Late Roman TFD (Topic For Discussion): Justinian I

[Ioannes_Ahenobarbus]

We all know about the emperor Justinian's expeditions to the West in the early-mid 6th century, as well as their eventual outcomes. But, I'm going to throw out an excellent discussion subject for you all:

Was Justinian's reconquest a failure (in his own time)? Was it doomed from the start? If so, for what reason(s)?

Now this is a speculative topic, but we have a lot of smart people on these forums, so I expect you guys to come up with some interesting things to say. 8)

[Theodosius the Great]

The western campaigns were certainly not a failure in his lifetime since the empire retained the reconquered territories for at least a couple of subsequent reigns, IIRC.

Everything went smoothly until the plague ruined everything. Had the Great Plague not appeared when it did I submit that the reconquests would have been far more permanent. The dramatic loss of tax revenues and population greatly strained the remaining resources of the empire to almost breaking point, IMO.

The reconquest of Spain would probably have been easy since, like Italy, it was also ruled by Goths but who were also divided among themselves, IMO.

~Theo

[Ioannes_Ahenobarbus]

Ah, the reconquest of Spain...think of the possibilities!

Many people, scholars and laymen alike, believe it was Justinian alone who brought about the ruination of the empire during the early part of the seventh century! If anyone can prove this to me, I will give them my entire early 2nd century legionary kit!

Nevertheless, thanks for your input. I happen to agree with the bit about the plague, by the way.

[sonic]

Was Justinian's reconquest a failure (in his own time)? Was it doomed from the start? If so, for what reason(s)?

First, you'd have to define what is meant by 'reconquest': how long was it in planning? what were its aims? what are the criteria for success and failure? etc.

[SMC]

Hi,
This was a standard tutorial/exam question at Queens and I took many tutorial classes on this one. It always produced a wide variety of answers, helped by the fact that the scope of the question brought in other aspects of 'renewal' such as legal reforms, religious policies and patronage of the arts.

The above points about judging success etc., are important to ask. What did Justinian genuinely expect to achieve?

Key points to consider should include:
Was it a planned reconquest of the west? For example was the expedition to N.Africa intended to retake the territory from the Vandals - it only had 15000 troops according to Belisarius. There is a good argument that it was just the equivalent of gunboat diplomacy such as sending the US 6th fleet to the Eastern Med when the situation demands a presence. It took two months to get there and stopped in Sicily for a week so there would hardly have been an element of surprise.
Holding the recaptured N.Africa was hardly a success - it was long sruggle against the Moors and a series of mutinies.

Did the Byzantines expect to get tied down in Italy for so long? It took them untill 553 I think to put down the last elements of Ostrogothic resistance, and then the Franks invaded nothern Italy anyway. There was not the manpower to conduct all the siege operations and hold towns captured/recaptured on both sides.

Was any of this wise given the position on the Eastern frontier? The Endless Peace was signed with Persia in 532 which freed troops for use in the west, but should he have expected it to last? There had been warfare almost continuoulsy from 502-532 and it erupted again a few years later with some terrible reverse for the Byzantines in 540. Warfare in the east lasted almost continuously until 627 and the eastern frontier was by far the most important for the empire.

Given that why did Justinian get involved in Spain? Here he may have learned some lessons. There is little evidence of the direct use of Byzantine troops, it was more a case of token support for a rebelious prince.

Finally the plague issue? Was there really a major plague? Belisarius and John Malalas both say it was very bad and that it kept recurring. However, where is the archaeological evidence - no plague pits, mass burials have been discovered. Undoubtedly there was a plague but how bad it was and how widely spread it was are much less clear. Many contemporary sources make absolutely no mention of it.

Hope this gives some food for thought.

[Timotheus]

Is it possible that we would see less evidence of plague in Constantinople due to it being a port? Large numbers of bodies could be disposed of at sea and thus leave little to no evidence to be found.

[sonic]

Finally the plague issue? Was there really a major plague? Belisarius and John Malalas both say it was very bad and that it kept recurring. However, where is the archaeological evidence - no plague pits, mass burials have been discovered. Undoubtedly there was a plague but how bad it was and how widely spread it was are much less clear. Many contemporary sources make absolutely no mention of it.

Why should archaeological evidence be found? I'd agree that mass burials/plague pits would be dug, but given the (relatively) small size of these, plus the fact that any dug outside the walls have now been built on, I wouldn't expect to find any. Furthermore, do we know whether the victims were buried or cremated? As already mentioned, there was also the possibility of disposing of the bodies at sea.

