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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
(11-29-2015, 09:10 PM)John1 Wrote: he left the bulk of his men there digging, building and assembling artillery and went south with a small unit to check out the London situation......

God!  It's the cavalry dash writ small!  But, seriously, why would he dig in at Church Stowe at that stage in the proceedings?  If the rebels had not reached London yet, he would not have the faintest idea of what they were going to do or where they would go.  He was not psychic; he would not know whether they would go north, south, west or east.  They probably did not know themselves.  Digging in anywhere at that stage would be a waste of time and effort.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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(11-29-2015, 03:58 PM)Renatus Wrote: Where do you see Paulinus being on these two dates?  When do you envisage Paulinus hearing of Cerialis' defeat and where would he be on that date?

I suggest he leaves his camp on the Menai Strait opposite Anglesea on the 14th. By the 20th he's on Watling Street between Wroxeter and Mancetter, perhaps around Stretton Bridge.

Cerialis and his surviving troops could have retreated north and tried to link up with Paulinus on Watling Street, in which case he could have met them (or messengers with news of the defeat) on the 22nd or 23th, as he approached Towcester (and, indeed, passed Church Stowe!)

Alternatively Cerialis could have gone to St Albans and waited there for Paulinus, who would have arrived there on the 25th. (all dates hypothetical and provisional, of course!)

I agree that 'digging in' anywhere en route would have been unlikely (and not very Roman!).


(11-29-2015, 04:04 PM)John1 Wrote: he was occupying a "steep place"... you'd think he'd be at the top of it rather than the bottom/a third of the way up, with the bad guys having several options for routes to the top..... 

Once again, I'm afraid, no! Tacitus is very clear about the position: Paulinus was in the defile, so he had high ground on both flanks - presumably to funnel the enemy advance towards his troops. The enemy obviously did not attack the high ground, perhaps because (as I've suggested) Paulinus had already occupied it with his cavalry and light troops.

There's no suggestion at all that he was on top of a hill or halfway up a slope.

The note about making sure there were no enemies behind him may indicate that this was a possibility. Paulinus therefore scouted the area to his rear to make sure there was nobody flanking him before taking up his final position. Clearly he did not believe he was in an impregnable spot, and we should not be looking for one.

(11-29-2015, 09:10 PM)John1 Wrote: The dashing round trip only took up 2 of his days

And this from a man who Tacitus describes as "naturally inclined to delay, and a man who preferred cautious and well-reasoned plans to chance success" (Histories, 2.25)?

I think not!
Nathan Ross
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"naturally inclined to delay, and a man who preferred cautious and well-reasoned plans to chance success" (Histories, 2.25)

Well that kinda covers it doesn't it. A cautious commander would advance down Watling Street to a point where he could gather his troops from East and West (IX and II) whilst not exposing himself to Iceni forces whose location and strength was unknown. What he would know was that the forces had their base in East Anglia and as soon as he was past the Nene he was exposed to an attack from the East or to a force getting behind him from the Nene or Ouse vallies. It would seem cavalier rather than cautious to advance further south than the Nene.

Once past the Nene he is hostage to the terrain on which he finds himself, it would not be "of his choosing". He would be mobile, making liason with the IX and II far trickier and his mobility, with all his troops en masse, would be severely compromised, again compromising his abilty to select his site.

So his inclination to delay and his cautious, well reasoned approach all sit very comfortably with Church Stowe at a strategic level IMHO. But this strategic cautiousness described in Histories does not transfer well to a personal cautiousness, that could be interpreted as cowardice, strategic caution and personal bravery sit well together. So the Histories quote can very well describe the approach I have outlined for Church Stowe.

Tring is by no means a popular choice, neither Nathan (Yesterday 3:28) nor I, buy it. Whilst I have major concerns about a commander who was "cautious" bottling himself up in the Dunstable pit and trusting to luck, it still has a strategic sense to it. BUT there are no traces of anything after two years of the BF Trust snooping around, so it would appear to be another unprovable site. 

