Quincunx and Keppie\'s hypothesis

[Macedon]

Battlefield tactics should, in my opinion, be approached in a more holistic way than most researchers do. When discussing gaps in the Roman army of any era one has to take into account the data we have on gaps in other armies (or times). The same applies to all other discussions like how gaps were closed, how lines were extended etc etc. Attacks of a battle-line with sizable gaps among relatively small units were an acceptable tactic called in Greek "speiridon" or attack by "orthioi lochoi". We have very good examples, mostly in Greek armies such as the 10,000 and of Antigonus at Selassia. Less detailed examples we have regarding a lot of armies like the Romans, the Lusitanians, the Illyrians etc. We have accounts of rear lines (boethos) receiving a retreating/fleeing front line (promachos) as a tactic with the men of the latter retreating through sizable gaps in the Roman/Byzantine manuals with much detail as to how these gaps were formed, their size, how they could be made invisible to the enemy, how the retreating men should be checked and reorganized. An advice here should be to always have in mind when an account is about infantry and when about cavalry. In all, most of the thoughts I read here have been implemented in the past and one should study how they worked before trying to apply them as a theory to instances we, unfortunately, have little details on. The peculiarity of the Roman system, especially in the pre-Caesarian times is stressed again and again by the authors but their accounts are generally, and unfortunately, ignored, since this peculiarity is usually linked with a system that allowed the maniples/cohorts to somehow more easily retreat and still keep their cohesion, order instead of being used in an unbeatable offensive thrust, which is the most common notion linked with the Romans.

@ Mark, What kind of march does your image depict? It is not a battle-array is it?