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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
All the refrences to the use of Google Earth have been split off after a request to an OT thread: Google Earth stuff.
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
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The Water Newton fort attributed to the Post Revolt clean up, keeping the Nene Valley in the frame (article dated 2014);

http://www.themomentmagazine.com/history...chaeology/

351,611
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If mopping up is taking place at WaterNewton and The Lunt gyrus used to retrain horses, does this strengthen the argument for Watling Street area as the battle site? Are there any other fort- sites having similar short-term occupation?
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(02-05-2018, 11:11 PM)David Scothorn Wrote: If mopping up is taking place at WaterNewton and The Lunt gyrus used to retrain horses, does this strengthen the argument for Watling Street area as the battle site?

Not necessarily. According to Tacitus, Paulinus' reprisals extended not only to actively hostile tribes but also to those of doubtful allegiance. They could, therefore, have been quite wide-ranging. He also says that the auxiliaries brought over from the Continent were placed in new winter-quarters, which were possibly situated in friendly areas. Likewise, if the Lunt was a training establishment, it too is likely to have been in a friendly area.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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(02-06-2018, 12:33 PM)Renatus Wrote: if the Lunt was a training establishment, it too is likely to have been in a friendly area.

That seems likely. But I've never been convinced by the theory that the gyrus was for training captured Iceni horses - it's not all that large, and why would the Iceni have more horses that needed training than the Roman cavalry? It seems to be another of Webster's ideas - Richard Hingley calls it 'improbable'. [Image: wink.png]

There are, though, quite a few fortifications around the Midlands that seem to have been occupied for a short period around mid-century. Could be post-Boudica, or perhaps connected with the expansion of Roman military control after the conquest period, maybe. John's point about the strategic importance of the Nene valley could be significant in a wider sense.

But all the direct evidence for the active period of the AD61 revolt is in East Anglia or south of the Chilterns.
Nathan Ross
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Nathan wrote:
 
There are, though, quite a few fortifications around the Midlands that seem to have been occupied for a short period around mid-century. Could be post-Boudica, or perhaps connected with the expansion of Roman military control after the conquest period, maybe. John's point about the strategic importance of the Nene valley could be significant in a wider sense. 
 
If as you state there were a number of forts established throughout the Midlands post the battle for a limited period perhaps this would indicate Seutonius Paulinus' campaign of severity to re-establish dominion over the tribes that had been directly involved or indeed had given succour to the tribes that did in reality rebel. It would also seem to support the contemporary reports that it was not only the Iceni and Trinovantes but possibly tribes north of the Thames rather than the Cantiaci, Regni or Attrebates.
 
Tacitus (The Annals) "The whole army was now concentrated and kept under canvas, with a view to finishing what was left of the campaign. Its strength was increased by the Caesar, who sent over from Germany two thousand legionaries, eight cohorts of auxiliaries, and a thousand cavalry. Their advent allowed the gaps in the ninth legion to be filled with regular troops; the allied foot and horse were stationed in new winter quarters;"
 
Perhaps it is these forts that were built as winter quarters, to house the auxilliaries and cavalry and these were the forts abandoned once SP had gone and Turpilianus took over with a more conciliatory policy to finish the war through diplomacy and to get the province consolidated and back on a peaceful and profitable footing as the rebellion was over and the affected tribes were being systematically slaughtered for no good further purpose.
 
It would seem logical to capture the tribal horses which would then prevent future cavalry or charioteers in any future rebellion and keeping the tribes subdued. Certainly the tablets from Vindolanda describe Brythonic cavalry in the field  causing mayhem much later so horses were a major weapon. Perhaps there were many “gyros” that simply have not been found or survived or that the Lunt was a specialist training school.
Deryk
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(02-06-2018, 04:56 PM)Theoderic Wrote: there were a number of forts established throughout the Midlands post the battle for a limited period

Then again, the fort at Water Newton is only a few miles west of the big vexillation fortress at Longthorpe, which apparently dates back to the Claudian period. Quite possibly Longthorpe was built just after the Iceni revolt of AD48, and the auxiliary fort at Water Newton, guarding the crossing of the Nene, may date from around the same period. Alternatively, the Water Newton site could have been established when Ermine Street was extended northwards, as a replacement for the Longthorpe fortification when the Ninth Legion moved up to Lincoln in (I think) the Flavian period.