"Digging in anywhere at that stage would be a waste of time and effort." - Renatus
Given the daily habit of digging in this would seem the obvious course of action. Day 1 a marching camp and any subsequent days whilst awaiting the IX and II or the return of a recce force could be spent embellishing those earthworks. Amassing the three partial Legions and stragglers would take a while, the ominous build up of 230,000 Britons would also take some intimidating days, you wouldn't want your squaddies just hanging around dwelling on that, you would give them a pick and have them dig for their lives. The real waste of effort would be having the 3 Roman forces bimbling around potentally enemy territory looking for each other and a suitable defile to hold out in. Tiredness, lack of purpose, depletion of resources and extended lines all suggest this would have been the real waste of time and effort. Better to hold a secure, known position until your forces are gathered and the strategic situation known, or the baddies find you.
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(11-30-2015, 12:23 AM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Cerialis and his surviving troops could have retreated north and tried to link up with Paulinus on Watling Street, in which case he could have met them (or messengers with news of the defeat) on the 22nd or 23th, as he approached Towcester (and, indeed, passed Church Stowe!)

Alternatively Cerialis could have gone to St Albans and waited there for Paulinus, who would have arrived there on the 25th. (all dates hypothetical and provisional, of course!)

This is where you and I part company.  As far as Paulinus was aware, the revolt was in the east and Colchester was under threat.  That is where he would have been heading and I suggest that he would have taken the most direct route, along the Via Devana.  London would be irrelevant until he knew that Colchester had fallen and that the rebels were moving in that direction.  If he was at Towcester when he heard of the fall of Colchester and the defeat of Cerialis (to all intents and purposes, simultaneous events), he was going the wrong way.

After his defeat, Cerialis would have made his way back to where the remainder of his legion was based.  If he did then try to link up with Paulinus, he clearly failed or we would have heard of the involvement of his legion in the final battle.

(11-30-2015, 09:20 AM)John1 Wrote: Day 1 a marching camp and any subsequent days whilst awaiting the IX and II or the return of a recce force could be spent embellishing those earthworks.

So Paulinus, not knowing precisely what the enemy is up to, chooses a point at random and digs in and, BINGO!, the rebels choose to go to exactly the same spot and fall into his trap.  Forgive me if I don't find that convincing.

(11-30-2015, 09:20 AM)John1 Wrote: The real waste of effort would be having the 3 Roman forces bimbling around potentally enemy territory looking for each other

Forget this 'bimbling about' nonsense.  Paulinus would have had scouts out constantly, establishing where his reinforcements were and passing instructions to them.  He knew exactly where everyone was.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
"So Paulinus, ........... chooses a point at random" - Renatus
Well that's a pretty blatant misrepresentation of the point. It wasn't random, as I stated it was the most southerly point of advance that wasn't exposed to out flanking from the East. It was almost certainly already known and possibly had some level of pre-preparation, as in whacking great Iron Age ditches. It would not be random strategically, and it would not be random tactically in topographic terms, no other candidate has a better all round defensive terrain. Furthermore it was on the accepted route from Angelsey to London so we can be pretty sure Paulinus was on or adjacent to the site in 61AD, a fact common to Dunstable but not necessarily to Tring.

"the rebels choose to go to exactly the same spot and fall into his trap" - Renatus
I think you'll find you are closer to characterising Tring with this statement.

"Forget this 'bimbling about' nonsense" - Renatus
Thanks, but I'll respectfully decline your instruction. If he was so well informed and in control, what were the II still doing at home? It may be worth dialling down the certainty level to cover the reality of horseborne scouts. I do not say this out of contempt for Roman communications but rather with an expectation of a 24-48 hours lag time in any intelligence, and a degree of uncertainty about messaging. Taking and holding a strong, known position against a mobile and huge enemy until facts are known and forces combined does not seem an unreasonable theory. In fact it seems cautious, well-reasoned and may bring about delay, BINGO !!! Heart Heart Heart 
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(11-30-2015, 10:57 AM)Renatus Wrote: London would be irrelevant until he knew that Colchester had fallen and that the rebels were moving in that direction... he was going the wrong way.

If he did then try to link up with Paulinus, he clearly failed or we would have heard of the involvement of his legion in the final battle.

I don't quite follow your first point - once Paulinus knew that Colchester had fallen, why would he not head for London? It's a moot point anyway, as we know that's what he did... (see below)

The second point is fair enough. Although I was assuming that Cerialis would only have escaped the battle with his cavalry (auxiliaries, plus his own mounted Equites Singulares) rather than elements of the Ninth. Would his duty not have been to report to his senior commander as soon as possible?


(11-30-2015, 09:20 AM)John1 Wrote: It would seem cavalier rather than cautious to advance further south than the Nene.

