03-09-2014, 08:09 PM
Hello all. I hope it's OK to recharge on old thread; I came across this a couple years ago and always meant to contribute. I have been away from contributing for a long time (some serious and intense family problems, but now all is well), but not from scouring. I am very happy to see the gorgeously glossy Ancient Warfare magazine on the stands! I very much like Paul McDonnell's and Duncan Campbell's, et el, style.
Fascinating question, Timothy, as a plausible overall answer drawn from our traditional sources reveal some substantial data, and reflect the manipular system at this time - during the war against Pyrrhus - one of vestigial transformation.
Firstly, as you've been addressed earlier in the thread, the swords wielded by the Roman soldier prior to the standardized gladius were surely ones akin to the extant Greek hoplites and their Italic brethren. The kopis, xiphos - or at least very similar Italic variants -, and larger antennae Villanovan style, etc., were all used as a secondary weapon, probably also symbolizing some form of social status. By 225 BCE, the nascent gladius was indeed the primary cut-and-thrust offensive weapon used by the Roman legionary (Polybius, The Histories, Book 2.30.9, and 2.33.6, respectively, in describing the Romans' superior swordsmanship over the Cisalpine Gauls).
Kudos to the erudition of the poster Steven James, but all these instances provided as state-supplied arms amid the regal period were instances when the tumultus was declared (viz., a military emergency in a time of crisis), hence the proletarii were armed at the state's expense under critical circumstances to aid in the defense of the Commonwealth (a reflection of the prodigious flexible adaptability of the Roman system to meet various challenges down the ages). Otherwise, indeed, the Roman armies of the earlier centuries before the onset of the 4th century BCE constituted a citizen militia in a timocratic society, in which all those drafted were to arm themselves at their own expense. As the Roman army expanded and spent longer periods of time in the field beyond a single campaign, the policy of stipendium was instituted (imputed to the siege of Veii in 406 BCE as the the catalyst of this substantial change) - pay for the army, which was originally weighed out before coinage was used to count it out. Moreover, the institution of tributum was contemporaneous with state issued army pay - indemnities levied upon defeated peoples. Both army pay and levied tribute are regularly linked, but mentioned often quite anachronistically by Livy (cf. Michael Crawford, Coinage and Money Under Roman the Roman Republic, pp. 22-24). Following the massive monetary gains for the Roman coffers following the plunder of Macedon (specifically, the mines there) as of 167 BCE, citizens became exempt from the tributum, being levied only rarely thereafter (Roman warfare increasingly fed of itself as the 'empire' evolved). It was not universal, however, until 123 BCE (amid the reforming policies of Gaius Gracchus), which saw the bill that called upon the state to pay for the arms and equipment of all legionaries (cf. Diodorus, Book 34/35.25.1; Asconius, Pro Cornelio, 68c).
For all the flexible changes commensurate to exigent conditions the Roman army undertook, a Roman century was never larger than 120 men, let alone that amount being a part of one, which - alluded here on the thread in assessing various sizes of tactical units - we do indeed read in the MSS. of Julius Caesar's Civil Wars, Book 3.91, within the backdrop of his famed victory at Pharsalus: '120 picked men of the same centuriae' - indicating that in this century 120 'picked men' would comprise a small percentage of it - is surely a scribal error when the MSS. was compiled, and in this case, Caesar actually embarked for Greece with quantitatively under-strength legions. Certainly, cohortis, not centuriae, was meant.
