Summarizing the Third Century Crisis

[Jona Lendering]

It's more difficult to say things in few words than in many pages. Do you think that the following summary is adequate?

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Increasing pressure on the Roman frontiers led to the creation of new legions: Matcus Aurelius added two, Septimius Severus three. This could not be financed (Roman Empire had no economic growth), so they debased the denarius. Because the soldiers realized they were cheated, they demanded more money; and this created a spiral of inflation, which made an adequate defense very difficult.

The deepest crisus was during the reign of Gallienus, when the Empire was split into three parts. This made it possible to look for new solutions. In the Gallic Empire, defense in depth was developped; Gallienus and the Palmyrene leaders preferred to put more soldiers on horseback. All this was even more expensive, but it worked, especially because the three empires had better defined borders: Rhine, Danube, Euphrates.

Although Aurelian -who united the three empires- gave up the Gallic system and the separation of the three command zones, Diocletian returned to these. The tetrarchy essentially was a return to the separated command zones (although with four sectors). A monetary reform (from silver to gold) enabled financing all this. Constantine again preferred defense in depth and built very heavy fortifications.

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I am not quite sure about what I say about the soldiers on horseback and Diocletian. If defense in depth in Gaul strikes you as odd: trust me, that's a recent contribution of Belgian archaeologists.

[D B Campbell]

Increasing pressure on the Roman frontiers led to the creation of new legions: Matcus Aurelius added two, Septimius Severus three.

I'm afraid I disagree with this statement, Jona. The late John Mann demonstrated that new legions were always raised in preparation for conquest, not as a reaction against external pressures. Marcus had his eye on Germania/Bohemia; Severus on Parthia.

Gallienus and the Palmyrene leaders preferred to put more soldiers on horseback

I'm a little sceptical about that one, too. Can you demonstrate it?

[Jona Lendering]

Gallienus and the Palmyrene leaders preferred to put more soldiers on horseback

I'm a little sceptical about that one, too. Can you demonstrate it?

I hesitate as well. I learned this during my first year, and never encountered it again. That's why I'm posting it... :wink:

[D B Campbell]

For what it's worth, I believe the key to the so-called Third Century Crisis was the coincidence of barbarian invasions, natural catastrophes and civil war amongst usurpers, which exacerbated financial difficulties by disrupting the economy.

Another Marcus Aurelius or Septimius Severus could probably have weathered the storm. You can see things picking up again under Aurelian, so it was just an unfortunate episode rather than a trend.

But then Diocletian took a more authoritarian stance, which has coloured our view (imho), encouraging us to see a continuing process of decline.

Just my tu'penny-worth.

[Carlton Bach]

Gallienus and the Palmyrene leaders preferred to put more soldiers on horseback

I'm a little sceptical about that one, too. Can you demonstrate it?

I hesitate as well. I learned this during my first year, and never encountered it again. That's why I'm posting it... :wink:

That one is based on a brief note in IIRC Zonaras, who states (erroneously) that Gallienus first raised cavalry units. Unfortunately, the term paper I wrote on that is on a 3.5" disc and the disc seems to be dead. Anyway, there is a good chance Gallienus raised cavalry - everybody seems to have - but I would be very careful with the assumption that he instituted any set policy or was any kind of first.

Generally, do we even know that the third-century crisis was directly related to military expenditures? I haven't looked into the matter in years, but I distinctly recall back then that scholars could barely agree on the central points, let alone clear causation and mechanisms.

[D B Campbell]

Generally, do we even know that the third-century crisis was directly related to military expenditures?

I don't believe so. There was a gradual debasing of the coinage, but it was mainly due to economic disruption (iirc). One good Parthian War would've set the finances straight again! (Unfortunately, along came the Sasanians ...)

[Timotheus]

Generally, do we even know that the third-century crisis was directly related to military expenditures?

I don't believe so. There was a gradual debasing of the coinage, but it was mainly due to economic disruption (iirc). One good Parthian War would've set the finances straight again! (Unfortunately, along came the Sasanians ...)

Can we determine how long then the influx of loot from a Parthian War propped up the Empire? I dont mean overal like the Empire would have failed this many years longer.

More of a question oh how long did they live large on the loot from one particular Parthian plundering before it was drained and the Romans were forced to go on an expedition again.

[Jona Lendering]

That one is based on a brief note in IIRC Zonaras, who states (erroneously) that Gallienus first raised cavalry units. ... Anyway, there is a good chance Gallienus raised cavalry - everybody seems to have - but I would be very careful with the assumption that he instituted any set policy or was any kind of first.

You and Duncan confirm my doubts. Thanks.

More of a question oh how long did they live large on the loot from one particular Parthian plundering before it was drained and the Romans were forced to go on an expedition again.

