Manpower in the Second Punic War

[Paullus Scipio]

Inaki wrote:-

I am still pretty sure that figures are highly inflated for the Carthaginians, but I guess the theory of Roman manpower superiority can still be asserted without resorting to discard them

Yes, I am inclined to agree that in some instances, Carthaginian figures have been inflated...the other major figure I am rather suspicious of is the one that gives Hannibal 90,000 Infantry, and 12,000 Cavalry(Polybius 3.35 -Appian 1.4 adds 37 elephants) when he set off for Italy in the summer of 218 BC, especially as it shrank so rapidly - he crosses the Pyrenees into France with "only" 50,000 Infantry and 9,000 Cavalry (Pol 3.35.7), leaving 10,000 Infantry and 1,000 Cavalry to hold newly-conquered Northern Spain ( no major fighting seems to have occurred, the tribes submitting as he marched).
This leaves a 'shortage' of 30,000 troops and 2,000 Cavalry.Polybius is evidently aware of this discrepancy, and says that as a goodwill gesture he "released" 10,000 Spanish Infantry and 1,000 Cavalry ( implying they were essentially hostages against rebellion in Southern Spain? But in that case, why release them?...and why go to the trouble and expense of raising them in the first place,simply to march them to Northern Spain and then send them back again? ) leaving as many as 20,000 Infantry and 1,000 Cavalry who may be levies that deserted etc, if the numbers are correct.
Significantly, Polybius does not cite Hannibal's Lacinian inscription for them, as he does for the numbers Hannibal previously sent to Africa to secure Carthage, and the numbers who subsequently reached Italy - just 20,000 Infantry and 6,000 Cavalry (Pol 3.56.4).

And you are right, Roman manpower potential was so vast, as the number of Legions raised in the years following Cannae show in particular, that exact Carthaginian numbers are not critical.

[Sardaukar]

Well...my take to issue is:

Considering manpower abilities of conscription army and mercenary army, former is inherently more able to replenish losses.

Depending how much more welthier Carthago was than Rome (and I think it was lot wealthier), their ability to draw replacements was very good too, just more expensive and depending somewhat on fortunes of war.

Ancient world was not really short of people who saw war as profitable business vs. their ordinary life..at least seems so to me. How big the pool of mercenaries was, that's different story. 8)

[Spartan JKM]

Good discussion everyone. Happy New Year!

Actually, Sardaukar, Carthage's wealth was not as much the advantage some seem to imply, albeit it certainly wasn't a trivial issue; after all, they had to pay demanding mercenaries, as Rome didn't need to pay her citizen-soldiers as much. Rome could raise loans from her nobles classes (most notably realised between the naval battles of Drepana and the Aegates Islands), and when there was a shortage of sailors in Sicily as early as 214 or 213 B.C., a Roman fleet (not the ships) was manned by private funds for the first time (Livy Book 24.11).

Carthage unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a loan from Egypt, and couldn't afford what her mercenaries demanded after the first war - a condition Rome ultimately exploited with the 'rape of Sardinia'. Basically, the very structure of Rome's federation allowed for her to dispose of her manpower more thoroughly, as she built a solid alliance of colonies faithful to her (sure, there were mbers of anger waiting ofr opportunities to detach), and Carthage's ties with her subjects were much looser; not only did Carthage not grant citizenship to her subjects, she didn't even extend to them similar privileges enjoyed by the Latins. In the First Punic War, Carthage proved she could soundly beat the Romans at sea in a conventional manner, and had the best commander of the war on land. But Rome's adoption and perfection of the corvus enabled her marines to fight to their likening at sea, and by the time the device was abandoned (its liabilities ultimately outweighed the benefit it provided), they were experienced enough to hold their own at sea in a standard manner: however, the Aegates Islands victory in 241 B.C., wrought with the fleet established by the wealthy citizens, after Rome had but a handful of ships after the disasters suffered at Drepana and Lilybaeum (Carthalo followed up Adherbal's victory with a successfull and stealthy night raid into the Romans' anchorage), was achieved with a little luck. The Carthaginians, also exhausted by this time, had hastily raised a fleet to supply Hamilcar Barca. This fleet may have been undermanned, but it was definitely hampered by the supplies and men for Hamilcar's army. They were certainly hoping to supply Hamilcar, then fight after they landed this load. But Catalus, commanding ships modelled on fast captured Carthaginian vessles, not to mention the best crews now available, caught them in stormy conditions. As Polybius tells us of the Romans' supreme ability to adapt and adopt, Book 6.25,

"...no people are so ready to adopt new fashions and imitate what they see is better in others."

