Julian II (the Apostate) and his policies

[Robert Vermaat]

The main point is that Julian's Persian campaign was pretty pointless from a strategic point of view and led to a vast waste of resources - it wasn't prudent at all.

If he'd been prudent he'd have continued to follow Constantius' policy for the Persian frontier - unglamorous but more or less successful.

But Nick, that's exactly what Julian was doing! Constantius had already massed troops on the Persian frontier - he was there while Julian was raised to Augustus, for the very reason that Constantius was demanding more and more of Julian's units for that very invasion!

Had Julian remained Caesar in Gaul, and had his troops quietly gone East, then Constantius would in all likelyhood have carried out that very same battle plan - it's very unlikely that Julian, with most troops already in place for the invasion, would have turned around the existing plans.

Another reason for Julian to go ahead seems to be that the Eastern troops, only months ago going for Julian himself, were not automatically won over for him. Had he remained placid, they were likely to have supported an Eastern candidate! By going ahead with the planned invasion, he supported the eastern troops, bound them to him in a single venture, promised them the loot from Persia and had a change to keep an eye on them at one go.
IF the invasion had ended in a better result (and chances were it could have), Julian could have been a much more respected and popular emperor from at least the army's point of view.

[Robert Vermaat]

Rome had seen enough disasters worse than Adrianopel before and she was able to manage.

The last disaster to be seen on such a scale was the Battle of the Teutoberg Forest, 360 years earlier. That was a different time and a different world. Even Augustus didn't have the kind of manpower reserves available to him that the Republic enjoyed during the Punic Wars. He had to resort to conscription and suffered a backlash for doing so. Later Emperors in the fourth century had even more trouble pressing civilians into the army.
Consequently, after Adrianople, the Visigoths were seen as a new pool of warriors to be tapped by the Emperors to be recruited into Roman service. They became indispensable despite the debilitating effects of their de facto independent status.

Pardon... and what about Abrittus... The emperor Decius who was killed by the Goths. Maybe almost as dramatic as Adrianople but because not much in known about this battle you simply ingore it?

Ah, I would say that the battle of the battle of Mursa (Ossijek) on September 28, 351? Magnentius and Constantius managed to get half the Roman army killed there! Adrianople was not half as disastrous as Mursa...

[Nicholas Gaukroger]

But Nick, that's exactly what Julian was doing! Constantius had already massed troops on the Persian frontier - he was there while Julian was raised to Augustus, for the very reason that Constantius was demanding more and more of Julian's units for that very invasion!

Correct me if I am wrong but all we know is that Constantius was getting ready to attack the Persians - no mention of anything specific like a large scale invasion all the way to Ctesiphon. As Shapur was at the time still attacking the border cities such as Singara (IIRC) it seems likely to me that Constantius' aim would have been to drive Shapur back from these and maybe recapture any lost. This would at least be consistent with Constantius' strategy to date.

However, I'm not with my books at present so as I said I'm willing to be corrected if I'm wrong - and if I am I'd suggest Constantius was a muppet for thinking of doing such a thing :wink:

[Theodosius the Great]

Not so easy Theo... Even if Iulianus was maybe too over-cautious, ... his generalship and strategy were not so "shoddy". Iulianus planned well for his campaign...The Iulianus' campaign was similar to the Traianus' one

Aqvilivs,
Marcus Lincinius Crassus and Marcus Antonius also planned well for their Parthian campaigns. We know how they ended : in failure. Shoddy generalship can't be compensated with good planning and preparation. And employing Trajan's 260 year old strategy doesn't seem to indicate the mind of an imaginative general. Events rarely happen according to plan. What good is a plan if it can't be adapted according to actual circumstances ? The strategy Julian followed seems to indicate very little Prudentia in his thinking. Julian knew how to beat barbarians and that was the limit of his military ability. At least the evidence would suggest that to me.

Quote:
The last disaster to be seen on such a scale was the Battle of the Teutoberg Forest, 360 years earlier

from Theodioius The Great.

