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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
Hmm, I may be some time .....
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(08-31-2016, 04:36 PM)Alecto Wrote: As for the South-East, I don't know. Richard Hunt, whose take on the rebellion I like a lot - suggests near Letherhead, A 24 Box hill country.(Queen Boudica's battle of Britain' )

I'm not familiar with Hunt's book. How does he justify his choice of the Leatherhead area?
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Hunt believes that going back up Watling Street was pointless, no help from the IXth for a start.
Towards the south -west Cogidumnus' territory would offer refuge in the worst case. The Regni capital was somewhere near Chichester. To prevent incursion into Regni territory he would have to block Stane street, Hunt proposes somewhere along the A 24 as one of the coordinates.

By the way I'm only on page 3 here...
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(09-02-2016, 06:13 PM)Alecto Wrote: I'm only on page 3 here...

I think it was around page 3 that we were discussing Nic Fuentes's idea of Virginia Water. Fuentes makes a good case for a western retreat, or at least a non-Midlands site.

Leatherhead, and the Surrey Hills gap generally, look quite good - the problem is the river Mole running right through the middle of it. We did discuss a proposed site just to the west of Box Hill, which was great, except for the river...

However, any western or southern site would face two problems, I think (which we've mentioned before, but a bit of a recap is always good!):

1. By withdrawing in either of these directions, Paulinus would leave the rebels an open route home. They could go back to their lands in East Anglia with their plunder, and he'd have to lead an expedition against them on their home ground. Besides, it would look like he'd run away from a fight, which wouldn't play well back in Rome...

2. He would be giving up his connection via Watling Street with his main army in Wales. He still had several thousand men up there, plus his campaign headquarters in (probably) Wroxeter.

I realise, actually, that the presence of the army in Wales would count against any protracted campaign. If the war lasted more than twenty days or so, Paulinus could have summoned reinforcements from his other legions, and would have had more than ten thousand at the final battle.
Nathan Ross
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Picking up on some of Nathan's points and doing some recapping of my own, I would like to add the following:

1. From my perspective, any site south of the Thames, however attractive topographically, is a strategic non-starter. Paulinus had already decided that he had insufficient forces with him to confront the rebels advancing on London and, consequently, his first priority would have been to seek reinforcements. He was not going to find them in any appreciable numbers in the south and he would almost certainly have been cut off from the rest of the army by the rebels, if he had gone that way.

2. I initially favoured a withdrawal into the west but that was when I thought that the full Second Legion was at Exeter. Now that I believe that the bulk of the legion was in North Wales with the campaign army and only the veterans remained at base, the west suffers from a similar objection with regard to the immediate availability of reinforcements, although he would not have been cut off and would have been able to call in troops from Wales and the south-west to build up an army for a retaliatory strike. However, this would probably have taken some time.

3. Consequently, as will by now be well-known to readers of this thread, the conclusion I have reached is that Paulinus withdrew up Watling Street as far as Verulamium and then branched off west along Akeman Street to the strategically important crossroads at Tring to await his reinforcements.

4. The Romans understood the value of strategic withdrawal, so avoiding combat until he had built up sufficient forces would not necessarily have been frowned upon. Engaging the enemy with inadequate forces and being wiped out would probably have gone down even less well in Rome. In the event, of course, a strategic withdrawal is exactly what Paulinus undertook.

5. Allowing the rebels to disperse to their homelands might not necessarily have been a bad thing. The tribes would have been split up and could possibly have been dealt with piecemeal. Had the final battle not taken place as it did, this is presumably what Paulinus would have done.

The effect of the troops in North Wales upon the time-scale of the campaign had not occurred to me but I have now given it some thought. I cannot offer a timing for the revolt as a whole (other than what has been done before) but the conclusion I have reached as to its final stages, after the withdrawal from London, is that these could possibly have lasted little more than two weeks. Precision is impossible, of course, because there is so much that we do not know but, for what they are worth, I offer my thoughts for consideration.

Assuming, as I do, that Paulinus actually summoned the legions in North Wales to join him but that they did not arrive in time to take part in the final battle, the first thing to consider is when he gave that order. I do not think that he did this until quite late. When he was first made aware of the uprising, he may well have thought that it involved only the Iceni and that two legions, the Ninth and the Fourteenth, could handle it. He would have been reluctant to compromise his Welsh conquests by withdrawing too many troops, perhaps unnecessarily, to deal with what might have been no more than a local revolt. Even after he heard of Cerialis' defeat, he may still have thought that he had enough troops with him to deal with the rebels. Cerialis had lost 2000 men but Paulinus had a full legion and probably a number of auxiliaries. He almost certainly did not have the 10,000 men that he had at the final battle but his force could still have been three or four times the size of Cerialis'. Thus, it was probably not until he reached London and was able to make a full appreciation of the situation that he decided that he had to call down the troops in North Wales. Up to then, he had probably done no more than to warn the legionary commanders there that they might be required to march at short notice, although he might have summoned the veterans of the Second, Fourteenth and Twentieth Legions from their various bases.

