Rome\'s most able general?

[Paullus Scipio]

Robert wrote:-

Yeah yeah, gimme a laudes!

....don't you have enough, yet? :lol:
I reserve those for exceptionally good posts.... and there is one coming your way soon for another of your posts.... D

[Robert Vermaat]

Robert wrote:-

Yeah yeah, gimme a laudes!

....don't you have enough, yet? :lol:

No no no, I'm a collector!

I reserve those for exceptionally good posts.... and there is one coming your way soon for another of your posts.... D

Ooh.. me wanna know! :lol:

[Paullus Scipio]

I thought you would have guessed...........patience!!!

Meanwhile, is there no Late Roman General that fits the bill of 'most able', in your view? Belisarius was looking like a candidate there...until you decided he had 'feet of clay'.........

[Robert Vermaat]

I thought you would have guessed...........patience!!!

I may have, something beginning with A I think - but I'll wait...

Meanwhile, is there no Late Roman General that fits the bill of 'most able', in your view? Belisarius was looking like a candidate there...until you decided he had 'feet of clay'.........

There might be, but to call him 'most able' would be presumptious. After all, Victoria's question was about the whole of the Roman period - I might go for an earlier generel instead.

The odds were so much different for several periods - did Roman generals who could wield those mighty legions of Hadrian's day, actually have it easier than those generals who fought from the small city in the early days, or those with mercenary armies in the latter days of the West?
And, does that make them lesser generals?

[Paullus Scipio]

Robert wrote:-

The odds were so much different for several periods - did Roman generals who could wield those mighty legions of Hadrian's day, actually have it easier than those generals who fought from the small city in the early days, or those with mercenary armies in the latter days of the West?
And, does that make them lesser generals?

...of course, that is entirely correct - each General faced different and unique circumstances......one might have a good army, another have only recruits, one might face a tough or numerous foe, another a small band of armed raiders little more than an armed mob, one might have had freedom of action, another acting under stern control from the Senate or Emperor..........the obstacles and challenges faced by each must have been unique, but we are here considering the ability of each Roman General to deal with their unique circumstances, are we not? So, whose ability in dealing with their separate and unique problems stands out ?....

[antiochus]

......well my vote for one who fits all those would be Scipio Africanus, who not only reformed the army, . D

Paul, I'm all ears about what these army reforms are you refer to.

[Paullus Scipio]

Alas, they may be somewhat disappointing from your point of view, Steven, since they are largely tactical rather than organisational, but here goes......
Firstly, the Barcids in Spain had produced over a long period of time a "professional", full-time (albeit mercenary) army, composed of multi-national contingents - and this army, with Hannibal at it's head represented a crisis the like of which the citizen-militia of Rome had only faced relatively briefly previously (Pyrrhus' army). The Barcid army could manouevre, drill and respond tactically in ways the Roman citizen-militia, commanded by "amateur" annual magistrates, could not. Cannae was to highlight this problem, and expose all the faults of the Roman system when facing "professional" opponents commanded by a brilliant "professional" General......
Fabius Maximus (Cunctator) could only stem, but not resolve the problem.
Rome needed to sacrifice it's system of annual command.....This had first occurred with the elder Scipios, sent to Spain and not replaced or superceded, except by death......
Scipio Africanus 'broke the mold' in that he was sent to Spain with sole and prolonged command ( donec deballatum foret) at an age too young for major command, never having held curule command, yet given pro-consular imperium/power to carry on in Spain until victory was won.......( although it should be said that there was an element of 'no-one else wanting the job').He was given similar power in Africa later.....

He was thus arguably Rome's first "professional" General with time to tactically reform his army, and whose soldiers looked to him as Commander,( apparently the first to be hailed Imperator by his troops...) rather than an annual succession of Generals ( yes, I am aware there had been occasional exceptions to the 'annual' rule in the past, and there was the Elder Scipiuos referred to above..).