Pardon... and what about Abrittus... The emperor Decius who was killed by the Goths. Maybe almost as dramatic as Adrianople but because not much in known about this battle you simply ingore it?

This is a bit OT, but... as you readily point out : we don't have any hard numbers in regards to losses in that battle. How can I make a comparison to Adrianople without such crucial information ? You could also mention Valerian's capture by the Persians. Do we know how many Roman lives were lost ?

I try to use the best evidence available to us and if I fail to mention a well documented event then it's probably due to an oversight on my part rather than me "ignoring" it. If I neglect to account for something then please correct me.

No?? There were a lot of rebels during the Christian Byzantine Empire!!

We see far fewer military uprisings than in previous times until the 7th century A.D. during the Persian and Arab invasions. So, that's about 300 years of relative peace since Constantine's conversion to Christianity. That's a pretty good stretch of time, I'd say.

Before the 7th century, yes, there were rebellious generals but they were usually unsuccessful in gaining the support of their troops to back them up. My point is that the army (not necessarily the generals) preferred to be ruled by strong familial dynasties during the Christian era.

Ah, I would say that the battle of the battle of Mursa (Ossijek) on September 28, 351? Magnentius and Constantius managed to get half the Roman army killed there! Adrianople was not half as disastrous as Mursa...

Okay, now we have some numbers. Something like 54,000 dead Romans in the context of a civil war. The battle of Mursa in and of itself resulted in a larger loss of life, sure. But I take issue with calling it a bigger disaster because the consequences were not as disastrous for the Empire as Adrianople since the enemy were Goths who had invaded and defeated Rome within Roman territory. The Empire could probably cope with Mursa far better since all the Romans would have to do is enroll barbarians into the army to make up for the losses.

Had Julian lived and led his army to destruction (which he led to the brink of, btw) he would have exposed the Eastern provinces to Shapur who would have picked up the pieces. That would happen later during the 7th century.

~Theo

[S SEVERUS]

Okay, now we have some numbers. Something like 54,000 dead Romans in the context of a civil war. The battle of Mursa in and of itself resulted in a larger loss of life, sure. But I take issue with calling it a bigger disaster because the consequences were not as disastrous for the Empire as Adrianople since the enemy were Goths who had invaded and defeated Rome within Roman territory. The Empire could probably cope with Mursa far better since all the Romans would have to do is enroll barbarians into the army to make up for the losses.

Theodosius The Great

So, that's just what Theodosius The Great did after Adrianople. What I wanted to stress is that Adrianople, just as Mursa, Abrittus, ... was not a blow the Roman Empire could not cope with. Like always, losse could be made good.

I don't follow you with you're dynastic principle simply because it makes no sense. In the Roman and Byzantine Empire there was never a long lasting dynasty like you have in the medieval France or England. There were uprisings, usurpers (succesful or not).
Relative peace after the conversion of Constantine? One of his sons was even killed in battle by a brother, Julian took over power, even Theodoius The Great had to deal with a very dangerous uprising and his sons, well yeah, they were pawns in the hands of others.

[S SEVERUS]

But Nick, that's exactly what Julian was doing! Constantius had already massed troops on the Persian frontier - he was there while Julian was raised to Augustus, for the very reason that Constantius was demanding more and more of Julian's units for that very invasion!

Had Julian remained Caesar in Gaul, and had his troops quietly gone East, then Constantius would in all likelyhood have carried out that very same battle plan - it's very unlikely that Julian, with most troops already in place for the invasion, would have turned around the existing plans.

Another reason for Julian to go ahead seems to be that the Eastern troops, only months ago going for Julian himself, were not automatically won over for him. Had he remained placid, they were likely to have supported an Eastern candidate! By going ahead with the planned invasion, he supported the eastern troops, bound them to him in a single venture, promised them the loot from Persia and had a change to keep an eye on them at one go.
IF the invasion had ended in a better result (and chances were it could have), Julian could have been a much more respected and popular emperor from at least the army's point of view.