Meanwhile, I was thinking a bit more about the defeat of Petillius Cerialis and the Ninth as they tried to relieve Colchester at the start of the revolt. Tacitus tells us that the 'victorious Briton' defeated Cerialis, presumably meaning the same force that had just sacked the city. So Cerialis's column could have got quite close to Colchester when they were defeated - perhaps even to the edge of the city itself.

The map below shows the early Roman city and the surrounding Iron Age setting. I would guess that Cerialis would have approached along the road from the north-west, approximately following the Colne valley. This road appears to meet with three others immediately west of Gryme's Dyke, and then pass through 2-3 further lines of ancient fortification before reaching the city.

Could it be that the Britons in Colchester, learning of the approach of a Roman relief force from the north-west, manned one or other of these very formidable ancient fortification lines? This might explain how they beat Cerealis and destroyed his infantry - a Roman assault against one of the dyke lines could have been enveloped by overwhelming numbers of defenders. Cerialis would not have sent cavalry against a fortified position, of course - so that would explain how he lost his infantry while the cavalry escaped.

We'll never know for sure, but it seems at least as plausible as the usual 'ambush in the woods' scenario!

[Image: fig01.gif]

Map from here - Iron Age and Roman Colchester
Nathan Ross
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Nathan wrote:
 
Meanwhile, I was thinking a bit more about the defeat of Petillius Cerialis and the Ninth as they tried to relieve Colchester at the start of the revolt. Tacitus tells us that the 'victorious Briton' defeated Cerialis, presumably meaning the same force that had just sacked the city. So Cerialis's column could have got quite close to Colchester when they were defeated - perhaps even to the edge of the city itself.

Certainly it is a possible scenario although if there were the numbers of Brythons that are mentioned it would seem to be a suicide mission to send 2,000 (or even 4,500) infantry against such a host in the open field, let alone when they had a defensive position to protect them.

I seems to me that for some reason that eludes us the Romans totally underestimated the forces that were unleashed against them. This was not only the Brythonic tribal armies but a popular uprising of a people who saw their land being taken from them by another state that would totally destroy their way of life not just at the aristocratic level but much farther down the pecking order affecting everyone.

Tacitus states:

“......all the chief men of the Icenians were stripped of their family estates, and the relatives of the king were treated as slaves. Impelled by this outrage and the dread of worse to come — for they had now been reduced to the status of a province — they flew to arms, and incited to rebellion the Trinobantes and others, who, not yet broken by servitude, had entered into a secret and treasonable compact to resume their independence. The bitterest animosity was felt against the veterans; who, fresh from their settlement in the colony of  Camulodunum, were acting as though they had received a free gift of the entire country, driving the natives from their homes, ejecting them from their lands, — they styled them "captives" and "slaves," — and abetted in their fury by the troops, with their similar mode of life and their hopes of equal indulgence.”

Even in our day and age, if people were stripped of their homes and their living there would be widespread uprisings and insurrection but to do this especially to a proud race of independent peoples, rebellion was almost guaranteed.
Deryk
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Steve Kaye wrote:

"Broaden the search a little." Good idea; the following might help with that…..

After Steve’s hard work on getting us all access to his Google Earth locations I felt that it would be churlish not at least to try and expand the sites away from the ones that seem to be the favourites: Church Stowe, Dorking, Dunstable, Ogbourne St George and Tring (Chivery Top) and Tring Newground.

I also have a concern about short “open valleys” where the roman army could be attacked from the rear by the local population if there was more than one group, (for example from the Icknield Way as well as Bulbourne Valley for Tring and Dunstable from the Icknield Way and Verulamium but  this also applies to Ogbourne St George from the Ridgeway and the road from Speen to Warnborough or from Cunetio to Wanborough; it could also apply to Church Stowe).

Others obviously have concerns about closed valleys where SP could be trapped such as Tring (Chivery Top) but apart from this site and Dorking there is no real depth or steepness to the valley that could be used as a rampart to shelter along this includes Paulbury and Arbury Banks.