The time-scale after that depends upon how far the rebels were from London when Paulinus left it, how long they spent in sacking the city and their speed of travel. Allied with that is when the legions in North Wales set off and what their speed of travel was. We have postulated that the rebels, encumbered by a train of ox-drawn wagons, possibly travelled at a rate of approximately 5 miles a day. The legions were trained, according to Vegetius, to march at the military pace of 20 miles in eight summer hours* and a full pace of 24 miles in the same period. However, these figures relate to training circumstances and we know that the Romans over-trained to make the conditions experienced on campaign seem easy. These figures, therefore, should be regarded as simply the rate of march, not the distances expected to be covered, bearing mind also that a camp had to be constructed at the end of a day's march. The legions would also have had baggage animals but these may be assumed to have been mules, rather than oxen. Let us assume, therefore, that the Roman reinforcements travelled at three times the speed of the rebels.

The distance between Bangor on the Menai Straits and London, following the line of the present A5, is approximately 250 miles. Assuming, for the sake of this argument, that the legions coincidentally left the Welsh coast on the same day as the rebels left London and that both proceeded along Watling Street at the rates mentioned above, they would have met after 12-13 days in the region of Towcester. As we know that these legions were not at the final battle, the time between the rebels leaving London and the battle would have been less than this. If I am right in thinking that the battle took place in the vicinity of Tring, this is approximately 40 miles from London, travelling via St Albans, so the rebels could have been there in eight days, say ten to allow some time for the sacking of Verulamium. In this time, the legions from Wales would have covered approximately 150 miles bringing them to the vicinity of Hinckley, still some 70 miles and about five days from Tring. With his reinforcements that far away, one can see why Paulinus felt that he had to give battle with the forces that he had immediately to hand.

One final thought arises from this analysis: how realistic would it have been to expect Poenius Postumus and the men of the Second Legion to have reached the battle site in time to take part in the battle? Exeter is approximately 190 miles from Tring taking the Fosse Way to Cirencester and then Akerman Street to Tring. A more direct route, if it were available, through Frome and Marlborough is some 30 miles shorter. We do not know when Postumus was ordered to march but, if he had left Exeter at the same time as the rebels left London, neither route would have brought him to the battle site in time. If, as is generally accepted, he simply ignored the order, it would not have cut much ice for him to have protested that it would not have made any difference, even if he had obeyed.

* That should be five summer hours, not eight.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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(09-04-2016, 08:47 PM)Renatus Wrote: Allowing the rebels to disperse to their homelands might not necessarily have been a bad thing.

Militarily, perhaps. But to allow such a thing would be very damaging to Roman prestige and to Paulinus's reputation and political future. The rebels had sacked two Roman towns and beaten an expeditionary force sent against them; Paulinus had a field army - albeit a small one - and it was his clear duty to oppose them. If he allowed them to return home he would not only appear weak and irresolute, but would be facing a lengthy punitive campaign with much gore and no glory.

So I agree that a move west or south from London would not have been in his interests.


(09-04-2016, 08:47 PM)Renatus Wrote: The legions were trained, according to Vegetius, to march at the military pace of 20 miles in eight summer hours and a full pace of 24 miles in the same period.

That would be Roman miles, equating to approx 18.4 and 22.1 modern miles respectively.


(09-04-2016, 08:47 PM)Renatus Wrote: With his reinforcements that far away, one can see why Paulinus felt that he had to give battle with the forces that he had immediately to hand.

I agree!


(09-04-2016, 08:47 PM)Renatus Wrote: how realistic would it have been to expect Poenius Postumus and the men of the Second Legion to have reached the battle site in time to take part in the battle?

A good question! If they were at Exeter and he only gave them the order to move when he was considering evacuating London, then, as you say, there would be no chance of them reaching him in time.

So - either he ordered them to join him at an earlier point (either when making his initial plans, or as soon as he heard of Cerialis's defeat), or they were based somewhere closer than Exeter. If they were at Gloucester they could have joined him in about 4-5 days, I think.

Once again, our ignorance of the disposition of the Roman army at this point doesn't give us many clues!



As this thread has briefly flickered back into life, I thought I'd add a bit of information I found recently about water requirements.

