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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
(11-20-2015, 10:42 PM)Renatus Wrote: I believe that, having left Verulamium, he chose to pause in the vicinity of Tring because it offered a number of strategic advantages, lying at the junction of Akeman Street with the Icknield Way.

I tend to think, by that time, Paulinus would have known that Postumus had refused to move, and therefore that he could not expect any reinforcement from the west.

The problem with a withdrawal up to Bulbourne valley towards Tring would be that it left a clear route for the rebels to bypass his position and head north from St Albans towards their homelands via the Iknield. That would look very much like Paulinus had avoided battle - a shameful prospect!

There are suggestions in Tacitus that Paulinus's delay might have been criticised at the time, or subsequently - T's vague allusions to (I believe) Fabius Maximus might have been an attempt to put a positive spin on what could otherwise have looked like dithering. The point about him being forced to fight 'contrary to his judgement' implies that, for all his supposed skill, Paulinus was not entirely in control of what was going on!

But if Paulinus wanted a strategic position that would allow him to control the Iknield and the routes northwards through the Chilterns, Dunstable would have made more sense than Tring, I think. It was also on Watling Street, so he would not have been surrendering his line of supply.

I agree about the citizens (or not) in St Albans - there would have been a few enfranchised members of the tribal elite, but no more. It was more important, I would say, as a 'friendly' place to fall back on after abandoning London.
Nathan Ross
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We do not know when Paulinus gave up expecting assistance from the Second Legion (or rather, that part of it commanded by Postumus), if he ever did.  Nevertheless, he could and probably had called up reinforcements from the auxiliary units in South Wales, which would approach him along Akeman Street.  Likewise, he had probably called on some, if not all, of his troops in North Wales, which could have marched south initially along Watling Street and then cut down the Fosse Way or Ryknield Street to Akeman Street.  There is no problem in his being bypassed by the rebels proceeding up Watling Street to the Icknield Way.  As I have suggested, he could in that event go up the Icknield Way and cut them off at Dunstable or shadow them until his reinforcements caught up and attack them then.  He could always move faster than they could.

There was no shame in retreating, if circumstances demanded it.  Vegetius acknowledged that this frequently occurred.  The secret, he advised, was to do so in such a way as not to demoralise the troops.  This could be done by leading them to believe that this was part of a plan to lure the enemy to a more favourable battle site or to a point where they could be ambushed.  I have no doubt that, if called upon to do so, Paulinus could have made a speech to his men to the effect that he had every confidence that they were quite capable of defeating the enemy as they were but that he preferred to join up with 'our friends' and give the rebels such a trouncing that they would never dare to rise again.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Vindex wrote:

The Governor' s duty was to his Emperor; it was also his own reputation first and anything else was a bonus. A legionary general can be blamed for losing his men, the loss of the Province is his responsibility alone.

I couldn't agree more. Of course the Procurator also reported directly to the Emperor and not to the Governor and as we read Catus Decianus fled the Province to Gaul (where he disappears) after Camulodunum was destroyed. The "buck" however stopped with the Governor but I expect that his reputation would be enhanced by rescuing Roman citizens from certain death rather than abandoning them to their fate. 

Renatus wrote:

By contrast, the inhabitants of a provincial municipium, such as Verulamium, would not have become Roman citizens automatically.  The magistrates and their families would be granted citizenship upon their retirement but, as Verulamium had only recently been granted municipal status, there are unlikely to have been many of these.  Those who were citizens are likely to have been so already. 

Verulamium was granted municipal status in AD 50 which would indicate that it was already more than a village at that time and possibly a substantial place. In that case Verulamium by AD60 may well have been established for some 15 years. This would have attracted Roman citizens, traders, builders, architects, landowners etc. as was also the case with Londinium but the latter as more of an import /export Roman controlled port for the Province. Certainly the Procurator was based here for tax collecting purposes. The writers of the day certainly imply that between Camulodunum, Londinium and Verulamium a substantial number of people occupied these places before they were killed.       

Nathan Ross wrote:

I agree about the citizens (or not) in St Albans - there would have been a few enfranchised members of the tribal elite, but no more. It was more important, I would say, as a 'friendly' place to fall back on after abandoning London.

Verulamium was of huge political importance to Rome as it was one of the seats of power of the Brythons who opposed  the Claudius invasion (probably Caratacus).  Camulodunum was made a colonia in the same year. This was Rome stamping its authority on the Province and banishing the warring Brythons to the West. Again Verulamium was not a walled city which indicates that this was a safe place ripe for expansion.

