Hoplites fighting in Phalanx formation

[Alexandr K]

Hi,

But I find CAesar's account of all front rankers jumping on the enemy to indicate that it was not unusual for the men as a whole to act in what many would view to be a foolhardy way.

Well, not all front rankers were jumping on the enemy. Many [of the legionaries] (complures nostri) were jumping on the enemy. Only the front rankers could reach the enemy in this way and I believe, these were the selected aggressive men. The rest was still in the relative safety of the second/third/fourth/... rank (which I'm not saying was psychically easier for them). I would say, that Caesar is stressing this situation, because it wasn't usual to do so. IIRC nothing similar is described in any of the other engagements in his Commentaries. But hey, these are only personal interpretations of the text. I can be wrong and so can you.

Check out the news coverage over the last couple of days of the football battles between English fans and the Italian and Spanish police. I saw many untrained, unarmed and unarmoured civilians taking on the police through simple rage at their situation, and what was happening to their peer group and friends. Now apply the same principal to a unit of armed, trained and tightly bonded Roman or Greek soldiers in a similar situation.

Well its a great difference to attack a line of policemen, when you know that they won't try to kill you and to attack a line of soldiers, who certainly will try to kill you.

My point was the opposite of the one which was taken. I am pointing out that men do attack en masse, putting themselves into immediate danger which they cannot effectively respond to. If the attackers are allowed or encouraged to fire, the attack usually breaks down. As a general rule, the attackers did hold their fire until they were in effective range of the defenders. The crisis began once the defenders started firing.

There were a few cases when soldiers attacked with unloaded muskets, so they couldn't stop to fire even if they wanted to, and were forced to rely on bayonets and elan to attack - and some of these attacks were successful. Obviously, avoiding danger was not the primary thought in these men's heads. Equally obviously, these attacks were not made only by the naturally aggressive minority of men, but by formations of considerable size.

As I said earlier today: "You must also realize, that to care more about your life than about killing enemies doesn't automatically mean, that you'll run away as soon as the fight begins or that you won't even advance to enemy. It means that during the clash you'll do your best to survive and if you have the opportunity to attack some enemies, you'll do that only if it doesn't poses greater risk for you. " Of course with some modifications for various kinds of combat.
The bayonet attacks are a chapter of its own. Modern studies (confirmed by du Picq's experience!) revealed that actually only very rarely the two lines met to fight with bayonets. In the absolute majority one of the sides ran away before contact. It seems that if one side was able to nerve themselves to attack with bayonets believing that the enemy will flee, it often really happened. If the enemy stood ground, the attackers slowed down and eventually halted. A gunfight at close distance resulted. It's difficult to understand all the mechanisms working here, but fear and the instinct of self-preservation are certainly the most important aspects. The soldiers are able to withstand some risk to their lives, but everything has its borders and it seems that fighting with bayonets at close quarters without armour or shield was simply too much for them.

Greetings
Alexandr