I'm somewhat new at Roman military history, so pardon me if this is a dumb/obvious question.<br>
Concerning the 'Wedge' formation, was this done by each cohort, forming a jagged edged battle line for an entire legion, or was it done by each century? Or was it done by whole legions? I would wager a guess at cohorts, being the tactical formations, but I'm not sure. Thanks.<br>
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Jesse the Velite <p></p><i></i>
Vegetius is the main ancient source on the wedge formation(Livy mentions it as being used by Cato, Tacitus characterized it as a German tactic),and unfortunatly he does not specify the actual tactical formations used. Probably could have used by both cohorts acting independently or Legions as a whole(Vegetius kind of implies this when he talks about the four strategies used in battle.) <p></p><i></i>
Thanks, Rufus. It is unfortunate that we don't have better information on such tactical matters. I would assume that this formation was a 'line breaking' formation designed for the attack, such as the final battle of the Boudiccan Revolt in Britain. After the Romans discharged their volley of pilum, I have read in two places (the Osprey 'From Caesar to Tragan and a wargame book which I think was by Donald Featherstone but I forget the title) that the Romans then advanced in wedge formation and slaughtered the Britons. Not that my sources are exactly impeccable, but I have no clear reason to doubt them, any other thoughts on the subject? <p></p><i></i>
Velite,<br>
I can't recall offhand another specific references to the wedge being used, but I don't doubt your sources. I can't recall Adrian Goldsworthy's Roman Army At War talks about the wedge or not, I seem to think not. I do recall one of the Osprey books talking about it, I believe the Late Roman Infantry, one. I just recently purchased Professor Gilliver's Roman Art of War(1999) which supposedly talks about tactical formations somewhat, but your quite right, the subject of battle formations is one that seriously lacks solid modern scholarship(mainly because the sources are so vague on the subject). The reference I always see in terms of being a good summary for the debate on Roman formations and tactics is a book from 1911 called Caesar's Conquest of Gaul by TR Holmes. It supposedly has a solid ten page section discussing the various theories on subjects like the checkerboard formation, cohort v. century as the main tactical unit, the depth of formations etc. Goldsworthy's book, while I don't believe it mentions the wedge, is a good source for this type of info as well. Michael Speidel has put forward some theories regrading formations in his "Framework of an Imperial Legion". I have yet to read this, but Goldsworthy discusses some of Speidel's points in his book. I would also recommend Phillip Sabin's Face of Roman Battle(Journal of Roman Studies, available from JSTORS) is a good discussion on the actual mechanics of combat.<br>
As for my opinion(which I wouldn't put much credence in, I'm only an armchair Roman history buff, European history major and a Senior ROTC Cadet, soon to be 2nd Lieutenant, so my knowledge is limited) I feel Sabin's theories make a lot of sense on the mechanics of battle. Goldsworthy has some good ideas but I'm skeptical about his "breakthrough" theory. As for the formations like the wedge, I have to think your correct in envisioning a sort of saw like line meant to break the enemy at specific locations, but I would think the vanguard of these formations would have to be at least a century long, and not some small group of a guys charging deep into an enemy line, this is clearly unreasonable. Hence, these wedges would have been more of echeloned lines, meant to be able to rapidly move troops in the rear of the formation forward to reinforce tired units or deal with enemy flankers. <p></p><i></i>
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Hi,<br>
Goldsworthy surely talks about wedge formation in "The Roman Army at War 100BC-AD200". However the discussion is about the effectiveness and reasons of effectiveness of the wedge, he doesn't talk about how it was formed.<br>
Greetings<br>
Alexandr <p></p><i></i>
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An episode in Caesar's 'Gallic War' mentions the wedge formation, and the context is perhaps quite informative.<br>
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It occurs in 53bc - Caesar is in the Ardennes, conducting his punitive campaign against the Eburones; he leaves Q Cicero (brother of the orator) in command of the supply base and baggage camp at Aduatuca, with a newly raised legion (probably the XIV) and about a cohort of veteran walking wounded. The camp is short of supplies, and Caesar is late in returning, so Cicero sends out five cohorts of his legion, plus 300 of the more able veterans, on a foraging expedition. While the expedition is away, German horsemen attack the camp. The forage column returns to find the camp surrounded:<br>
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"But here there is no fortification to receive them, in their alarm: those last enlisted, and unskilled in military discipline turn their faces to the military tribune and the centurions; they wait to find what orders may be given by them (...)<br>
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...Some propose that, forming a wedge, they suddenly break through, since the camp was so near; and if any part should be surrounded and slain, they fully trust that at least the rest may be saved; others, that they take their stand on an eminence, and all undergo the same destiny. The veteran soldiers... do not approve of this. Therefore encouraging each other, under the conduct of Caius Trebonius, a Roman knight, who had been appointed over them, they break through the midst of the enemy, and arrive in the camp safe to a man." (Caesar - Bellum Gallicum 6.39-40)<br>
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It is not stated whether these veterans actually formed a wedge or not, but the context implies they did - meaning that 300 men could form an effective wedge formation <em>against cavalry</em>. It also implies that the original five cohorts+300 <em>could</em> have formed the wedge as well - what's most interesting, though, is that it was the veteran troops who managed the breakthrough, while the fresh recruits 'unskilled in military discipline' just milled about on the hilltop - several more of them then follow the veterans' lead, but the implication remains that the wedge formation was something that newly raised troops might find difficult, whereas skilled veteran troops would be good at it - a 'battlefield' tactic, therefore, rather than the sort of thing practiced on the drill field.<br>
