Osprey - Granicus 334 BC

[Aryaman2]

So where does "18,000" come from? :? ?

Apparently, it is an assumption by the author, he says

"Before setting off, Alexander decided to leave behind the 7,000 Greek
allied infantry and 5,000 mercenaries who had been brought over with the
invasion force." but no reference given, then he goes on detailing the Macedonian OOB

"The leftmost position was taken by the 1,800-strong
Thessalian cavalry under the command of Calas, who had been one of
the commanders sent with the advance force these were placed. To the right of the allied Greek cavalry under Philip, son of Menelaus, and the Thracian cavalry from Odrysia under Agathon respectively. The 2,700-strong cavalry of the left wing were under the
overall command of Parmenion. In the centre were placed the six taxeis
('brigades') of the sarissa-wielding pezetairoi. The commanders of each
1,500 strong taxis ('brigade') were: Meleager, Philip son of Amyntas,
Amyntas, Craterus, Coenus, and Perdiccas. To the right of the phalanx
were the 3,000-strong hypaspists. On the right wing, and under the
overall command of Alexander, were the 1,800-strong Companion
cavalry under Philotas, son of Parmenion with the prodromoi and
Paeonian cavalry to their left and the archers and Agrianian javelinmen
screening in front. With the phalanx in the centre drawn up to a depth
of eight men, the Macedonian line extended approximately 2.5 miles
from the confluence of the river where Alexander and the Companion
cavalry were stationed on the right wing northwards towards the cavalry
under Parmenion on the left wing."

I have to say that when I read it I was not surprised because I have read a similar reconstruction in another article, so I assumed it was somewhere in the sources, however I can´t find nothing in the sources, and I don´t have the other article at hand, maybe it was asumed ex silentio since sources only mention the forces listed, similar to the argument about no Persian infantry in the battle, but I am just guessing.

[Sean Manning]

It looks like we have primary sources for the 5,000 Greek mercenaries under Memnon:

Polyanaeus, Stratagems, 5.44.3 Memnon with a body of four thousand troops advanced against Magnesia; and he pitched and fortified his camp at the distance of forty stades from the city, which was defended by Parmenion and Attalus with a force of ten thousand men.

Diodorus Siculus 17.7.2-3 The king gave him [Memnon of Rhodes] five thousand mercenaries and ordered him to march to Cyzicus and to try to get possession of it.

Now back to work for me ...

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

Inaki wrote:-

1)The author dismiss the presence of Persian infantry at all in the battle. The numbers he gives for the Persian army are c.10.000 cavalry and 5.000 Greek mercenary infantry, so that the Persians would be actually outnumbered by the c.18.000 Macedonians

....went back to try and see why the author dismissed Persian Infantry, and did a double take at this little gem !
Plutarch ( life of Alexander15, and Moralia327D) records ancient estimates of Alexander's force that crossed into Asia varied from 30-43,000 foot and 4-5,500 Horse (Aristobulus,Ptolemy and Anaximenes).Justin has 32,000 Foot and 4,500 Horse;Polybius mentions that Callisthenes recorded 40,000 Foot and 4,500 Horse; Diodorus ( the only source to give a breakdown ) has 32,000 Foot and 5,100 Horse.
Long ago Brunt, and others since, have argued convincingly that the discrepancies disappear if we appreciate that some are including Philip's advance force and others are not. (Arrian and Diodorus are careful to say their figures are before crossing the Hellespont.) Polyainos records Parmenio and Attalus as having over 10,000 men when attacked by Memnon.Diodorus(17.7.10) and Polyainos (5.44.5) record another Macedonian force under Kalas..... Without going further into breakdowns, it is clear that Alexander's army was WAY larger than 18,000......and no way was an army of 10,000 horse and just 5,000 Infantry going to offer battle to it. hock: :roll:

:?