Traditional Roman tactics involved (at this time) the triplex acies (three lines of maniples) formation in depth and had served Rome well, even standing up to Pyrrhus' Phalanx and elephants, but whilst it was trained to advance and retire, and to change over lines, it could not wheel or turn easily, or adopt other formations. This depth and resilience and 'changeover' tactics were it's strength but the inability to manouevre was also a grave weakness, exploited to the full by Hannibal at Cannae and earlier( whose army could wheel, extend it's wings, change formation, extend front and make a flank attack)
It was this weakness that Scipio, with his long-term command, was able to address and change. After the fall of Cartago Novo(New Carthage), he armed his troops and trained them in new drill and tactics.He was the first to introduce ( so far as we know) individual weapons training, which was to be carried on by Rutilius Rufus and Marius ( who apparently utilised the expertise of gladiatorial schools), and may have introduced the Gladius Hispaniensis as standard, (The later Suda/Suidas , following a lost passage of Polybius (frag.179) records this occurring during the Hannibalic War, and since Cartago Novo was an arsenal, this seems the logical opportunity - though elsewhere there is evidence in PolybiusII.30.8; 33.5 that this occurred much earlier....perhaps Scipio merely emphasised expertise in the 'new' weapon) He also taught his troops to move in sub-units (Maniples and for the first time, Cohorts, rather than as lines/acies.) Indeed, Polybius first uses the term 'cohort' of Roman troops( as opposed to Allies who were organised in cohorts) when describing three maniples of Roman troops moving together at Ilipa. (Polybius XI.23 - Livy, at 28.14.17, has a slightly garbled version) [i](edit: Actually, I am guilty of an over-simplification here. While use of cohorts as tactical units seems to have first occurred in the second Punic War in Spain, it seems they were in use before Scipio took command. Livy(XXV.39) tells us of Lucius Marcius concealing a cohort with cavalry support in woods to ambush Carthaginians a year or so before Scipio takes command. Under Scipio this use of cohorts as tactical units seems to have expanded, probably because maniples were too small ( liable to be over-run) and legions too large to pin down the elusive spaniards.Cohorts continue in use in Spain, but maniples were used elsewhere, especially in the East against the Phalanx (e.g.Cynoscephalae, where 20 maniples act independently) and at Pydna( Paullus orders the maniples to act independently against the phalanx). Even Scipio continues to use manipular tactics e.g. at Ilipa, where the velites withdraw through the gaps in the maniples, though the outflanking manoeuvre seems to have been carried out by cohorts( or units of three maniples, if you will). At Great Plains and Zama Scipio uses the manipular triplex acies...in both battles bringing up the maniples of Principes and Triarii on the flanks....Manipular tactics under Marius and Sulla are heard of even as late as the war in Africa against Jugurtha (grandson of Scipio's friend Massinissa), apparently.(112-105 BC)[/i]
The results of these tactical reforms were first seen at Baecula - where Scipio used the Roman Legionaries to carry out a 'flanking' attack, ( they usually occupied the centre) though he failed to surround Hasdrubal, which would have given him a decisive victory.....
At Ilipa, once again at the critical moment, The Roman legionaries carried out an outflanking manouevre, (having suddenly been deployed on the flanks instead of in the centre) by turning outward and moving in 'cohorts' as Polybius tells us, to outflank the more numerous Carthaginians.... whether this entailed an actual organisational change ( the cohorts may have already been 'administrative' units) is not known. This time the Carthaginians were only saved from complete destruction by a providential thunderstorm and downpour. This innovation ( of using 'cohorts' as a tactical sub-unit) would become standard later...... Ilipa was Scipio's masterpiece, justifying his reforms ...
Later, it would be veteran 'volunteers' from this Army that would provide the core of Scipio's invasion of Africa, and pass on these tactical reforms to the army, where they would re-appear at Great Plains and Zama....

Thanks to these reforms, the Roman Army would never again be 'rigid', but instead flexible and manouevrable, with the 'new' "professional" i.e. full-time, legionaries appearing for the first time ( many of them would go on to fight in Greece) , being better trained in individual skills, and better at drill and manouvre in sub-units (maniples and cohorts).

So, as well as tactical reforms, we may credit Scipio with instigating the later organisational change into 'cohorts' and the introduction of professional soldiers who were both the strength and bane of later Republican Warlords, such as Marius and Sulla, and Caesar and Pompey ( settling veterans became a big social and military problem in the Late Republic)......all of this began with Scipio, and indirectly, Hannibal....

[Ygraine]

Paullus, am I correct in guessing that George Patton is on your (modern) list of greats, given your signature?

As to my question, I did not mean to ask who was simply the most successful or who had the greatest area of conquest - for that could more easily lend itself to circumstance and timing (although those are always factors).

What interests me the most is knowing who was the most "able". I would define that as someone who made the most of each situation, was innovative, as well as brilliant both offensively and defensively, and exhibited great leadership to his men.