Dorking has a river running through it but possible there are other nearby sites (many of the sites have limited water but I expect that the armies were used to finding water in a well known environment) As far as Steve is concerned it is too close to London as is Dunstable and Tring and others would say that Ogbourne St George is a step too far for the Brythons to follow as it would leave their homelands exposed.

So I looked at the possibility of other roman roads that might have a bearing on the site location.

Firstly there is a road that has been difficult to ascertain between Verulamium and Silchester called the Camlet Way and verified by ID Margary as far as Hedsor Wharf crossing the Thames  (near Cookham) which obviously gives an alternate route for SP and Boudica.

It is supposed that there is a link road between Brockley Hill (Watling Street) and Bourne End (Akeman  Street) which is unproven but if there, this again could affect timings of the pursuing host from London.

Have we considered all the roman road in the area. Perhaps not….

If SP went past the sites at Tring it is assumed that he would naturally head for Alchester but did he have any alternatives? There is a roman road from Fleet Marston on Akeman Street which connects with Dorchester on Thames and this is another route that could have been taken where SP could have crossed the Thames and gone down via the roman road to Streatley, through the Goring Gap to Silchester.

Although Dorchester is assumed to be a small settlement whilst looking at Google Earth for where the Thames crossing is, I found a layout of a town in “parch marks” near Warborough and Shilingford (worth checking out) and on looking it up found that it is a well known unexcavated site, so again this may have an influence.

Obviously there is the Upper and Lower Icknield Way as well and the Lower Icknield Way is now thought to have been roman, whereas the Upper Icknield Way is the older trackway. The Lower Icknield Way is between Dunstable, past Tring going through the roman site at Aston Clinton and along the plain, parallel to the hills about a mile distant from them to Pyrton where it is thought to link to Dorchester on onwards North to Alchester or South to Streatley then Silchester.

So does this bring an other sites into play that fit the description?

There is a gap near Princes Risborough off the Lower Icknield Way at Saunderton where the Upper Icknield Way also traverses the valley; this 14 mile gap links the Icknield way with the River Thames and would appear to be an ancient trade route. 

Now this is a through valley where the river Wye rises in the Chilterns near West Wycombe and flows southwards into the Thames at Hedsor Wharf, passing High Wycombe. This spring could have been held by the roman troops denying Brythons access to water but having an abundance for themselves and their guests and their horses etc., with the river Wye flowing away from the Brythons.


.pdf   Bourne End to Princes Risborough.pdf (Size: 416.73 KB / Downloads: 9)

So why would SP take his forces down here?

One option is that his scouts had found that there were rebellious forces to the north of Tring and that he decided to go west towards Silchester. By taking the roman Lower Icknield Way through Aston Clinton and then taking the route down the gap that also links to the Camlet Way and on to Silchester he would have avoided confrontation.

It would appear that as far as the South of Britain was concerned it was deemed to be “roman friendly” and perhaps SP felt this was a safer route or it may be that this offered a great battle site to even up the numbers odds and also allows for a protected camp site.

This gap is unusual as it has a number of steep sided valleys caused by a hill with an iron age hill fort near West Wycombe in the middle of the main gap which would force the advancing Brythons into smaller groups which may have been the intention of SP.

The site seems to fit the Tacitus description but also allows for Dio’s as well. There is the defile, there is the plain and the Upper Icknield Way lies behind the battle site stopping fleeing Brythons from leaving through the gaps.


.docx   West Wycombe.docx (Size: 388.83 KB / Downloads: 13)

[img=602x296]file:///C:/Users/deryk/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image002.jpg[/img]
As a matter of interest there was supposed to be a roman road down the gap at some time, a roman temple on the hill (now lost) and a number of roman villas and artefacts along the gap.  

Any way I would be interested in your views…….
Deryk
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(02-15-2018, 12:10 AM)Theoderic Wrote: I also have a concern about short “open valleys” where the roman army could be attacked from the rear by the local population

I think open valleys are exactly what we're looking for. The translation 'defile' is confusing - the word Tacitus uses means 'throat' - so it's an open pass or through-way between hills, 'closed' in the rear by woods, not by high ground. It is not a closed valley or an indentation in an escarpment.


