Revisiting Zama

[Michael J. Taylor]

Re: Duncan Ross. His proposal is creative, but not entirely convincing. There is not question that Kbor Khlib is a Numidian royal monument. But Ross' thesis hinges on Russell's identification of the battle site, which is far from certain. A rough mid-20th consensus formed around the Dra-el-Metnan plain (Kromayer, Scullard), although any other number of sites have been proposed.

Battlelines: Infantry probably needed about mile before the extension, and perhaps not much more after the extension, if the lines were deeply concave/convex. The cavalry actions probably needed much more space. I've written up my thoughts on the tactical aspects of the battle; PM or email me and I will send a copy (can't post on academia.edu).

Additional skirmishes: It seems clear that a number of minor actions took place before and after the battle. Polybius is clearly uninterested in these (but mentions significant violence against Libyan cities by Scipio, which no doubt involved some fighting as well as much massacre). But these skirmishes were important to family traditions, especially to up and comers, and were likely exaggerated in importance as they entered the annalistic tradition.

This thread has advanced the curious argument that these skirmishes somehow negate that at battle occurred or that the battle itself was somehow very minor. Most people believe that the Battle of Gettysburg took place and that it was the turning point of the US Civil War. That a skirmish was fought at Second Winchester on June 15th 1863 and another skirmish at Falling Waters on July 14th 1863 does not negate that a major battle took place on 1-3 July 1863 that changed the course of the war. But many written histories of the Civil War might omit these actions, even if they might be important to the officers and men who fought in them, and might receive local commemoration (say, a roadside marker).

Polybius had to sift through the morass of Roman family tradition, which involved a great deal of chest-thumping and finger pointing. No doubt he often hewed to certain traditions favored by the Aemillii and Scipiones, although not always: he famously botches the story of Scipio's election to aedile (wrong year, wrong running mate), which he ought to have gotten right given his close access to the family. We get the correct information, oddly, from Livy.

No one thinks Polybius is gospel, and the last generation of criticism on Polybius has emphasized the schematicism of his analysis and the moral lens with which he refracts his story. But if you want to write a history of Middle Republic, you are either inside the warm and cozy Polybius Club enjoying your free drink, or you are outside in the cold reading Appian's story of the duel between Scipio and Hannibal and insisting that this must contain some sort of Gnostic truth.

[Michael Collins]

The attempts to identify the battlefield of "Zama" have largely been based upon the notion that it was without doubt a large scale battle and so people have actively searched for large, flat plains where big armies can deploy with ease and the cavalries would have been able to manouevre. But these sites have no monuments associated with them.

We have some physical evidence of a battlefield monument close to Zama. How then do the histories match the evidence?
Take the surprise appearance of Massinissa and Polybius` three spies story.
I think it far more likely that Massinissa`s forces could have been kept out of view from Hannibal at Kbor Klib, than if the battle had taken place on a wide, flat plain. In a wide flat plain it would be difficult to decieve Hannibal that Massinissa had not turned up until the very last moment. Why did Hannibal give battle?
In Appian (and Zonoras too) the big surprise is Scipio turning to face Hannibal after the Romans made a retrograde movement
and Massinissa is there. He is there because later Hannibal negotiates with Scipio through Massinissa, and yet he still engages in a major battle knowing he is out-numbered in mounted troops. This is why Polybius adapted and upgraded the original 3 spies story from a means to undermine enemy morale to a deception to mislead Hannibal as to the strength of Scipio`s cavalry forces. So instead of a cavalry battle at Kbor Klib followed by skirmishes and then a negotiated armistice, we have the great battle of Zama (that never was).

There is more reason to believe Appian and Zonoras` version of how the armies first met than in Polybius` pre-battle coverage.

And I`m pretty sure I`m not out in the cold here without a drink; I can take the stylistic differences of Livy, Polybius and Appian for what they are.

[Michael Collins]

@Michael Taylor
If we venture into the cold again and revisit Appian`s Zama and we set aside the personal heroics of the army leaders (Hannibal, Scipio and Massinissa) that are tacked onto the end of each of the paragraphs below, we are left with quite a different battle to Polybius` Zama. Scipio and the Italian cavalry are in reserve and the Numidians are placed on the Roman army`s flanks, the infantry is divided into wings and Laelius is commanding the right wing (the position of seniority). Hannibal`s elephants are arrayed against entire Roman army`s front, including the Numidians.
But lacking in Polybius, Appian includes mention of the actions of the Roman subordinate commanders; Laelius, Octavius and Thermus. So, a simple question for you, did Appian invent all this, or did he perhaps take this information from an earlier source?

