08-14-2006, 04:42 AM
As most of you know, the eastern Roman army of Valens was destroyed by the Goths in Thrace, a little west of modern Istanbul, in 378 A.D. This battle has been described by modernists as a revolutionary battle which saw the advent of the cavalry-cycle - heavy cavalry becoming the chief arm on European battlefields until the English longbow set new trends in the mid 14th century.
Are they right, most notably Charles Oman? Was this battle different, in terms of the set-piece dispositions and equipment used by both sides? Could it have been a debacle for the Romans due to faulty intelligence and tactical failures?
Please forgive me if this is too long; I simply have trouble being succinct :roll:
This is how I basically see it. Some accounts claim the Goths as having stirrups - that these horsemen were different, being 'glued to their hoses'. I think its unlikely there were stirrups used at Adrianople by the Goths, Alans and their other mounted briganded friends (perhaps a loop of some sort rather than the metal rings?); there is just no concrete evidence to support their use. These horsemen, like all horsemen growing up riding and fighting on horseback, could ride adeptly without stirrups. Stirrups would be a necessity for the mounted archers who maneuvered while implementing firepower upon thier enemies, most notably the Mongols, to achieve what they excelled at, but the saddles these horsemen had were probably efficient enough for stability. Despite the wonder as to why the stirrup wasn't in Europe earlier, being it was in the eastern lands perhaps 1/2 millennia earlier than when it was used prevalently in Europe, there is simply no evidence to support their use. I don't see how it could have 'gotten by anybody' until the 7th century, when in fact it did arrive. One major asset the stirrup rendered was for men not bred to riding horses to effectivley clash while mounted, and reduce fatigue throughout long marches.
Another element which improved the capabilities of cavalry was the horse-shoe. Rough terrain could be manipulated on shod horses without long periods of time afterwards for the animals to heal in soft pastures. Anyone know when this came along?
I think the battle of Adrianople was significant because it irrevocably changed the conditions on which barbarians and Romans would deal with each other in the future, and Rome might have been sacked sooner if not for the diplomatic astuteness of Theodosius I; the trained army lost that terrible day at Adrianople could not be replaced, at least any time soon. His offer to the vagabonding Goths in the Balkan regions of allied status (foederati) with Rome, while retaining their own sovereignty, proved very efficacious until his death in 395 A.D. There was something more appealing for many barbarian chieftains about leading their warriors to fight along the ranks of the Roman military system than merely leading their own federated mobs (somewhat) into battle against Romans. They were probably thinking along the lines of stature, such as gaining war ministries in the empire. Moreover, Theodosius paid them higher than the Roman troops (reputedly), and showed them greater consideration. Trained units were also transferred from Egypt to replenish Thedosius' ranks.
The result of the battle of Adrianople also seemed to signify the reality to the Eastern Empire's military that efficient cavalry must be adopted more fully, but not necessarily changed, in terms of structure. Part of Theodosius' foederati was perhaps 40,000 conscripted Gothic warriors, many being cavalry. This must have been instrumental in the vanquishing of Theodosius' rivals, Magnus Maximus and Eugenius by 394 A.D. Actually, I believe Alaric, who would sack Rome in 410 A.D., was part of the campaign that crushed Eugenius.
Now, I would like to pose three major questions. I will refrain from addressing anything in depthly on the first two right now until, or if, the thread gets going.
Was the battle of Adrianople the advent of the cavalry cycle - the so-called tactical revolution in the relation between cavalry and infantry which would influence the period when heavy cavalry, typified by the Medieval knight, dominated the battlefields of Europe for another 1,000+ years?
Was the battle simply a battle lost catastrophically by the emperor Valens because of his tactical and intelligence failures, combined with a swift tactical surprise from the Gothic horsemen? But remember, it wasn't an ambush akin to what Hannibal achieved at Trasimene, Scipio's 'Burning of the Camps' (night ambush), or the Teutoburger Wald. The clash at Adrianople was fought on an open plain.