When the manipular system began to take its shape, a primary catalyst which triggered the change was probably when the Roman phalanx (Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions the Roman 'phalanx' - in his Greek terminology - forming up against the Latin League in c. 496 BCE, at the Battle of Lake Regillus; Roman Antiquities, Book 6.5.4-12.6, but the Loeb English translation simply interprets this as 'battle-line'), whatever its true alignment (probably not an exact duplicate of the traditional one of that used among the Greek states; social and geographical circumstances were not exact), was absolutely trampled into the ground by the more maneuverable Gauls in 390 BCE (despite its rhetorical glibness, the famous anecdotes in the Ineditum Vaticanum reflects an overall basis in fact: the wars against the hardy and hilly Samnites certainly were also events which necessitated reforms, perhaps much involving marching camps and communications, etc.); it seems to carry merit that the initial progressions of the manipular system had the hastati as the second-line troops wielding the hasta (the basic hoplite spear), and the principes ('most important', thus initially 'in the first line' when this was worked out at first) formed the first line; why would the hastati be singled out as 'spear-bearers'? Surely because the front-line principes - at the onset of the manipular system - wielded throwing spears as their primary weapon. The etymology in ascribing these terms, of course, is probably more often than not quite cognitive. As this martial system became viable along a slow, piecemeal and vestigial process (not mainly transformed amid wartime; after all, we read of nominal ad-hoc cohorts as early as 211 BCE in Spain, but they would not replace the maniples as Roman doctrine until probably not long before 109 BCE, when Sallust describes the war against Jugurtha, where we first read that the maniple seems defunct), the paramount Roman attribute of virtus could manifest - the manipular array could accommodate the pressure to display masculine courage, and the brave deeds of the younger velites and hastati could be showcased with the the more experienced soldiers behind them in support (see the fine breakdown of this theory in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Vol. I, pp. 509-513). Thus one possible reason for the switching, if it occurred, of the two front lines, albeit the etymology was retained. But no annalistic evidence supports this, and this is one of many cases where the often murky work by them was illustrated (in terms of facts), no less while wallowing their early history in a schematic manner for their patriotic readers (this is quite arbitrary on my part, by all means). But this is not meant to mean 'literary' always means 'fictional'; all the rhetoric and propaganda can still be used to pinpoint probable historicity. Our most accomplished modern experts on this topic have far from evaded tackling this, and their are as voluminous as they can be elucidating.
OK, to the war with Pyrrhus and the terrific question by Timothy.
For Livy the manipular system was in being by 340 BCE, but nothing can be more jaw-droppingly dichotomous than what he apprises and what Dionysius of Halicarnassus does, the other primary source for all this.
Roman influence began eroding Tarentine influence at this time (280s BCE), and a Roman garrison in Thurii set a dangerous precedent to the political climate with their military presence within Tarentum's sphere of influence (actually, here in 280 BCE is one example of crisis when the Romans recruited soldiers who had no property qualification at all, not unlike what they resorted to after the disaster at Cannae). The Tarentines were soon able to eject the Romans in Thurii within a few years, and Thurii was compelled back into the southern 'Italic League' of the time, but this was a part of a gradually rising escalation of tension between Rome and Tarentum, which culminated in war. Enter Pyrrhus...
At the Battle of Asculum in 279 BCE, Plutarch tells us that the Romans fought Pyrrhus' phalanx 'fiercely with their swords against the Macedonian spears, reckless of their lives and thinking only of wounding and slaying, while caring naught for what they suffered' (Life of Pyrrhus, Ch. 21.6). Four years later in the action at the battle of Beneventum, Dionysius of Halicarnassus tells us some explicit and tantalizing stuff, Roman Antiquities, Fragments (Book 20), no. 11 (stress on the fragments of his works),
[indent]"...It was bound the happen, as might have been expected, that hoplites burdened with helmets, breastplates and shields and advancing against hilly positions by long trails that were not even used by people but were mere goat-paths through woods and crags, would keep no order and, even before the enemy came in sight, would be weakened in body by thirst and fatigue.