The high-minded J.F. Lazenby tells us, in his The First Punic War,

"...it is at the higher levels of strategy that there was a crucial difference between the two sides...no Carthaginian seems to have had the slightest inkling how to defeat Rome, except in the short term, whereas the Romans made a series of decisions that show that some of them at least knew how to fight a war like this...ultimate credit for the strategy adopted must presumably go to the Senate...Rome fought for "victory" in a far more real sense than Carthage. To Rome, wars ended when the Republic dictated its terms to a defeated enemy: to Carthage, wars ended with a negotiated settlement - even Hannibal was later to think in much the same terms."

Polybius tells us, Book 6.52,

"...the conduct of war, the Carthaginians naturally are superior at sea both in efficiency and equipment, because seamanship has long been their national craft, and they busy themselves with the sea more than any other people; but as regards military service on land the Romans are much more efficient. They indeed devote their whole energies to this matter, whereas the Carthaginians entirely neglect their infantry, though they do pay some slight attention to their cavalry. The reason of this is that the troops they employ are foreign and mercenary, whereas those of the Romans are natives of the soil and citizens. So that in this respect also we must pronounce the political system of Rome to be superior to that of Carthage, the Carthaginians continuing to depend for the maintenance of their freedom on the courage of a mercenary force but the Romans on their own valour and on the aid of their allies. Consequently even if they happen to be worsted at the outset, the Romans redeem defeat by final success, while it is the contrary with the Carthaginians. For the Romans, fighting as they are for their country and their children, never can abate their fury but continue to throw their whole hearts into the struggle until they get the better of their enemies. It follows that though the Romans are, as I said, much less skilled in naval matters, they are on the whole successful at sea owing to the gallantry of their men; for although skill in seamanship is of no small importance in naval battles, it is chiefly the courage of the marines that turns the scale in favour of victory. Now not only do Italians in general naturally excel Phoenicians and Africans in bodily strength and personal courage, but by their institutions also they do much to foster a spirit of bravery in the young men. A single instance will suffice to indicate the pains taken by the state to turn out men who will be ready to endure everything in order to gain a reputation in their country for valour."

There was always an element of pro-Roman circumlocution on the part of Polybius (is there a unbias human being anywhere?), but this is basically a sound judgment (IMHO).

Thus Carthage could have done nothing to win the First Punic War; they had not the manpower to outmuscle Rome, even with further raids on Sicily and southern Italy. As has been stated before, the third war was an arduous siege, but the outcome was never in doubt. The superiority of Rome in war over Carthage was evident, and that superiority somehow had to be taken away from them. Hannibal figured by taking the war into Italy, thus relieving Carthage of any direct threat on her, he could tip the balance towards Carthage's benefit. He was correct that he could; he just couldn't tip it enough. But the Romans definitely had some Bona Fortuna in Sicily, Spain, and even in Sardinina where a serious uprising awaited a Carthaginian army and fleet, which happened to be blown off course to the Balaeric Islands due to bad weather. By the time they arrived in Sardinia, the Romans had heightened their position: the Roman army coming from Italy (or Sicily?) didn't get blown off course, and they were coming form a further distance.

We often read from Livy of a Carthaginian 'complete army' sent here, or a 'full army' arriving here.


Inaki, what we may surmise is that ancient enumerations are indeed inflated at times, but there's not a universal rule. Let's just look at each campaign's context etc. take what we are told, and extrapolate any gaps. As if it were that easy, right? :roll:

If we reject what the fountainhead has told us without careful scrutiny, we might as well give up on military history from antiquity; we need a useful gauge in some form or another.

On the flip side, if we insist upon 'revisionism' based on 'this must have been this way', we are delving into the writing of what could be little better than historical fiction. It reaches a point where we have to have faith, basically, on what we have been presented. There is, of course, that other form of revisionism, alternately termed 'negationism', or 'logical fallacy'.

I agree, however, upon some scrutinization, that the numbers given for some Carthaginian numbers are inflated, whether purposeful or not.

Livy, following a source he choose to stay with, tells us Hasdrubal Barca lost 57,000 killed (ie, before prisoners and fugitives) at the battle of the Metaurus (Book 27.49). C'mon, that's almost as bad as Arrian's claim that 1,000,000 soldiers of the Persian Empire opposed Alexander at Gaugamela.