(02-15-2018, 12:10 AM)Theoderic Wrote: there is no real depth or steepness to the valley that could be used as a rampart

Again - there is no 'rampart'!

As I've said before: angustias loci pro munimento retinens means 'kept to the narrowness of the place as a defence'. It's narrowness we're after, not steepness and certainly not ramparts.


(02-15-2018, 12:10 AM)Theoderic Wrote: a through valley where the river Wye rises in the Chilterns near West Wycombe and flows southwards into the Thames at Hedsor Wharf, passing High Wycombe... This gap is unusual as it has a number of steep sided valleys caused by a hill with an iron age hill fort near West Wycombe in the middle

It's certainly an attractive site, with some nice long 'throat'-like defiles. But it would seem to make more sense if the Britons were coming from the south-east, advancing from the Thames valley after plundering the area west of London up to Staines and Windsor, perhaps. The problem here is the Wye valley - the battle would happen around modern High Wycombe, whch looks quite watery!

Having the Britons approaching from the north-west - the direction of Saunderton - gives a drier battlefield, but I'm not convinced that both sides would have manoeuvred around the Chilterns so they were effectively facing in the other direction to when they started. Paulinus's 'delay' (as I mentioned above) I take to be a period of static waiting, not a series of strategic movements - and I doubt the Britons would have 'chased' him all that way either!

But if both sides did end up in this vicinity, moving south-west along the far side of the Chilterns, then I would think that the valley south of Wendover, between Chivery and Dunsmore, would present a more immediate choice of location for Paulinus.
Nathan Ross
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Nathan wrote:

I think open valleys are exactly what we're looking for. The translation 'defile' is confusing - the word Tacitus uses means 'throat' - so it's an open pass or through-way between hills, 'closed' in the rear by woods, not by high ground. It is not a closed valley or an indentation in an escarpment.

Thanks for the clarification..... OK no closed valley Sad ........my issue is not with the "open valley" in general but with the "open valleys" that are open to attack from both sides simultaneously because there is easy access by the Brythons, if you are talking about more than one tribe (which we possibly are) coming from different directions.

Nathan wrote:

Again - there is no 'rampart'!

OK - no rampart then either   Sad 

Nathan wrote:

As I've said before: angustias loci pro munimento retinens means 'kept to the narrowness of the place as a defence'. It's narrowness we're after, not steepness and certainly not ramparts.

OK....definitely no ramparts Sad Sad but how do you define "narrowness" , surely this must be defined and what is the parameter that makes something narrow. 

Steve seems to judge narrowness at about 750 metres to 1200 metres (a metre being the width of a man) but then what defines the narrowness that forces people along between something that is too steep to walk along and how high is this?

Nathan wrote: 

It's certainly an attractive site, with some nice long 'throat'-like defiles. But it would seem to make more sense if the Britons were coming from the south-east, advancing from the Thames valley after plundering the area west of London up to Staines and Windsor, perhaps. The problem here is the Wye valley - the battle would happen around modern High Wycombe, which looks quite watery!

Glad you like the site  Smile

Agree that if the Brythons were coming up from the South East from Hedsor Wharf it doesn't work....but...... 

Again this is all about timing but the scenario that I was looking at is as follows:

1. SP leaves London with the refugees after burning the warehouses and the bridge (if there was one)
2. SP arrives at Verulamium with his refugees
3. The Brythons arrive in London and raze it to the ground
4. SP re-stocks and moves out along Akeman Street with the London and Verulamium refugees and sets fire to the warehouses
5. The Brythons from London follow him up Watling Street (why would they bother to go farther West at this time?)
6. SP gets to Tring and waits for re-inforcements from the local stations
7. The Brythons get to Verulamium and then rather than go to Dunstable or Braughing or Silchester head towards Tring along Akeman Street.
8. SP's scouts report to him that the Brythons are not dispersing but are coming his way.
9. He moves out towards Alchester but there is no cover and he is not sure about the Midland tribes
10. SP Heads West down the Lower Icknield Way for the quickest way to Silchester and to avoid any Brythons from the at North, from the East down the Icknield  but then decides that he has no option but to fight and chooses to fight at West Wycombe with the whole of the Brythonic army opposed to him.
11. The combined forces of Brythons from the London raid, the East and from the North descend on the gap at Princes Risborough because to the south of the Thames at the other end the natives are roman friendly.