Those who fight in close combat with cavalry spears grasped by the middle with both hands and who usually save the day in battles are called principes by the Romans..."[/indent]
Wow! That's very clear at face value - the principes (specified) still wielded spears - grasped by the middle by the bearer with both hands no less, and in stark contrast to all or many of the views of the Roman annalists (and their sources) on the early Republican army, whether Livy and Co. naively assumed that the late manipular system had existed since regal times, or those who realized on the basis of antiquarian evidence that at one time the phalanx had been in use, than the words above of Dionysius. The Greek writers dealing with this, obviously, took a keen interest in the war against Pyrrhus, and they probably were availed the works of Hieronymus of Cardia (sadly lost to us), as well as those of one Proxenus, the court historian of Pyrrhus; Dionysius is our primary Greek writer for this backdrop, and he was writing for a Greek audience, hence the wording of 'cavalry spears' wielded by the (now, presumably) second line of the Roman acies triplex of infantry; the Roman mounts of Dionysius' day wielded light spears (longche, for the sake of imputing relevant etymology) with one hand, and not all were, presumably, the same; but the potentially deadly contus (or kontos), was still far in the future. The description constituting the arms of the principes at Beneventum can probably be explained by the assumption that such a description would make sense to those familiar with the vaunted Macedonian xystophori (Alexander and his Companions, along with their Hellenistic successors, displayed a singular ability with the xyston). Moreover, what indicates Dionysius' care is his usage in the present tense of the verb 'they call', hence this was not his own addition, as the principes neither existed in his time.
Furthermore, in his previous book, Dionysius tells us that a Ferentan leader named Oblacus attacked Pyrrhus on his horse (this was during the the Battle of Heraclea, the first field clash in this conflict, in 280 BCE):
Roman Antiquities, Book 19.12.1-3,
[indent]"...The Ferentan Oblacus, having thus found the opportunity for which he was waiting, charged with his companions into the midst of the royal squadron; and breaking through the crowd of attendant horsemen, he bore down upon the king himself, grasping his spear with both hands..."[/indent]
In the Royal Squadron?...Companions?; familiar to a Greek audience with a Greek source, no? Oblacus could very well have been an allied cavalry officer, as he broke through his attendant horsemen, meaning Italic cavalry (at least Ferentan) in the early 3rd century BCE wielded heavier spears than their Roman counterparts. This story per se probably falls in line with apocryphal tales of ancient historiography, but the information of weaponry rings true, IMHO.
I feel Plutarch can be sustained in this particular case regarding the Roman swordsmanship at Asculum (though he doesn't specify who was armed with the swords), so in conjunction with Dionysius, I propose that the hastati in the war against Pyrrhus were armed with the pilum (or at least a forerunner of it), being that the change to the looser manipular tactics - now well into its evolving stage - entailed missile power with close-combat; the hastati hurled their throwing spear and moved in wielding swords (a forerunner of the gladius); the second-line troops constituted the principes who now used the thrusting spear as their primary weapon, still in a phalanx-style method (this would mean, however, that they surely didn't yet use the scutum as their shield). In the decades following the First Punic War, the triarii alone used thrusting spears. The pila may have been in use by 250 BCE, if Polybius' etymology of the 'rapid shower of javelins and spears' is not retrojected (The Histories, Book 1.40.12; at the very least, we have another forerunner of a supreme Roman weapon which became standard). However, one of our reputable scholars on this, Dexter Hoyos, swings the other way: he feels that Dionysius may have been copying a Pyrrhic-era source which saw the principes 'armed in the old way', and uses the same description by Plutarch - that of the Romans fighting with their swords - as the 'new way', and that the latter probably refutes the former (Hoyos, along with Peter Connolly, opine that Livy's extant mid-4th century BCE manipular system need not be anachronistic; cf., A Companion to the Roman Army, p. 70; Connolly, Greece and Rome at War, pp. 126-128). Maybe, and Hoyos does concede the possibility (the lesser possibility, he feels) of the phalangial and manipular elements overlapping at this time. But there are just too many confusions and inconsistencies in this context with Livy, and it seems too explicit and concise with Dionysius, IMHO. Certainly food for thought, either way.
Invaluable sources for this topic include Elizabeth Rawson (The Literary Sources for the Pre-Marian Army (Papers of the British School at Rome, Vol. 39, November 1971); Stephen P. Oakley, A Commentary on Livy, Books VI-X, pp. 451-476; Michael M. Sage, The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook; Jonathan P. Roth, Roman Warfare; Adrian Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare and The Complete Roman Army; Paul Erdkamp (editor), A Companion to the Roman Army; Nic Fields' relevant books by Osprey are particularly illuminating, too, as are the few I mentioned earlier in the post.