"[43] Having thus exhorted their men they joined battle. Hannibal ordered the trumpet to sound, and Scipio responded in like manner. The elephants began the fight decked out in fearful panoply and urged on with goads by their riders. The Numidian horse flying around them incessantly thrust darts into them. Being wounded and put to flight and having become unmanageable, their drivers took them out of the combat. This is what happened to the elephants on both wings. Those in the center trampled down the Roman infantry, who were not accustomed to that kind of fighting and were not able to avoid or to pursue them easily on account of their heavy armor, until Scipio brought up the Italian cavalry, who were in the rear and more lightly armed, and ordered them to dismount from their frightened horses, and run around and stab the elephants. He was himself the first to dismount and wound the front-tramping elephant. The others were encouraged by his example, and they inflicted so many wounds upon the elephants that these also withdrew.
[44] The field being cleared of these beasts the battle was now waged by men and horses only. The Roman right wing, where Laelius commanded, put the opposing Numidians to flight, and Massinissa struck down their prince, Massathes, with a dart, but Hannibal quickly came to their rescue and restored the line of battle. On the left wing, where Octavius commanded and where the hostile Celts and Ligurians were stationed, a doubtful battle was going on. Scipio sent the tribune Thermus thither with a reinforcement of picked men, but Hannibal, after rallying his left wing, flew to the assistance of the Ligurians and Celts, bringing up at the same time his second line of Carthaginians and Africans. Scipio, perceiving this, brought his second line in opposition. When the two greatest generals of the world thus met, in hand to hand fight, there was, on the part of the soldiers of each, a brilliant emulation and reverence for their commanders, and no lack of zeal on either side in the way of sharp and vehement fighting and cheering."
(Appian Punic Wars 9)

[Michael J. Taylor]

So my sarcasm aside, yes, we often have to use Appian. And one potential benefit of Appian is that he does sometimes give us information that does not appear in Livy or Polybius. For example, Appian is the only source to bother telling us the strength of the opposing armies (23,000 Roman infantry, 50,000 Carthaginians) and these figures are at the very least plausible. Then of course, Appian "jumps the shark."

The problem is that Appian never tells us who his sources are (unlike Livy and Polybius, who not only drop names, but even engage in source criticism). Furthermore, Appian does not seem to be like Diodorus, who tended to pick up a source and then follow it for a while, but instead used a pastiche of sources. No doubt his is using Polybius and Livy, but also other sources, probably both Latin annalists and Greek histories. He may have been inspired by Flavian poetry for the duels between Hannibal, Massinissa and Scipio, although in Appian it is Masinissa who plays the hero, and it is not impossible that he is channeling a Numidian tradition.

As for the tribunes, it may be that Appian is aware of the family traditions; the Thermus may be the consul of 193 BC. Scipio would have had 12 military tribunes in his army, and presumably all of these told a version of the battle that gave them a prominent role. Sadly, we just don't know what the precise source was for these traditions.

[Michael Collins]

I find myself hitting a wall at the point at which Appian tells us that an armistice and a negotiated agreemnet took place between Hannibal and Scipio. At that point, it would appear that Scipio had very nearly achieved all of his war aims; Hannibal`s cavalry force had been defeated and he was no longer a threat to Roman forces and there would be little chance of Vermina being able to reinforce the Carthaginian army.
According to Livy, there`s then a two month period before Vermina is defeated, but it is a mere formality and effectively the war is over whilst Scipio holds a central position to the west of Zama.
So one asks oneself why a large scale battle would need to be fought after this point in the campaign. I can not help but think it was Scipio`s need for a glory and a triumph that Laelius was actually sent with fake news of a great victory after the cavalry battle and the outcome to the negotiations that Appian describes.

[Michael J. Taylor]

Well, the puzzle where Appian is getting all of this, which frankly doesn't feel compelling to me. And the internal coherence of the timeline also does't make much sense. Thermus' victory, as described by Appian, isn't a death-blow. And why would Hannibal be short of supplies? He's in his home territory.

This is where Polybius' series of events (which Polybius has probably compressed time-wise) still makes the most sense.