Although we know (unless we disregard Tacitus) that this is precisely what he did... The note in Annals about P wondering whether to choose London as a battle site, and looking around at his 'scanty force of soldiers' would be absurd if he only had a 'small unit' or cavalry bodyguard with him - of course he wasn't going to fight a battle with them!

And if he'd already decided to base himself somewhere further north, then he'd already made the decision not to fight at London - so why bother going there? While I think you make perhaps the best case here for the notorious 'cavalry dash' (as opposed to Webster et al, who make no case!), I'm afraid it's still pretty untenable based on the evidence we have.


(11-30-2015, 09:20 AM)John1 Wrote: Given the daily habit of digging in this would seem the obvious course of action.

Marching camps, yes. But fighting from inside fortifications was not Roman practice if they had a choice in the matter, and I've already quoted a reference to Roman disdain for the practice. The final conflict with Boudica was a field battle, not a siege, and Paulinus was forced to it - he had not prepared for it in his chosen position for a long time beforehand.

There is the note in Histories about Paulinus 'preparing the field' before Ad Castores in AD69 - I would take this to mean cutting down trees or hedges that might have provided cover for the enemy, not digging his men into fortifications. Nothing in the following battle indicates this.


(11-30-2015, 09:20 AM)John1 Wrote: bottling himself up in the Dunstable pit and trusting to luck

Nope. As I pointed out above, there was no reason for Paulinus to move into position in the Manshead 'pass' before the Iceni were committed to their approach route. Before that, he could base himself at Tilsworth (site of a 1st century Roman settlement with water supply and what could be traces of several marching camps) and send his scouts to watch the Iceni advance. Only when the Iceni were within a few miles of the position would he need to march a couple of hours south (perhaps under cover of darkness) and block their route.

These three maps, covering the 24 hours or so leading up to the battle, should show what I mean:

   


(11-30-2015, 09:20 AM)John1 Wrote: there are no traces of anything after two years of the BF Trust snooping around, so it would appear to be another unprovable site.

The BF Trust survey was denied access to the grounds of Manshead school by the local council, so could only investigate the margins of the proposed battle area.

Besides, as I've said, there are very few known ancient and medieval battle sites that have yielded any archeological traces. Cannae - a much greater slaughter - has produced nothing at all. So the lack of finds should not discount any site.
Nathan Ross
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Lovely maps, thank you.
 
"Chapter 33. [Suetonius abandons London to the Boudiccan forces.]

Suetonius, undismayed by this disaster, marched through the heart of the country as far as London; a place not dignified with the name of a colony, but the chief residence of merchants, and the great mart of trade and commerce. At that place he meant to fix the feat of war; but reflecting on the scanty numbers of his little army, and the fatal rashness of Cerealis, he resolved to quit the station, and, by giving up one post, secure the rest of the province."

 
This certainly points to the whole force getting to London, or at least part way, but it still doesn’t entirely rule out Paulinus taking the view on the basis of an advanced recce of which he may have been a part. Do you have a better translation?
 
“then he'd already made the decision not to fight at London”
not necessarily, they may have just been a couple of days up the road awaiting their comrades and re-provisioning, after all he was a cautious commander.
 
“Marching camps, yes. But fighting from inside fortifications was not Roman practice”
I still have no objection to this, ridge-top camps and an engagement in the confines of the CS valley is fine by me.
 
“so could only investigate the margins of the proposed battle area”
Given the re-grading of the Manshead playing field that was probably their best bet, so it stands another un-provable site.
 
 “the lack of finds should not discount any site”
No it should not, but with no investigable site it just becomes a matter of opinion, which is where we are at with Dunstable. So we either accept Dunstable as it, or continue debating with D in the same unproven but opinionated bag as Mancetter/Paulerpury/Arbury etc. etc. Finds, whether artifacts or marching camps would however come as a big bonus to any site.
 
Dunstable to Church Stowe is a mere 27 miles, that’s one march away, and a far better bet strategically and topographically for Paulinus.
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(11-30-2015, 02:29 PM)John1 Wrote: on the basis of an advanced recce of which he may have been a part.

That would be a job for scouts, not the commander, still less the governor of the province. Paulinus knew very well what London looked like already.

{*EDIT - Austin and Rankov's Exploratio includes a section on what they call Autopsy - the personal reconnaissance of an enemy position by a commander. In almost all the cases mentioned, the commander is immediately ahead of his army and in most cases within sight of the enemy, i.e. these are not long-distance missions. Only Julian and Galerius, both very 'energetic' leaders, are mentioned as conducting more extensive surveys.}


(11-30-2015, 02:29 PM)John1 Wrote: Do you have a better translation?