Nathan Ross wrote:


The problem with a withdrawal up to Bulbourne valley towards Tring would be that it left a clear route for the rebels to bypass his position and head north from St Albans towards their homelands via the Iknield. That would look very much like Paulinus had avoided battle - a shameful prospect!


Chivery Top (Tring) is only 12 miles from Dunstable up the Icknield Way and guards the North West approach to the West.

I would propose that Tring was a better strategic position (but I would). 

If the Brythons did go North from Verulamium to pick up the Icknield Way, Paulinus was in the position to pursue the horde.

Paulinus' scouts would have been following the movements of the Brythons and he would have caught up with them by the following day with his 10,000 men, the refugees would have been in comparative safety at Tring from where they could have travelled to Alchester and then Cirencester etc.

The overwhelming opinion is that without the refugees the Roman Army could have easily have caught the Brythonic Army. In the field in a fixed battle the Roman Army was never beaten by the Brythons. The difficulty for the Roman generals was getting the Brythons to fight a fixed battle. 

Even then when they were beaten they were so fleet of foot that the majority would escape and re-group. After the Boudica battle the majority escaped but decided to disband when Boudica died.

Had he been at Dunstable the Brythonic Army could have split and one part have gone up Watling Street to his front whilst the other outflanked him via Tring and the Ickneld Way and circled around to his rear.

On the other hand if they wished to travel home they could have left Verulamium via Braughing and arrived at Colchester by the established road network by-passing Dunstable altogether.

It was likely however that both sides wanted to fight.

Deryk 



    

(11-22-2015, 04:32 PM)Renatus Wrote: We do not know when Paulinus gave up expecting assistance from the Second Legion (or rather, that part of it commanded by Postumus), if he ever did.  Nevertheless, he could and probably had called up reinforcements from the auxiliary units in South Wales, which would approach him along Akeman Street.  Likewise, he had probably called on some, if not all, of his troops in North Wales, which could have marched south initially along Watling Street and then cut down the Fosse Way or Ryknield Street to Akeman Street.  There is no problem in his being bypassed by the rebels proceeding up Watling Street to the Icknield Way.  As I have suggested, he could in that event go up the Icknield Way and cut them off at Dunstable or shadow them until his reinforcements caught up and attack them then.  He could always move faster than they could.

There was no shame in retreating, if circumstances demanded it.  Vegetius acknowledged that this frequently occurred.  The secret, he advised, was to do so in such a way as not to demoralise the troops.  This could be done by leading them to believe that this was part of a plan to lure the enemy to a more favourable battle site or to a point where they could be ambushed.  I have no doubt that, if called upon to do so, Paulinus could have made a speech to his men to the effect that he had every confidence that they were quite capable of defeating the enemy as they were but that he preferred to join up with 'our friends' and give the rebels such a trouncing that they would never dare to rise again.

Couldn't have put it better myself 

Deryk
Deryk
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Renatus: There was no shame in retreating, if circumstances demanded it... Paulinus could have made a speech to his men to the effect that he had every confidence that they were quite capable of defeating the enemy as they were but that he preferred to join up with 'our friends' and give the rebels such a trouncing that they would never dare to rise again.


A plausible scenario - and I like the idea of the speech! The problem with all this is, of course, that we really don't know where various units were deployed at this point or how long Paulinus would have had to hear who may or may not have been coming to his aid. I tend to think not much time, and our sources suggest that whatever he intended to do (delay until 'another season' according to Dio, presumably so he could wait for reinforcements) he couldn't do and found himself having to act quickly.

The more I think about this, the more it seems that the three objectives you're discussing here - meeting up with western reinforcements, falling back on friendly natives and taking the refugees to safety - would be better served by pulling back west from London (again!). There's also this tricky business of the 'hostile population' in the Midlands to worry about...



(11-22-2015, 06:01 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Had he been at Dunstable the Brythonic Army could have split and one part have gone up Watling Street to his front whilst the other outflanked him via Tring and the Ickneld Way and circled around to his rear.

...they could have left Verulamium via Braughing and arrived at Colchester by the established road network by-passing Dunstable altogether.

I would think that if the Britons were capable of such long-distance strategic movement then your position at Chivery Top would have been doubly vulnerable, as it faces away from the enemy's direction of approach (but we've discussed all this!)

