Manipular formation

[Mitra]

I translate you this evening.

Great! Will you display it somewhere? I'm eagerly looking forward to read it. Thank you.

Greetings
Alexandr

Sorry Alex i have time only for the last section; the entire article is too long for my bad english.

It isn't a word to word translation, but i hope is it clear (first the italian section and after the english, need to have the images vefore the eyes for more clear understanding):


Come abbiamo già visto nell’articolo, in Livio VIII.8 abbiamo una descrizione del meccanismo della triplex acies; permangono comunque punti oscuri sul funzionamento: 1. Livio non dice esplicitamente se i varchi nella linea degli astati ed in quella dei principi venissero chiusi, come quelli dei triarii (claudebant uias). 2. Non è chiaro come la linea dei triarii, per numero di uomini la metà delle altre, potesse coprire una linea di pari dimensione, se non schierandosi con un numero di ranghi estremamente ridotto. Esiste poi il problema dello spazio occupato da ogni singolo legionario in combattimento; Polibio nel famoso confronto tra legione e falange afferma che ogni soldato romano occupava uno spazio di 1,8 metri contro i 90 cm del falangita. Questa affermazione contrasta con il dato di 90 cm riportato da Vegezio, dato di solito preferito a quello polibiano. In questa sezione cercherò di dare una possibile soluzione alle lacune nelle nostre fonti, con l’ausilio della grafica.

As we have seen in the article, in Livy 8.8 we have a description of triplex acies mechanism; anyway not clear points exist:
1 - Livy don't tells us explicitly if the gaps in the hastati and principes lines were closed like those of triarii (claudebant vias).
2- It isn't clear as the triarii line, half for men number in respect to other lines, could cover a equal space without use a very low ranks number.
Also exist the problem of space covered by the single legionary during the fighting. Polybius affirm that each roman soldier occupied a 1,8 m. space vs the phalangite 90 cm. This affirmation is very differente with the 90 cm. data reported by Vegetius, data normally preferred respect that of Polybius.
In this section i try to offer a possible solution to the gaps in the sources, with the graphic help.

Fase 1: Il disegno mostra uno schieramento per manipoli prima dell’inizio della battaglia; le dimensioni delle unità dei triarii sono la metà di quelle degli altri manipoli. Si assume che la profondità fosse pari ad un contubernium di 6 uomini (cifra che ci viene dagli schieramenti di marcia) per tutti i manipoli. Le distanze tra i singoli soldati sono di 90 cm. Come ho già detto nell’articolo astati e principi dovevano essere molto vicini uno all’altro coprendosi a vicenda, con i triarii più distanti in posizione di attesa. E’ facile notare che tra questi ultimi, schierati dietro gli astati lo spazio è molto più ampio rispetto a quello degli altri manipoli.

Step 1. THe image shows a maniple battle array at thestart of battle; the triarii units dimension are half that of other maniples. We assume that the depth was equal to a 6 men contubernium (take from march b.array) for all the maniples. The space from the soldiers is 90 cm. Like I have affirmed in the article the hastati and principes line had to be close covering mutually, with the triarii in waiting position. Is easy to note that between the triarri the space is larger respect the other maniples.


Fase 2: Cosa succedeva ai varchi nei momenti immediatamente precedenti all’attacco degli astati? Abbiamo due soluzioni alternative a quella classica che vede la centuria posterior avanzare al fianco di quella prior. La prima soluzione prevede la non-chiusura dei varchi e, come abbiamo già visto, la presenza a distanza ravvicinata dei manipoli dei principi, impediva lo sfruttamento degli spazi nella linea da parte dei nemici. La seconda soluzione vede i legionari allargare le proprie file fino agli 1,8 metri citati da Polibio, raddoppiando così la superficie coperta (vedi immagine); l’autore greco può aver fatto un banale calcolo matematico: partendo dall’assunto che in combattimento falange e legione coprivano un fronte uguale e che metà di quello della legione era formato dagli spazi tra i manipoli, se per Polibio i varchi venivano richiusi prima dell’urto, allora lo spazio coperto dal legionario doveva essere il doppio di quello del falangita. Il movimento di apertura e chiusura dei varchi era abbastanza facile, coordinato da centurioni su entrambi i lati del manipolo, e lo svantaggio dell’eccessivo spazio per uomo compensato dalla maggiore libertà di movimento e dalla superiore possibilità di intervento degli uomini nel secondo rango.

step 2: What happen to the gaps during the moments just precedents the hastati attack? We have two alternative solutions respect that classical (centuria posterior advance to cover the space). THe first solution says that the gaps aren't closed, the short distance between the maniple lines blocked the possibility to enter in the gaps and encircle the maniples. The second solution see the legionaries open the line as far as the Polybian 1,8 m, doubling the cover surface (see image); the greek author can have made a simple calculation: starting from the assumption that in battle (as his finctional rconstruction) phalanx and legion covered the same frontal space and tha half of legion space are made by gaps, then if the gaps are closed by the opening of ranks, the legionary space has to be the double of that of phalangite. THe open/close movement isn't complex, coordinated from the centurions at the flanks of maniple, and the disadvantage of large space,compensated by a major movement liberty and major possibily of intervention by the men in the second rank.