I would say the 102,000 for the figure of Hannibal's departing army from New Carthage is a magnification:

Polybius tells us, of the accurate figures of the numbers of Hannibal's cross-posting of troops between Spain and Africa that, Book 3.33,

"...he took precautions for the security of Africa, adopting the very sensible and wise policy of sending soldiers from Africa to Spain, and vice versa, binding by this measure the two provinces to reciprocal loyalty. The troops who crossed to Africa were supplied by the Thersitae, Mastiani, Iberian Oretes and Olcades, and numbered 1,200 horse and 13,870 Balearians, a popular appellation, derived from ballein, 'to throw', and meaning slingers, given to them owing to their skill with this weapon and extended to their nation and islands. He stationed most of these troops at Metagonia in Libya and some in Carthage itself. From the so‑called Metagonian towns he sent 4,000 foot to Carthage to serve both as a reinforcement and as hostages. In Spain he left with his brother Hasdrubal 50 quinqueremes, two quadriremes, and all the triremes being fully manned. He also gave him as cavalry Liby-Phoenicians and Libyans to the number of 450, 300 Ilergetes and 800 Numidians drawn from the Masylii, Masaesylii, Maccoei and Maurusi, who dwell by the ocean, and as infantry 11,850 Libyans, 300 Ligurians, and 500 Balearians, as well as 21 elephants.

No one need be surprised at the accuracy of the information I give here about Hannibal's arrangements in Spain, an accuracy which even the actual organizer of the details would have some difficulty in attaining, and I need not be condemned off-hand under the idea that I am acting like those authors who try to make their misstatements plausible. The fact is that I found on the Lacinian promontory a bronze tablet on which Hannibal himself had made out these lists during the time he was in Italy, and thinking this an absolutely first-rate authority, decided to follow the document..."

Now, following the idea that the Lacinian tablet can be gauged as an authoritative source, we can take the 26,000 figure of Hannibal's arrival in the Po Valley as the accurate figure, as Polybius states that too was from Hannibal's bronze tablet (Book 3.56). Thus working our way back we clearly can present an issue:

Before crossing into Transalpine Gaul from NE Spain, we are told by Polybius that Hannibal left one Hanno to police the newly acquired region; Polybius says Hanno was assigned 11,000 men, and an 'equal number' were sent home. Livy tells us something slightly different in his Book 21.23. He tells us the same about Hanno's assigned men, but also that they were to secure the area and guard the defiles connecting Spain and Gaul; this makes sense, as Hannibal would have never approved of his accepting battle with the landing army of Gnaeus Scipio with half as many men, which is what he did, thus laying down the strategic situation that would favor Rome the next decade.

But that's not the point, sorry. I just always find it ludicrous when Hannibal's critics accuse him of not securing Spain before he set off. It simply wasn't his fault that they all failed against numerically inferior Roman forces, except this one time at Cissa. Actually, the Roman plans for Spain were delayed becauseof a Gallic uprising, caused by Hannibal's envoys. That was paradoxical: in causing trouble for Rome's forces in northern Italy stirring up the Cisalpine Gauls with his delegation, Rome's forces arrived in NE Spain with fortuitous timing. If things had gone as planned, they would ahve arrived while Hannibal was till there. This may have been delayed him a couple weeks, but they still would have had no inkling of his plan. He would have destroyed a Roman army, and another wouldn't have come until Hasdrubal had secured the area better. Bu, I guess one can argue Hannibal was lucky to arrive at a spot in Cisapline Gaul where the dissension between the Taurini and Insubres allowed him an immediate opportunity to exploit, winning over friends right away.

Anyway, Livy tells us in conjunction with the disposed 11,000 under Hanno, that 3,000 Spaniards deserted, and 7,000 were sent home, and Hannibal pretended the entire 10,000 were sent home. But it comes down to roughly 20,000+ men left behind by Hannibal in Catalonia. Now, Polybius tells us Hannibal left Emporion with 59,000 men, and Livy, interestingly, doesn't give the figure. This would mean 21,000+ were lost in subduing the regions north of the Ebro; we read in Book 3.35 Polybius' comment that Hannibal...

"...set about subduing the tribes of the Ilurgetes, Bargusii, Aerenosii, and Andosini as far as the Pyrenees, and having reduced them all and taken some cities by assault, with unexpected rapidity indeed, but after many severe engagements and with great loss, he left Hanno in command of all the country on this side of the river..."

Well, I assume these 'cities', which were probably fortified towns at most, were taken by storm if 'rapidity' had been achieved. Even though Polybius mentions 'severe engagements' and 'great loss', I am inclined to think 21-22,000 men lost seems excessive.