:roll: even I had figured that much out..... :lol:

[Paullus Scipio]

Sean wrote:-

It looks like we have primary sources for the 5,000 Greek mercenaries under Memnon:

.......I see your work has prevented you having that detailed look you mentioned, at my longer posts. :wink: I had in fact referred to both Diodorus and Polyainos in them - but no harm re-iterating them !

Inaki wrote:-

maybe it was asumed ex silentio since sources only mention the forces listed, similar to the argument about no Persian infantry in the battle, but I am just guessing.

...that must be right, although even using the authors figures, they come to over 18,000. I notice also that he gives a mere 1,500 for the units of the phalanx. As long ago as 1980 ( In "Warfare in the Classical World"), I postulated 2,000 strong units [2,048 to be precise] and others have argued similarly, most notably Luke Ueda-Sarson, who considers the matter in detail at
www.ne.jp/asahi/luke/ueda-sarson/GranicusNotes.html

If 2,000 is correct then even those forces come to well over 22,000.....

The 'ex-silentio' argument is hardly a convincing one....seldom in any battle do all the troops present get into action, and Alexander 'typically' posted the Greek Allies and Mercenaries to the rear anyway ( c.f. Gaugamela).......I suspect the real reason to 'minimise' Alexander's numbers is the one Byron alluded to.....many more Macedonians and a Persian force of the supposed size (without infantry) would never have offerred battle!

It seems the problems of following Arrian/Callisthenes account just multiply !!! :roll: :wink:

[Aryaman2]

Ok, I traced the article that is the source for the 18.000 Macedonian at Granicus, it is Hammond, N.G. L., 'The Battle of the Granicus River', in Journal of Hellenic Studies 100, pp.73-88 (1980). Unfortunately I don´t have it at hand to check his arguments.

[Paralus]

Apparently, it is an assumption by the author, he says

"Before setting off, Alexander decided to leave behind the 7,000 Greek
allied infantry and 5,000 mercenaries who had been brought over with the
invasion force." but no reference given, then he goes on detailing the Macedonian OOB

A most interesting subject with much to be considered. I must thank Paullus for bringing it to my attention!

In reference to the above, it must indeed be an assumption and a fairly “fancy-freeâ€

[Aryaman2]

Much of the tradition surrounding Memnon comes from Diodorus' constant theme of Greek generals being far better than Persians. He often uses the same or very similar words for differing Greeks in different centuries. Memnon is the latest. The suggestion of burning the crops is likely not correct: it is early spring and green crop fields would take a serious amount of accelerant one would think.

Right.

It was already May, Memnon counselled, the Persians
should withdraw, destroying the fodder and provisions in the area,
burning the growing crops, and even destroying the towns and cities of
the region. This 'scorched-earth' policy would deprive Alexander of the
supplies he would require according to D.W. Engels. He also says that the 30 days grain provision would be by then exhausted and that in May, althoug only milk-ripe, crops could be harvested and eaten.

[Paralus]

The only serious suggestion can have been the destruction of the stored grains. There is little likelihood of burning fields of young, green grains. A cursory reading of our Greek sources (and Anatolia will have been little different one suspects) instantly shows that these operations only ever were undertaken “at the time when corn was ripeâ€

[Paullus Scipio]

Paralus wrote:-

Much of the tradition surrounding Memnon comes from Diodorus' constant theme of Greek generals being far better than Persians. He often uses the same or very similar words for differing Greeks in different centuries. Memnon is the latest. The suggestion of burning the crops is likely not correct: it is early spring and green crop fields would take a serious amount of accelerant one would think. The idea of taking the war to Greece is, almost certainly, a later interpolation with hindsight.