Did the Gothic cavalry contemporaneously send the Roman horsemen into flight and aid their infantry in the destruction of their enemy? Or was it really a battle won by Gothic infantry over Roman infantry, who were already thrown into disorder (terribly tight-packing of their ranks) by the initial salvo of Gothic cavalry, who all left the field chasing Roman cavalry, thus being merely a preliminary supplement?
Some reputable modern sources state unequivically 'no' to the cavalry-cycle issue. I am inclined to agree; this battle led to a Roman catastrophe due to faulty intelligence and tactical surprise from the Gothic cavalry. It doesn't seem the arms and tactics employed from both sides were anything novel.
Our primary source for this event was Ammianus Marcellinus, whose work is available thanks to the Loeb Classical Library.
I think, basically, both armies numbered between 20-30,000 men, with Valens having an edge in quality and quantity (slight edge in numbers). But Valens thought he was approaching an enemy force, primarily Fritigern's footmen housed in their wagonlaager (wagon-fort), composed of slightly more than 1/2 of what it actually was. Fritigern had sent for his allied horsemen, out foraging 'far away', and was 'begging' a truce with Valens, sending out envoys of 'low origin' initially, whom Valens refused to see. Valens wanted to be sent a suitable chieftain to execute a lasting treaty. Fritigern then sent a 'common' soldier as a herald, requesting that picked men of noble rank among the Romans be sent to him as hostages, and he would tolerate the anger felt by his warriors because of his virtual overture of peace. But, in actuality, he was purposely delaying, hoping that amid the pretended truce his cavalry might return. Valens approved, but may have been also buying time to deploy efficiently (Marcellinus doesn't say this on the part of Valens). This makes sense, as the wagonlaager was, presumably, well situated and difficult to assault, and Valen's men were weary and the day was extremely hot.
Fritigern also set the surrounding land afire, thus exposing further with time the Romans to such horrid conditions in the 'fiery summer', exhausting them by heat and thirst. Valens had already imposed a forced march on his men to get here. Hunger began to set in for the Romans, too.
Marcellinus tell us of Valens' emissary, one Richomeres,
"...As he was on his way to the enemy's rampart, the archers and targeteers, then under the command of one Bacurius of Hiberia and Cassio, had rushed forward too eagerly in hot attack, and were already engaged with their adversaries; and as their charge had been untimely, so their retreat was cowardly; and thus they gave an unfavorable omen to the beginning of the battle..."
This untimely action, perhaps one of insubordination, is believed to have been instigated by the right (we don't know for sure) Roman cavalry. Then, like a 'thunderbolt does near high mountains', the cavalry under Alatheus and Saphrax arrived, and threw themselves into the 'confusion'.
This is the Marcellinus' overview of the entire battle, Book 31.13 (Loeb Classic Library),
"All the Goths united, namely, the Theruingi under the command of King Fritigern, and the Greuthungi led by Alatheus and Saphrax, and engaged with the Romans in the open, routed their cavalry, and put to flight the infantry, thus left unprotected and crowded together, with enormous losses; Valens was killed, but his body could not be found."
Just a pedantic observation - 'All the Goths united', with no specific mention of all of the Gothic cavalry leaving the field. Thus, in my opinion, the revised theory that this was a battle of technically infantry over infantry is not incontrovertible. But Marcellinus' account does carry some holes.
Right from the beginning, Marcellinus states,
"On every side armor and weapons clashed..."
A few sentences later,
"...the lines dashed together like beaked ships, pushing each other back and forth in turn..." (could infantry alone, of no more quantity, cause this?)
He then tells us that the left cavalry wing of the Romans, deserted by some of their comrades, was hard pressed by the enemy's numbers, crushed, and overwhelmed, the infantry now unsupported. Again, he does not say the Gothic cavalry left the field. But he doesn't say the stayed either. Gosh, I wish he had specified!
He continues,
"...Because of the clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen, and echoed with frightful cries. Hence the arrows whirling death from every side always found their mark with fatal effect...But when the barbarians, pouring forth in huge hordes, trampled down horse and man...no room for retreat..."