Thanks, and it feels great to post here on RAT again!
James K MacKinnon
Fascinating question, Timothy, as a plausible overall answer drawn from our traditional sources reveal some substantial data, and reflect the manipular system at this time - during the war against Pyrrhus - one of vestigial transformation.
Firstly, as you've been addressed earlier in the thread, the swords wielded by the Roman soldier prior to the standardized gladius were surely ones akin to the extant Greek hoplites and their Italic brethren. The kopis, xiphos - or at least very similar Italic variants -, and larger antennae Villanovan style, etc., were all used as a secondary weapon, probably also symbolizing some form of social status. By 225 BCE, the nascent gladius was indeed the primary cut-and-thrust offensive weapon used by the Roman legionary (Polybius, The Histories, Book 2.30.9, and 2.33.6, respectively, in describing the Romans' superior swordsmanship over the Cisalpine Gauls).
Kudos to the erudition of the poster Steven James, but all these instances provided as state-supplied arms amid the regal period were instances when the tumultus was declared (viz., a military emergency in a time of crisis), hence the proletarii were armed at the state's expense under critical circumstances to aid in the defense of the Commonwealth (a reflection of the prodigious flexible adaptability of the Roman system to meet various challenges down the ages). Otherwise, indeed, the Roman armies of the earlier centuries before the onset of the 4th century BCE constituted a citizen militia in a timocratic society, in which all those drafted were to arm themselves at their own expense. As the Roman army expanded and spent longer periods of time in the field beyond a single campaign, the policy of stipendium was instituted (imputed to the siege of Veii in 406 BCE as the the catalyst of this substantial change) - pay for the army, which was originally weighed out before coinage was used to count it out. Moreover, the institution of tributum was contemporaneous with state issued army pay - indemnities levied upon defeated peoples. Both army pay and levied tribute are regularly linked, but mentioned often quite anachronistically by Livy (cf. Michael Crawford, Coinage and Money Under Roman the Roman Republic, pp. 22-24). Following the massive monetary gains for the Roman coffers following the plunder of Macedon (specifically, the mines there) as of 167 BCE, citizens became exempt from the tributum, being levied only rarely thereafter (Roman warfare increasingly fed of itself as the 'empire' evolved). It was not universal, however, until 123 BCE (amid the reforming policies of Gaius Gracchus), which saw the bill that called upon the state to pay for the arms and equipment of all legionaries (cf. Diodorus, Book 34/35.25.1; Asconius, Pro Cornelio, 68c).
For all the flexible changes commensurate to exigent conditions the Roman army undertook, a Roman century was never larger than 120 men, let alone that amount being a part of one, which - alluded here on the thread in assessing various sizes of tactical units - we do indeed read in the MSS. of Julius Caesar's Civil Wars, Book 3.91, within the backdrop of his famed victory at Pharsalus: '120 picked men of the same centuriae' - indicating that in this century 120 'picked men' would comprise a small percentage of it - is surely a scribal error when the MSS. was compiled, and in this case, Caesar actually embarked for Greece with quantitatively under-strength legions. Certainly, cohortis, not centuriae, was meant.