[Paullus Scipio]

Ygraine/Victoria wrote:-

Paullus, am I correct in guessing that George Patton is on your (modern) list of greats, given your signature? Yes, despite Patton's somewhat (to many eyes) flawed character, he was certainly among the great commanders of WW II
As to my question, I did not mean to ask who was simply the most successful or who had the greatest area of conquest - for that could more easily lend itself to circumstance and timing (although those are always factors). I agree, which is what prompted my first post!

What interests me the most is knowing who was the most "able". I would define that as someone who made the most of each situation, was innovative, as well as brilliant both offensively and defensively, and exhibited great leadership to his men.
Yup, wouldn't disagree there either...."able" as in 'skilled'......and I would still champion Scipio Africanus as the "most able" Roman General...he meets all your criteria exactly, and better, in my view, than other candidates!

8) D

[PMBardunias]

Paullus, am I correct in guessing that George Patton is on your (modern) list of greats, given your signature? Yes, despite Patton's somewhat (to many eyes) flawed character, he was certainly among the great commanders of WW II

Since he was a reincarnated Carthaginian, doesn't he count as an ancient general? :wink:

What interests me the most is knowing who was the most "able". I would define that as someone who made the most of each situation, was innovative, as well as brilliant both offensively and defensively, and exhibited great leadership to his men.

Does Sertorius make the list as a Roman? I've always admired those men who through force of personality, rather than inherited station, can command at this level.

[Paullus Scipio]

Paul B. wrote:-

Since he was a reincarnated Carthaginian, doesn't he count as an ancient general?

:lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:
....for those puzzled by the reference, Patton was a staunch believer in reincarnation, and famously claimed to be Hannibal, one of Caesar's Legion commanders, one of Napoleon's marshals and others in 'previous lives' (Napoleon too was a believer...claiming to be Charlemagne in a previous life! )

[Sardaukar]

Well..I have always liked "less popular" choises as best general, but I find it impossible to name one.

My personal favourite is Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa. His military prowess enabled Octavianus to become Augustus and he did not lose battles, even against quite accomplished commanders like Marcus Antonius or Sextus Pompeius. In sense, his exploits on battlefied had at least as much or more impact to Roman history than Caesar's, if we look at lasting effects.

Gaius Julius Caesar, well...everybody knows him..."Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres", bane of every Latin student... :lol: Probably one of the best battlefield commanders Rome ever had..but his judgement *before* battles were sometimes suspect. His way of taking huge risks, even gambles, often put him and his army into extreme peril. That he always managed to save his bacon makes him probably among the best, if not best battlefield commander of ancient times, but not best general. After re-reading Adrian Goldsworthy's "Caesar", I tend to re-read J.F.C. Fuller's "Caesar: Man. Soldier and Tyrant", latter, while having lot of flawed assumptions, has some very astute (in my opinion) and not too complimental observations about Caesar's character as general. While I am great admirer of this great man, I'd not advocate him as best Roman general overall.

Quintus Sertorius is one of my favourites too..after all, he repeatedly humiliated Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus on battlefield in Spain. And his ability to fight both conventional and unconventional engagements makes him one of the most versatile commanders.

Scipio Africanus, Scipio Aemillianus, Marius, Sulla..and Lucius Licinius Lucullus, who was excellent general..and quite a character too... lol:

I don't really care who was greatest, I like to learn about them all.

[markusaurelius]

Hi Robert,

Of course you raise some good points. And yes I realize there is a "gap" between Adrianople and Aetius The Battle That Led to the Fall of the Roman Empire" By Alessandro Barbero. I'm looking forward to the read.

I think that perhaps Aetius was not the "best" general, however when compared to the types of people that seemed to be left in the empire by that period, his feats "stuck out", to say the least. Valentinian III was too busy playing to realize that by the next generation there would not longer be a Roman Emperor.....

Falvius Aetius all the way

[antiochus]

Alas, they may be somewhat disappointing from your point of view, Steven, since they are largely tactical rather than organisational, but here goes......

Firstly I must thank you Paul for the elaborate answer that by all appearances must have taken some time to compile. Because of my investigation into the organisations of the Roman legions, it has drawn me into their tactical applications, which I have included in the book via various battle studies.

The later Suda/Suidas , following a lost passage of Polybius (frag.179) records this occurring during the Hannibalic War,

Can you supply the exact reference?