Vortigern

I agree.

[Theodosius the Great]

So, that's just what Theodosius The Great did after Adrianople. What I wanted to stress is that Adrianople, just as Mursa, Abrittus, ... was not a blow the Roman Empire could not cope with. Like always, losse could be made good.

Andrianople was devastatingly unique for the Empire in three crucial ways :

1.) the loss took place within Roman territory, combined with

2.) the fact that they were fighting barbarians and not Romans, combined with

3.) the migration of the Gothic nation (i.e. Men, Women, and Children) into Roman territory which afterwards made it virtually impossible for the weakened Romans to expel them

So, the Goths' entry and permanent presence within the Empire retarded the Romans' ability to recover their strength to restore the status quo of pre-Adrianople.

In the Roman and Byzantine Empire there was never a long lasting dynasty like you have in the medieval France or England. There were uprisings, usurpers (succesful or not).
Relative peace after the conversion of Constantine? One of his sons was even killed in battle by a brother, Julian took over power, even Theodoius The Great had to deal with a very dangerous uprising and his sons, well yeah, they were pawns in the hands of others.

You misunderstand me. It's all relative. Politically, the Empire was more stable in the 4th century than in the 3rd. The army was loyal to 4th, 5th, and 6th century dynasties. What can one do when civil wars break out between rivals of the same dynasty ? Sure, there were civil wars but the ruling dynasty was seldom challenged by an outsider. The dynasty would always remain in power until it became naturally extinct.

Besides, medieval dynasties of Western Europe were also plagued by civil war. The Visigoths in Spain fought among themselves leaving Spain open to Muslim invasion and conquest. The Franks in the North warred among themselves too. "England" or Britannia was the most chaotic and backward place in all Europe for centuries after Rome abandoned it. Even when they finally pulled themselves up they were plagued with civil wars as well. Pick any "English" dynasty and you'll see that none were free from worry about civil wars breaking out.

These are the major Christian Roman / Byzantine Dynasties :

Constantinian Dynasty : 293 A.D. - 363 A.D. (70 years)
Theodosian Dynasty : 379 A.D. - 455 A.D. (76 years)
Justinianic Dynasty : 518 A.D. - 602 A.D. (84 years)
Heraclian Dynasty : 610 A.D. - 711 A.D. (91 years due to an interlude)
Isaurian Dynasty : 717 A.D. - 802 A.D. (85 years)
Macedonian Dynasty : 867 A.D. - 1056 A.D. (189 years !)
Palaeologan Dynasty : 1261 A.D. - 1453 A.D. (192 years !)

The most sucessful "English" dynasty were the Angevins who lasted for 245 years. They too were fraught with civil wars. Have you seen "Lion in Winter" starring Peter O'Toole ? Now there's a dysfunctional family if I ever saw one. hock:

The French "Direct Capetian" dynasty was the most sucessful dynasty of all : 341 years but they were freaks ! They kept managing to have male heirs well beyond the typical lifespan of three generations.

The average "house", I would estimate, lasted for about 3 generations in the medieval period (including Byzantium). Now you could lump some of them under the overall Capetian, Hapsburg, Romanov umbrella and say they last(ed) for several centuries but so what ? Their various branches were scattered thoughout all Europe or lasted only through the female line.

~Theo

[S SEVERUS]

Andrianople was devastatingly unique for the Empire in three crucial ways :

1.) the loss took place within Roman territory, combined with

2.) the fact that they were fighting barbarians and not Romans, combined with

3.) the migration of the Gothic nation (i.e. Men, Women, and Children) into Roman territory which afterwards made it virtually impossible for the weakened Romans to expel them

So, the Goths' entry and permanent presence within the Empire retarded the Romans' ability to recover their strength to restore the status quo of pre-Adrianople.