One of the beauties of the Dunstable position is that it's approached by a long narrow valley, all the way from Flamstead. Once a slow-moving column of people and vehicles had entered the valley, it would very hard for them to turn around - and Paulinus wouldn't have needed to deploy his men until the entire rebel group had entered the valley and were moving towards him... (but I would say that, of course!)
Nathan Ross
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(11-22-2015, 10:50 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: There's also this tricky business of the 'hostile population' in the Midlands to worry about...

I considered this a while back.  My suggestion was that Paulinus' original intention was to go along Watling Street to Lutterworth, divert along the Via Devana to Godmanchester and link up with Cerialis and the Ninth Legion there.  The combined force would then advance to the relief of Colchester.  If he learned of the fall of Colchester and the defeat of Cerialis when he was between Lutterworth and Godmanchester, he could carry on to Godmanchester and then take Ermine Street down to London.  This would take him close to the rebel forces and, possibly, through the fringes of the territories of the Iceni and the Trinovantes, thus allowing Tacitus to say, with a little exaggeration, that he had pressed on through the midst of the enemy (medios inter hostes).
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
Nathan Ross wrote:

The more I think about this, the more it seems that the three objectives you're discussing here - meeting up with western reinforcements, falling back on friendly natives and taking the refugees to safety - would be better served by pulling back west from London (again!). There's also this tricky business of the 'hostile population' in the Midlands to worry about...

Apart from Virginia Water there are no realistic sites going west until the Kennet Valley and then there are a number of possible sites as we have discussed earlier.

Would the tribes have followed this far and leave their own lands unprotected? Possibly not.

Also the majority of troops were in "Wales" (Part of Second Legion) and on the Welsh borders  (20th Legion) and Brigantian borders (Part of 9th Legion) which are closer to the Akeman Street route than the route to Silchester.

Deryk


 
Deryk
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(11-22-2015, 11:53 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Apart from Virginia Water there are no realistic sites going west until the Kennet Valley and then there are a number of possible sites as we have discussed earlier.

Virginia Water remains a fine site, I'd say - it's hilly, it's right on the edge of the Thames flood plain, and the Portway runs straight through it. The problem is that we have little idea of the local topography at the time, as it's been so altered in subsequent centuries.

My other suggested site, on Bagshot heath a short way further west, is clearer and I still think could be considered. The Kennet is probably a bit too far away though.


(11-22-2015, 11:53 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Would the tribes have followed this far and leave their own lands unprotected? Possibly not.
 

I wasn't anticipating a long distance trek! Virginia Water is about 25 miles from London, Bagshot another 5 or 6 beyond that. Although this does assume that the Britons were willing to lead their whole force, with wagons and families, off against Paulinus, which as we've discussed elsewhere may not have been likely.


(11-22-2015, 11:45 PM)Renatus Wrote: Watling Street to Lutterworth, divert along the Via Devana to Godmanchester and link up with Cerialis and the Ninth Legion there.

Again, plausible - although if we're allowing for Tacitean exaggeration then the actual population of the Midlands, perhaps inspired or even led by roving warrior groups from the eastern districts, would be a more obvious choice!
Nathan Ross
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Stepping back to 1073 Vindex;
“Has the concept of a prepared position ever crossed your mind?”

The whole issue of prepared positions is massive. I understood Verulamium and Towcester were not meaningfully fortified in 61AD. I had interpreted this as a symbol of confidence in Roman government, but if the “threat” of the Druids wasn’t yet subdued why would this be the case?

The distribution of garrisons at this period also seems rather peripheral, there really does seem to be a gaping hole in the middle of the country. Highcross would seem an obvious place for a garrison but there doesn’t seem to be a meaningful one there. Is this because the proto-Mercians were not a threat? Or are we missing a depot/garrison, even if modest on the scale of the others.

If there was no Midland garrison/depot then I would have thought the Staff would have made a special effort to get a really good knowledge of where there were sound positions to take up in an emergency, so even if not Moi’s “prepared positions”, then “pre-determined positions” would be at the top of Paulinus’ staffs minds.

The roll up the country in the preceding few years would have left a legacy of knowledge and/or entrenchments that could be utilised so I have no doubt Paulinus was heading for a known, probably partially prepared and possibly pre-supplied location. It would be naïve to think he just bimbled up the nearest site that looked ok under duress. He had time as the other side assembled and his staff and allies may have had the intimate knowledge he needed.

Where are the midland forts/camps from the initial "conquest" in the Midlands?

Maybe we are over estimating the potential cohesion of the British tribes, if the Coritani and Catavalunni were better disposed towards the Romans than they were to the Iceni, maybe no retreat West from Watling Street was needed to be in friendly territory. I have heard floated the theory that the Iceni were culturally different to the other tribes, an isolated land of immigrants from over the North Sea perhaps? A proto Saxon/Norse bridgehead?

