle order
#16
Re: phalanxes<br>
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"That a hoplitic phalanx could be used aggressively is banal to the extent that one of the two sides in a battle was trying to win. The OTHER hoplitic phalanx was defending"<br>
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Strategically, this is true. Tactically, which is where formations of any kind make the most difference, the usual rule for Greek warfare was that both sides were marching forwards. They were both attacking, and met in mid-field. This is not the same as what was being done by the Anglo-Saxons at Hastings. Yet Harold's formation would qualify as a phalanx, by a loose definition. So would a cuneus, or the mixed archer and spearmen formations of the 10th century Eastern Roman armies.<br>
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"To defeat a mass of men you need another mass of men. A numerous group of men, to have any real effective weight, must be in a formation of some minimum density, else no degree of useful cohesion can be ensured. PERIOD.<br>
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All other details -perfered weapons and way of striking at enemy, with spear of sword, type of armor, use of very heavily armored and shield to shield formations or less dense, more open ones- are variations that some armies specialized in, or, a given army might apply in various tactical variations. The best ancient exmple of the latter is the flexible roman army. "<br>
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This implies that the English formation at Agincourt is also a "phalanx". I would submit that this usage makes "phalanx" mean "any infantry formation except a Roman legion". <p></p><i></i>
Felix Wang
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#17
Good point. But it does make my point too.<br>
A phalanx is too generic to be of any use. Without qualifiers the confusion mounts quickly. The generic word phalanx simply indicates any situation wherein a formation counted more on mass rather than on some articulation; i.e. almost all ancient and medieval infantry armies in almost all battles. Even the romans used a "phalanx" formation (Cannae, Arrian,...).<br>
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The roman infantry army, over a very long period of its semi-professional then fully professional history, had available in its basic tactical repertoir an articuation and a flexibility that they could and did systematically apply.<br>
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Other peoples did simply did not systemically have this option. Only under exceptional commanders, hence for limited periods of time, could they stage an articulated army that could do more than hope to win simply by using a straightforward formation based on sheer numbers. It takes a great charismatic commander and veteran soldiers to make a Hannibal-like army that could adopt sophisicated tactics. Of course also Philip and Alexander created a magnificent army, in mnay ways the best of ancient history. But its greatness came mainly from the dymanic use of cavalry in combination with the sheer weight of the macedonian phalanx that could only go straight. But father and son were unique, did not consolidate a system, and once they passed away that line of tactical evolution withered away.<br>
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Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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#18
I think the best way to define formations is by order, in which have basically close order formations and open order formations, and then within them we can distinguish different weapon systems, eg a close order pike formation. or spearmen formation, or musketeers, etc. Of course, many units could manouver and/or fight in open and close order, eg. the legionaries could throw their pila in open order and then close ranks to fight with the gladius <p></p><i></i>
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#19
Great thread! A few comments: I took fencing many years a go and was told that the reason (in foil) one fences for 5 points or 15 minutes is that based on the experience of the French fencing masters ( who were the first to set up systematic fencing schools) a soldier could fight for 10 to 20 minutes, the average being 15 and then is exhausted and must replaced or he dies quickly. The Romans using muscular effort to fight just like Renaissance swordsmen. and since human beings all have the same basic physical capabilities I would assume that the Romans (presumably the Centurions) had to replace men about every 15 minutes.<br>
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I think goffredo is right, any system beats no system, and it seems quite likely that brief breaks in the fighting occurred during ancient battles (exhaustion). I hope, goffredo, that I am paraphrasing you accurately here.<br>
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Colonel Dodge in his book Caesar has the gaps being closed by the men moving from close order to open order. He may be right, he may be wrong, but it is a logical theory.<br>
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What I have a hard time comprehending is: only the very first man in the line could actually fight. So does this mean that at some point in time the man standing behind him took his place and he fought? And further along in time the entire front line was exhausted and had to be replaced?<br>
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My own opinion is that when you consider that the line had to be kept coherent, the troops relieved periodically, the enemy moves countered (talking about at the local century/cohort level here), that Roman officers must have been well trained and fully earned their pay! <p></p><i></i>
Tom Mallory
NY, USA
Wannabe winner of the corona
graminea and the Indy 500.