..."much", perhaps, but not all. All we hear about Memnon and his military decisions argues competence, even if our Hellenistic sources place a spotlight on him, to the detriment of the Satrapal commanders. If you are going to argue a 'scorched earth' policy, then one expects that to include maximum destruction,even if total destruction is not possible.( due to possible 'greeness' - and I live in a place where 'green' fields, even stubble, burn well, and you too Michael, must have seen paddocks 'burnt off' in Spring to prevent bushfires in Summer). Arrian also reminds us that grass and young crops can be 'trampled down'. Given the known disparity of forces, Memnon's knowledge of Macedonian capabilities ( from his exile there), and the knowledge of Alexander's poor supply position ( someone in the Persian reconnaissance force had evidently done well and counted the wagons and carts! ) this was a sound strategy, and Memnon was bound to raise it, even if he knew the Satraps would reject such an extreme and harsh ( on their own people) strategy out of hand. Arsites does just that, vowing that not a single house belonging to his subjects will be destroyed - exactly the response one would expect from an honourable and noble Leader.
I would agree with Inaki and Engels, and therefore think this part is very credible and more likely than not.

However, given that Strategically the Persians were on the back foot, and struggling with their smaller forces, and no signs of rebellion in Greece, I'd also think that you are most likely correct that the idea of carrying the war to Greece was premature, and added to the narrative tradition with hindsight, although intervention in Greece was a well-used tool in the Persians kit of remedies against Hellenic incursions.

Your point about our sources loose use of terminology is also well made...our sources were written by authors in Roman times who probably had trouble with earlier technical terms, the more so when only Arrian could be called a Military man. It is quite likely that to the earlier Hellenic sources, all the Persian infantry could be described as 'foreign mercenaries', as you say - which removes one anomaly.

[quote]Memnon, as a commander of “mercenaryâ€

[Paralus]

Indeed I have seen burn offs as hazard reduction et al. The difference is that these already have a “fuel baseâ€

[Paullus Scipio]

I was referring to open paddocks, with just a few inches of grass on them - no fuel base of dead material, and I didn't mean sugarcane - the 'burnoff' method of harvesting hasn't been used for many years anyway!
I suspect Anatolia has a similar climate, and that short grass would burn well....but we needn't get too hung up on this - as I mentioned Arrian refers to 'trampling down' horse fodder and the like, so clearly burning wasn't the only option for destruction anyway.

By'under-emphasise' I simply meant that we should bear in mind he was more than a mere cavalry unit commander, which those unfamiliar with the history might think from what you wrote...it was just a clarification....I would agree with you that the Satraps et al were the first tier of Persian command 'advised' by the likes of Memnon, in military matters.
Similarly, in general, Diodorus makes it clear that Mentor's command was a purely military one, and only once gives him the rather odd title of 'Satrap of the Asiatic Coast'- which may be merely a boastful slip. As you say, this is unlikely to the point of all but impossible......after Granicus, with most of the Satraps of Asia minor dead, Darius appoints Memnon only as supreme military commander ( Darius having sent letters to 'those who dwelt next to the sea' -c.f.Mentor's appointment).Diodorus is careful not to call him 'Satrap'.
If Mentor only campaigned against Hermias, it was because he died in 340 BC, aged a relatively young 45.
Nor were the brothers mere mercenary 'condottieri', but were esteemed enough to cement their relationship by marriage to Artabazus, Satrap of Phrygia, and both ways - Artabazus' daughter Barsine to Mentor and then Memnon; and the Rhodians sister to Artabazus.

[Paralus]

By'under-emphasise' I simply meant that we should bear in mind he was more than a mere cavalry unit commander, which those unfamiliar with the history might think from what you wrote...it was just a clarification....I would agree with you that the Satraps et al were the first tier of Persian command 'advised' by the likes of Memnon, in military matters.

Yes, I suppose one could form that view from what I wrote. Memnon was, indeed, no run-of-the-mill condottiere. His family had relationships within the Anatolian/Aegean littoral Persian aristocracy, even if it did pick the wrong satrap to back – for a time until reconciliation. This speaks volumes for the relationship between the Greeks who – to use the propaganda of the Graeco/Macedonian sources and the pan-Hellenists – “suffered under the heelâ€