1) Hannibal returns with his army/war restarts
2) Scipio, lacking the forces to confront him and with his supply lines disrupted, marches towards Numidia, waiting for Masinissa to join him.
3) Hannibal builds up his own own army. He also receives reinforcements from Numidian chieftains
4) Masinissa finally moves to join Scipio, likely after taking his sweet time. He perhaps senses that his opponents (Tychaeus, Mazaetullus) are moving to join Hannibal.
5) The affair of the spies
6) The parley
7) Battle

Why did both sides fight? Hannibal had Scipio deep in Tunisia, far from his fleet, and probably had him modestly outnumbered. Scipio had the last Carthaginian army standing before him, and a chance to end the war before he could be replaced (clearly a major motive for Scipio). Both took a risk, and Scipio won.

Where does Appian get the Thermus affair and the second armistice? I'm not sure, but there likely were skirmishes prior to Zama that could be exaggerated into a battle, either by the Minucii Thermi, or by a annalist with a grudge against the Scipios. And there likely was some negotiation as well prior to the parley, which could be puffed into a second armistice.

[Michael Collins]

The three Spies affair is where Polybius` version of the campaign falls apart.
It is a recycled stratagem from Herodotus and it is a pretext for the court-room drama and summing up that the parley between Scipio and Hannibal really is. It would, no doubt, have appealed to Polybius` readers, (and Livy`s version of it to a later Roman audience), but I can`t see how this makes any kind of sense to us.

I don`t see how Hannibal could have seen Scipio`s position as disadvantageous after Appian`s cavalry battle, or even if we accept Polybius` three spies deception variant, before Polybius` great battle.
I think you have missed out Vermina in all this. Hannibal was at this point still without reinforcement from Vermina in either of the cases above.

I do agree that the Thermus story is hard to believe as Hannibal is operating in home territory. The other translation i`ve found makes it an equipment train (part of Hannibal`s baggage) - but that places Hannibal`s army in a retreating posture. If the action was real, it`s rather more likely that the "supply/equipment train" was in fact a reinforcement from Vermina and this would have been a serious blow indeed to Hannibal`s military capabilities. This would have been a change of situation that made negotiations probable.
But then the importance of Vermina`s forces in this campaign was ignored by Polybius and played down by Livy. For both authors Minucius` action and the cavalry battle at Zama would be seen as diminishing Scipio`s victory.

If the timeline is confused at points in Appian, it is because of his use of multiple sources. Following Polybius and Livy, Appian too includes the three spies episode, but this comes after "Part One"; the cavalry battle, the skirmishes, Minucius and the negotiations/armistice. Appian though treats the spies as something which simply unnerved Hannibal, undermining his confidence (close to the original meaning of the stratagem).
Appian passes over this quickly and it is probably as well he did, because Hannibal already knows the Roman army`s strength and that Massinissa was present (Massinissa acted as mediator in his negotiations with Scipio), so why does he need to send out spies?

At first reading, it seemed to me that essentially Appian had taken two versions of the campaign and glued them together. The first version ends after the armistice starts and a settelment is reached and the second part begins with the pressure for the renewal of hostilities by the Carthaginian public and then comes a jockeying for a good camp site, the 3 spies, the parley etc..
But the three spies story had cropped up before in Roman history (one of those family traditions to which you referred earlier) Appian`s source was probably Alimentus. Alimentus served under Marcus Valerius Laevinus and by this association could have learned of Marcus` grandfather Publius` stratagem against Pyrrhus before the battle of Heraclea in 280 BC., or have used it to flatter a commanding officer`s ancestors?
Please see post #40 at. https://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/showth...094&page=3

If you feel like we`re going around in circles, well, we really are going around in a circle and that is because the three spies is the device that Polybius used to obscure the fact that there was an important cavalry battle at Zama and to create a circumstance in which Hannibal would want to risk a major land battle invloving all of his forces.

You say that Hannibal and Scipio both risked battle. I don`t believe that they would have done anything so unprofessional; neither would have entertained the prospect of a major engagement unless they were reasonably sure that they held an advantage. The key here is understanding that local, auxiliary cavalry forces were going to be the decisive factor in an African campaign - Numidian horsemen had proven themselves to be invaluable on campaign and useful in battle.

Hannibal was surprised at a cavalry battle and that surprise was Massinissa tipping the balance in favour of Scipioo`s cavalry, but rather than report a simple ambush, Polybius credits Scipio with a major deception plan. Implying the late arrival of Massinissa may be as close as Polybius gets to the truth.

RE. puffing things up, contrast if you would Polybius` version of the parley before his battle of Zama and that of Appian before his second battle of Zama, which do you think is more credible and which appears to be rather more puffed up?

