08-08-2006, 11:14 AM
Well have had a bit of a rest, I would like to return to the fray and hopefully we can discuss the issues without talking about Frances Pryor.
I may be appearing to go off at a bit of a tangent for a bit but stay with me - it could be worthwhile. I would like to make a couple of points.
There are many known, mass, bog sacrifices around Denmark, perhaps the most prolific and certainly the best excavated are those at Illerup. The sacrifices of soldiers’ equipment begins at around 200 A.D. and continues for about three hundred years. It seems that the victors sacrificed the armour, weapons, trappings and tools that belonged to the dead of the army that they had vanquished. Whether the battles had been fought locally or abroad and the captured wargear brought home for a Roman (style triumphal parade before sacrifice in a holy lake is not absolutely clear. The sheer quantity of the bog finds and their timescale demonstrate that warfare was a frequent and bloody occurrence. They represent at least fifty major battles. These finds are illustrative of the power struggles between the people inhabiting what is now Denmark and those from the southern and western Scandinavian peninsula. Later, as Angles, Jutes, Saxons and even later as Vikings these peoples would turn their attention to the British Isles and the continent. It is the earliest site of Illerup, Illerup A that has been the most thoroughly investigated and which will provide clear evidence of the possible size of an army at a chieftain’s disposal.
According to Albrethsen’s* analysis, armies of the time could have considerable numbers. The finds from Illerup A comprise the equipment of about five very well equipped warriors who he sees as senior officers. There are about 40 sets of finds that would service soldiers of a middle rank, and about three hundred for ordinary warriors. This is not the complete force represented in the bog, to get a better idea of the true numbers involved it must be remembered that so far only 40% of Illerup A has been excavated. If the remaining 60% was examined then the numbers are likely to grow to about 12 senior officers, 100 from the middle ranks and about 750 soldiers. If an army loses 30% of its forces then that is usually a disastrous defeat, however, Albrethsen suggests losses of 50% which would scale up the figures to 24 senior officers, 200 middle ranking officers and 1,500 ordinary soldiers. If the figure of 30% is used then the army would be even bigger. At around 1,500 men the army is roughly comparable to a Roman auxiliary unit. These figures are supported by Hansen** who actually gives slightly higher numbers of ordinary soldiers (1,750).
Now when you take into account the fact that boat houses in Norway (during the same period) particularly in the south, are in clusters of up to 250 boathouses, each capable of housing a boat of at least 20 metres (Nydam type - 30 men each) and sometimes up to 40 metres, you begin to see that the military potential in Southern Scandinavia/ Northern Germany was huge and it was well organised around central chieftains king, whatever. *** Boathouses of similar types may well also have existed in Denmark and Germany but have not yet been searched for and may have been of a different type.
The point of all this is to demonstrate that fairly large bodies of men, organised and well motivated were perfectly able to move across the sea to the British Isles, either to raid (Saxon Shore forts) or to invade if they felt like it.
A second point is; if there was an invasion and a displacement of a largely agricultural people what traces would be visible in the archaeological record?
Paul
*Svend Albrethsen: Logistical Problems in Iron Age Warfare, in Military Aspects of Scandinavian Society (MASS) Copenhagen 1997.
**Ulla Hansen: The Nature of Centres, in Military Aspects of the Aristocracy in Barbaricum in the Roman and Early Migration Periods (MAB). Copenhagen 2001.
***Oliver Grimm: Norwegian Boathouses from the Late Roman and Migration Periods. An analysis of their militaryt functions. (MAB).
Oliver Grimm: THe Military Context of Norwegian Boathouses, in Maritime Warfare in Northern Europe. Copenhagen 2002.
Bjorn Myhre: Boathouses and Naval Organisation. (MASS).
I may be appearing to go off at a bit of a tangent for a bit but stay with me - it could be worthwhile. I would like to make a couple of points.
There are many known, mass, bog sacrifices around Denmark, perhaps the most prolific and certainly the best excavated are those at Illerup. The sacrifices of soldiers’ equipment begins at around 200 A.D. and continues for about three hundred years. It seems that the victors sacrificed the armour, weapons, trappings and tools that belonged to the dead of the army that they had vanquished. Whether the battles had been fought locally or abroad and the captured wargear brought home for a Roman (style triumphal parade before sacrifice in a holy lake is not absolutely clear. The sheer quantity of the bog finds and their timescale demonstrate that warfare was a frequent and bloody occurrence. They represent at least fifty major battles. These finds are illustrative of the power struggles between the people inhabiting what is now Denmark and those from the southern and western Scandinavian peninsula. Later, as Angles, Jutes, Saxons and even later as Vikings these peoples would turn their attention to the British Isles and the continent. It is the earliest site of Illerup, Illerup A that has been the most thoroughly investigated and which will provide clear evidence of the possible size of an army at a chieftain’s disposal.
According to Albrethsen’s* analysis, armies of the time could have considerable numbers. The finds from Illerup A comprise the equipment of about five very well equipped warriors who he sees as senior officers. There are about 40 sets of finds that would service soldiers of a middle rank, and about three hundred for ordinary warriors. This is not the complete force represented in the bog, to get a better idea of the true numbers involved it must be remembered that so far only 40% of Illerup A has been excavated. If the remaining 60% was examined then the numbers are likely to grow to about 12 senior officers, 100 from the middle ranks and about 750 soldiers. If an army loses 30% of its forces then that is usually a disastrous defeat, however, Albrethsen suggests losses of 50% which would scale up the figures to 24 senior officers, 200 middle ranking officers and 1,500 ordinary soldiers. If the figure of 30% is used then the army would be even bigger. At around 1,500 men the army is roughly comparable to a Roman auxiliary unit. These figures are supported by Hansen** who actually gives slightly higher numbers of ordinary soldiers (1,750).
Now when you take into account the fact that boat houses in Norway (during the same period) particularly in the south, are in clusters of up to 250 boathouses, each capable of housing a boat of at least 20 metres (Nydam type - 30 men each) and sometimes up to 40 metres, you begin to see that the military potential in Southern Scandinavia/ Northern Germany was huge and it was well organised around central chieftains king, whatever. *** Boathouses of similar types may well also have existed in Denmark and Germany but have not yet been searched for and may have been of a different type.
The point of all this is to demonstrate that fairly large bodies of men, organised and well motivated were perfectly able to move across the sea to the British Isles, either to raid (Saxon Shore forts) or to invade if they felt like it.
A second point is; if there was an invasion and a displacement of a largely agricultural people what traces would be visible in the archaeological record?
Paul
*Svend Albrethsen: Logistical Problems in Iron Age Warfare, in Military Aspects of Scandinavian Society (MASS) Copenhagen 1997.
**Ulla Hansen: The Nature of Centres, in Military Aspects of the Aristocracy in Barbaricum in the Roman and Early Migration Periods (MAB). Copenhagen 2001.
***Oliver Grimm: Norwegian Boathouses from the Late Roman and Migration Periods. An analysis of their militaryt functions. (MAB).
Oliver Grimm: THe Military Context of Norwegian Boathouses, in Maritime Warfare in Northern Europe. Copenhagen 2002.
Bjorn Myhre: Boathouses and Naval Organisation. (MASS).
Paul Mortimer