When the manipular system began to take its shape, a primary catalyst which triggered the change was probably when the Roman phalanx (Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions the Roman 'phalanx' - in his Greek terminology - forming up against the Latin League in c. 496 BCE, at the Battle of Lake Regillus; Roman Antiquities, Book 6.5.4-12.6, but the Loeb English translation simply interprets this as 'battle-line'), whatever its true alignment (probably not an exact duplicate of the traditional one of that used among the Greek states; social and geographical circumstances were not exact), was absolutely trampled into the ground by the more maneuverable Gauls in 390 BCE (despite its rhetorical glibness, the famous anecdotes in the Ineditum Vaticanum reflects an overall basis in fact: the wars against the hardy and hilly Samnites certainly were also events which necessitated reforms, perhaps much involving marching camps and communications, etc.); it seems to carry merit that the initial progressions of the manipular system had the hastati as the second-line troops wielding the hasta (the basic hoplite spear), and the principes ('most important', thus initially 'in the first line' when this was worked out at first) formed the first line; why would the hastati be singled out as 'spear-bearers'? Surely because the front-line principes - at the onset of the manipular system - wielded throwing spears as their primary weapon. The etymology in ascribing these terms, of course, is probably more often than not quite cognitive. As this martial system became viable along a slow, piecemeal and vestigial process (not mainly transformed amid wartime; after all, we read of nominal ad-hoc cohorts as early as 211 BCE in Spain, but they would not replace the maniples as Roman doctrine until probably not long before 109 BCE, when Sallust describes the war against Jugurtha, where we first read that the maniple seems defunct), the paramount Roman attribute of virtus could manifest - the manipular array could accommodate the pressure to display masculine courage, and the brave deeds of the younger velites and hastati could be showcased with the the more experienced soldiers behind them in support (see the fine breakdown of this theory in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Vol. I, pp. 509-513). Thus one possible reason for the switching, if it occurred, of the two front lines, albeit the etymology was retained. But no annalistic evidence supports this, and this is one of many cases where the often murky work by them was illustrated (in terms of facts), no less while wallowing their early history in a schematic manner for their patriotic readers (this is quite arbitrary on my part, by all means). But this is not meant to mean 'literary' always means 'fictional'; all the rhetoric and propaganda can still be used to pinpoint probable historicity. Our most accomplished modern experts on this topic have far from evaded tackling this, and their are as voluminous as they can be elucidating.
OK, to the war with Pyrrhus and the terrific question by Timothy.
For Livy the manipular system was in being by 340 BCE, but nothing can be more jaw-droppingly dichotomous than what he apprises and what Dionysius of Halicarnassus does, the other primary source for all this.
Roman influence began eroding Tarentine influence at this time (280s BCE), and a Roman garrison in Thurii set a dangerous precedent to the political climate with their military presence within Tarentum's sphere of influence (actually, here in 280 BCE is one example of crisis when the Romans recruited soldiers who had no property qualification at all, not unlike what they resorted to after the disaster at Cannae). The Tarentines were soon able to eject the Romans in Thurii within a few years, and Thurii was compelled back into the southern 'Italic League' of the time, but this was a part of a gradually rising escalation of tension between Rome and Tarentum, which culminated in war. Enter Pyrrhus...
At the Battle of Asculum in 279 BCE, Plutarch tells us that the Romans fought Pyrrhus' phalanx 'fiercely with their swords against the Macedonian spears, reckless of their lives and thinking only of wounding and slaying, while caring naught for what they suffered' (Life of Pyrrhus, Ch. 21.6). Four years later in the action at the battle of Beneventum, Dionysius of Halicarnassus tells us some explicit and tantalizing stuff, Roman Antiquities, Fragments (Book 20), no. 11 (stress on the fragments of his works),
[indent]"...It was bound the happen, as might have been expected, that hoplites burdened with helmets, breastplates and shields and advancing against hilly positions by long trails that were not even used by people but were mere goat-paths through woods and crags, would keep no order and, even before the enemy came in sight, would be weakened in body by thirst and fatigue.
Those who fight in close combat with cavalry spears grasped by the middle with both hands and who usually save the day in battles are called principes by the Romans..."[/indent]
Wow! That's very clear at face value - the principes (specified) still wielded spears - grasped by the middle by the bearer with both hands no less, and in stark contrast to all or many of the views of the Roman annalists (and their sources) on the early Republican army, whether Livy and Co. naively assumed that the late manipular system had existed since regal times, or those who realized on the basis of antiquarian evidence that at one time the phalanx had been in use, than the words above of Dionysius. The Greek writers dealing with this, obviously, took a keen interest in the war against Pyrrhus, and they probably were availed the works of Hieronymus of Cardia (sadly lost to us), as well as those of one Proxenus, the court historian of Pyrrhus; Dionysius is our primary Greek writer for this backdrop, and he was writing for a Greek audience, hence the wording of 'cavalry spears' wielded by the (now, presumably) second line of the Roman acies triplex of infantry; the Roman mounts of Dionysius' day wielded light spears (longche, for the sake of imputing relevant etymology) with one hand, and not all were, presumably, the same; but the potentially deadly contus (or kontos), was still far in the future. The description constituting the arms of the principes at Beneventum can probably be explained by the assumption that such a description would make sense to those familiar with the vaunted Macedonian xystophori (Alexander and his Companions, along with their Hellenistic successors, displayed a singular ability with the xyston). Moreover, what indicates Dionysius' care is his usage in the present tense of the verb 'they call', hence this was not his own addition, as the principes neither existed in his time.