Pryor and Jeffreys's Age of the Dromon has a few notes about the watering of medieval galleys, which due to their limited carrying capacity had to measure and record the amounts carried very carefully. Apparently a French ordinance of 1318 specified 4 litres per man per day, for all needs - but these were passengers not crewmen. For oarsmen, French galleys of the 17th century allowed 7 litres per man per day, while the sea trials of the replica galley Olympias suggested that every oarsman needed 6 litres per day to drink, and an estimated 2 litres for cooking.

This is for men performing strenuous labour in the heat of the Mediterranean summer; we might assume that soldiers marching in the more temperate climate of Britain would require less. Even so, 6-8 litres per man per day would not be too far off Steve Kaye's estimate of 9 litres. However, multiplied by the size of an army this would produce very different requirements. Even leaving aside the question of supply by springs, and the changes in water flow over the centuries, I wonder what effect this sort of recalculation would have on the possible positioning of Roman camps in the areas we've been looking at?
Nathan Ross
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(09-04-2016, 10:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote:
(09-04-2016, 08:47 PM)Renatus Wrote: Allowing the rebels to disperse to their homelands might not necessarily have been a bad thing.

Militarily, perhaps. But to allow such a thing would be very damaging to Roman prestige and to Paulinus's reputation and political future. The rebels had sacked two Roman towns and beaten an expeditionary force sent against them; Paulinus had a field army - albeit a small one - and it was his clear duty to oppose them. If he allowed them to return home he would not only appear weak and irresolute, but would be facing a lengthy punitive campaign with much gore and no glory.

I'm not sure that I agree with this. As you have repeatedly and rightly said, Paulinus was a cautious general and his natural instinct would have been to avoid engaging the enemy until he had amassed sufficient forces to ensure victory. Even if this had involved allowing the rebels to return to their homelands, if he had subsequently carried the war to them and defeated them, any perception of irresolution would have been eliminated. He had, after all, the example of Fabius Maximus, whose tactics were criticised at the time but were later vindicated and who was consequently hailed as a great Roman hero.

That said, I think that the Roman instinct generally, when faced with a revolt, was to try to nip it in the bud as quickly as possible with whatever forces were immediately at hand. This may be why Petilius Cerialis, despite losing half a legion and being criticised by Tacitus for recklessness, does not seem to have suffered official censure. Mind you, it might have been a different story if he had lost the Eagle!

(09-04-2016, 10:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote:
(09-04-2016, 08:47 PM)Renatus Wrote: The legions were trained, according to Vegetius, to march at the military pace of 20 miles in eight summer hours and a full pace of 24 miles in the same period.

That would be Roman miles, equating to approx 18.4 and 22.1 modern miles respectively.

That makes my 15 statute miles a day a respectable 16.3 Roman miles.

(09-04-2016, 10:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote:
(09-04-2016, 08:47 PM)Renatus Wrote: how realistic would it have been to expect Poenius Postumus and the men of the Second Legion to have reached the battle site in time to take part in the battle?

A good question! If they were at Exeter and he only gave them the order to move when he was considering evacuating London, then, as you say, there would be no chance of them reaching him in time.

This is not a foregone conclusion, however. If matters had progressed a little more slowly, they might have got there in time. Nevertheless, Tacitus' claim that he committed suicide because he had cheated his legion of the glory of participating in the victory, rather than merely the chance of doing so, does seem to imply that, even as things turned out, he could have actually reached the battle site in time, if he had only followed the order to march.

(09-04-2016, 10:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: So - either he ordered them to join him at an earlier point (either when making his initial plans, or as soon as he heard of Cerialis's defeat), or they were based somewhere closer than Exeter. If they were at Gloucester they could have joined him in about 4-5 days, I think.

Gloucester is approximately 90 miles from Tring, so they could have made it in six days, well within the time-scale that I have suggested.

If the Second was based at Gloucester at the time, the Twentieth was presumably at Usk. Usk is about 125 miles from Tring, so the Twentieth could have reached the suggested battle site in just over eight days, travelling via Gloucester and Cirencester. If they did pass through Gloucester, with the veterans of the Twentieth on the march and those of the Second staying put, I can imagine some interesting conversations between Postumus and the praefectus castrorum of the Twentieth!
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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(09-02-2016, 10:21 AM)Alecto Wrote: Hmm, I may be some time .....

it took me 3 weeks to read the whole thread and follow all the links. have fun!
wayne oldfield
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(09-05-2016, 05:39 PM)Renatus Wrote: if he had subsequently carried the war to them and defeated them, any perception of irresolution would have been eliminated. He had, after all, the example of Fabius Maximus...