Then virtually everything else works........
 
Nathan wrote:

Having the Britons approaching from the north-west - the direction of Saunderton - gives a drier battlefield, but I'm not convinced that both sides would have manoeuvred around the Chilterns so they were effectively facing in the other direction to when they started. Paulinus's 'delay' (as I mentioned above) I take to be a period of static waiting, not a series of strategic movements - and I doubt the Britons would have 'chased' him all that way either!

I think that going down the Upper Icknield to where SP was near Saunderton  would only have been about 12 miles and this would have been the last cast of the dice. Regarding them facing it each other - all the Brythons had to do was follow him....

Nathan wrote:

But if both sides did end up in this vicinity, moving south-west along the far side of the Chilterns, then I would think that the valley south of Wendover, between Chivery and Dunsmore, would present a more immediate choice of location for Paulinus

That valley would take them back to danger and not safety....... 
Deryk
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(02-15-2018, 06:32 PM)Theoderic Wrote: 10. SP Heads West down the Lower Icknield Way for the quickest way to Silchester and to avoid any Brythons from the at North, from the East down the Icknield  but then decides that he has no option but to fight and chooses to fight at West Wycombe with the whole of the Brythonic army opposed to him.

I'm afraid that this does not work for me. If Paulinus moved south (as he would be doing, if he ended up at West Wycombe), he would not only be moving away from his main source of reinforcements, the legions coming down from North Wales, but would be allowing the Britons to get behind him and cut him off from them. If he really felt that the potential battle sites in the Tring area did not give him the protection he needed, he would have little alternative but to go west and meet his reinforcements on or near the Fosse Way at Cirencester.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Renatus wrote:


I'm afraid that this does not work for me. If Paulinus moved south (as he would be doing, if he ended up at West Wycombe), he would not only be moving away from his main source of reinforcements, the legions coming down from North Wales, but would be allowing the Britons to get behind him and cut him off from them. If he really felt that the potential battle sites in the Tring area did not give him the protection he needed, he would have little alternative but to go west and meet his reinforcements on or near the Fosse Way at Cirencester.

I agree

If (as i am surmising) however he felt that he would be exposed at Tring because of the tribes to the North he could not use Akeman Street to get to Alchester and then on to Cirencester and safety but would have either had to use the Lower Icknield Way to get to Dorchester on Thames or the road from Fleet Marston on Akeman Street to Dorchester on Thames as these were the only alternate western routes available to him. 

If that  was the case it would seem logical that he would head from Dorchester over the Thames through the Goring Gap at Streatley and then down to Silchester and on to Cirencester that way. (or he could have crossed the Thames and gone across country along the Thames to Lechlade and then on to Cirencester)

My supposition is that he changed his mind and went down the well known and established trading route which was the valley from Saunderton to West Wycombe, High Wycombe and Hedsor Wharf and take the Camlet Way to Silchester (which for the purposes of this exercise I am assuming was "safe") and then on to Cirencester.  (The Wendover valley would have taken him away from Silchester back East)

At some point early on he decided that he needed to face the Brythons or realised that this was a great place to give battle and where he could control the flow of water from West Wycombe where the river Wye rises and flows southwards and there was an excellent site where he could do the most damage by using the landscape to his advantage.

The fact that the Upper Icknield Way runs at the back of the battle field of the Brythons and where the wagons would have been stationed was just pure luck so that he could inflict such a massive defeat but of course he had already defeated the army before they tried to escape....

 




 
Deryk
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(02-15-2018, 06:32 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Steve seems to judge narrowness at about 750 metres to 1200 metres... but then what defines the narrowness that forces people along between something that is too steep to walk along and how high is this?