I note the discussion has defaulted the movement model based on the Roman roads and beginning with a “P” so I’m going to keep out of that…..
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(11-23-2015, 11:41 AM)John1 Wrote: I understood Verulamium and Towcester were not meaningfully fortified in 61AD.

Nowhere in the south east was - Colchester and London were both unfortified settlements at this point. It seems that the Romans did not regard the south east as a military zone, and (excepting some possible forts on the margins of Iceni territory, and the procurator's bodyguard in London) they took no steps to garrison or fortify the province. Tacitus calls St Albans 'unsafe for a defending force'.


(11-23-2015, 11:41 AM)John1 Wrote: if the “threat” of the Druids wasn’t yet subdued why would this be the case?... The distribution of garrisons at this period also seems rather peripheral

I think you answer your own question here! There's no evidence of significant fighting in south-east Britain or the Midlands between the conquest campaign and Boudica'a revolt. So there was no 'druid threat', and no military campaign against the central Britons either - the Romans just marched in and occupied the place. They would have built temporary marching camps, but the fortifications at Towcester (as you've said), Mancetter and the Lunt seem to date from the years following the revolt.



(11-23-2015, 11:41 AM)John1 Wrote: He had time as the other side assembled and his staff and allies may have had the intimate knowledge he needed.

The note about Paulinus being drawn to fight 'contrary to his judgement' suggests that time was not on his side, and he was forced to take action. This would count against any idea that he had withdrawn to a position he'd prepared well in advance, and was waiting for the Britons to come to him. His chosen battle site would be the best available to him at short notice from a limited range of options.



(11-23-2015, 11:41 AM)John1 Wrote: the theory that the Iceni were culturally different to the other tribes, an isolated land of immigrants from over the North Sea perhaps? A proto Saxon/Norse bridgehead?

This has cropped up before. Saxons and Norse are well out of it! But we perhaps shouldn't discount the idea that the eastern Britons might have had closer cultural and even ethnic links with the peoples on the far side of the North Sea - Menapii, Batavians, Tungri perhaps - than the Britons of the far west and north. Britain at this date was surely not a sealed environment populated by an entirely homogenous people.
Nathan Ross
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(11-23-2015, 12:23 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: But we perhaps shouldn't discount the idea that the eastern Britons might have had closer cultural and even ethnic links with the peoples on the far side of the North Sea - Menapii, Batavians, Tungri perhaps - than the Britons of the far west and north. Britain at this date was surely not a sealed environment populated by an entirely homogenous people.

I would think that would be more the case for the tribes along the south coast? I could not say that the Iceni were not any different from their neighbours, but if so that would be far more the case of the Cantiaci, the Artrebates, Regni and Durotriges?

(11-22-2015, 11:45 PM)Renatus Wrote: I considered this a while back.  My suggestion was that Paulinus' original intention was to go along Watling Street to Lutterworth, divert along the Via Devana to Godmanchester and link up with Cerialis and the Ninth Legion there.  The combined force would then advance to the relief of Colchester.  If he learned of the fall of Colchester and the defeat of Cerialis when he was between Lutterworth and Godmanchester, he could carry on to Godmanchester and then take Ermine Street down to London.  

Has there ben any research about the extent of the defeat of Legio VIIII, as well as the place of the ambush?
And how would the succesful ambush of Cerialis have been a factor in the mind of the british as to the approach of Paulinus?
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
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(11-22-2015, 10:50 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: The more I think about this, the more it seems that the three objectives you're discussing here - meeting up with western reinforcements, falling back on friendly natives and taking the refugees to safety - would be better served by pulling back west from London (again!).

Originally, I favoured the idea of a withdrawal westwards into the territory of the Atrebates and for Paulinus to stipulate a rallying point somewhere on the Fosse Way, along which his reinforcements from the south, west and north could reach him.  However, that was, I believe, when I thought that the entire Second Legion was at Exeter, albeit under the command of its praefectus castrorum.  Now that I think that all the legions except the Ninth were campaigning in Wales and that their bases, including Exeter, were manned only by the veterans, the western route seems less attractive.  If I am right in thinking that Paulinus would want to link up with his reinforcements as quickly as possible, the route along Akeman Street seems more plausible, as it would shorten the journey that the reinforcements would have to take to reach him.  It would also bring Verulamium into the picture.