Fase 3 e 4: gli astati, contratte le file, si ritirano nei varchi tra i principi che allargano i manipoli ed iniziano a combattere.

step 3 and 4: the hastati close the lines, go back between the principes that opened the maniples and starting to fight.


Fase 5: principi ed astati si ritirano dietro i triarii; i grandi varchi nella linea di questi ultimi permettono un passaggio agevole a due file di manipoli.

step 5: principes and hastati go behind the triarii; the big gaps in the triarii line permit a easy passage to two maniples lines.

Fase 6: Come potevano solo 600 triarii coprire un’area pari a quella degli altri manipoli senza trasformarsi in un’unica linea sottile? La risposta è che probabilmente non lo facevano, perché erano destinati non a difendere ma ad attaccare. Il passo di Livio che parla della chiusura dei varchi dice testualmente “triarii consurgentes, ubi in interualla ordinum suorum principes et hastatos recepissent, extemplo compressis ordinibus uelut claudebant uias unoque continenti agmine, iam nulla spe post relicta, in hostem incidebantâ€

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

That all sounds right in my mind. A laude for the excellent effort mate!

[sonic]

2- It isn't clear as the triarii line, half for men number in respect to other lines, could cover a equal space without use a very low ranks number.
Also exist the problem of space covered by the single legionary during the fighting. Polybius affirm that each roman soldier occupied a 1,8 m. space vs the phalangite 90 cm. This affirmation is very differente with the 90 cm. data reported by Vegetius, data normally preferred respect that of Polybius.

Sorry Mitra, your English is far better than my Italian :oops: , but I would like to make sure of what you have written before I send in a long reply!

Are you saying that historians writing about the Roman armies of the Punic Wars prefer to use the 90 cm. of space per man given in Vegetius, as opposed to using the 180 cm given in Polybius?


PS. To Tarbicus; I don't like to use 'clouds' either, but I'm not sure if the phrase 'loose order' fits the bill, as in many people's minds it may imply a slightly looser formation but still formed in rigid lines and by ranks. :?
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Ian (Sonic) Hughes

[Mitra]

Are you saying that historians writing about the Roman armies of the Punic Wars prefer to use the 90 cm. of space per man given in Vegetius, as opposed to using the 180 cm given in Polybius?

What I want tell is that in general the 1.80 of Polybius is taken as a error of medieval manuscript or a directly of misunderstanding of greek author, thinking that this is too large space for fighting in formation. The Vegetius data is normally take as the more realistic measure by the scholars.

[Felix]

no one wants to be surrounded, even if this makes no direct difference (i.e. being surrounded, but the enemies in your back are some distance from your body).

But any of the enemy trying to surround you would find themselves surrounded due to the checkerboard formation, even if loose. In fact the loose order (I'd prefer not to use 'cloud') would enable the Romans to far more readily counter any such advance by the enemy, which would be far more difficult to do in dressed ranks. As the author says, if pila were retained for the full duration of battle, such a maneouvre would be far more difficult for the enemy.
...

It would depend on what sort of enemy formation was being confronted. If the enemy fought in ad hoc clumps, i.e. familial or clan groups, then the fundamental issue of being outflanked is the same on both sides: if A penetrates B's front, then the flanks of B's troops are exposed, as are the flanks of the attackers of A. In this case, the key issue is initiative and intent, not the physical positions of A and B.

The easiest illustrations of this proposition are seen in WW II. A blitzkrieg breakthrough of an enemy line threatened to roll up the defender's line, but the sides of the breakthrough were potentially vulnerable to counterattack, if the defenders reacted aggressively and fast enough. Usually, they didn't/couldn't react properly, and the breakthrough usually was successful.

Against a rigid formation, I agree that gaps in a manipular line would be harder to exploit.

[Sean Manning]

Quesada has an interesting and plausable theory. Certainly, generals like Sertorius found it possible to train Iberians to Roman quality fairly quickly. And I think Polybius's statement about the width per man in Polybian Roman formations is fairly clear and cannot be lightly dismissed.

My main problem with such a formation is that it would be very vulnerable to shock cavalry, and that it goes against the natural tendency of men in battle to clump together. It would also be very different from the medieval heavy infantry and cavalry tradition that stressed very dense formations. But I need to look into the mechanics of Roman warfare in more detail.

[M. Demetrius]

it goes against the natural tendency of men in battle to clump together

In Caesar's De Bello Gallico, there is a passage, in which he goes directly to the front, and orders the men to spread out so they have room to fight. Without having the book at hand, though, I can't tell where it was found.

This lends veracity to both of the preceding statements, namely, that 1) men's tendency is to clump, and that 2) Roman strategy was to leave space between men in ranks.