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#20
Yes I agree. For a formation to maintain coherence I imagine that replacement of individuals should not be left to occur randomly only when exhaustion sets in (or worse: wounds and even death) because coherence could be quickly lost.<br>
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Best to find a way to make a whole segment change simultaneously. NOTE I used the word "segment" rather than "line" because I do not think it possible for a whole line, a legion's worth, maybe not even a cohort's worth. By segment I mean a fraction of the front line, short enough that a single centurion could visually monitor and command. So I imagine some degree of coherence in the front-liner replacement at small, maybe medium scale level, certainly not to the largest scale.<br>
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On a larger scale units of men could be moved about on the field using visual and sound commands (tubas), but I am trying to imagine what happend at the level of the individual's experience.<br>
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I think the unit organization in the immediate radius of tens of meters about him, not hundreds, was what made him feel he had a purpose and a chance to survive. I certainly do not believe he was left to himself or hoped the guy behind him would kindly take his place. The replacement occurred because it was ORDERD to take place.<br>
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Of course replacements occurred piecemeal as they were needed, but I am thinking of a coherent change of many men. This is what made real sense as no individual was expected to fight until he collapsed. Instead the change was programmed! That the coherent change could take place was ensured by the natural lulls. That a unit could coherently do their "dance" during those lulls was because they were TRAINED to do it, and they kept the enemy's countercharge in check maybe by:<br>
(I am thinking/guessing; any ideas?)<br>
1) barrage of pila by third, forth liners? (not too far away, not too deeply behind) this would keep enemy hurting and incapacitate them at least for some precious moments during which the "dance" could occur;<br>
2) second liners stepping forward while the front-liners, those to be replaced, stood firm in guard. For a moment the roman line was doubly dense, truely shield to shield, as the spent front-liners stood abreast the fresher second-liners. This compactification would intimidate the shaky and unstable enemy.<br>
3) the now new front liners would step forward and aggressively charge and hack at the enemy. The natural movement is forward, and if the enemy lines has been clobbered and disorganized by pila, I think it would be hard to stop.<br>
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It was essential that they fight aggressively enough to take the initiative during the lulls. Actually I imagine that they could even set the rythm of the fight! Once you lose the initiative then you become passive and very quickly end up simply doing your best to absorb the next charge; you quicky lose the resources to take the initiative back one you lost it. Keeping the initiative had the highest premium because it fueled a feedback that was based on the natural instability of group fighting: the group that did not have the initiative fought worse; consequently those that had the initiative fought better; consquently those that did not have the initiative found it more and more difficult to get it back (if they ever had it); consequently those that kept the initiative made more and more progress; conquently... !<br>
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In my mind a big battle was a coral effort of many fighting episodes over many portions of the battle field. Each portion might tell a different story; nearby portions certainly interacted with one another more than distant portions did. Certainly if a single portion broke it might jeopardize the whole line. A ancient general had to make sure there was some degree of coherence between the various parts. The very nature of such physical way of fighting made things very unstable. The staying power of a formation depended on its coherence, because only in a group will men fight well and might survive. For the same reason loss of coherence quicky made the formation fragment and if fragmentation went too far things got worse and worse until everything went terribly wrong and the massacre began.<br>
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The romans made a system of raising the critical threshold towards eccessive fragmentation by adopting an articulated formation; they introduced from the start a certain degree of initial fragmentation. Rather than invest everthing in a rigid formation they understood and anticipated certain tensions and invested in coherence at the medium and small scales. As no large formation behaves as a solid block (except maybe on parade grounds!) then it is best to organize smaller well organized units that might fair well along a portion: i.e. make sure that each portion, each segment, was able to do essential things.<br>
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It goes without syaing that small scale organization is quite natural even in enemy formations: everyone has buddies; then there are brothers, cousins, blood ties of all sorts; tribal structures,... But these do not usually compare with the type of organization that can be instilled in a group of people, initially complete strangers, that are trained to fight as a unit in well rehersed ways.<br>
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Jeff<br>
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p.s. sorry for long and not very coherent reply. Its very hot and stuffy here and I just drank a large cold beer! Hmmm good <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://p200.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showUserPublicProfile?gid=goffredo>goffredo</A> at: 8/9/04 7:24 am<br></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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#21
Excellent post Jeff, cold beer is always agood isnpiring source in summer<br>
I agree on your picture of battle, I would like to add just some minor comments<br>
1) The Hellenistic phalanx was also divided in small subunits, the smallest one being the lochos (16 men) and the tactical unit, equivalent to the manipulus, was the syntagma (256 men, 16x16) It is not a case of articulated Roman legion against rigid phalanx (not that you said that, simply to clarify matters)<br>
2) I think some automatic replacement should have to be taking place whithin units at individual level, say a manipulus of hastati deployed 4 ranks deep, I am sure a dead or wounded soldier would be inmediately replaced by the comrade in the second rank behind him, probably there would be also some sign by which an exhausted soldier in the front line asked to be replaced. Then, organized replacement would be implemented when the whole manipulus was replaced by the principes manipulus that was standing behind. This replacement being done with both formations opening ranks (that was a well documented standard procedure to replace front line units at least as far back as the XVI century, roman military historians should take a look to other periods better documented to see how things worked in battle)<br>
<p></p><i></i>
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#22
A good general description of battlefield replacements, from Appian's account of Philippi:<br>