I would suggest that using negative evidence from archaeology to counter a specific claim in ancient sources is very unwise. Furthermore, the fact that the plague is not mentioned in other sources may be worrying in some respects, but the individual sources then need to be assessed for purpose, to show whether mentioning the plague was actually necessary for purpose.

For example, Procopius (not Belisarius! :wink: ) mentions how bad the plague is but only in one major section. Apart from that, the possibility that the plague has any effect on the Empire is by-passed. This suggests that the historical tradition at the time was not interested in acts-of-God, as such, but more attuned to the behaviour and reactions of individuals.

[Ioannes_Ahenobarbus]

Aha, very good input! Just what I was looking for guys, thank you for comments.

As a response to Mr. Hughes' and McCotter's valid questions, I am forced to say that the 'reconquest' includes the territorial/physical control (or perhaps imperial hegemon to support the gunboat diplomacy idea?) of Italy, North Africa, Spain, and I might as well add the Gallic provinces (even though, historically speaking, this never came to pass). As for the judging of success or failure, I think it is self-explanatory with my newly added explanation above.

Aims, then, would be the eventual regaining of the 'Western Empire' and its joining with and retention to the 'Eastern Empire' thus (re)forming the Roman Empire, territorially speaking. It's heavy, I know.

The planning, in this sense at least, does not fit into my schema despite its historical importance, but is more of an ancillary question in relation to this discussion, one which I will not address here.

As far as the small number of troops involved, I would like to bring up two points. First, if Procopius can be believed on this point (most scholars seem to think so), Justinian was hesitant in placing too many troops under Belisarius. And even though good ol' Belisarius would probably have not acted in a rebellious manner, one can easily understand the emperor's recalcitrance on the matter. Much more can be said about this, but I'll let you guys roll it over a bit. Second, Justinian seems to have been - how to put it - a cheapskate when it came to the military. 'As few as can do the job',seems to have been the mantra. He put very few soldiers into the area of operations, considering how many he could have used. This does not include mention of the Persian front, nor of the plague. But just a couple ideas.

Keep'em coming!

[sonic]

The planning, in this sense at least, does not fit into my schema despite its historical importance, but is more of an ancillary question in relation to this discussion, one which I will not address here.

But the question about planning is vital: if, for example, Justinian never planned to invade Gaul, then the reconquest was, to a very large degree, a success. If Gaul was included, then it must be seen as only a marginal success at best.

As far as the small number of troops involved, I would like to bring up two points. First, if Procopius can be believed on this point (most scholars seem to think so), Justinian was hesitant in placing too many troops under Belisarius. And even though good ol' Belisarius would probably have not acted in a rebellious manner, one can easily understand the emperor's recalcitrance on the matter. Much more can be said about this, but I'll let you guys roll it over a bit. Second, Justinian seems to have been - how to put it - a cheapskate when it came to the military. 'As few as can do the job',seems to have been the mantra. He put very few soldiers into the area of operations, considering how many he could have used. This does not include mention of the Persian front, nor of the plague. But just a couple ideas.

The problem I have is that I have covered all of these questions in the book that will be out next year, (see the thread "New book on Belisarius"), so I am a little wary of including all of the information here and so rendering the book 'Old Hat'.

I'll just say that historians who claim that Belisarius was not given enough troops, and then go on to claim that Justinian was a 'cheapskate' have simply read their Procopius, taken it at face value and not taken other events into account.

[Ioannes_Ahenobarbus]

To the first point, again, I included Gaul as a type of "what if" scenario, just assuming Gaul is included. Ergo the original planning is moot to me, in this instance. Although, obviously I must admit it would be crucial to a more serious discussion (or a book, in your case, which I am looking forward to!).

Unflinchingly believing in Procopius' every word is of course poor scholarship. I will certainly not debate that point.

Thanks again for the comments.

[Theodosius the Great]

I agree with John. Speculation about the aims of the emperor is probably futile, IMO.

Who knows what's in the mind of any given emperor ? The best we can do is run a cost / benefit analysis to determine success / failure, IMO.

Was the empire enriched and made more secure by the reconquests ? Yes and yes, at least in the medium term. The Mediterranean Sea was pacified and trade was allowed to flow unmolested again since the mid-5th century.