At Suetonius mira constantia medios inter hostes Londinium perrexit… ibi ambiguus, an illam sedem bello deligeret, circumspecta infrequentia militis… unius oppidi damno servare universa statuit.

I'd suggest this:

Suetonius, however, with wonderful steadfastness, pressed on through the midst of the enemy to London… There, uncertain whether to select it as a place of battle, he looked around at the fewness of his soldiers… (and) decided to save the whole (province) with the loss of one town.


It's clear that Paulinus at least considered the option of fighting at London. If his army was stationary somewhere in the Midlands this would not have been possible.



(11-30-2015, 02:29 PM)John1 Wrote: Dunstable to Church Stowe is a mere 27 miles, that’s one march away

And at least three days steady travel for the Britons, who could more easily have diverted northeast on the Iknield beyond Dunstable and returned to their own lands.

Boudica still had the upper hand at this point - why trek all that way to fight a battle at a site of the Romans' choosing, so surrendering the advantage?
Nathan Ross
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"why trek all that way to fight a battle at a site of the Romans' choosing"
why not? IF the whole Iceni gang is moving as a whole from point to point, why not raid all the way up to the Nene then float home on the river. I seem to recall a sausage of this nature a while ago. That makes at least as much sense as an up down to Dunstable. Although I'm still not of the view they were one big cohesive host. We know from Tacitus it was fought on ground of Romans choosing so somehow the Iceni moved out of their homeland and fought on the ground of Roman choosing. We're just quibbling again about how far up the corridor he went and within the scope of a single days march. Whatever works for Dunstable in these terms works for CS.

"Paulinus knew very well what London looked like already"
But he still went for a look anyway, then bails out, so what was he looking for? and what, or the lack of what, changed his mind? and sent him back up Watling Street to either Dunstable or CS?

"If his army was stationary somewhere in the Midlands this would not have been possible."
but it was possible to assess whether it was worth bringing them down or if the enemy were far enough away to allow him the time to make the place defendable, was the decision based on the reports of the distance and size of the enemy? Were the enemy so close to London that he had to abandon for a better site, and if so close how far would he have to go at speed? I have no problem with the whole army being with Paulinus in London, I just don't think it's proven, and if they all turned tail and headed to beyond Dunstable I don't see why they could't have gone from Bedfordshire a short hop over the border to Northamptonshire, it's hardly deep Midlands.
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(11-30-2015, 03:59 PM)John1 Wrote: it was fought on ground of Romans choosing so somehow the Iceni moved out of their homeland and fought on the ground of Roman choosing.

Chosen at short notice though - 'he was compelled, contrary to his judgement, to engage them' (Dio) This does not sound like a commander picking a position over 60 miles from the enemy and waiting there for them to come and get him.


(11-30-2015, 03:59 PM)John1 Wrote: We're just quibbling again about how far up the corridor he went and within the scope of a single days march.

Three days, at least, for the Britons, as I said above. Would a commander who needed to force a battle move so far from his enemy?

There is no reason for the Britons to fight Paulinus at Church Stowe, or anywhere further north: they could have returned to their own lands and attacked him on ground of their choosing when he came after them - as he would have been forced to do eventually. A similar policy had already proved effective against the Romans in Wales, and had probably contributed to their success against Cerialis.
Nathan Ross
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"This does not sound like a commander picking a position over 60 miles from the enemy"
But does it sound like a commander picking a position over 33 miles from the enemy? it's about the same isn't it

"Three days, at least, for the Britons, as I said above. Would a commander who needed to force a battle move so far from his enemy?"
Sounds like a good move if you want to deplete their forces by making them walk further and use up more of their stores.

 "they could have returned to their own lands and attacked him on ground of their choosing when he came after them"
and exactly the same logic could be applied to the Dunstable and Tring scenarios.
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(11-30-2015, 04:41 PM)John1 Wrote: a commander picking a position over 33 miles from the enemy? it's about the same isn't it

Not really. You're suggesting that Paulinus selected Church Stowe on his march south, before going to London. At that point the enemy was a long way away, and he could have no idea that they would come in that direction.



(11-30-2015, 04:41 PM)John1 Wrote: exactly the same logic could be applied to the Dunstable and Tring scenarios.