Now, I hope the 'picking and choosing' doesn't signify a taking out of context, but think it is plausible, though the word 'cavalry' doesn't come up from Marcellinus after the initial charge of the Gothic horsemen, that phrases such as, "On every side", and, "Because of the clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen", and, "arrows whirling death from every side", and, "barbarians, pouring forth (not 'out', as out of their wagon-fort), in huge hordes, trampling down horse and man", and, finally, "no room for retreat", can not mean only the Gothic infantry itself surrounded the Romans, which has been a major belief of the current appraisals of the battle (Thomas Burns and Stephen Williams, to name a couple). These beliefs have been accepted, and are very credible (I have skimed Williams' excellent Theodosius: The Empire at Bay) on many issues. This is definitley not a black & white issue. Much of the Gothic cavalry vanquished the Roman horsemen with great celerity mainly because of the element of surprise, but some quite possibly swung inwards to aid in the envelopment of the Roman infantry, already thrown into disarray. Men alone do not "trample down horse and man" (do they?).
Perhaps I am being too academic, and ancient accounts can suffer from 'static' with the translations down the timelines. One of the eminent and panoramic works of Roman history, especially of this period, says this of the battle of Adrianople,
"On the 9th of August 378 A.D., a day which has deserved to be marked among the most inauspicious of the Roman Calender, the emperor Valens, leaving under a strong guard his baggage and military treasure, marched from Hadrianople to attack the Goths, who were encamped about 12 miles from the city....The event of the battle of Hadrianople, so fatal to Valens and to the empire, may be described in a few words: the Roman cavalry fled; the infantry was abandoned, surrounded, and cut to pieces. The most skillful evolutions, the finest courage, are scarcely sufficient to extricate a body of foot encompassed on an open plain by superior numbers of horse..."
- Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. III, Ch. XXVI.
Gibbon always drew his work from the fountainhead, as he put it, though certain sources he used have been edited in superior texts (supposedly). Archaeology has become a science since his day. He wrote his masterpiece throughout the 1770s-1780s , but drew from the same sources our contemporaries do. Actually, he is constantly used for a source. Another is Theodor Mommsen, whose famed work I don't have with me.
Thanks, James K MacKinnon
EDIT: real name on signature (sorry)
Are they right, most notably Charles Oman? Was this battle different, in terms of the set-piece dispositions and equipment used by both sides? Could it have been a debacle for the Romans due to faulty intelligence and tactical failures?
Please forgive me if this is too long; I simply have trouble being succinct :roll:
This is how I basically see it. Some accounts claim the Goths as having stirrups - that these horsemen were different, being 'glued to their hoses'. I think its unlikely there were stirrups used at Adrianople by the Goths, Alans and their other mounted briganded friends (perhaps a loop of some sort rather than the metal rings?); there is just no concrete evidence to support their use. These horsemen, like all horsemen growing up riding and fighting on horseback, could ride adeptly without stirrups. Stirrups would be a necessity for the mounted archers who maneuvered while implementing firepower upon thier enemies, most notably the Mongols, to achieve what they excelled at, but the saddles these horsemen had were probably efficient enough for stability. Despite the wonder as to why the stirrup wasn't in Europe earlier, being it was in the eastern lands perhaps 1/2 millennia earlier than when it was used prevalently in Europe, there is simply no evidence to support their use. I don't see how it could have 'gotten by anybody' until the 7th century, when in fact it did arrive. One major asset the stirrup rendered was for men not bred to riding horses to effectivley clash while mounted, and reduce fatigue throughout long marches.
Another element which improved the capabilities of cavalry was the horse-shoe. Rough terrain could be manipulated on shod horses without long periods of time afterwards for the animals to heal in soft pastures. Anyone know when this came along?