Polybius 15 Affairs of Italy and Africa
"...3 On the following day both generals came out of their camps accompanied by a few horsemen, and then, leaving their escorts behind, met each other alone, having an interpreter with them. 4 Hannibal first saluted Scipio and began to speak as follows:
4 "Would that neither the Romans had ever coveted any possessions outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians any outside Africa; 5 for both these were very fine empires and empires of which it might be said on the whole that Nature herself had fixed their limits. 6 But now that in the first place we went to war with each other for the p479 possession of Sicily and next for that of Spain, now that, finally refusing to listen to the admonition of Fortune, we have gone so far that your native soil was once in imminent danger and our own still is, 7 what remains but to consider by what means we can avert the anger of the gods and compose our present contention? 8 I myself am ready to do so as I learnt by actual experience how fickle Fortune is, and how by a slight turn of the scale either way she brings about changes of the greatest moment, as if she were sporting with little children. 7 1 But I fear that you, Publius, both because you are very young and because success has constantly attended you both in Spain and in Africa, and you have never up to now at least fallen into the counter-current of Fortune, will not be convinced by my words, however worthy of credit they may be. 2 Consider things by the light of one example, an example not drawn from remote times, but from our own. 3 I, then, am that Hannibal who after the battle of Cannae became master of almost the whole of Italy, who not long afterwards advanced even up to Rome, and encamping at forty stades from the walls deliberated with myself how I should treat you and your native soil. 4 And now here am I in Africa on the point of negotiating with you, a Roman, for the safety of myself and my country. 5 Consider this, I beg you, and be not overproud, but take such counsel at the present juncture as a mere man can take, and that is ever to choose the most good and the least evil. 6 What man of sense, I ask, would rush into p481 such danger as that which confronts you now? If you conquer you will add but little to the fame of your country and your own, but if you suffer defeat you will utterly efface the memory of all that was grand and glorious in your past. 7 What then is the end I would gain by this interview? 8 I propose that all the countries that were formerly a subject of dispute between us, that is Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, shall belong to Rome and that Carthage shall never make war upon Rome on account of them. Likewise that the other islands lying between Italy and Africa shall belong to Rome. 9 Such terms of peace would, I am convinced, be most secure for the Carthaginians and most honourable to you and to all the Romans."
8 1 Hannibal having spoken so, Scipio replied. He said that neither for the war about Sicily, nor for that about Spain, were the Romans responsible, 2 but the Carthaginians were evidently the authors of both, as Hannibal himself was well aware. The gods, too, had testified to this by bestowing victory not on the unjust aggressors but on those who had taken up arms to defend themselves. 3 No one, he said, was more awake than himself to the fickleness of Fortune and as far as it was in his power he took into consideration the uncertainty of human affairs. 4 "But as for the conditions you propose," he continued, "if before the Romans had crossed to Africa you had retired from Italy and then proposed them, I think your expectations would not have been disappointed. 5 But now that you have been forced reluctantly to leave Italy, and that we, having crossed into Africa, are in command of the open country, the situation is manifestly much changed. 6 And — for this is the most important question — what is the p483 position we have now reached? 7 When your countrymen were beaten and begged for peace we framed a treaty in writing in which it was stipulated, in addition to your present proposals, that Carthaginians should give up their prisoners without ransom, that they should surrender their ships of war, and that they should pay us five thousand talents, and finally that they should give hostages for the performance of those conditions. 8 We jointly sent envoys to Rome to submit them to the senate and the people, we Romans stating that we agreed to the terms offered and you Carthaginians entreating that they might be accepted. 9 The senate agreed and the people also gave their consent. The Carthaginians, after their request had been granted, most treacherously violated the peace. 11 What remains to be done? Put yourself in my place and tell me. Shall we withdraw the most onerous of the conditions imposed? That would be to reward your countrymen for their treachery and teach them to continue to betray their benefactors. 12 Or shall we grant their present request in the hope of earning their gratitude? But now after obtaining their request by earnest supplication, the moment they conceived the slightest hope from your return, they at once treated us as enemies and foes. 13 If we added some conditions even more onerous we might in that case refer the treaty to our popular assembly, but if we withdraw some of the conditions it would be useless even to make mention of this conference at Rome. 14 Of what further use then is our interview? Either put yourselves and your country at our mercy or fight and conquer us."
p485 9 1 After this conversation, which held out no hopes of reconciliation, the two generals parted from each other..."