Now, Polybius tells us that Hannibal had 46,000 men after crossing the Rhone, which means 13,000 were lost since Emporion, But here we read of no activity whatsoever. Substantial desertions or losses caused by extenuating circumstances would have been mentioned; 13,000 seems too high.

Again, Hannibal reached northern Italy with 26,000 men, the figure Polybius says comes form the Lacinian tablet. Therefore, another 20,000 disappeared in the Alps. However testing the crossing was, this figure is probably too high; no great ambush took place, nor any mass desertion; remember, Polybius drew form the works of Sosylos, who accompanied Hannibal. Thus Hannibal probably didn't lose 76,000 men from New Carthage to the Po Valley. More likely, he lost more than half of a force, including demobilizations, of maybe 60,000 men at the start.

I agree the 93,000 figure in the African campaign is too high. They would have attacked Scipio with supreme confidence! They probably outnumbered him, as if they hadn't they wouldn't have moved so close to him. But they still didn't feel strong enough to attack him in enfilade.

Livy does say the Carthaginian force leading up to Iliap was about 54,500 total after levying, but also states that other sources state the infantry at 70,000, obviously referring to Polybius.

Judging by Hannibal's tactical arrangements at Cannae, he definitely faced a huge army, and he used that very strength against them.

Food for thought.

Thanks, James K MacKinnon

[Sardaukar]

Very good post, Spartan JKM !

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

A good grasp, but I am surprised you say there were critics of the idea he secured spain before leaving...
That would make him the most foolish commander of all time! Especially considering the Carthagenian presence in Spain for how ever long, then just to walze off on what would seem a very precarous enterprise, wit hhis rear wide open, and the Romans pretty well in command of the sea buy that time?....But it is a free world I suppose! :roll: :?

[Sardaukar]

A good grasp, but I am surprised you say there were critics of the idea he secured spain before leaving...
That would make him the most foolish commander of all time! Especially considering the Carthagenian presence in Spain for how ever long, then just to walze off on what would seem a very precarous enterprise, wit hhis rear wide open, and the Romans pretty well in command of the sea buy that time?....But it is a free world I suppose! :roll: :?

Might also make him a daring commander :wink:

Maybe he had trust of his sub-commander's ability (which was not misplaced). After all, you had to have competent subordinates in ancient times or you might go down just because of them.

Those were the times you could not micromanage from GHQ :lol:

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

Yes, but I understand the critics as opposing the idea that he secures Spain? Which would mean leaving troops and 'sub-commanders 'behind to do the job, unless I am mistaken?

[Spartan JKM]

Thanks guys.

I didn't mean give the idea that many critics said Hannibal didn't secure Spain before he left for Italy. I believe it was John Peddie, a military expert (ie, not an armchair historian) who opined Hannibal didn't secure Spain properly before emebarking for Italy. Peddie has written books on the Roman army and the Second Punic War; on whole, they are very good, if only for being quite thought provoking. Moreover, some 'Hannibal critics', if you will, on these forums (TWC, allempires, paradoxplaza) seem to imply how 'foolish' Hannibal was with his invasion. My major retort is that he was smarter than they are (no personal offense, of course).

What happened in NE Spain upon Gnaeus Scipio's arrival at Emprion had long term effects that favored Rome, but we can never know how things would have panned out. We know the Romans would have certainly come even if he hadn't had done so well at quickly solidifying his position. The subordinate named Hanno identified that Scipio was swiftly gaining control of the coastal regions between Catalonia and Transalpine Gaul, and simply wanted to do something about it - this was the area with landing areas, which was paramount. Maybe he didn't realize how vastly outnumbered he was (but that would constitute bad reconnaisance). On the face of it, it just seems likely Hannibal would have told him not to accept a field battle against an army twice his size, a battle which would establish Roman position very solidly if he did (which he did!). After all, Hasdrubal was close by, and was coming when the Romans landed with 9,000 men.

In my opinion, Peddie is very much like Dexter Hoyos' criticisms of Hannibal: they both cite how because events fomented unfavorably for Hannibal over the course of a few years, somehow it was Hannibal's fault. Didn't Clauzewitz himself evince the issue of chance.

In my opinion, the Second Punic War was provoked by the Massiliotes and Romans, but they didn't necessarily want to fight it in 219-218 B.C. Hannibal was prepared and determined to fight, to their surprise perhaps, as Carthage was in a much stronger position than two decades earlier.

Because we look back at what occured (not to speak for others), Cannae seems to many as the highmark of Hannibal's career. But I don't think so, as his grand strategy seems to have concealed more than revealed how viable it was.