I think the battle of Adrianople was significant because it irrevocably changed the conditions on which barbarians and Romans would deal with each other in the future, and Rome might have been sacked sooner if not for the diplomatic astuteness of Theodosius I; the trained army lost that terrible day at Adrianople could not be replaced, at least any time soon. His offer to the vagabonding Goths in the Balkan regions of allied status (foederati) with Rome, while retaining their own sovereignty, proved very efficacious until his death in 395 A.D. There was something more appealing for many barbarian chieftains about leading their warriors to fight along the ranks of the Roman military system than merely leading their own federated mobs (somewhat) into battle against Romans. They were probably thinking along the lines of stature, such as gaining war ministries in the empire. Moreover, Theodosius paid them higher than the Roman troops (reputedly), and showed them greater consideration. Trained units were also transferred from Egypt to replenish Thedosius' ranks.
The result of the battle of Adrianople also seemed to signify the reality to the Eastern Empire's military that efficient cavalry must be adopted more fully, but not necessarily changed, in terms of structure. Part of Theodosius' foederati was perhaps 40,000 conscripted Gothic warriors, many being cavalry. This must have been instrumental in the vanquishing of Theodosius' rivals, Magnus Maximus and Eugenius by 394 A.D. Actually, I believe Alaric, who would sack Rome in 410 A.D., was part of the campaign that crushed Eugenius.
Now, I would like to pose three major questions. I will refrain from addressing anything in depthly on the first two right now until, or if, the thread gets going.
Was the battle of Adrianople the advent of the cavalry cycle - the so-called tactical revolution in the relation between cavalry and infantry which would influence the period when heavy cavalry, typified by the Medieval knight, dominated the battlefields of Europe for another 1,000+ years?
Was the battle simply a battle lost catastrophically by the emperor Valens because of his tactical and intelligence failures, combined with a swift tactical surprise from the Gothic horsemen? But remember, it wasn't an ambush akin to what Hannibal achieved at Trasimene, Scipio's 'Burning of the Camps' (night ambush), or the Teutoburger Wald. The clash at Adrianople was fought on an open plain.
Did the Gothic cavalry contemporaneously send the Roman horsemen into flight and aid their infantry in the destruction of their enemy? Or was it really a battle won by Gothic infantry over Roman infantry, who were already thrown into disorder (terribly tight-packing of their ranks) by the initial salvo of Gothic cavalry, who all left the field chasing Roman cavalry, thus being merely a preliminary supplement?
Some reputable modern sources state unequivically 'no' to the cavalry-cycle issue. I am inclined to agree; this battle led to a Roman catastrophe due to faulty intelligence and tactical surprise from the Gothic cavalry. It doesn't seem the arms and tactics employed from both sides were anything novel.
Our primary source for this event was Ammianus Marcellinus, whose work is available thanks to the Loeb Classical Library.
I think, basically, both armies numbered between 20-30,000 men, with Valens having an edge in quality and quantity (slight edge in numbers). But Valens thought he was approaching an enemy force, primarily Fritigern's footmen housed in their wagonlaager (wagon-fort), composed of slightly more than 1/2 of what it actually was. Fritigern had sent for his allied horsemen, out foraging 'far away', and was 'begging' a truce with Valens, sending out envoys of 'low origin' initially, whom Valens refused to see. Valens wanted to be sent a suitable chieftain to execute a lasting treaty. Fritigern then sent a 'common' soldier as a herald, requesting that picked men of noble rank among the Romans be sent to him as hostages, and he would tolerate the anger felt by his warriors because of his virtual overture of peace. But, in actuality, he was purposely delaying, hoping that amid the pretended truce his cavalry might return. Valens approved, but may have been also buying time to deploy efficiently (Marcellinus doesn't say this on the part of Valens). This makes sense, as the wagonlaager was, presumably, well situated and difficult to assault, and Valen's men were weary and the day was extremely hot.
Fritigern also set the surrounding land afire, thus exposing further with time the Romans to such horrid conditions in the 'fiery summer', exhausting them by heat and thirst. Valens had already imposed a forced march on his men to get here. Hunger began to set in for the Romans, too.
Marcellinus tell us of Valens' emissary, one Richomeres,
"...As he was on his way to the enemy's rampart, the archers and targeteers, then under the command of one Bacurius of Hiberia and Cassio, had rushed forward too eagerly in hot attack, and were already engaged with their adversaries; and as their charge had been untimely, so their retreat was cowardly; and thus they gave an unfavorable omen to the beginning of the battle..."