If I recall correctly, Birley thinks the loot from Ctesiphon postponed the crisis with a decade or two. The trouble is that when Birley wrote his biography of Severus, there were no quantitative studies of Roman coinage, based on the number of dies, as we now have. I am unaware, however, of such a numismatic study, although this is the obvious strategy to say something meaningful about Roman finances.

Another Marcus Aurelius or Septimius Severus could probably have weathered the storm. You can see things picking up again under Aurelian, so it was just an unfortunate episode rather than a trend.

I'm not really sure about that; although I think the extent of the crisis is exaggerated, and that we must allow for regional variation, the combination of declining trade (decline of number of wrecks) and inflation suggests something serious. Neither am I confident about the qualities of Aurelian. The fall of the Gallic Empire meant the end of the Rhine army, and it took six years until Probus was able to restore some order; it was only Constantius Chlorus who restored the Lower Rhine frontier.

[Epictetus]

Michael Grant points to coinage to bolster the idea that Gallienus instituted a new phase of cavalry-centred military organisation. However, this is fairly dated (1985.)

The coinage of Gallienus celebrated various virtues attributable to this new elite cavalry force, including its speed (ALACRITATI); and a particular appeal was made to its loyalty (FIDEI EQVITVM).

Grant, Roman Emperors, page 171.

[Praefectusclassis]

Jona, you may want to try to get your hands on the 7th volume of the Impact of Empire conferences. It addresses mostly structural and less the military parts of the crisis (whenever, whereever and to what extant it was a crisis).
It has always been drilled into me that it is important to point out that the crisis left some areas more or less untouched. Re: the defense in depth aspect, the Augsburg stone that tells of a Germanic raid that was intercepted on its way out of the empire is a beautiful piece of evidence.

[Theodosius the Great]

I think the Sassanids should be much more emphasized in the summary. Their rise was the greatest and most dangerous external change that the empire had to deal with. The Persians were hellbent on expansion whereas the Germanic tribes were merely raiding on an unprecedented scale.

The old empire simply wasn't organized to repel large armies on two fronts. Or three fronts for that matter - i.e. the Rhine, Danube, and Euphrates.

The author Peter Heather cites the rise of the Sassanids and the Huns as two primary reasons the Western empire eventually fell. Both peoples appeared almost suddenly and the empire took decades to adapt to their new circumstances. To adapt to the Sassanid invasions and the Germanic raids the Romans felt the need to adopt a Dual Monarchic principle, as mentioned earlier. To adapt to the Hunnic pressure in Europe both the Western and Eastern emperors admitted larger groups of barbarians into the empire and settled them on the frontier provinces (e.g. Gratian, Valens, Theodosius I, etc..)

As for Constantine's fortress building program, I thought he was merely completing Diocletian's plans. Besides, Constantine belongs in the fourth century (post-Crisis). :wink:

~Theo

[jho]

Increasing pressure on the Roman frontiers led to the creation of new legions: Matcus Aurelius added two, Septimius Severus three. This could not be financed (Roman Empire had no economic growth), so they debased the denarius. Because the soldiers realized they were cheated, they demanded more money; and this created a spiral of inflation, which made an adequate defense very difficult.

It has been suggested that inflation was actually fairly modest (<4% p.a.) up to the era of Aurelian (cf. Inflation and Financial Policy under the Roman Empire to the Price Edict of 301, Alfred Wasink, Historia, Volume 40 / 1991), therefore inflation as such may not have played a major role in the crisis.

[jho]

In the Gallic Empire, defense in depth was developped; Gallienus and the Palmyrene leaders preferred to put more soldiers on horseback.

I believe that the concentration of troops at central locations was more due to the fact that the emperors needed them to fight their fellow Romans and also needed to stay in personal contact with them to survive than to any changes in defensive strategy. With respect to the "increase" in the number of cavalry, evidence is shaky and it has been pointed out that the strategic speed of cavalry armies is far lower than that of infantry armies. Again, this may be more of an issue of concentrating "high value" troops closely around the emperor.

Re: the defense in depth aspect, the Augsburg stone that tells of a Germanic raid that was intercepted on its way out of the empire is a beautiful piece of evidence.

Given the ragtag nature of the force that defeated the Iuthungi (apparently including local militias), I am not sure that it can be taken as evidence of any sort of policy.

[Jona Lendering]

It has always been drilled into me that it is important to point out that the crisis left some areas more or less untouched. Re: the defense in depth aspect, the Augsburg stone that tells of a Germanic raid that was intercepted on its way out of the empire is a beautiful piece of evidence.

The Limes Tripolitanus and the Bu Njem ostraca are another case in point. The province was flourishing and the ostraca show a garrison that is working normally.

[D B Campbell]

Jona, you may want to try to get your hands on the 7th volume of the Impact of Empire conferences.

Wow -- that one had passed me by. (Pity it's unavailable in Glasgow. :x )