He also taught his troops to move in sub-units (Maniples and for the first time, Cohorts, rather than as lines/acies.) Indeed, Polybius first uses the term 'cohort' of Roman troops( as opposed to Allies who were organised in cohorts) when describing three maniples of Roman troops moving together at Ilipa.

Unlike some academics, I do not find Polybius’ first time use of the term cohort as proof of when it was introduced. Those that do then, for the battle of Illipa, ignore Polybius’ account of ONE cohort being used for the outflanking manoeuvre in favour of Livy’s THREE cohorts. All of a sudden Polybius’ reliability is quietly put aside. This approach shows selective academic investigation to promote a predefined theory. Academics should explain and prove why Polybius one cohort should be rejected in favour of Livy’s three cohorts.

Thanks to these reforms, the Roman Army would never again be 'rigid', but instead flexible and manouevrable,

During the Samnite wars the Romans could withdraw the hastati and send them on flanking manouvers. Even in the early republic, there are incidents of detaching units to go on flanking manouvers in order to have them arrive behind the enemies’ rear. At Sentinum the Romans are manoeuvring units from one front to the other. In 314 BC, 1200 men are transferred from the left wing to the right wing to give assistance. The reason why Scipio used an outflanking manoeuvre at the Great Plains is because those poor 4,000 Iberians were abandoned by the Carthaginians. They lost all flank protection. Scipio’s best option was to surround them. It was nothing he originally conceived as part of his major battle plan. It was nothing more than an opportunity that presented itself. Any Roman commander could have done it with the old Roman legion organisation.

So, as well as tactical reforms, we may credit Scipio with instigating the later organisational change into 'cohorts'

But then how do you explain Dionysius and Livy’ use of cohort for the early republic, not to forget the middle republic period? If memory serves me correct, Livy uses the term cohort fifteen times in books I to V. Dionysius somewhere around 11 times, and on four occasions gives the number of men in a cohort. If your answer is ‘anachronistic practice’ (the academic mantra), then how can you prove it? In fact I will ask any academic to prove it is anachronistic.

[Chilperic]

I don't know anything about earlier Roman commanders though I find Sardaukar's comments on Caesar compelling (a bit like Wellington, then?). As for the late candidates suggested so far, I must say I've always thought Belisarius hugely over-rated, though clearly somewhat talismanic. Lucky rather than skilful, but then didn't Napoleon say (something like - and in French!) 'give me lucky generals rather than good ones'?

I don't see how Aetius would make the cut, if only because we don't know anything about his battles. He was certainly energetic and won a number of engagements against non-Romans - although from reading Sidonius' Carmina it would seem that his defeat of a Frankish invasion was more an attack on a wedding party - but when up against Roman opposition he never did better than a draw (if I remember correctly). I also think (increasingly) that seeing him in the light of Gibbon's comment - 'the last Roman' - misses the point of fifth-century politics. He was a faction-fighter like everyone else and it was the indecisiveness of those faction fights that destroyed the Empire (e.g. came to prominence originally backing a usurper; had Felix killed; got rid of Boniface after several attempts; etc.). Certainly the Empire was in no better condition when he died than when he acquired assured control of the court in the 430s; in many respects, in terms of the extent of the imperial writ, it was worse off (most prosperous part of Africa lost; situation in Spain worse; Gothic military control of, and kingdom in, Aquitaine formally recognised; retrenchment in the south of Gaul; etc). His murder was much less important than Valentinian III's the next year. The one thing that could hold the factions together was a shared loyalty to the imperial dynasty. Once the Theodosian house was extinguished, as the history of the next 25 years shows, none of the factions was prepared to acquiesce in the legitimacy of the rule of any of the others. Avitus, Majorian and Anthemius were all perfectly good emperors and indeed in other eras might have become great emperors but (with the possible exception of Anthemius) they all lacked that crucial element of dynastic legitimacy.

On a different note, I'd accept the claims of generals who beat opposition from rival Romans or other Mediterranean or near eastern (i.e. Persia) urban cultures ahead of any general whose fame rest on fighting northern barbarians (before the C5th) as once one looks closely at the sources and their absurd claims about barbarian army sizes the struggle against the latter was so one-sided that it was about as challenging as shooting fish in a barrel. If they ever lose, now that is significant!:wink:

Cheers,
Guy