OTOH, Greece and Illyicum were exposed to Slavic invasion. But the western Balkans were always considered by the Romans to be a backwater. It was merely a land bridge between western Europe and the East. Hence it tended to be underdeveloped throughout Roman rule. Constantinople and Thessalonika, which were strong enough to withstand barbarian raids and sieges, were the only valued cities in the peninsula.

The African campaign more than paid for itself. It ended up being the crown jewel of all the reconquered territories. The Berbers were a nuissance for a while but were eventually checked.

Italy was impoverished because of the prolonged campaign there due to politics and the plague. But it was a prize worth having before the war broke out.

The Spanish foothold was cheap and easy enough to hold due to internecine feuds among the Visigoths. It would have served well as a staging ground for future expansion.

Another dimension to the campaigns was a religious one. All the campaigns greatly contributed to the erosion or elimination of Arianism. This would have been seen as a great victory by the emperor and his new Catholic subjects.

So, I think the entire reconquest (assuming it was planned as one reconquest) was a net gain for the empire, not a wash or a loss.

I'll just say that historians who claim that Belisarius was not given enough troops, and then go on to claim that Justinian was a 'cheapskate' have simply read their Procopius, taken it at face value and not taken other events into account.

Indeed. There were enough troops but too many generals. :wink:

~Theo

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

OTOH, Greece and Illyicum were exposed to Slavic invasion. But the western Balkans were always considered by the Romans to be a backwater. It was merely a land bridge between western Europe and the East. Hence it tended to be underdeveloped throughout Roman rule. Constantinople and Thessalonika, which were strong enough to withstand barbarian raids and sieges, were the only valued cities in the peninsula.

Amazing there were more than one emperor who loved Athens, odd for a backwater..... :wink:

[Ioannes_Ahenobarbus]

There were enough troops but too many generals.

I wonder which is worse, what you said, or too many troops and not enough generals? :lol:

But yes, the Balkans were regarded as sort of a backwater, at least as much as we can tell. Athens is not really included in the Balkan area. It was included in Greece, which the Romano-Byzantines differentiated from the Balkans. I guess the appropriate modern description for the "backward" area would be (approximately) everything west of Thrace to the Adriatic, and north of Macedonia to the Danube.

[sonic]

I agree with John. Speculation about the aims of the emperor is probably futile, IMO.

Who knows what's in the mind of any given emperor ? The best we can do is run a cost / benefit analysis to determine success / failure, IMO.

Actually, I think that if you analyse Justinian's actions you can determine whether he meant to 'reconquer' the West or not. By looking at the resources applied, the goals aimed at etc. it's possible to come to definite conclusions about this.

There were enough troops but too many generals.

I wonder which is worse, what you said, or too many troops and not enough generals? :lol:

Now THAT is a good question! Hmmm.......

There weren't too many generals - especially as some of them were actually very good at their job. What there were were a few generals who were politically, rather than militarily, oriented, and who thought Belisarius wasn't the best general for the job. Take those few away and the army was actually superly led.

I think I'd rather have too many generals: although the infighting could become severe, at least you'd have the chance to take the initiative. Too few troops and you can't actually DO anything.

But yes, the Balkans were regarded as sort of a backwater, at least as much as we can tell. Athens is not really included in the Balkan area. It was included in Greece, which the Romano-Byzantines differentiated from the Balkans. I guess the appropriate modern description for the "backward" area would be (approximately) everything west of Thrace to the Adriatic, and north of Macedonia to the Danube.

The Balkans simply weren't economically vital to the East. When analysing the responsibilities of East and West, it would appear that for the sake of balance the East should have been responsible for the Balkans: after all, they had long borders but many of them were relatively peaceful and covered by deserts. In effect, all they had to counter were the Persians. Therefore, to help the West, they should really have covered the Balkans as well - which they did up to Adrianople.

However, after Adrianople they lost control and although not economically vital to the East, strategically they were vital to the West as they allowed an easier route into Italy than crossing the higher mountains to the north and west.

[Ioannes_Ahenobarbus]

Too many generals or not enough? That deserves its own thread! :wink:

Although true we might ascertain some semblance of a cohesive plan, we can not know if maybe Italy and Africa represented some sort of 'phase I' with Spain being the start of 'phase 2' or some such. Maybe Brittania would be 'phase 5'! 8)

Anyway, it is an interesting thought, if nothing else.