I don't think so. Both sites address direct routes from St Albans; my Dunstable suggestion blocks a route through the Chilterns that links with the Iknield. The Iceni had a good reason to be heading this way - there's no reason for them continue up to Church Stowe, unless they were going there specifically to fight Paulinus in his redoubt. Which does not sound like him being 'compelled to engage them, contrary to his judgement'. Engaging them there would have been exactly his 'judgement'.
Nathan Ross
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Wink 
Whew!!!

You guys are going too fast for me to keep pace!!! [Image: wink.png]

Here are a few observations from a day or so ago....... and a couple from today 

Renatus wrote:
1.  It is inconceivable that Paulinus would have embarked upon a campaign taking him and the greater part of his army to the westernmost tip of the island, if he had been aware of a major rebellion brewing in the east.

Completely Agree

Renatus wrote:

2.  The inhabitants of Colchester became aware of their danger at a late stage, just in time to notify the procurator in London and for him to dispatch a hastily-gathered force of 200 ill-armed men to the colony, and to inform Cerialis and for him to set off with whatever part of his legion that was immediately available to march.

Obviously none of the Romans really thought that there was a major danger. Firstly the 200 soldiers that were sent were apparently ill equipped. Secondly no defences were raised and finally none of the old, infirm and young were sent away.

Renatus wrote:

3.  News of the rebellion did not reach Paulinus until his operation in Anglesey was in its final stages and, indeed, he may actually have been on his way back to London, in the company of the Fourteenth Legion, which may have been intended to stop at its base at Wroxeter, leaving him to continue to London with his bodyguard.

Tacitus states that Seutonius was “securing the island” when he heard the news which would indicate that he was still in Anglesey.

Renatus wrote:
1.  The rebels planned the rebellion well in advance but kept their intentions so secret that the news only leaked out at the last minute.

2.  Officials were aware of unrest but did not take it seriously and did not think it worth telling the governor.

3.  Paulinus knew of unrest amongst the Iceni but thought that it was confined to that tribe and that Cerialis and the Ninth Legion could deal with any trouble that might arise.


It seems that a combination of these points contains the reality.

The officials were not only aware of the unrest but perhaps even expected it but thought it would be a localised uprising.

Knowing the Iceni history that they had already risen up previously when they had been forcibly disarmed, the Romans must have been aware of the risk and probably had made contingency plans with Cerialis to cover any uprising.  

Also Prasutugus was probably a calming influence and with his death perhaps the anti Roman faction of the Iceni were in no mood to be cowed.

Possibly the citizens of Colchester just wanted to be sure and asked Catus for some soldiers to be sent just in case some of the locals rioted in the city.

Certainly they, nor the military, didn’t think they were going to be attacked by the tribes as previously stated.

The Iceni made their plans, re-armed and made alliances with the Trinovantes and the “others” behind the smokescreen of local upset.     

Renatus wrote:

4.  The outrage against the Iceni occurred after Paulinus had set off on campaign and the rebels organised the revolt very quickly, with only the Iceni and the Trinovantes involved at the outset.  

Tacitus is pretty explicit that it wasn’t only the Trinovantes and the Iceni but that “others” were involved.

I am not sure that the tribes would have risen up had the majority of the army been in their area but of course they weren’t.

Probably the Second were somewhere in the West, debateable as to where exactly. The Twentieth were keeping the Silures and the Ordovices within their borders. The Fourteenth were moved to Wroxeter or on campaign and the Ninth were at Longthorpe and guarding the Brigantes borders.

So if the 14th were being assembled at Wroxeter the tribes would have realised that they were going to attack “North Wales”.

Nathan Ross wrote:

The division of power between Paulinus and Catus is an interesting unknown. It does seem as if the procurator had unusual authority over the 'pacified' regions; Paulinus may have though he could leave the administration of the Iceni to Catus. But doubtless the procurator would have informed him as soon as news of a large scale hostile force reached him.

The “tax collecting” part of the operation was definitely the Procurator’s responsibility and his allegiance was directly to the Emperor. When the next Procurator was installed Paulinus and he were at loggerheads as Paulinus was killing off the native Brythons rather than enslaving them. In fact he tried to have Paulinus removed. 

Nathan Ross wrote:

However, it's possible that Paulinus and his army were already based in the west, perhaps at Wroxeter, and had been since the previous year's campaigning.

I think that this is a valid proposition with Paulinus readying the 14th Legion for the up and coming campaign against North Wales.