~Theo

The presence of the Goths was the policy of Theodosius The Great. He defeated them but failed to crush them. Maybe he had something in mind but he died to early to give a permanent solution to the Gothic problem and it were his sons who after his death were to weak to control them. I don't agree to the fact that the empire was to weak to deal with the Goths. There was no reason to expell them, they just had to absorb them. Theodosius made the mistake not to eliminate there political leaders or breaking them up and Arcadius...well he did nothing. Maybe that Theodosius saw the Goths as a cheap reservoir for the army...

So dynasties are not that good also i see. Only 3 generations and than it's over? So from Nerva till Commodus the Roman Emperors did better... :lol:
I think both the dynastic principle and the other system have there faults, neither is perfect.

[Nicholas Gaukroger]

You misunderstand me. It's all relative. Politically, the Empire was more stable in the 4th century than in the 3rd. The army was loyal to 4th, 5th, and 6th century dynasties. What can one do when civil wars break out between rivals of the same dynasty ? Sure, there were civil wars but the ruling dynasty was seldom challenged by an outsider.

All those dynasties you quote were challenged by outsiders, some more than others - I really don't see that you point is valid.

Also comparing to the C3rd is rather selective, what about the C1st and C2nd as well?

[L C Cinna]

I agree as well.

There are some problems during this campaigns which leave some open questions and can't really be answered.

First of all I want to say that Julian's campaign in Gaul as Caesar were quite good. People shouldn't underestimate it. Gaul was the target of frequent incursions for more than a century already! and Julian had quite limited forces at hand. A big number of troops probably was already in the east or with the emperor. or defending the Danubian frontier at that time. Compare his forces to the ones other commanders had when operating in this area. And he actually carried out a brilliant campaign defeating the Allemanni in battle and then surprising the Franks and others with a quick unexpected advance into their territory. Of course we have only one big battle but you don't always need such battles if you plan your campaign well. The way he fought this campaign was very "Caesarian" in style imho and had a lasting impact on the tribes as it proofed that the Romans were still capable even with a small force to bring the war the them and it showed once more the advantage of Roman organization. Something which had lacked during Constantius reign where the troops were mainly passive or split.

Julian was a very intelligent man, I don't think anyone could deny that and unlike many of his contemporaries knew Roman history very well.

As Vortigern said, he just continued the campaign in the east which his predecessor had already prepared for.

All went well on the way to Ctesiphon and they won an overwhelming victory at its gates. Now, the Romans didn't bring siege equipment with them. We know from other campaigns that it was necessary to bring it yourself because the area around Ctesiphon doesn't allow for building much of your own and a long siege is not possible because of the conditions.

The question here is: What was Julian's plan then?

Maybe he wanted to do something different from what Traian and Severus did? Mesopotamia always caused more problems then it was worth and the previous Roman campaigns against the east had actually achieved little to nothing except gaining some lands which were lost quite quickly again. Sometimes the losses were quite bad. Severus and Traian's failure at Hatra had cost more men then necessary, the conquered areas had to be given up or where lost under horrible losses. I'm not talking of big battles here but many of the garrisons fell sooner or later and each cost many men, that makes quite an amount in the end.

So, I've been studying Julian's writings and his actions quite a bit to get a better guess at how he thought. 2nd is a look at what happened during the campaign and what is mentioned and 3rd is a little "what has happened in the past and what would I have done if I were in his position"

My point here is, as I said before, that most of the previous campaigns, although successful in taking the enemies capitol didn't change much in the end. They had shown that taking that area didn't weaken the Sasanides enough for the Romans to hold this area. The siege-train always slowed the advance and gave the enemy just more targets to attack.

So what was the plan?

A smaller army was to secure the boarder and then enter Armenia and link up with Armenian forces, while Julian took the main body south. This was a precaution so that no Sasanide forces could enter Roman provinces unopposed to force Julian to retreat. Once he was in enemy territory and it was sure the enemy would concentrate his forces in this area, the smaller force was to join the Armenians and head south to meet Julian.