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Nathan Ross
This incident seems to indicate a three century triangular wedge, which would make sense. The advantage of such a formation is that it could, as the incident you reference makes clear, give small units the ability to have good 360 security while operating independently, while also giving said units a fair amount of tactical mobility. I have always doubted seriously the whole "breakthrough theory" of the wedge, and see it more akin to the modern US Army squad column or platoon/company vee formation, which is used because of its ability to bring a good volume of fire to both the front and flanks.This of course would apply well to a three century pilum armed Roman infantry wedge as well. Also, in terms of tactical mobility, the wedge by its nature would force an attacking foe to either stretch its lines attacking all three centuries or focus on one, more often than not the forward, century, which would in turn expose the enemy's flanks to the trailing centuries. <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showUserPublicProfile?gid=rufuscaius>RufusCaius</A> at: 3/30/04 5:52 pm<br></i>
Thanks for all the imput.<br>
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I would think that the kind of 'wedge' mentioned in Caeser's Gallic Wars would be different from an attack wedge. The defensive wedge would only make sense if all the soldiers were facing outward, three lines of a hollow triangle, similar to the Napoleonic square of much later times. Judging from accounts of squares, if indeed a connection can be drawn between them and the defensive wedge, then this formation is relatively immoble but almost impenatrable against cavalry. This makes sense in light of the Gallic War incident, well-trained veterans would be able to manouver in a difficult formation whilst being immune to the cavalry.<br>
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An attack wedge of a cohort could have been a 'pyramid' of the first century, supported by the second and third, supported by the fourth, fifth, and sixth, etc. Or it could have been echelon of centuries, but the situation could have dictated what was needed. I suppose a solid wedge would have the same effect as an attack column but with less vulnerable flanks, but I'm just guessing. If there is anything to the 'push of the rear ranks' in the attack, then this would work rather well. If this is the formation used by the beleagured Romans in Ceasar's account, then maybe those 300 veterans formed the point of the wedge to forge the way and the less experienced cohorts covered the flanks and rear.<br>
Most of this is speculation, but I think it is at least plausible in light of other historical formations, since that is all we have to go on.<br>
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Good discussion, though, all around. <p></p><i></i>
I agree with your idea of the pyramid, though I would think that the center area would have been left hollow because there wouldn't be much purpose in having century in the center because it would not be able to throw it pila and would be too close behind to allow an orderly line changing. Such a solid block would also be tactically very dangerous and could create the crowding which several ancient authors(Caesar, Livy) discuss in reference to hard pressed units. The Roman infantrymen needed space to operate: a solid, wedge shaped phalanx would have had limited use, like against cavalry: ala Arrian. My view is that the wedge would normally have another line behind it(of wedges or the rectangular "standard" line) in the second acis, which could quickly reinforce or press the front line to replace tired units or to fill in gaps left by certain tactical maneuvers, etc. As Goldsworthy points out, Caesar especially mentions that the second line of battle was very often engaged almost as much as the first line, and that the third line often acted as a reserve. This would tend to indicate that any front line formations had to be able to be replaced quickly, usually on the cohort level. <p></p><i></i>
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Now that you mention it, the echelon makes more sense. Cramped swordsmen are rather useless, and usually signalled a Roman defeat (Cannae, for example). A hollow point would probably also allow good command of a unit, the commander stays in the center of the wedge and is able to be relatively close to all his units.<br>
What do you mean by 'standard' line?<br>
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I put standard in quotes because we can't be sure what the stadard Roman battle line looked like. I'm assuming a one to two century deep(3 to 6 ranks) line with a few meters on each flank seperating the centuries. <p></p><i></i>
One of the problems with the existance of wedges at all is that the term "cuneus" often translated as "wedge" also means column - IIRC somewhere in one of the Penguin volumes of Livy there's a section where a Macedonian phalanx forms up in a "wedge" - but it's clearly a column (ie a deep formations).<br>
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The section above quoted by Nathan Ross implies that the veterans did NOT favour forming a wedge.<br>
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Moreover a wedge would be a poor formation to "stand on an emminence" - which is what most of the recruits did, and mostly died for it.<br>
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Another quote from Caesar about a "wedge" is from Book 7 chapter 28:<br>
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" The enemy being alarmed by the suddenness of the attack, were dislodged from the wall and towers, and drew up, in form of a wedge, in the market place and the open streets, with this intention that, if an attack should be made on any side, they should fight with their line drawn up to receive it."<br>
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Forming up in a "wedge" in such an area to receive a charge makes no sense - forming up in deep columns certainly does.<br>
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From Tacitus's "Annals" - "wedge" is used in this case as an adjective to describe a column:<br>