(11-23-2015, 01:53 PM)Robert Vermaat Wrote: Has there ben any research about the extent of the defeat of Legio VIIII, as well as the place of the ambush?
And how would the succesful ambush of Cerialis have been a factor in the mind of the british as to the approach of Paulinus?

I am not aware of any specific research, although there are plenty of theories.  Unfortunately, we have even less information about the site of this encounter than we have of the final battle.  Presumably, it was somewhere to the north-west of Colchester, probably not too far from the town.  I don't think that there is anything in Tacitus' Latin to suggest that there was an ambush; that seems to be a modern idea.  I read it as a face-to-face encounter in which Cerialis' force was simply overwhelmed.  His infantry were slaughtered and he escaped himself with only his cavalry.  We are told that, after the suppression of the revolt, 2000 legionaries were transferred from the Continent and that this brought the Ninth up to strength.  This implies that Cerialis took only about half his legion for the relief of Colchester.  If Paulinus was reluctant to give battle with 10,000 men and was successful, probably, because he had the luxury of being able to choose a battle site that suited his limited numbers, it is easy to see why Cerialis' force in open ground would be no match for the vastly superior numbers of the enemy.  The probable effect of this success upon the minds of the rebels was to let them think that they were invincible and that Paulinus' force could be overcome with equal ease.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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"I am not aware of any specific research, although there are plenty of theories." -Renatus

just a recap to save Robert V trawling through the old posts. Theoretically this site should be easier to pin point than the final Battle as we know where Cerialis was coming from and where he was going to. I favour Bartlow as a reason to have those massive butrial mounds at the bottom of a valley confluence;
www.reading.ac.uk/archaeology/research/Projects/arch-HE-Bartlow.aspx

Camden identified Wandlebury Ring as the site of teh final battle so I onder if that might be the site of the IX disaster;
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wandlebury_Hill_Fort

Alternatively it could be both as a running battle or attempt at a fighting retreat. 

I must admit I'm not even aware of the other plentiful theories Robert KM alludes to. Could you name some Robert?
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(11-22-2015, 11:45 PM)Renatus Wrote: he had pressed on through the midst of the enemy (medios inter hostes).

Just a quick thought about this - as noted above, several forts were apparently built or recommissioned in the year or so following the revolt, at Mancetter, The Lunt, Wall in Staffordshire and Metchley near Birmingham, besides Towcester further south.

Could this suggest that the hostes that troubled Paulinus on his march south were precisely the people of this area (the Warwickshire/Staffordshire region), and the forts were built to help suppress them following Boudica's defeat?

I was thinking about John's suggestion of the Nene valley as a route for the Iceni - could it be that Iceni cultural and political influence was carried westwards along the Nene and into the Midlands, and so the people of this region joined in the revolt? The area concerned would seem to fit very well with this spread of forts.

(11-23-2015, 07:07 PM)Renatus Wrote: I think that all the legions except the Ninth were campaigning in Wales and that their bases, including Exeter, were manned only by the veterans, the western route seems less attractive.

Possibly so, yes. I still favour the northern route. But if Paulinus was unsure about the road north - perhaps with St Albans already fallen to the enemy - and looking for somewhere else to fall back, the route along the Portway could meet his needs.
I did come across this interesting map, giving some rough idea of the topography along the Portway just west of London:

Chobham Map

The Virginia Water site is just about where the road crosses the Bourne, I think. My proposed Bagshot site is directed west of Rapley Farm, where the road climbs onto the high ground of Chobham Ridges. Wickham Bushes could well have been a former fort site later settled as a town.
Nathan Ross
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Nathan Ross wrote:


Nowhere in the south east was - Colchester and London were both unfortified settlements at this point. It seems that the Romans did not regard the south east as a military zone, and (excepting some possible forts on the margins of Iceni territory, and the procurator's bodyguard in London) they took no steps to garrison or fortify the province. Tacitus calls St Albans 'unsafe for a defending force'.

Although I agree that the towns of Colchester, London and St. Albans were regarded as not being in the “militarised zones” and were therefore undefended and unwalled there were soldiers based in London (after all 200 were sent to Colchester by the Procurator) and therefore you would think that there was a small fort or military establishment at the very least.

Graham Webster does mention that there were some 137 possible forts during the invasion and expansion period.

Some of these forts would have been garrisoned but a bit like police stations but on a larger and more substantial scale.