Here is problem no1: They didn't do what they were ordered! So this is hardly his mistake at all.

Question 2:

why didn't he bring siege equipment?

He could have transported it on the ships he brought with him, already a big advantage over land transport like Antonius had done and it wouldn't have been much extra work or anything.

MY answer: It was never his plan to take the town!

Let me explain:

He didn't want to besiege the bigger towns and waste time. The plan looks much more like he wanted to be fast and by this be able to catch and fight the Sasanide army before they could burn everything and evade action. And that's what he actually achieved. The Romans were even TOO fast for the Persians because Shapur was not able to unite his 2 armies, which gave Julian the opportunity to defeat the smaller army first.

Shapur wanted to give battle, the king of kings could not accept such a defeat in his own country.

The plan seems to have been, that by now Procopius should be meeting Julian's army bringing along his troops and the Armenians. This would have provided Julian with an army about equal to the one of Shapur. and the Romans had the advantage of an undefeated army which had already beaten one of the Sasanide armies.

Such a victory would have secured the eastern provinces much longer than plundering one town without defeating the enemy's main army.

Now about the provisions: they obviously had enough and had taken great care. Julian's plan was to even move further south along the river. His generals insisted on going back home. So he had to do that.

To me it looks like he still had his plan in mind and just made a compromise here:

Procopius didn't show up, the generals wanted to return home. This would have made the whole campaign useless and a waste of money with no profit as the Sasanide forces were still strong.

The way back not along the Euphrat but along the Tigris now gave the option to somehow maybe still achieve a victory. If Procopius and the Armenians were going to march south they could meet somewhere there and return towards Armenia and maybe offer battle with united forces if Shapur followed. If, which was likely, Procopius did NOT come at all, Julian needed more soldiers. So decision was made to burn the ships and by this getting around 20.000 more troops for a battle. The danger was of course that there were less provisions but the villages and less defended towns along the Tigris would have offered some possibilities there and as I said before, if my messengers Procopius could still be convinced to move south a meeting along the Tigris would have been faster to achieve.

My guess is that the biggest problem during the campaign were the generals on Julian's side because it seems they were quite afraid and didn't want to take any risks.

Procopius not following his orders and staying safe in the North, and the generals following older ideas of reaching Ctesiphon and then returning home. They even advised Julian not to accept battle at Ctesiphon because they thought they'd lose against the Persian army there! Julian insisted on the battle and it was an overwhelming victory.

To me it seems that what I described above was Julian's plan. NOT the plundering of Ctesiphon which had proved to be useless before. A surprise attack and battle against Shapur would have fitted perfectly into his previous patterns and would have had a much longer lasting effect.

It's a risky plan but on the other hand much more effective. It's quite similar to his campaigns in Gaul, where he used speed and surprise (like campaigning out of season and such things). He showed the same concept when he marched against Constantius where he was advancing very quickly and could have cut off Constantius from Constantinople and Greece.

I know the campaign failed BUT it was very well planned and we don't know what would have happened had Julian's plans been carried out. A defeat of Shapur's army (something the Romans had avoided for quite some time) would have secured the eastern boarder for many years.

In the eyes of his contemporaries this would have made him probably even bigger than Traian. Taking out the Alemanni, Franks and Sasanides withing a few years and securing all the boarders would have given him the opportunity to carry out his economic reforms in a way other emperors during his time could not because he would have restored the pax romana in a way it hasn't been since the Severans. Well this is all "what if" but imho the plan described above was his actual plan and it would have given the empire a new stability and him a very secure position.

[S SEVERUS]

Severus and Traian's failure at Hatra had cost more men then necessary, the conquered areas had to be given up or where lost under horrible losses. I'm not talking of big battles here but many of the garrisons fell sooner or later and each cost many men, that makes quite an amount in the end.

L C Cinna

I think that one way or the other S Severus forced a Roman garrison on the city of Hatra. If I am correct there was for some time a cohort of palmyra there. But it was razed by the Sassanians.