If indeed the Italic peoples had embraced him on his arrival, he would have been happily surprised. But he resolved assiduously to enervate the Roman Federation however he could. If it meant becoming a massive raider poking at Rome's basis of her economy, agriculture, so be it. If it meant playing on the embers of discontent within many indigenous Italians, and weakening them by stirring them on each other, so be it. His attitude was more Roman than Carthaginian - whatever it takes to attain the means to the end. But he wan't a random dreamer.

It just didn't work.

I'm actually working on a supposition right now about the attempt of Hannibal's of breaking the bonds Rome had with her allies. It's not a deep re-assesment of the events, but mainly a presentation all the examples from Livy (I know, a red flag with some issues, but he's all we have) that illustrate how strained and discontented many allies felt - ones who had no intention of sympathizing with Carthage. Hannibal's political strategy didn't seem far-fetched, as he proved he would wipe out thier masters in battle, and in conjunction allow them their own self-governing methods, however they wished if they left Rome. He made it clear his intentions, and Carthage was not an imperial power that would come into Italy, except to exploit the trade etc. It's hard to extrapolate, though.

Basically, he failed to gain their ear as far as restoring any 'liberty' he seemed to think Rome took from them, but he came very close in bleeding them white, and causing Rome to take stretching measures with troop levies and calling on private funds etc. It was very close until the defeat of Hasdrubal, parly becasue of Hannibal's supreme ability to keep his main army coherent well enough to maneuver; he couldn't sustain an attrition war as well as Rome could if he accepted open draining two-day type battles without some vigilance, but many would be surprised how he still beat them in the field in the 'boring' years, of which we have to read between the lines Livy quite often. And on a few occasions the 'victories' Livy claims for Roman leaders such as Marcellus and Nero seemed more likely to be Hannibal's adeptness at accepting battle, only to swiftly detach from them to give it the slip across mountainous tracks etc. But it's very obvious Marcellus was hors de combat after the slogfesting around Canusium in 209 B.C.

Throughout his entire career in Italy, only 1,272 troops left him for the Romans, and that was in 215 B.C., when things looked brighter.

I'll gladly put it up here on RAT when it's finished in a few days.

Thanks, James K MacKinnon

[Aryaman2]

Inaki, what we may surmise is that ancient enumerations are indeed inflated at times, but there's not a universal rule. Let's just look at each campaign's context etc. take what we are told, and extrapolate any gaps. As if it were that easy, right? :roll:

Certainly no universal rule, however there is indeed one useful rule, don´t trust reports on enemy strengths!
I think the best we can do to work reasonable figures is to select those testimonies that are more reliable and to compare them with others.
For instance, I think Caesar is very reliable when speaking of his own forces, as well as Thucydides on Athenians, or Polybius for the Achaeans and some other contemporary Greek forces. The more we depart from this the more we find difficult terrain.
For instance, the data from the Tabula Laciniana transmitted by Polybius could be probably the more accurate we get from the Second Punic War. We know Livy himself sometimes could not decide what source to follow as they were so divergent. When they are impossible to reconcile probably there is some propagandistic invention going on.
To sum up, IMO the best we can do with some of the numbers is just plainly discard them and don´t build upon them, because we are building on sand.

[Sardaukar]

Yes, but I understand the critics as opposing the idea that he secures Spain? Which would mean leaving troops and 'sub-commanders 'behind to do the job, unless I am mistaken?

My take is that he obviously didn't think Spain was going to be the main arena but sideshow. He left reasonable number of troops and reasonably competent subordinates to deal with situation, to go for main prize, which was Italy.

[Spartan JKM]

Aryaman2 wrote:

Certainly no universal rule, however there is indeed one useful rule, don´t trust reports on enemy strengths!
I think the best we can do to work reasonable figures is to select those testimonies that are more reliable and to compare them with others.
For instance, I think Caesar is very reliable when speaking of his own forces, as well as Thucydides on Athenians, or Polybius for the Achaeans and some other contemporary Greek forces. The more we depart from this the more we find difficult terrain.
For instance, the data from the Tabula Laciniana transmitted by Polybius could be probably the more accurate we get from the Second Punic War. We know Livy himself sometimes could not decide what source to follow as they were so divergent. When they are impossible to reconcile probably there is some propagandistic invention going on.
To sum up, IMO the best we can do with some of the numbers is just plainly discard them and don´t build upon them, because we are building on sand.

I think that's quite intelligibly put.