Although it would have been better to avoid any such possible perceptions! But yes - it's certainly plausible, and I've mentioned the connection with Fabius Maximus before (a connection that I suggest Tacitus was eager to imply).

Perhaps this was Paulinus's plan at some point - the note about being 'inclined to delay until a later season' (or 'later time') might refer to this. But clearly he changed his mind...


(09-05-2016, 05:39 PM)Renatus Wrote: If the Second was based at Gloucester at the time, the Twentieth was presumably at Usk.

Or vice versa - I don't think we know where either was based at this time. Quite possibly somebody was garrisoning the small fortress at Alchester at the time as well; as it surely wasn't the Second (who would have needed a really good excuse not to show up for the battle!), it may have been part of the Twentieth.

So we could have a vexillation of the Twentieth at Alchester and the Second at either Gloucester or Usk. Are there any other known legionary establishments, besides Exeter and Colchester, in the south at this point?
Nathan Ross
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(09-04-2016, 08:47 PM)Renatus Wrote: The legions were trained, according to Vegetius, to march at the military pace of 20 miles in eight summer hours and a full pace of 24 miles in the same period.

Where did I get 'eight' from? That should be 'five summer hours'.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
There appear to be a number of anomalies regarding the speed of movement of the opposing armies in the previous arguments, based on the figures that are being used.

If SP was marching from Bangor down the A5 to London at 20 miles per day it would have taken him about 12 days. By the time that he had heard that Cerialis had left to put down an uprising in Colchester, it would have already been burnt to the ground and Cerialis defeated (not that SP would have been aware of that).

The rebels were only 70 miles away from London yet SP arrived there before them. The implication is that Boudica's army spent days sacking Colchester (possibly correct as they would have had free run of the city even before the final victory at the temple) and then took days to reach London as this was some type of mass migration where whole tribes were leaving their homelands. 

The word "horde" seems to have been interpreted as a slow moving tribal movement rather than a huge army.

This is not reflective of the previous methods of Brythonic fighting which was based on hit and run tactics interspersed with ambushes and full individual warrior type battles and although "wives" may have been there as well (at the final battle) this would have been part of the necessary baggage train for any travelling army; there is no mention of children or families

Interestingly if the rebels took so many days in the sacking, the returning army overwhelmed Cerialis which would indicate that either the sacking was shorter than estimated or that the 9th was ambushed by another set of forces.

The assumption is that this was not an efficient rebel army and therefore was slow travelling is this likely. Again the defeat of Colchester was based on surprise and if the rebel army was as slow as moving at 5 miles a day messages would have reached Colchester that an army was on the way and the population would have attempted to leave - they didn't.

Also a number of forts were captured in this first phase which again indicates a fast moving and effective force which is supported by the fighting styles of 18 years previously based on a horse based culture with a mix of cavalry, chariots and mobile foot soldiers.  

So if the army was fast moving and they left Colchester early enough to defeat the 9th after sacking Colchester why weren't they in London when SP arrived?

Also later SP retreats from London, mindful of the defeat of the 9th that were ambushed and therefore heads West to regroup and fight in another season, yet is forced later to turn and fight because he is being pursued and therefore at the risk of being caught.

If the Brythonic army was slower than the Roman army he could have outrun them and not have taken the risky strategy of fighting against such extreme odds.....

Deryk
Deryk
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(09-07-2016, 10:09 AM)Theoderic Wrote: The rebels were only 70 miles away from London yet SP arrived there before them.

This is the conundrum, originally identified I think by Professor Haverfield c.1913, that led to the development of the 'cavalry dash' theory.

Colchester is 50 miles from London, not 70, but if we dispense with the 'cavalry dash' (which I believe we must) then Paulinus did indeed reach London first. This necessarily supposes that the rebels were either moving very slowly, or had paused somewhere in their advance.

Having Paulinus arrive at London after 10-14 days on the road is not at all unlikely, if we assume that he had a certain amount of prior warning of the rebellion. This in turn is not unlikely, as we know that the citizens of Colchester had already warned Decianus Catus, who would surely have warned Paulinus. It is only Tacitus's dramatic presentation of events that makes it appear that the rebellion happened suddenly; in fact, assembling and moving a vast tribal host would have taken time, and would have been impossible to do in secret.

If Paulinus was already moving south with his army by the time the rebels attacked Colchester, much of the confusion in the chronology disappears, I think.



(09-07-2016, 10:09 AM)Theoderic Wrote: there is no mention of children or families

As we discussed before, I think it unlikely that the rebels would have brought their wives but left their children at home! 'Wives', in the Tacitus account, is a metonym for 'families'.