Appian 8.39
"The latter [Hannibal] deemed it advisable to have a parley with Scipio, and when it was granted he said that the Carthaginians had rejected the former treaty on account of the money indemnity. If he would remit that, and if the Romans would content themselves with Sicily, Spain, and the islands they now held, the agreement would be lasting. "Hannibal's escape from Italy would be a great gain to him," said Scipio, "if he could obtain these terms in addition." He then forbade Hannibal to send any more messages to him. After indulging in some mutual threats they departed, each to his own camp."

[Steven James]

Michael Taylor wrote:
But if you want to write a history of Middle Republic, you are either inside the warm and cozy Polybius Club enjoying your free drink, or you are outside in the cold reading Appian's story of the duel between Scipio and Hannibal and insisting that this must contain some sort of Gnostic truth.

No Michael, it does not have to be that way…your either in one camp or the other. Let all ancient historians share the stage and treat them all equally. They all provide vital information. And as for duels, does not Livy or Polybius mention Paullus at Cannae went hunting for Hannibal.

Michael Taylor wrote:
And why would Hannibal be short of supplies? He's in his home territory.

Hannibal is not short of supplies, Carthage is short of supplies. The supplies are meant for Carthage.

Michael Taylor wrote:
This is where Polybius' series of events (which Polybius has probably compressed time-wise) still makes the most sense.

After studying Polybius line by line, regarding the African campaign, I cannot support your view. Parts of Polybius’ account borders on the ridiculous.

My account:

Carthaginian army destroyed at Utica
Syphax captured at Utica
Carthaginians open negotiations for peace based on a position of power.
Scipio given power of attorney to decided on peace terms
Peace terms are: Hannibal and Mago to leave Italy. Rome controls Spain. Carthage not to make war on Rome or its allies.
Hannibal returns to Africa at Hadrumetum
Concern in Roman senate about two armies in Africa (Hannibal and Hasdrubal). Concerns in Rome of whether there will be war or peace.
Mago continues to drag his feet. Scipio gives an alternation that Mago must leave Italy by a specific time.
Mago continues to drag his feet. Scipio moves into Carthaginian territory and cuts food supplies to Carthage.
Carthage orders Hannibal to collect food at Hadrumetum and ship to Carthage. Carthaginian food ships are destroyed in a storm. This has been turned into Roman supply ships being captured by the Carthaginians.
Mago leaves Italy. Roman senate concerned that Scipio will face three armies (Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Mago’s armies), sends the consul Nero with a consular army to Africa. This is the supposed Roman supply fleet that the Carthaginians supposedly captured when some are caught in a storm near Carthage.
Hannibal moves to around Carthage to maintain food supplies to Carthage. This results in some skirmishes…a small cavalry engagement at Zama of no significance and a convoy of food being sent to Carthage, captured by the Romans.
Scipio is informed of Mago’s arrival in Africa.
Hannibal sends delegates to finalise peace.
Hannibal moves his army closer to Scipio and camps on ground with little water, but it is not important the peace treaty will be signed the following day.
Hannibal with 10 delegates sign the peace treaty.
Within 60 days all Roman forces leave Africa.

None of the above has been put together lightly. It is all there in the primary sources.

[Michael Collins]

"Hannibal moves his army closer to Scipio and camps on ground with little water,..."

Appian Punic Wars 8.40
The town of Cilla was in the neighborhood and near it was a hill well adapted for a camp. Hannibal, perceiving this, sent a detachment forward to seize it and lay out a camp. Then he started and moved forward as though he were already in possession of it. Scipio having anticipated him and seized it beforehand, Hannibal was cut off in the midst of a plain without water and was engaged all night digging wells. His army, by toiling in the sand, with great difficulty obtained a little muddy water to drink, and so they passed the night without food, without care for their bodies, and some of them without removing their arms.

Zonoras 14.1
For Hannibal now gave no thought to battle, but was desirous of shifting his camp to a more favourable place. Scipio, gaining this information from deserters, broke camp by night and occupied the spot which was the goal of Hannibal's efforts. And when the Carthaginians had reached a valley [also translated as "a depressed part of the road"] unsuited for a camping place, he suddenly confronted them. Hannibal refused to fight, but in his efforts to pitch camp there and to dig wells he had a hard time of it all night long. Thus Scipio forced the enemy, while at a disadvantage from weariness and thirst, to offer battle in spite of themselves.

http://grandmanoeuvre.co.uk/wp-content/u...jaypeg.jpg

The google earth image above is from 2nd August 2014, so try to visualise that in mid-October 202 BC this landscape would look more verdant due to the seasonal rains that would have started in late September perhaps.