Actually, the situation in Spain in the summer to autumn of 218 B.C. took a very paradoxical opening turn. I agree it was a sideshow at first, and Carthage sent Hasdrubal 4,500 men to suppress a tribal revolt and ordered Hasdrubal to march to Italy, and after they subsequently sent a 'complete army' to help with the increasing Roman thorn, they stipulated Italy was 'the priority' (Livy, Book 23.27-28).

Unlike Roman Italy, the hegemony Carthage established in Spain was but less than two decades old, and their ways did not result in the binding as Rome's with her protectorates, thus disaffection and revolts could come far easier for encroaching Roman armies to foment among the indigenous tribes of Spain than Hannibal's likewise resolved task in Italy with the Italic peoples, of which many had been under Roman dominion for two generations. The Romans were not as 'alien' to them as Carthage was to many Spanish tribes, nor did the Italian population view Romans as 'aliens' as they surely did Hannibal and his men. Hannibal certainly considered all this, but still figured he could pull it off. Polybius tells us his strategy wasn't far-fetched at all, despite the firm loyalty of Rome's people of central Italy when Hannibal was ravaging his way through Samnium into Campania in 217 B.C (Book 3.90-92).

Hannibal indeed conciliated his Spanish troops to gain their loyalty the best he could; as well as sending those in his army home, to be called on when ready for action, he also sent 11,000 home after subduing much of the land north of the Ebro. Clearly, he was addressing a levy for Carthage when the Romans arrived (something he knew could not be prevented, given the superiority to transport troops along the sea-lanes). Perhaps some he deemed unworthy, but they could still help in the near future. If he could have been everywhere at once...., well, even in our present time teleportation devices are still far away in the future :laughter:

Many make reference to the strategic foresight of Scipio the Elder while on the mouth of the Rhone, in his decision to send the bulk of his army onto Spain even after he realized Hannibal was heading for Italy. That’s tenable, as this meant Carthage at least would not have a free hand in Spain, and as it turned out, it had far-reaching effects in Rome's favor. But it was the Senate’s decision to send the army to Spain in the first place, thus he was merely adhering to their orders. But his own decision to return to northern Italy indeed illustrates the flexibility of the Roman system, and long-term strategy would be the hall-mark of Roman direction throughout the war.

However, there's some circumstantial Bona Fortuna here for Rome: the Roman plan had been to strike at NE Spain much sooner; Hannibal had consolidated and regrouped in NE Spain (modern Catalonia) for the shorter part of two months, from probably mid-July to late August of 218 B.C. Roman war plans, undertaken contemporaneously with Hannibal's march up Spain and into Transalpine Gaul (modern southern France), had been thrown awry by an uprising in the Po Valley by the Boii and Insubres, who had overran the area of the new Latin colonies (Placentia and Cremona), and the inhabitants fled to Mutina (modern Modena). Then the Gallic army besieged Mutina without effectiveness, but heavily mauled the approaching Roman army under the praetor Lucius Manlius Vulso, who sought refuge in Tannetum (near Parma), west of Mutina. The Senate was compelled to re-assign fielded troops under Scipio, who was at Pisa ready to head to Spain, and raise a new legion, or maybe two; the accounts between Polybius and Livy differ about the Roman dispositions to deal with the Gallic problem at this time, but the result of four fielded legions in northern Italy is concurrent between them.

Scipio the Elder arrived on the mouth of Rhone at the end of September, thus he was delayed by approximately a month. Thus sometime in August, if things had gone as the Romans had intended, Scipio would have arrived in NE Spain while Hannibal was there - resulting in an obvious destruction of the Roman army against a military genius, a condition not yet realized by the Romans, at the head of a much larger army. This would have delayed Hannibal a little, but the Romans had no inkling of his plan yet. It would have changed things dramatically, with Hannibal arriving in the Po Valley perhaps a week or two later than he did, but no Roman army arriving in NE Spain for some time. Looking back, the chain of events wound up luckily favoring Rome, as Spain would be compromised for Carthage's war effort from the get-go.

Thus, paradoxically, it was because of the rising of the Boii and Insubres, leading to their delay, that helped Rome in the long run with the war in Spain. Moreover, the rising was stirred up by the news Hannibal's envoys brought them of his plans to come into their lands and rally them against Rome, particularly to one Magalus of the Boii, who came to greet Hannibal at the Rhone (Livy, Book 21.29). This is something Hannibal had engineered to throw the Romans off balance. As it was, the delay turned out to be timingly fortuitous for Rome.