Ha! Yes, ok, you've got me there - if there is 'narrowness' there must also be 'steepness' on either side! [Image: tongue.png]

I would guess a gap of c.1000 metres is about right. Paulinus had 10,000 men, probably about 8000 regular infantry - drawn up eight deep in close formation they would need a space of about that width. I would assume the cavalry and light infantry/archers etc would occupy the slopes or higher ground on the flanks.



(02-16-2018, 09:50 AM)Theoderic Wrote: he would be exposed at Tring because of the tribes to the North

Hmm, not sure. These 'tribes to the north' or 'hostile people of the Midlands' are often assumed in this debate, but we don't know if they existed. Similar to 'the Britons who defeated Cerialis' (aka 'Boudica's other army'!)...

Even if the Midlands were in a state of rebellion, I don't think we need assume there was any large scale rebel army in the field up there. And against a fully equipped Roman force of ten thousand men, including cavalry, any smaller bands of rebels would not offer much of a threat. So I don't think our theories should be informed by the possibilities of 'other' groups of Britons roaming about the place.

Tacitus's note about Paulinus 'making sure there were only enemies in front of him' I take to be a tactical and not a strategic move: he wanted to ensure that the vast rebel army had not outflanked him before taking up his position.
 

(02-16-2018, 09:50 AM)Theoderic Wrote: he could not use Akeman Street to get to Alchester

Alchester is only about 22 miles from Tring - a day's steady march - so if Paulinus thought he was in any danger from the surrounding area he would surely have made for the fortifications there, which were apparently large enough to contain his full force, rather than diverting southward into the Chilterns again.
Nathan Ross
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Nathan wrote:


I would guess a gap of c.1000 metres is about right. Paulinus had 10,000 men, probably about 8000 regular infantry - drawn up eight deep in close formation they would need a space of about that width. I would assume the cavalry and light infantry/archers etc would occupy the slopes or higher ground on the flanks

If we assume that SP had the 14th Legion with him would he not have had the Batavians with him? If this was the case, by extrapolation if there were only 10,000 men would not there have been a greater ratio of mounted men to Legionaries? In other words would the depth of the force have been less than 8 deep or not as wide as 1000 metres? Could the space needed have been narrower?
 
Nathan wrote:

Even if the Midlands were in a state of rebellion, I don't think we need assume there was any large scale rebel army in the field up there. And against a fully equipped Roman force of ten thousand men, including cavalry, any smaller bands of rebels would not offer much of a threat. So I don't think our theories should be informed by the possibilities of 'other' groups of Britons roaming about the place.

Alchester is only about 22 miles from Tring - a day's steady march - so if Paulinus thought he was in any danger from the surrounding area he would surely have made for the fortifications there, which were apparently large enough to contain his full force, rather than diverting southward into the Chilterns again.
 
I think that you are probably correct in that a full blown army was not there but the Brythons were notorious for harrying marching columns,  operating a guerrilla war (Caesar had major problems during his second expedition) so you wouldn’t have needed that many men (small war bands) to cause a major power, major problems (the Afghan wars and the Indian wars in North America have a parallel). 

The problem for the Romans as we have already discussed was bringing the Brythons to a formal battle which they would win everytime but unless the Romans had substantial cavalry many of the Brythons would escape to fight another day - as in fact happened here.

So the key possibly is when and why SP made the decision to fight rather than re-group with his forces in the west. My supposition is that he went west along the Lower Icknield Way, heading for the Goring Gap to Silchester (possibly safe territory held by roman allies) and then to Cirencester via Speen and Wanborough.

The Brythons following him had the option to turn for home at Verulamium by going up Watling Street via Dunstable and then going east along the Upper Icknield Way, or they could follow SP to Tring along Akeman Street, they could have even outflanked him by splitting their force into one group going up Akeman Street to Tring and one going to Tring via Dunstable and then down the Icknield Way to Tring which would have made the Tring site undefendable.

(Of course this is only speculation - but it is possible)

SP’s scouts would have kept him informed of the movement of the Brythons and perhaps it was when the Brythons continued to advance that he made the move to a site where he could not be outflanked yet gave him an exit to Silchester.
 
It just seems that we should look at all the possible scenarios - as we haven't found that much archeology as yet referring to the battle site - apart from the Tring helmet  Undecided
Deryk
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