I think the terrain at Kbor Klib fits the descriptions, but there is some indication perhaps that the author had elaborated slightly - "toiling in the sand" does not match with the geology of the Kbor Klib area and the soils in area of Kbor Kilb are calcisols; that is derived from weathered limestones. The impression that Appian or his source gives us here is of a very dry, desert-like environment.

I am a little suspicious of this manoeuvring for position and a single camp site prior to the great battle of Zama, as of course, it is another example of Hannibal being out-manoeuvred in his own backyard. Hannibal seems far too sloppy here to risk camping so close without information as to the topography and without sufficient regard to supplying his army.
And I find it hard to accept that this failure of pre-battle manoeuvre, would have forced Hannibal to close the distance between the armies and would have forced him to give battle.
In addition to this doubt, it is also, in the sequence of events described, associated with the three spies story and an attempt to justify the meeting of the two armies, when little was to be gained by either side in fighting a full-scale engagement.

The cavalry battle was probably included in the earlier histories of the campaign (e.g. Alimentus), and this was followed by the main battle itself and the manoeuvring for campsites, etc., but perhaps the first part always was missing from Scipio`s memoirs and from his son`s history too. Polybius then rejected the cavalry battle and chose the family history instead, converting the three spies strategy into a deception plan to justify the aleady fabricated accounts of a large battle.

[Steven James]

Michael's quoting me verbatim. I secretly knew he was impressed.

[Michael Collins]

Michael's quoting me verbatim. I secretly knew he was impressed.

Well, they say that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.

[Michael J. Taylor]

Michael's quoting me verbatim. I secretly knew he was impressed.

Well, they say that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.

One too many cocktails in the Polybius club, but today I will leave its cheery and welcoming confines to come out into Appian and Cassius Dio alley-ways. 

Even, if you discard Polybius and rely just on Appian and Cassius Dio, it is impossible to reduce the Battle of Zama to either a face-off or just a minor skirmish.

Appian Pun. 39-41 reports a battle in which 23,000 Roman infantry and 3000 cavalry faced down 50,000 Carthaginian troops. Appian Pun. 48 reports Hannibal suffered 25,000 killed (somewhat more than Polybius! and 8500 captured (rather less than Polybius, but still a lot of prisoners). That is a big battle, not a skirmish and not a face-off. 

Also note the tradition in Appian of the banter between Hannibal and Scipio in the Seleucid court (Syr. 10). This event is no doubt fictional, but the point of this exercise is to take Appian seriously on his own right. The interview, in which Scipio asks Hannibal to make a list of great commanders, and Hannibal lists Alexander, Pyrrhus and then himself in third, but then says that if Scipio hadn't defeated him, he would have been greater than Alexander.  The story only makes sense if Scipio had won a significant and universally recognized victory over Hannibal. 

On to Cassius Dio (Zonoras at Dio Book 17): He actually is the only person to give at date for the battle---no eclipse was visible in Africa, but if Dio consulted a historical eclipse table he may have aligned the known date with an eclipse that occurred elsewhere. The cliff notes version still describes a big battle, with elephants and elephant channels, and the report that Hannibal's army was most destroyed.

Indeed, there is no source tradition that denies that a battle took place or suggests that Scipio inflated a minor skirmish (or even a non-event) into a major one. Scipio had a lot of enemies (remember, he died in exile) , and if he had faked the battle of Zama they certainly would have called him out.

Alright, back into the Polybius Club. On Fridays we discuss 18.28-32 and drink sherry. 



 

[Michael Collins]

Michael's quoting me verbatim. I secretly knew he was impressed.

Well, they say that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.

One too many cocktails in the Polybius club, but today I will leave its cheery and welcoming confines to come out into Appian and Cassius Dio alley-ways. 

Even, if you discard Polybius and rely just on Appian and Cassius Dio, it is impossible to reduce the Battle of Zama to either a face-off or just a minor skirmish.

Appian Pun. 39-41 reports a battle in which 23,000 Roman infantry and 3000 cavalry faced down 50,000 Carthaginian troops. Appian Pun. 48 reports Hannibal suffered 25,000 killed (somewhat more than Polybius! and 8500 captured (rather less than Polybius, but still a lot of prisoners). That is a big battle, not a skirmish and not a face-off. 