Nathan Ross wrote:

As I mentioned above, the revolt must have started around the time of spring planting, and the major battles were completed before the autumn, when Paulinus received reinforcements from the Rhine and sent his army into winter quarters.

Not really sure about this. There would have already have been a planting of Winter wheat which would have been ready for 
the summer of AD61 and this is the predominant crop in the southern UK.

Furthermore it is almost inconceivable that a people who relied on growing their own food to exist would not have planted for their needs.

It seems more likely that because of the high death rate from Boudica’s last battle and because of the continuance of the war against the Brythons “by the whole army” winter wheat was not planted in September, because so many had gone to war (and were still being hunted down) and therefore it was in AD62 the famine really hit.

Nathan Ross wrote:

*EDIT - another possibility: Paulinus may have sent his request for reinforcements after he heard of the defeat of Cerialis but before the final battle, perhaps while he was in London pondering his options. This might extend the time available for the 'delay and manoeuvre' stage of the campaign and set back the final confrontation. But it would not alter the timing of the revolt's beginning or the advances on London by much.

It is possible that he did send for re-inforcements at this stage as he was at a port that he held at that time and he was preparing to abandon it.

Nathan Ross wrote:

After taking London and ravaging the Thames valley up to Staines, the rebels turn north. Paulinus pulls back to either Dunstable or Tring.

Possible but why go as far as Staines?

Nathan Ross wrote:

As you know, I find the suggested site near Tring altogether too vulnerable - any site which positions its battle line facing away from the direction of the enemy advance is going to have this problem.

I really don’t understand this argument. 

Why do you think that they are facing away from the advance Brythons?

If the Brythons had come from London, St Albans or from Staines they would have come up the Bulbourne Valley to Tring. 

If they came down the Ickneld Way they would have come to Tring. 

Chivery Top controls Tring, Akeman Street and the Icknield Way and as the highest position in the County has incredible views over the approaches from every direction.

I have attached a diagram which I  hope helps? 


.pdf   ROMANS AT TRING.pdf (Size: 180 KB / Downloads: 8)

As far as Dunstable is concerned if any Brythons from North of the Icknield Way arrived, which according to John's scenario could have happened, then Paulinus would have been caught between two forces.

If the Iceni did not want to engage Paulinus and were heading for home I think that after St Albans they would have gone via Braughing to the East along the established route.

They themselves were masters of the ambush so it is unlikely they would not scout ahead for ambuscades.

If they did want to fight Paulinus they would have gone as far as Church Stowe, or Dunstable or Tring. 

Of course if they didn't want to fight none of the sites mentioned would be relevant.

The logic and the texts do favour the fact that they wanted to destroy Paulinus. 

Could have Paulinus have "dug in"? 

I would have thought that this was an almost definite "yes" (even if un-Roman).

Caesar did at Alesia with a double wall, one to siege the Gauls in Alesia and one to protect him and his from the Gallic relief columns that were on their way.

The Roman Army had at the most around 11, 000 men and some more refugees and his opposition had 230,000 people in their army.

Defensive measures were a must to stop themselves being overwhelmed.

Deryk



  
Deryk
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(11-30-2015, 06:39 PM)Theoderic Wrote: It seems more likely that... winter wheat was not planted in September, because so many had gone to war

Hmm, a very plausible suggestion!

Butser suggests that two crops were planted, so if one failed the other could support the population; I believe winter crops were planted in September/October (after the harvest of the summer crop) and harvested in July, and summer crops were planted in April and harvested in late July/August.

We know that the rebellion began shortly after Paulinus had marched against Anglesey. Therefore Spring or early summer. So they may have had time to do their spring planting, but not returned in time (or at all!) to harvest it or plant the winter crops - which would imply that the fighting was still ongoing in July/September. That opens out the timescale for the latter stage of the uprising, although we still need time for both Classicianus and Polyclitus to turn up from Rome and make their reports, apparently before Paulinus lost his ships (in late autumn/winter?)



(11-30-2015, 06:39 PM)Theoderic Wrote: why go as far as Staines?

Only because there's mid-1st-C burnt debris along that route (as mentioned in the Nic Fuentes article proposing Virginia Water). It seems unlikely that the rebels, having found London unprovisioned, would not have ravaged quite widely, and this was settled agricultural land.



(11-30-2015, 06:39 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Why do you think that they are facing away from the advance Brythons?