[L C Cinna]

I will check if this might have been the result of a treaty or something.

What's sure is that Severus besieged Hatra twice and couldn't take it (like Traian).

[S SEVERUS]

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/med/ken.html

I think it's also mentioned in this.

Also
During this campaign Severus laid siege to the important trade-post city of
Hatra twice, a city which had defied Trajan earlier. The historians Cassius
Dio and Herodian both report that Severus failed to capture the city, but
it's been persuasively argued (to me at least) that a diplomatic victory was
secured, and the city became an outpost for the Cohort IX Maurorum, with the
victory recorded in its way on the Arch of Severus at the Forum, dedicated
at his Decennalia in 203. ( http://www.novaroma.org/forum/mainlist/ ... 03-29.html )

It could also be Gordian III ( http://www.cavazzi.com/roman-empire/art ... e-036.html )

[L C Cinna]

Well this article just states that there were Auxiliary units in Hatra during the reign of Severus Alexander and Gordianus. They might have come there at the time of Caracalla or later when the Persian empire was busy with civil war.

For Septimius problems at Hatra and the 2 sieges see:

Cassius Dio 75.9-10
J. Spielvogel: "Septimius Severus" p.116 ff.
A.R.Birley: "The African Emperor: Septimius Severus": p.130/131

Herodian reports this siege as well but incorrectly mentiones only 1 and that one before the attack on Ctesiphon.

the article on this page:

http://www.g26.ch/texte_irak_geschichte_10.html

written by Frank Rainer Scheck (I don't know this person) says that Hatra recieved a Roman garrison around 235CE.

This page: http://www.angelfire.com/nt/Gilgamesh/sasanian.html mentions the following:

"In 230 Ardashir besieged Hatra but failed to take it. Hatra called on Roman aid, and in 232 the Roman emperor Severus Alexander launched a campaign that halted Ardashir's progress."

but sadly enough doesn't name any sources.

[Natuspardo]

I know some wont like this, but maybe there was no big battle at Ctesiphon, but only a small landing operation involving few thousand men at best.

Zosimus Book3:

The emperor, however, being very resolute, two barges crossed over full of foot soldiers ; which the Persians immediately set on fire by throwing down on them a great number of flaming darts. This so increased the terror of the army, that the emperor was obliged to conceal his error by a feint, saying, "They are landed and have rendered themselves masters of the bank ; I know it by the fire in their ships, which I ordered them to make as a signal of victory." He had no sooner said this, than without further preparations they embarked in the ships and crossed over, until they arrived where they could ford the river, and then leaping into the water, they engaged the Persians so fiercely, that they not only gained possession of the bank, but recovered the two ships which came over first, and were now half burnt, and saved all the men who were left in them. The armies then attacked each other with such fury, that the battle continued from midnight to noon of the next day. The Persians at length gave way, and fled with all the speed they could use, their commandors being the first who began to fly. Those were Pigraxes, a person of the highest birth and rank next to the king, Anareus, and Surenas. The Romans and Goths pursued them, and killed a great number, from whom they took a vast quantity of gold and silver, besides ornaments of all kinds for men and horses, with silver beds and tables, and whatever was left by the officers on the ramparts. It is computed, that in this battle there fell of the Persians two thousand five hundred, and of the Romans not more than seventy-five. The joy of the army for this victory was lessened by Victor having received a wound from an engine.

Upon the following day the emperor sent his army over the Tigris without difficulty, and the third day after the action he himself with his guards followed them.

That story proves Ammianus account (AM 24.6.1ff) a little bit blown up. From Zosimus it is clear that it was a bridge head operation and the greater part of the army crossed later. Ammianus even lets Julian be present at the battle - another point contradicted by Zosimus. Also Libanios doesnt mention the Ctesiphon episode as a big battle - and he wont left out a chance to glorify his Julian!

The strenght of the foederati detachment of Goths: AM 26.10,3