Also note the tradition in Appian of the banter between Hannibal and Scipio in the Seleucid court (Syr. 10). This event is no doubt fictional, but the point of this exercise is to take Appian seriously on his own right. The interview, in which Scipio asks Hannibal to make a list of great commanders, and Hannibal lists Alexander, Pyrrhus and then himself in third, but then says that if Scipio hadn't defeated him, he would have been greater than Alexander.  The story only makes sense if Scipio had won a significant and universally recognized victory over Hannibal. 

On to Cassius Dio (Zonoras at Dio Book 17): He actually is the only person to give at date for the battle---no eclipse was visible in Africa, but if Dio consulted a historical eclipse table he may have aligned the known date with an eclipse that occurred elsewhere. The cliff notes version still describes a big battle, with elephants and elephant channels, and the report that Hannibal's army was most destroyed.

Indeed, there is no source tradition that denies that a battle took place or suggests that Scipio inflated a minor skirmish (or even a non-event) into a major one. Scipio had a lot of enemies (remember, he died in exile) , and if he had faked the battle of Zama they certainly would have called him out.

Alright, back into the Polybius Club. On Fridays we discuss 18.28-32 and drink sherry. 


I think we`ve gone over the question as to why no one was able or would have wanted to "blow the whistle" on Scipio for this.

Appian obviously had other sources for the great battle that conflict with Polybius in some major areas of deployment - a point covered earlier too.

How would you account then for the sequence of events; the cavalry battle, the skirmishes, etc. prior to Polybius`great battle that appears Appian and then later in Cassius Dio?   Who could the source have been and why would they have fabricated such a story? 




 

[Steven James]

Michael wrote:
One too many cocktails in the Polybius club, but today I will leave its cheery and welcoming confines to come out into Appian and Cassius Dio alley-ways.

Watch out you could get mugged. However, the first step is the hardest, but congratulations for taking that step.

Michael wrote:
Even, if you discard Polybius and rely just on Appian and Cassius Dio, it is impossible to reduce the Battle of Zama to either a face-off or just a minor skirmish. Appian Pun. 39-41 reports a battle in which 23,000 Roman infantry and 3000 cavalry faced down 50,000 Carthaginian troops. Appian Pun. 48 reports Hannibal suffered 25,000 killed (somewhat more than Polybius! and 8500 captured (rather less than Polybius, but still a lot of prisoners). That is a big battle, not a skirmish and not a face-off.

You’re a historian, go after the numbers. As I have already reported, Appian also provides a figure for Scipio’s army of 16,000 infantry and 1,600 cavalry. Appian also reports that Scipio crossed in Sicily with 7,000 men. Now 16,000 plus 7,000 makes 23,000, which again approximates with Appian figure of 23,000 infantry at Zama. The numbers given for Scipio’s army at good figures, but all it proves is Scipio had that amount of men. It does not prove there was a battle. As for Appian’s figure for Hannibal’s casualties, have you ever closely examined them? I do not accept everything at face value until proven otherwise.

Michael wrote:
Also note the tradition in Appian of the banter between Hannibal and Scipio in the Seleucid court (Syr. 10)….The story only makes sense if Scipio had won a significant and universally recognized victory over Hannibal.

That story is inconsequential. The writer simply believed there was a battle. It is like saying there was no fall of the monarchy without the rape of Lucretia. Someone believed the rape of Lucretia was the catalyst for the downfall of the monarchy.

Michael wrote:
On to Cassius Dio (Zonoras at Dio Book 17): The cliff notes version still describes a big battle, with elephants and elephant channels, and the report that Hannibal's army was most destroyed.

They are following a common source. However, this does not address all the contradiction of events riddled throughout the Second Punic War. After Cartagena was captured by Scipio, his soldiers offered him as a gift some beautiful women. However, as she was betrothed to some prince, Scipio gives her back to her fiancé. Another version claims Scipio kept her. On the History Forum, I was giving my views about Zama being a fabricated battle. Now one of those I was discussing with, gave me a link to a paper on the battle that he believed would defeat my case. As he believed himself to be the big rooster in the chicken yard (the forum), I did not have the heart to tell him I wrote that paper. Once upon a time I believed with all my heart the battle did happen. But my level of research and my understanding of Roman military mathematics over the years have proven to me it is a fabrication. And it is not the only single fabricated battle occurring in the Second Punic War. There are also fake fleet engagements.

Michael wrote:
Indeed, there is no source tradition that denies that a battle took place or suggests that Scipio inflated a minor skirmish (or even a non-event) into a major one.