That's the way it looks to me! On your diagram you have 'From St Albans' to the left (east, as your map is inverted). Whereas Akeman street heads away into the top left corner, and the Iceni would be approaching from the south-east. Since your proposed position faces onto the plain to the north-east, this looks like a different direction.

We've discussed this before. Any force coming up Akeman Street, unless it was advancing blindly, would surely have been aware of a large number of Romans across or on top of the hill to their left. Your plan has the Iceni continuing up Akeman Street and following it around to the west to face the Romans directly from the north-east, when they could easily have flanked Paulinus or even got behind him by moving up the relatively gentle slopes west of the Bulbourne valley to occupy the high ground that lay between them.

   

(11-30-2015, 06:39 PM)Theoderic Wrote: As far as Dunstable is concerned if any Brythons from North of the Icknield Way arrived... then Paulinus would have been caught between two forces.

There's always that possibility - I believe that was why he checked that he only had the enemy in front of him!

He knew that if he defeated the very big army heading towards him, the much smaller and more scattered rebellions in the Midlands could be dealt with piecemeal. It's unlikely, I think, that the rebels had another army of any considerable size operating in the area, as Boudica had so many with her.


(11-30-2015, 06:39 PM)Theoderic Wrote: they would have gone via Braughing to the East along the established route.

Could have done. In which case Paulinus could have shadowed them along the Iknield Way and attacked their flank... I've looked for sites all along that route and found nothing suitable to match our battle description.



(11-30-2015, 06:39 PM)Theoderic Wrote: it is unlikely they would not scout ahead for ambuscades.

This is a problem, yes. But Paulinus could have sent some of his cavalry forward to patrol the 'pass' and the hills to either side, and drive back the enemy scouts. Until he moved his main force forward, the 'ambuscade' may not have been evident to anyone approaching from the south. The speed of Roman deployment would have counted for a lot.



(11-30-2015, 06:39 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Defensive measures were a must to stop themselves being overwhelmed.


I think the 'defensive measures' were the terrain he chose for the battle. Nothing in Tacitus or Dio's description suggest any kind of fortification being used the Romans (except in that poetic translation that mentions 'ramparts'!)
Nathan Ross
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(11-30-2015, 11:33 AM)John1 Wrote: So Paulinus, ........... chooses a point at random" - Renatus
Well that's a pretty blatant misrepresentation of the point. It wasn't random

OK, I'll withdraw the word 'random'.  Nevertheless, whatever advantages it may have had in other circumstances, it does not seem to me to be an appropriate place to dig in, with the enemy somewhere between Colchester and London and with Paulinus thinking that he might make a stand in or near London.


(11-30-2015, 11:33 AM)John1 Wrote: "the rebels choose to go to exactly the same spot and fall into his trap" - Renatus
I think you'll find you are closer to characterising Tring with this statement.

Not at all.  With the rebels having reached St Albans, Tring is so placed strategically as to allow Paulinus to respond to three, if not four, of the possible routes that they might subsequently take.  If it were indeed the final battle site, it would appear that the rebels took what amounts to the first stage of two of those routes.  The alternative is that its proximity was so threatening to the rebels that they felt compelled to try to eliminate the Roman force.

(11-30-2015, 11:33 AM)John1 Wrote: If he was so well informed and in control, what were the II still doing at home?

Ah well, as I've explained before, I don't think they were.

(11-30-2015, 01:30 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: I don't quite follow your first point - once Paulinus knew that Colchester had fallen, why would he not head for London?

He would but my point was that, if he did not yet know that Colchester had fallen, he would have turned off on to the Via Devana before reaching Towcester.  If the news reached him when he was at Towcester, it meant that that he was already on the way to London and this would not have been appropriate, if he still believed that Colchester could be relieved.

(11-30-2015, 01:30 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: The second point is fair enough. Although I was assuming that Cerialis would only have escaped the battle with his cavalry (auxiliaries, plus his own mounted Equites Singulares) rather than elements of the Ninth. Would his duty not have been to report to his senior commander as soon as possible?

Tacitus reports that Cerialis' infantry was slaughtered but that 2000 legionaries from the Continent brought the Ninth Legion up to strength.  This implies that he did not have a complete legion with him when he went to the relief of Colchester.  After he had escaped from the battle, I would assume that he would go to the base where the remainder of his legion was stationed.  He would, of course, inform Paulinus of what had occurred but he would have done so, I suggest, by means of a dispatch, not in person.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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