Forces dispatched out of Carthage and Spain throughout the Second Punic War amounted to over 140,000 men (following the numbers we are given by the original sources); it's staggering to think only 4,000 reached Hannibal, being that they fully proved they could land in Italy, albeit not with huge fleets at leisure.

Excluding Hannibal's initial invasion, Livy gives us interesting data.

218 B.C.

Carthage sends 1,000 marines aboard twenty quinqueremes to raid the coastal farmland around the SW tip of Bruttium (Livy, Book 21.49-50).

217 B.C.

A Carthaginian fleet of seventy ships touches first at Sardinia then at Pisa, hoping to communicate with Hannibal, who is in Etruria. But a larger Roman fleet compels them to flee, but not after they capture some Roman transports bound for Spain, off Cosa (Polybius, Book 3.96, and Livy, Book 22.11).

216 B.C.

Hannibal's brother Mago is now in Carthage, requesting material assistance for Hannibal in Italy, after showcasing a huge amount of gold rings taken from the fallen Roman nobility at Cannae; a huge majority in the Carthaginian senate authorizes 4,000 Numidians, forty elephants and money for Hannibal in Italy for now, and 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry to be raised in Spain as reinforcing armies for those in Italy and Spain* (Livy, Book 23.13).
Carthage sends 4,000 foot and 500 cavalry to reinforce Hasdrubal Barca in Spain, due to a tribal uprising (Livy 23.26).

215 B.C.

Hasdrubal ordered to Italy, but explains Spain is not solidified enough; Carthage sends a 'complete army** and enlarged fleet' to Spain under Himilco (Livy, Book 23.27-2eight).
Hasdrubal Barca is flat-out defeated by the Scipios in the battle of Dertosa, which brings Rome new Iberian allies, as well as the opportunity to carry the war into Punic Spain, as Carthaginian control here is now rendered very shaky. This was a supreme moment of the war (Livy, Book 23.29).
As a result, 12,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, twenty elephants, and funds, intended for Hannibal in Italy, are diverted to Spain aboard sixty ships; a 'roughly equal' sized army under Hasdrubal 'the Bald' is sent to Sardinia to aid one Hampsicora, a local leader who is ready to rise up against Rome’s rule (Livy, Book 23.32).
Bomilcar lands at Locri with the 4,000 Numidians, forty elephants, and provisions for Hannibal; they are brought to him in Campania by his subordinate Hanno.

213 B.C.

On the urging by way of a letter from Hannibal, and a delegation of Himilco and Hippocrates in Carthage, 25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and twelve elephants are sent to southern Sicily, landing at Heraclea Minoa.

211 B.C.

Hannibal sends a top-notch Liby-Phoenician cavalry leader from Hippo Acra (modern Bizerte, northern Tunisia), one Muttines, to Sicily, presumably with a unit of men, who runs roughshed over Roman outposts and pushes Marcellus back to his camp on the River Himera (Livy, Book 25.40). But Muttines soon turned coat due to the Carthaginian commander’s jealousy of him, as well as nepotism, and racism. Muttines was later awarded Roman citizenship, and was honored as Maarkos Oalerios (Marcus Valerius) Mottones (Livy, Book 27.5). A decicatory inscription of Muttines is still intact at Delphi. Perhaps Hannibal should have come himself to Sicily at this time, with the intent of returning as soon as possible to southern Italy.

210 B.C.

Carthage sends 8,000 men and 3,000 cavalry to Hanno, the supreme commander on the island, and Muttines (Livy, Book 26.21).

A Carthaginian fleet of forty ships plunders Sardinia on the north and south ends of the island, alertly not being drawn into land against Roman forces, after which it returns to Africa laden with spoils (Livy, Book 27.6)

209 B.C.

A Carthaginian fleet is in Greek waters off Corcyra, perhaps the same one under Bomilcar that had left Tarentum two years earlier for lack of supplies (Polybius, Book 9.9, Livy, Book 26.20), hoping to aid Philip V of Macedon against the Aetolians (Livy, Book 27.15).

208 B.C.

After fighting a rearguard action against Scipio the Younger at Baecula (modern Bailen, southern Spain), Hasdrubal Barca crosses the western Pyrennes and heads to Italy with about 15-20,000 men (Livy, Book 27.20); another 8,000 Ligurians are conscripted to join him once he arrives (Livy, Book 27.39).

207 B.C.

A 'fresh army'*** is sent to Spain under one Hanno to replace the departing one of Hasdrubal Barca, less than a year earlier. Hanno junctions with Mago in Celtiberia (Livy, Book 28.1).
The Carthaginian fleet in Greek waters is now near the Acarnanian coast, anchored off the Oxeae Islands (Livy, Book 28.7). We read nothing of it again.