Tacitus does mention at the beginning of the campaign that “and after pursuing the soldiers scattered among the Roman forts and capturing the garrisons, they invaded the colony itself”

 Also later “Like ruin fell on the town of Verulamium, for the barbarians, who delighted in plunder and were indifferent to all else, passed by the fortresses with military garrisons ……”

Also Cerialis retreated to a fort when he lost the column that he was leading to relieve Colchester.
 
Robert Vermaat wrote:

I would think that would be more the case for the tribes along the south coast? I could not say that the Iceni were not any different from their neighbours, but if so that would be far more the case of the Cantiaci, the Artrebates, Regni and Durotriges?

Julius Caesar remarks that the Cantiacii were very similar to the Gauls and Commius, Clent King of the Atrebates in Gaul (Belgium), communicated with the Atrebates in the South and possibly also other tribes including the Trinovantes during the second expedition of Caesar to Britain.

Commius also became leader of the Atrebates in Britain after he fell out with Caesar.

The Parisii were another tribe associated with the continent but also in the north of Britain.
 
 
Robert Vermaat wrote:
Has there ben any research about the extent of the defeat of Legio VIIII, as well as the place of the ambush?

The location of the site of the defeat of half of the Ninth Legion depends on the interpretation of events.

Tacitus states that the Brythons flushed with success advanced to give him battle.

This could imply that the Brythons were returning from Colchester or that they had already returned and were waiting for a Roman attack.

The Brythons were not unsophisticated when it came to warfare and had been fighting the Roman Army for over 15 years so would expect a counter attack or defence force to be sent to the seat of the battle at Colchester.

Typically the Brythons were successful ambushing the Roman Legion when they were on the march and the 9th were on the march.

It is also interesting that the cavalry escaped but all the infantry were wiped out which might indicate a surprise attack.

If they had been deployed in battle no doubt the cavalry would also have been overwhelmed.

Cerialis was known to be rash and brave so it is unlikely that he would have left his troops in open battle.

He was to become a future Governor of Britannia himself.

It is possible that the 9th travelled down the Via Devana (Leicester to Longthorpe to Cambridge to Colchester) past Wandlebury Ring down past Bartlow and were ambushed around the Sturmer / Wixoe area where the road intersected the Roman Road from Great Chesterford (on the Icknield Way) to Long Melford .

This would be a place where a military force would pass on their way to Colchester from the North.     
 
Robert Vermaat wrote:

And how would the succesful ambush of Cerialis have been a factor in the mind of the british as to the approach of Paulinus?


The news of the destruction of Colchester and part of the 9th Legion would have spread like wildfire and raised the spirits of Brythons.

The Romans had lost their capital of the Province and their soldiers had been beaten.

Arguably this was the biggest defeat that the Roman Administration and Army had suffered in Britannia and this would have attracted more tribes to the Iceni / Trinovantes coalition which would end with nearly a quarter of million people surrounding the Roman Army at the later battle.

A lot of Brythons were obviously disaffected with Roman Rule.

It was just that the Roman Governors and Procurators didn’t realise this until it was too late.

Nathan Ross wrote:

I was thinking about John's suggestion of the Nene valley as a route for the Iceni - could it be that Iceni cultural and political influence was carried westwards along the Nene and into the Midlands, and so the people of this region joined in the revolt? The area concerned would seem to fit very well with this spread of forts.

Interesting observation.......

Deryk
Deryk
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(11-23-2015, 07:42 PM)John1 Wrote: I must admit I'm not even aware of the other plentiful theories Robert KM alludes to. Could you name some Robert?

Do you mean me?  A bit of hyperbole in my part, I'm afraid.  Anyway, more than one, as you and Deryk have demonstrated.

(11-23-2015, 09:06 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Just a quick thought about this - as noted above, several forts were apparently built or recommissioned in the year or so following the revolt, at Mancetter, The Lunt, Wall in Staffordshire and Metchley near Birmingham, besides Towcester further south.

Could this suggest that the hostes that troubled Paulinus on his march south were precisely the people of this area (the Warwickshire/Staffordshire region), and the forts were built to help suppress them following Boudica's defeat?

That's an interesting idea, although they could have joined the revolt later.  Also, Tacitus tells us that, in the operations after the revolt, Paulinus dealt with those involved and those who had been wavering in the same way, i.e., with fire and sword, so it may be that they were merely of uncertain loyalty.

(11-23-2015, 09:06 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: But if Paulinus was unsure about the road north - perhaps with St Albans already fallen to the enemy - and looking for somewhere else to fall back, the route along the Fosseway could meet his needs.
I did come across this interesting map, giving some rough idea of the topography along the Fosseway just west of London

Do you mean Portway?
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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