(09-07-2016, 10:09 AM)Theoderic Wrote: the returning army overwhelmed Cerialis which would indicate that either the sacking was shorter than estimated or that the 9th was ambushed by another set of forces.

Not necessarily. Cerialis was advancing to relieve the siege, so it was obviously still in progress when he set off and he could have reached the city in a matter of days. He would have arrived a day or two after it fell, at most. The rebels who had taken the city, realising that a Roman force was approaching, mustered to oppose him and then defeated him.


(09-07-2016, 10:09 AM)Theoderic Wrote: The assumption is that this was not an efficient rebel army and therefore was slow travelling is this likely.

Very likely, if the numbers are anything like those that the sources suggest. Such a massive force would strip the land bare in all directions, and spend much of their time foraging for food, animal feed and fuel - 150,000 men use up 65-70 tons of firewood a day, apparently. Even a disciplined army of that size with an established supply train and logistics corps would struggle to make 10 miles a day. Estimating 8 miles a day or less for the Britons is reasonable, I'd say, even allowing for plundering on the way.


(09-07-2016, 10:09 AM)Theoderic Wrote: the defeat of Colchester was based on surprise

Not really - the citizens had prior warning of the attack and sent a request to Catus, who sent 200 men as reinforcements (and almost certainly informed Paulinus). The defeat was perhaps due to bad defensive planning, expectation of relief, confusion, or just sheer Roman hubris!


(09-07-2016, 10:09 AM)Theoderic Wrote: SP retreats from London...and therefore heads West to regroup and fight in another season

Why west? If he wanted to 'regroup' he would head north - his main army was in that direction!


(09-07-2016, 10:09 AM)Theoderic Wrote: If the Brythonic army was slower than the Roman army he could have outrun them

They certainly would have been slower, and Paulinus could have run away if he wanted to - but his job was to defeat the rebels, by confrontation or by guile. His movements were intended to outflank and trap the rebels, not escape them.
Nathan Ross
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Nathan has made most of the points that I would have but I would like to add the following:

(09-07-2016, 11:40 AM)Nathan Ross Wrote:
(09-07-2016, 10:09 AM)Theoderic Wrote: the defeat of Colchester was based on surprise

Not really - the citizens had prior warning of the attack and sent a request to Catus, who sent 200 men as reinforcements (and almost certainly informed Paulinus). The defeat was perhaps due to bad defensive planning, expectation of relief, confusion, or just sheer Roman hubris!

We have it in the speech that Dio gives to Paulinus that the rebels burned a couple of cities, one of which was 'betrayed' and the other abandoned to them. These would be, respectively, Colchester and London. We have speculated before that this suggests that there was a 'fifth column' in Colchester that persuaded the colonists that there was no need to erect defences or to evacuate the city.

(09-07-2016, 11:40 AM)Nathan Ross Wrote:
(09-07-2016, 10:09 AM)Theoderic Wrote: If the Brythonic army was slower than the Roman army he could have outrun them

They certainly would have been slower, and Paulinus could have run away if he wanted to - but his job was to defeat the rebels, by confrontation or by guile. His movements were intended to outflank and trap the rebels, not escape them.

I agree. The scenario as I see it is that Paulinus withdrew a short way up Akeman Street to a strategic position from which he could observe through scouts the movements of the enemy and react accordingly. The intention was to wait there for reinforcements to join him but the actions of the rebels were such that he felt obliged to give battle before his reinforcements could arrive.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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(09-07-2016, 01:40 PM)Renatus Wrote: The scenario as I see it is that Paulinus withdrew a short way up Akeman Street to a strategic position... he felt obliged to give battle before his reinforcements could arrive.

I agree with this, except that I think he withdrew initially to St Albans (which is why that otherwise-unsignificant place finds its way into Tacitus's account!). He perhaps intended reinforcements from the west or north-west to meet him there; when they did not he withdrew once more to the vicinity of either Tring/Newground or Dunstable/Manshead.
Nathan Ross
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Spotted a typo Nathan...

"I agree with this, except that I think he withdrew initially to St Albans (which is why that otherwise-unsignificant place finds its way into Tacitus's account!). He perhaps intended reinforcements from the west or north-west to meet him there; when they did not he withdrew once more to the vicinity of" Church Stowe.

Otherwise I can't fault the logic...  such a scenario and time line doesn't rule out a number of sites and it doesn't necessarily point only at those you favour. So I like the regional conclusion but it's not anything like the clear signpost that seems to be implied.
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