Furthermore, in his previous book, Dionysius tells us that a Ferentan leader named Oblacus attacked Pyrrhus on his horse (this was during the the Battle of Heraclea, the first field clash in this conflict, in 280 BCE):
Roman Antiquities, Book 19.12.1-3,
[indent]"...The Ferentan Oblacus, having thus found the opportunity for which he was waiting, charged with his companions into the midst of the royal squadron; and breaking through the crowd of attendant horsemen, he bore down upon the king himself, grasping his spear with both hands..."[/indent]
In the Royal Squadron?...Companions?; familiar to a Greek audience with a Greek source, no? Oblacus could very well have been an allied cavalry officer, as he broke through his attendant horsemen, meaning Italic cavalry (at least Ferentan) in the early 3rd century BCE wielded heavier spears than their Roman counterparts. This story per se probably falls in line with apocryphal tales of ancient historiography, but the information of weaponry rings true, IMHO.
I feel Plutarch can be sustained in this particular case regarding the Roman swordsmanship at Asculum (though he doesn't specify who was armed with the swords), so in conjunction with Dionysius, I propose that the hastati in the war against Pyrrhus were armed with the pilum (or at least a forerunner of it), being that the change to the looser manipular tactics - now well into its evolving stage - entailed missile power with close-combat; the hastati hurled their throwing spear and moved in wielding swords (a forerunner of the gladius); the second-line troops constituted the principes who now used the thrusting spear as their primary weapon, still in a phalanx-style method (this would mean, however, that they surely didn't yet use the scutum as their shield). In the decades following the First Punic War, the triarii alone used thrusting spears. The pila may have been in use by 250 BCE, if Polybius' etymology of the 'rapid shower of javelins and spears' is not retrojected (The Histories, Book 1.40.12; at the very least, we have another forerunner of a supreme Roman weapon which became standard). However, one of our reputable scholars on this, Dexter Hoyos, swings the other way: he feels that Dionysius may have been copying a Pyrrhic-era source which saw the principes 'armed in the old way', and uses the same description by Plutarch - that of the Romans fighting with their swords - as the 'new way', and that the latter probably refutes the former (Hoyos, along with Peter Connolly, opine that Livy's extant mid-4th century BCE manipular system need not be anachronistic; cf., A Companion to the Roman Army, p. 70; Connolly, Greece and Rome at War, pp. 126-128). Maybe, and Hoyos does concede the possibility (the lesser possibility, he feels) of the phalangial and manipular elements overlapping at this time. But there are just too many confusions and inconsistencies in this context with Livy, and it seems too explicit and concise with Dionysius, IMHO. Certainly food for thought, either way.
Invaluable sources for this topic include Elizabeth Rawson (The Literary Sources for the Pre-Marian Army (Papers of the British School at Rome, Vol. 39, November 1971); Stephen P. Oakley, A Commentary on Livy, Books VI-X, pp. 451-476; Michael M. Sage, The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook; Jonathan P. Roth, Roman Warfare; Adrian Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare and The Complete Roman Army; Paul Erdkamp (editor), A Companion to the Roman Army; Nic Fields' relevant books by Osprey are particularly illuminating, too, as are the few I mentioned earlier in the post.
Thanks, and it feels great to post here on RAT again!
James K MacKinnon
"A ship in harbor is safe - but that is not what ships are built for."
James K MacKinnon
James K MacKinnon