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"They had little need of volleys of arrows, or stones or javelins, according to the custom of war, since they made no use of the other techniques and manoevers of battle, but came to grips with drawn swords, inflicting and receiving thrusts and trying to push each other out of formation... and as the bodies were carried back out of the way fresh men took their place from the reserves. The commanders, riding about and visible everywhere, urged the men on in their surges forward... and relieved those who were exhausted, so there was always fresh spirit at the front. Finally, Octavian's troops started to dislodge the enemy line, as though they were tipping over a very heavy piece of machinery. Their opponents were pushed back foot by foot... but once their formation had been disrupted they retreated more rapidly, and as the reserves of the second and third line joined the retreat they all became mixed together..." (Appian IV.128.)<br>
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Particularly interesting is the line about 'their surges forward' - this implies that the two lines were not in constant contact, but that the battle was a series of short clashes, with one side or the other pushing forward, engaging, and then holding steady to dress ranks and remove casualties. The 'commanders' (and I don't have this in the original to check the correct term used - whether it be centurions, tribunes, legates or whatever Greek alternative Appian used) would therefore have been able to coordinate the steady reinforcement of the front line from the reserves - the second and third lines, as the text later makes clear. <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://p200.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showUserPublicProfile?gid=nathanross@romanarmytalk>Nathan Ross</A> at: 8/9/04 6:53 pm<br></i>
Nathan Ross
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#23
Quote:</em></strong><hr>The commanders, riding about and visible everywhere, urged the men on in their surges forward.<hr><br>
Appian's Greek says <em>hoi stratêgoi</em>, "the generals", presumably Octavian and Brutus. <p></p><i></i>
** Vincula/Lucy **
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#24
Saw the other day a TV sequence of a riot in South Korea. The Police with usual plastic shields and in vague formation and the rioting crowd with moltovs and big sticks!<br>
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It was very interesting to watch both sides. Occasionally, after long time intervals in which each side would stand at a safe distance, one side would suddenly charge the other. In the TV sequence I saw both sides charge the other a couple of times.<br>
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Looking closely all the charges were best described as surges starting with a single person. That individual evidently worked up enough frustration to act out and strike at the annoying opponent. It seemed as if the outburst of that single person then triggered off similar behavior in those nearby and a surge occurred; i.e. they were not really coordinated charges!<br>
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Mind you this occurred in the Police force too. There was no audio in the TV sequence but to me it seemed as if the coordination of the Police surges were not superior to those of the rioters. I suspect that the portion of the riot that I was watching had actually degenerated with the Police Commander having little or no command at all. It was simply a case of two groups beating at each other in a very simple and straightforward way.<br>
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In front of a surge the opposing group sort of disintegrated falling back away from the oncoming threat. An interesting thing happened: as the defenders backed off, the density of attacking surge dropped and the attackers lost momentum: i.e. the surge extinguished itself! For a moment the attackers are very unstable and in once instance I saw a counter surge, again started by a single individual, sweep the attackers back.<br>
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This is the risk of a emotional surge versus a coordinated charge. If enough people don't participate in the surge then it can disolve. In any case the location of the no-mans-land is indeed momentarlity pushed forward. But if it is not consolidated by the group that surged then the opponents will counter-surge and no net progress is made. For one side to progress it is important it follow-up and fill the gap.<br>
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How do these "tribal warfare" observations apply to ancient battles? Any comments? My own comment/question is the following: In massive ancient battles was there not too little room (any at all?) for a defending side to disperse into so to dilute the oncoming surge? <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://p200.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showUserPublicProfile?gid=goffredo>goffredo</A> at: 8/27/04 1:05 pm<br></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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#25
Hi Goffredo,<br>
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Brilliant observation.<br>
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My comment would be that decent training would make all the difference. I can imagine Celts charging like this, individually or on command, but the Romans would not fall back I think!<br>
That's why Roman units, even when inferior in numbers, could carry the day any time.<br>
Maybe some South Korean police commander should read a good book.. or else get that German soccer trainer to train his force as well!<br>
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Valete,<br>
Valerius/Robert <p></p><i></i>
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
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#26
I agree that training would be an important difference. In terms of training, the police are amateurs and the mob is just a mob. From what I recall, the Germanic tribes did compensate to somoe extent for their lack of formal training - by fighting in tribal, clan, or familial units. A mob is just that: a collection of individuals, mostly unknown to each other although (sometimes) having some sense of common purpose. This may be political, or an ethnic identity, or whatever. Sometimes the mob is just a crowd of looters. In ancient societies, tribal and familial identity were literally vitally important. A stranger or someone outlawed (literally outside of the law) could often be killed, enslaved, or otherwise abused with impunity.<br>
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In this kind of social system, fighting alongside your brothers, cousins, etc. was a powerful bond. An aggressive member of a family might be able to pull the rest of his kin along with him into the fight; and running away meant abandoning people on whom your life, livelihood, and social status depended. This is not comparable to a modern mob.<br>
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The other factor to consider is the role of command. It is possible that the indecisiveness of the police was due to a lack of command; but it may have been due to a deliberate command decision (such as "we don't want too many crowd casualties, so let's just contain them and let them tire themselves out", or "we'll wait for reinforcements before charging aggressively", etc.). Of course, the mob wasn't commanded, far less so than any Celtic warband, so their behaviour is less useful as an example. <p></p><i></i>
Felix Wang
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#27
That description of surges sounds similar to Phil Sabin's "The Face of Roman Battle" if I recall correctly (I don't have access to it right now and it's been a while since I've read it...). 'The Face of Roman Battle', Journal of Roman Studies 90, 2000 <p></p><i></i>
Dan Diffendale
Ph.D. candidate, University of Michigan
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