[Aryaman2]

I recall a remark by De Saxe in which a regiment advancing in 3 ranks ended up 8 or more ranks deep, because soldiers tried to hide behind their comrades

[Tarbicus]

it goes against the natural tendency of men in battle to clump together.

What better remedy than an optio with a very big stick behind them, and a centurio at their front near the standard?

But I need to look into the mechanics of Roman warfare in more detail.

Ross Cowan's new Osprey book on battle tactics is worth a read. He puts the centurio in the centre front rank.

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

Yes, he seems to dispute the common convention of having the Centurion on the right! What is his evidence for that?

[Tarbicus]

What is his evidence for that?

It's more sensible for one thing, and the Strategicon places the cavalry commander, standard-bearer and trumpeter in the centre.

What's the evidence for the centurion to be placed at the right?

[M. Demetrius]

What's the evidence for the centurion to be placed at the right

(name deleted to protect the writer) said so on RAT.

[sonic]

In general the 1.80 of Polybius is taken as a error of medieval manuscript or a directly of misunderstanding of greek author, thinking that this is too large space for fighting in formation. The Vegetius data is normally take as the more realistic measure by the scholars.

I think that this sums up many of the mistakes that historians have made both in the past and today. (I count myself as somebody who has been mistaken in the past! :lol: )

Since the data does not fit the expected norm, then the data must be wrong. Why can't it be that the expected norm is wrong, and that the data has been twisted to fit it?

I'm about to start another thread (hopefully!) in which I will argue for the same mentality but on a different topic, yet it confuses me why people think that, if the facts don't fit the theory, then the facts must be wrong and not the theory.

Maybe it's just human nature oops: .

However, to get back to the thread, I believe that the 'cloud' theory fits the facts better than the linear theory that has been accepted as the norm since 'time immemorial'.

For me, the best thing about this thread is that we are now looking, not to historians of the past century or so, but at the primary evidence. For example (On the centurion being placed in the centre);

Yes, he seems to dispute the common convention of having the Centurion on the right! What is his evidence for that?

It's more sensible for one thing, and the Strategicon places the cavalry commander, standard-bearer and trumpeter in the centre.

What's the evidence for the centurion to be placed at the right?

What is the primary evidence for the centurion being placed on the right? Please don't quote modern historians, as they may be following other historians or their own inclinations and not using primary (or at least relatively-contemporary secondary) evidence.

Unfortunately, the 'Strategikon' is c.800 years after the Punic Wars etc, and so, at least to my mind, should only be used with extreme caution and only if earlier evidence does not allow us to reach an independent conclusion.

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Ian (Sonic) Hughes

[Ross Cowan]

Unfortunately, the 'Strategikon' is c.800 years after the Punic Wars etc, and so, at least to my mind, should only be used with extreme caution and only if earlier evidence does not allow us to reach an independent conclusion.

My main concern was to group the centurion, signifer and trumpeter together, and the front centre of the century seemed better than the traditional right if all the soldiers were supposed to see/hear the centurion, look to the standard for direction, etc. The Strategikon, even though it referred to a cavalry formation, helped me make up my mind. Where would you place the centurion?

For the Strategikon as an aide to making sense of earlier Roman fighting organisation and tactics, see M. P. Speidel's paper 'Who Fought in the Front?' in G. Alföldy et al., Kaiser, Heer und Gesellschaft in der römischen Kaiserzeit (2000), 473-82.

[sonic]

Unfortunately, the 'Strategikon' is c.800 years after the Punic Wars etc, and so, at least to my mind, should only be used with extreme caution and only if earlier evidence does not allow us to reach an independent conclusion.

My main concern was to group the centurion, signifer and trumpeter together, and the front centre of the century seemed better than the traditional right if all the soldiers were supposed to see/hear the centurion, look to the standard for direction, etc. The Strategikon, even though it referred to a cavalry formation, helped me make up my mind. Where would you place the centurion?

For the Strategikon as an aide to making sense of earlier Roman fighting organisation and tactics, see M. P. Speidel's paper 'Who Fought in the Front?' in G. Alföldy et al., Kaiser, Heer und Gesellschaft in der römischen Kaiserzeit (2000), 473-82.

I am in wholehearted agreement with your descriptions and the concept that the centurion, signifer and trumpeter should be together. It is also certainly more logical that they should be stationed in the front and centre rather than on the right. If I was forced to choose at present I would certainly back you in your ideas.

What I am asking here is whether there is any evidence from earlier to either support or refute the theory, since the Strategikon is rather late and the Roman army had been through a lot of changes in the intervening centuries.

Is there nothing in Polybius, Livy etc. that hints at such a positioning?

Finally, have you traced where the original idea that the centurions were on the right-hand side originated? It's possible that if you did this you'd find that it was decided by a lone academic with no military experience or desire to think on military lines!! :lol:

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Ian (Sonic) Hughes