We don't have all the written accounts, many did not survive. And yet there are contradictory events. I cannot answer why the historical events were interwoven with the fabricated events, but that is what I have been uncovering for some years. Appian seems to try and blend both accounts, as do others. Even Polybius from time to time. From the reign of the kings to the battle of Pynda, the narrative is nothing but contradictory stories relating to the same event. It is too large to dismiss.

Here are two links to George Cornewall Lewis’ study, “An Inquiry into the Credibility of Early Rome Volume one and two. Lewis was responsible for not allowing England to get involved in the American Civil War.

https://books.google.com.au/books?id=acc...01&f=false

https://books.google.com.au/books?id=acc...01&f=false

Michael wrote:
Scipio had a lot of enemies (remember, he died in exile) , and if he had faked the battle of Zama they certainly would have called him out.

I am not, nor is Michael Collins claiming that Scipio faked the battle. Someone, or through a process of time, injected their own story based on uncontrolled emotion. The true events have been distorted. I find it interesting that you like Paralus, defend the traditional narrative, but will not address my posting showing how Polybius arrived at his numbers for both Syphax and Hasdrubal at the battle of Utica. It was fabricated, and puts new light on Polybius’ methodology. And it is not the only example I have, there as so many others that in a legal sense, if it was evidence for a murder case, I could put Polybius behind bars for three lifetimes. But actually I don’t. I give Polybius the benefit of the doubt and place it on his sources. However, his claim of finding some salty sea tablet giving Hannibal’s army numbers arriving in Italy is a pure lie.

Michael wrote:
Alright, back into the Polybius Club. On Fridays we discuss 18.28-32 and drink sherry.

Oh the phalanx versus the legion, and Polybius’ statement that one legionary faced ten pikes, well I found that to be correct.

[Michael Collins]

Polybius does not mention Gaius Laelius being sent to Rome immediately after the battle of Zama. All that Polybius says about the aftermath of the battle is that with,... "The action over, Scipio after following up the enemy and plundering their camp returned to his own." Livy and Appian both include Laelius` mission however:

Livy firstly, in Book 30.36:
Immediately after the battle, Scipio, having taken and plundered the enemy's camp, returned to the sea and his ships, with an immense booty, news having reached him that Publius Lentulus had arrived at Utica with fifty men of war, and a hundred transports laden with every kind of stores. Concluding that he ought to bring before Carthage every thing which could increase the consternation already existing there, after sending Laelius to Rome to report his victory, he ordered Cneius Octavius to conduct the legions thither by land; and, setting out himself from Utica with the fresh fleet of Lentulus, added to his former one, made for the harbour of Carthage.
(Trans. Cyrus Edmonds 1850)

And in Appian at 10.48:
Now Scipio, having gained this splendid victory, girded himself as for a sacrifice and burned the less valuable spoils of the enemy, as is the custom of the Roman generals. He sent to Rome ten talents of gold, 2,500 talents of silver, a quantity of carved ivory, and many distinguished captives in ships, and Laelius to carry news of the victory.

That first news of a victory against Hannibal would have arrived in Rome around the beginning of November 202, but it would be another five months before the formal announcement of the end of the war in Rome and celebrations were held.

Earlier I think, I mentioned the rather odd aside by Livy about Valerius Antias` claim that there had been a preliminary battle before Zama. I suspect that Valerius` claim is based upon a battle report sent by Scipio and presented by Laelius.

"Valerius Antius records that he [Hannibal] was defeated by Scipio in a preliminary encounter, in which he lost 12,000 men and a further 1,700 taken prisoner. It was after this that he [Hannibal] went to Scipio’s camp as an official envoy with ten other colleagues." (Livy 29.7.)

Livy made it very clear that he had read all histories and annals available and quite obviously Valerius` battle did not appear in any of them; it was only to be found in Valerius Antias` history. Rather than fabricate the event, I think that Valerius found this information in a source that Livy never bothered to make use of.
There are two sources which Valerius may have made use of which Livy did not. The first is the Annales maximi, compiled by Publius Mucius Scaevola between 130-115 BC when he was Pontifex Maximus and the other source could perhaps be the Linen Rolls. Livy only refers to other histrorians and annalists who made use of the Linen rolls; he does this at 4.7 and 4.23 of his ab Urbe Condita - in 4.23 Valerius himself is mentioned.

I suspect that Scipio sent Laelius with a false report after he had beaten Hannibal`s cavalry at Kbor Klib; it was a half-truth, Hannibal was only effectively beaten and all but for the resistance of Vermina, the war was over.