This untimely action, perhaps one of insubordination, is believed to have been instigated by the right (we don't know for sure) Roman cavalry. Then, like a 'thunderbolt does near high mountains', the cavalry under Alatheus and Saphrax arrived, and threw themselves into the 'confusion'.
This is the Marcellinus' overview of the entire battle, Book 31.13 (Loeb Classic Library),
"All the Goths united, namely, the Theruingi under the command of King Fritigern, and the Greuthungi led by Alatheus and Saphrax, and engaged with the Romans in the open, routed their cavalry, and put to flight the infantry, thus left unprotected and crowded together, with enormous losses; Valens was killed, but his body could not be found."
Just a pedantic observation - 'All the Goths united', with no specific mention of all of the Gothic cavalry leaving the field. Thus, in my opinion, the revised theory that this was a battle of technically infantry over infantry is not incontrovertible. But Marcellinus' account does carry some holes.
Right from the beginning, Marcellinus states,
"On every side armor and weapons clashed..."
A few sentences later,
"...the lines dashed together like beaked ships, pushing each other back and forth in turn..." (could infantry alone, of no more quantity, cause this?)
He then tells us that the left cavalry wing of the Romans, deserted by some of their comrades, was hard pressed by the enemy's numbers, crushed, and overwhelmed, the infantry now unsupported. Again, he does not say the Gothic cavalry left the field. But he doesn't say the stayed either. Gosh, I wish he had specified!
He continues,
"...Because of the clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen, and echoed with frightful cries. Hence the arrows whirling death from every side always found their mark with fatal effect...But when the barbarians, pouring forth in huge hordes, trampled down horse and man...no room for retreat..."
Now, I hope the 'picking and choosing' doesn't signify a taking out of context, but think it is plausible, though the word 'cavalry' doesn't come up from Marcellinus after the initial charge of the Gothic horsemen, that phrases such as, "On every side", and, "Because of the clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen", and, "arrows whirling death from every side", and, "barbarians, pouring forth (not 'out', as out of their wagon-fort), in huge hordes, trampling down horse and man", and, finally, "no room for retreat", can not mean only the Gothic infantry itself surrounded the Romans, which has been a major belief of the current appraisals of the battle (Thomas Burns and Stephen Williams, to name a couple). These beliefs have been accepted, and are very credible (I have skimed Williams' excellent Theodosius: The Empire at Bay) on many issues. This is definitley not a black & white issue. Much of the Gothic cavalry vanquished the Roman horsemen with great celerity mainly because of the element of surprise, but some quite possibly swung inwards to aid in the envelopment of the Roman infantry, already thrown into disarray. Men alone do not "trample down horse and man" (do they?).
Perhaps I am being too academic, and ancient accounts can suffer from 'static' with the translations down the timelines. One of the eminent and panoramic works of Roman history, especially of this period, says this of the battle of Adrianople,
"On the 9th of August 378 A.D., a day which has deserved to be marked among the most inauspicious of the Roman Calender, the emperor Valens, leaving under a strong guard his baggage and military treasure, marched from Hadrianople to attack the Goths, who were encamped about 12 miles from the city....The event of the battle of Hadrianople, so fatal to Valens and to the empire, may be described in a few words: the Roman cavalry fled; the infantry was abandoned, surrounded, and cut to pieces. The most skillful evolutions, the finest courage, are scarcely sufficient to extricate a body of foot encompassed on an open plain by superior numbers of horse..."
- Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. III, Ch. XXVI.
Gibbon always drew his work from the fountainhead, as he put it, though certain sources he used have been edited in superior texts (supposedly). Archaeology has become a science since his day. He wrote his masterpiece throughout the 1770s-1780s , but drew from the same sources our contemporaries do. Actually, he is constantly used for a source. Another is Theodor Mommsen, whose famed work I don't have with me.
Thanks, James K MacKinnon
EDIT: real name on signature (sorry)
"A ship in harbor is safe - but that is not what ships are built for."
James K MacKinnon
James K MacKinnon