205 B.C.

Mago lands at Genoa, Liguria, from the Balaeric Islands (Minorca), with 12,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry aboard more than thirty ships. Moreover, eighty Carthaginian transports are captured off Sardinia, clearly on their way to supply Hannibal, whom Livy a little earlier was suffering shortages in money and provisions, in Book 28.12. (Livy, Book 28.46). But what were they doing off Sardinia? Perhaps this illustrates Roman naval presence in the closer approaches to supply Hannibal. The transport fleet could almost certainly not have been returning to Africa after loading Etruscan booty which Mago gained, as Livy reports - he just got there to Liguria!
Carthage dispatches 6,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, seven elephants, and money, aboard 25 ships to reinforce Mago (Livy, Book 29.4).

203 B.C.

Mago and Hannibal called to Africa to defend the homeland from the onslaught of Scipio the Younger’s campaign. Mago dies on the voyage to Africa from Liguria, but 12,000 of his men reach Africa, who will constitute the first line at the battle of Zama; Hannibal lands at Leptis Minor with around 15,000 men (conjectural), aboard a transport fleet he built ’ahead of time’ in Bruttium (Livy, Book 30.19-20.

* We don't know how to what degree the 24,000 troops actually materialized, if at all; the 4,000 Numidians did reach Hannibal a year later. But the 24,000 cannot be added to the total of 140,000 or so of troops dispatched. If anything, they were a part of those dispatched out of Spain.
** I’m curious as to how many troops this 'complete army' consisted of.
*** Same as above: a 'fresh army' was how large? If we have to apply numbers, we’ll have to settle with opining that these two 'complete' (or 'fresh') armies were roughly the same size as the 13,500 figure of the troops Mago had assembled for Italy, but were diverted to Spain at the last moment because of the outcome of the battle of Dertosa, as well as the force of ’roughly equal in size’ as that of Mago’s which sailed to Sardinia (only to be blown off course and delayed by bad weather, long enough for the Romans to ready themselves).

Food for thought, but it's just pedantic, deductive (and inductive) logic, not to mention pro-Hannibalic.

Thanks, James

[Aryaman2]

Very informative post James, laudes added.
One detail that sets apart the data from the tabula lanciniana from other data given by narrative sources is that the numbers are not rounded, in all probability then they are taken from payment documents, the ones usually more detailed. In contrast, the number for the army of Hannibal in Italy is the only rounded figure, which again is suspicious. I would bet it was the result of adding the theoretical strength of present units.

[Aryaman2]

One thing we should question us is what are the sources Ancient Historians used for their data. In the examples cited it seems they are all troops sent or to be enlisted on orders of the Carthaginian Senate, so maybe there were official records that could be checked for those. In other cases, like battles, we could imagune they were eyewitness reports from the Roman side, here the disparity between the regular size of the armies reported in the list and the huge size of some of the Carthaginian armies in the field.

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

Yes, but I understand the critics as opposing the idea that he secures Spain? Which would mean leaving troops and 'sub-commanders 'behind to do the job, unless I am mistaken?

My take is that he obviously didn't think Spain was going to be the main arena but sideshow. He left reasonable number of troops and reasonably competent subordinates to deal with situation, to go for main prize, which was Italy.

Yes, he was aiming for Italy, but what I am incredulous about is that there are people who think he would not have secured Spain behind him.
The rest, is as they say, history!

[Sardaukar]

Yes, but I understand the critics as opposing the idea that he secures Spain? Which would mean leaving troops and 'sub-commanders 'behind to do the job, unless I am mistaken?

My take is that he obviously didn't think Spain was going to be the main arena but sideshow. He left reasonable number of troops and reasonably competent subordinates to deal with situation, to go for main prize, which was Italy.

Yes, he was aiming for Italy, but what I am incredulous about is that there are people who think he would not have secured Spain behind him.
The rest, is as they say, history!

Well, in a way, he didn't secure it well enough. Erwin Rommel once said that "difference between gamble and taking a risk, is that when you take a risk and fail, you can recover". Hannibal took a risk, because he did recover from loss of Spain to fight another day, but he failed.

And it still took another strategic and tactical genius to bring him down. He must have been extremely interesting and capable person to pull out things he did.

I don't think he underestimated Romans, but he definitely underestimated loyalty of people within Italian peninsula to Rome. That might be because he was accustomed to that, after all, we are all biased based on our own experiences. And he was not that far off..just too early, as shown on Social wars in Italy century and some later.