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"At first, the legion kept its position, clinging to the narrow defile as a defence; when they had exhausted their missiles, which they discharged with unerring aim on the closely approaching foe, they rushed out in a wedge-like column" (14.37)<br>
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Now don't get me wrong - there ARE many cases where "cuneus" is clearly used to reference a wedge and not a column, but this is rarely the case for land-based military formations.<br>
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See also pub45.ezboard.com/fromana...=137.topic<br>
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www.pvv.ntnu.no/~madsb/ho...army03.php<br>
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Note also that "Cuneus" was a term for a cavalry unit - but only those who are reading superficially actually state that it is fighting in a wedge.<br>
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Rather the term is used to mean a "segment" or a part - the original "cuneus" seems to refer to the seats in a part of a semi-circular amphitheatre or similar - ie a wedge of seating, but like many terms in many languages it came to mean many more things - eg consider the term "tank" in English!!<br>
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Stickers makes a good point, lingustics is key here especially considering that many of our sources are not from military backgrounds. This is part of the reason I have always imagined the Roman cuneus as more of a large echeloned formation of rectangular lines of centuries(something Vegetius discusses) rather than a smaller wedged shaped mass. In addition to the tactical problems with such a wedge, which Velite and myself have already discussed, there's also the matter of Tacitus's discussion of the German cuneus in the Germania. Even though Tacitus was of course not a "military man", the fact that he makes a point of mentioning the German boar's head wedge as a distinctly German formation, and makes no attempt to compare it to the Roman one, tells me that either the Roman wedge was not as often used as other formations and/or it was quite a different formation from the German one. <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showUserPublicProfile?gid=rufuscaius>RufusCaius</A> at: 4/1/04 8:40 am<br></i>
Adrian Goldsworthy (I recommend everyone pickup his Roman Army at War: 100BC to 200AD) theorizes a combat model where the wedge is not a formation rather an effect of troop movement on the battlefield.<br>
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In his model, two sides don't just run directly into contact but stop some distance away while they build up the courage to take the final steps. During this time, they'd hurl insults, trade missile fire, etc...<br>
Then a few men (usually Centurions) would advance to kill/maim the enemy. The men beside them would advance to protect their flanks. This would create a wedge like effect as each man gets dragged along by the spontaneous advance of one or a few men. The key men would then fight until he got tired and then back off to their start lines to rest/recover. This would continue until one side eventually broke. He also theorizes the wedge, to the unlucky individual(s) in the path of the advance think the entire roman army is bearing down on them and is quite unsettling, possibly better chance of breaking the enemy before contact.<br>
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It's a good model (IMHO) as so far it's the only thing that could explain how ancients could fight for hours without massive casualties and their sword arms falling off.<br>
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Cheers,<br>
Leon <p></p><i></i>
As I mentioned in one of my previous posts, Goldsworthy's model shares much in common with Phillip Sabin's, though there are certain key differences between the two. The main difference lies in how enemy units were pushed back and broken. Goldsworthy, as Pericles points out, advanced the "breakthrough theory" in which a wedge was unintentionally formed by a small group of experienced or vainglorious soldiers who on their own initiative would lead a breakthrough into the enemy lines. While Goldsworthy admits this would probably not be a regular event, it seems to be an unlikely one in my view. Certainly a Roman battle line would not remain straight during battle but in most cases it would be suicidal for Roman troops to dive headlong into an enemy formation. In addition to being stupid for personal reasons, such a movement would endanger the rest of the soldier, or group of soldiers' unit.(Look at Sickles at Gettysburg) Roman troops were taught to fight as a unit. While such foolhardy heroics undoubtedly occurred, they cannot, in my view, be taken as a model of how the Roman won there battles.This is of course my opinion, and was the only real complaint I had with Goldsworthy's many theories. His work is the best modern work on the subject and will be rightly regarded as a classic for many years to come.<br>
Sabin's model shares Goldsworthy's reasonable belief in battle lulls in which the opposing armies would hurl missiles at one another, rest, speed wounded soldiers to the rear and change up tired units. Sabin, like Goldsworthy, believes that if the initial charge/pila volley did not break the enemy than lulls/rest breaks would occur after a short melee(15 20 minutes) in which most of the front line of the legion/auxiliaries would take part. As soon as the two forces became tired they would then standoff from each other, creating a lull in the fighting. These lulls would be interspersed by charges of particularly motivated or fresh units(not individuals, nor necessarily the Legion as a whole) and fairly regular pila, arrow and bolt volleys. These charges would ideally chip away(not breakthrough) at the enemy front lines relatively quickly and hopefully panic them into retreat or rout. In most cases, though, Sabin argues convincingly it took many charges and counter charges(made possible through the deployment of fresh reserve units) over a period of hours that would gradually push the increasingly tired enemy force(which normally would not have a reserve) back until they(the enemy) decided to retreat, were routed or were out flanked on the wings, or completely encircled(ala Cannae or Phalarsus). <p></p><i></i>
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